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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Armeniasince 2000still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Water management contracts and leases, and the national lease from 2017

Armenia ran a sequence of water public-private partnerships from 2000, a Yerevan management contract, a 2006 to 2016 Yerevan lease and management contracts for the national and three regional utilities, which raised daily supply from about 6 hours in 1998 to 24 hours in most of Yerevan by 2015, and from January 2017 consolidated them into a single 15-year national lease covering about 2.2 million people.

2,200,000 people (about two-thirds of the population), people in the area covered by the 15-year national water lease from january 2017, 2017. 6 hours per day (24 in most of Yerevan by 2015), average daily water supply in most parts of the country, including yerevan, before the ppps, 1998. World Bank and PPIAF, Review of Armenia's Experience with Water Public-Private Partnerships (Marin, Muzenda and Andreasyan), 2017, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government contracted private operators in stages, first to manage the Yerevan utility for a fee with performance incentives, then to lease it, then to manage the national and regional utilities, and finally to lease all of them as one national concession paying a lease fee to the state, while the state kept financing capital works.

Preconditions

  • Donor and state finance for network rehabilitation, which the operators did not provide
  • Government willingness to raise tariffs in steps matched to visible service gains
  • Successive contracts long enough to build a local record that justified the next, larger one

Limits: All figures are in the executive summary of a PDF (printed pages ix to xi). The review was written by World Bank staff with support from PPIAF, a facility that promotes infrastructure PPPs, and credits the operators generously, and the 24-hour figure is 'most of Yerevan', not the country. The same review says non-revenue water barely improved, that tariffs outside Yerevan stayed below cost recovery when the management contracts ended in 2016, and that capital investment was financed by the government, so the private operators ran networks without financing them. The record's newest verified fact is the start of the national lease in January 2017; we did not find an official account of its performance since then at an open URL, so 'operating' rests on its 15-year term, and any later dispute, renegotiation or early termination is not covered. The national lease introduced a single national tariff, a cross-subsidy from Yerevan to the rest of the country, whose effect on supply hours outside Yerevan is not shown here.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Armeniasince 1994delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Earthquake Reconstruction Project in the Spitak earthquake zone

Armenia's Ministry of Economy, through a project implementation unit, restarted reconstruction in the zone of the December 1988 Spitak earthquake that had stopped when Soviet work crews withdrew in 1991, and by April 1997 had provided 2,857 housing units against 2,069 planned, completed 10 factories against 7 and laid 41 km of water pipes against about 27 km, under an IDA credit closed in June 1997.

2,857 housing units, housing units provided (completed unfinished apartments and repaired or strengthened units), 1997-04. 2,069 housing units, housing units planned at appraisal, 1993. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Armenia Earthquake Reconstruction Project (Credit 2562-AM), Report No. 17255, December 1997, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A small, politically insulated implementation unit under the economy ministry took over half-finished Soviet reconstruction sites and completed them through competitive local contracts, choosing nearly finished buildings to maximise habitable units per dollar.

Preconditions

  • Sunk investment in partly built blocks that could be finished cheaply
  • Competitive local contractors willing to bid in dollar-equivalent contracts
  • An external credit when the state budget could not fund reconstruction

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report on a credit of about US$28 million. The unit counts are in Table 5 (Key Indicators for Project Implementation, printed page 17), which is OCR text with errors (the bathhouse row repeats the housing figure). The earthquake left about 530,000 people homeless (Part I, para. 1), so 2,857 units is a small fraction of the need, delivered five to eight years after the shock; the record shows recovery capacity in a newly independent state restarting a stalled Soviet programme, not a timely national recovery. The ICR says beneficiaries were slow to move out of temporary 'domiks', and that many families were still in temporary shelter in 1997. Units count apartments of different kinds (completion of unfinished blocks, repair and strengthening) and the project's single-family starter houses were scaled back. The ICR rates implementation satisfactory and credits an independent implementation unit, not a ministry line department.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Armeniasince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

North-South Road Corridor Investment Program, Tranche 1

Armenia's Ministry of Transport, Communication and Information Technologies reconstructed about 30 km of the M1 Yerevan to Ashtarak and M2 Yerevan to Artashat roads under the first tranche of the ADB-financed North-South Road Corridor programme for an implementation cost of US$68.70 million against US$68.0 million at appraisal, but completed the project on 16 June 2016 against a planned 31 December 2013, after one round of bids was rejected and the M1 section was cut from 18.4 km to about 10 km.

68.7 million US dollars, total implementation cost, actual, 2018-02-23. 68 million US dollars, total implementation cost at appraisal, 2009-09. Asian Development Bank, Completion Report, Armenia North-South Road Corridor Investment Program (Tranche 1), Project 42145-023, Loan 2561, January 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry used a multitranche ADB facility to rebuild the national north-south corridor section by section, adjusting each tranche's scope to land acquisition and fiscal limits instead of extending its budget.

Preconditions

  • A multitranche facility that lets scope move between tranches
  • A project management unit that also prepares designs and tenders for later tranches
  • Government readiness to finance gaps when bids come in above estimate

Limits: ADB, the lender, wrote the report. The completion dates and costs are in the basic data table at the front of the PDF (pages 2 to 4); the scope changes are paras. 8 to 16. The 30-month slip from December 2013 to June 2016 is my subtraction from the two dates; the loan closed on 23 February 2018 against 30 June 2014 in the loan agreement. Cost held near appraisal only because the scope moved: the M1 section was cut to about 10 km because of land acquisition, 2 km was transferred to tranche 2 when Armenia hit fiscal limits, and 19.6 km of the M2 was added, so the outturn buys different roads; the combined tranche 1 and 2 works contract was US$10 million above the engineer's estimate and the government undertook to fund overruns (para. 14 and footnote 13). This is the first and smallest tranche of a programme to rebuild a 550 km corridor; later tranches, including the Talin to Gyumri works, were not read, and the programme's overall delivery is not evidenced here.