Shared Purpose
To what extent can people imagine themselves as participants in a common project?
The country comparison, the indicators and the documented cases below show how much of this capability the current data can capture.
125 countries in the frame7 indicators in the registry3 indicators with data118 countries with a score
Compare every country on one scale
The table starts in alphabetical order. Sort by score, confidence, coverage, or trend. A score needs two observed indicators; a trend uses indicators observed at both ends.
Scores use one 0 to 100 scale for all countries. Each flag is a country, and the ring around it shows how strong the evidence behind that score is. Point at a flag to read the country, click it to open the profile.
- Solid ring: usable or good evidence
- Broken ring: thin evidence, opening further as confidence falls
- The shaded band is the middle half of the field and the line inside it is the median.
- Indonesia: 84.3
- Netherlands: 82.7
- New Zealand: 82.0
- Belgium: 77.8
- Ukraine: 76.7
- Slovakia: 76.6
- Armenia: 76.1
- United Kingdom: 75.6
- Denmark: 75.0
- Sweden: 73.3
- Czechia: 73.2
- Iran: 72.8
- Moldova: 71.5
- Slovenia: 71.2
- Australia: 70.8
- Serbia: 70.7
- Lesotho: 70.1
- Norway: 69.6
- Ireland: 67.5
- Finland: 65.6
- Kenya: 65.6
- Nigeria: 65.6
- Thailand: 65.4
- Romania: 63.9
- India: 63.2
- Cyprus: 62.0
- Israel: 62.0
- Pakistan: 61.7
- Morocco: 60.6
- Jamaica: 60.3
- Nepal: 60.3
- Myanmar: 60.2
- Mauritius: 60.2
- Mongolia: 58.7
- Canada: 58.0
- Austria: 57.7
- El Salvador: 57.7
- Burkina Faso: 56.7
- Uruguay: 56.3
- Kyrgyzstan: 56.2
- Malaysia: 55.7
- Croatia: 55.5
- North Macedonia: 55.2
- United States: 54.3
- Greece: 53.1
- France: 52.9
- Philippines: 52.4
- Hungary: 51.8
- Russia: 51.7
- Cรดte d'Ivoire: 51.5
- Italy: 51.5
- Laos: 51.0
- Germany: 50.7
- Malawi: 50.7
- Tunisia: 50.5
- Iraq: 50.1
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 49.5
- Mali: 49.4
- Poland: 49.3
- Tajikistan: 49.2
- Guatemala: 49.0
- Estonia: 48.8
- Dominican Republic: 48.7
- Nicaragua: 48.1
- Georgia: 48.0
- Burundi: 47.9
- Namibia: 47.8
- Switzerland: 47.4
- Guinea-Bissau: 47.4
- Uzbekistan: 47.3
- Bolivia: 46.8
- Portugal: 46.6
- Albania: 46.4
- Colombia: 46.4
- Kazakhstan: 46.4
- Madagascar: 46.4
- United Arab Emirates: 46.3
- Belarus: 46.0
- Ethiopia: 45.8
- Rwanda: 45.8
- Mexico: 45.2
- Sudan: 45.0
- Chile: 44.7
- Spain: 44.6
- Egypt: 44.5
- Vietnam: 44.3
- Lithuania: 44.2
- Mozambique: 43.9
- Tanzania: 43.7
- Sri Lanka: 43.6
- South Africa: 43.4
- Latvia: 43.1
- Japan: 41.7
- South Korea: 40.6
- Uganda: 40.5
- Bulgaria: 40.3
- Honduras: 39.7
- Ecuador: 39.3
- Ghana: 39.0
- Costa Rica: 37.7
- Lebanon: 37.7
- Peru: 37.5
- Botswana: 37.3
- Bangladesh: 37.2
- Zambia: 36.9
- Paraguay: 36.5
- Turkey: 35.7
- Zimbabwe: 35.7
- Democratic Republic of the Congo: 34.8
- Argentina: 33.4
- Singapore: 32.3
- Jordan: 31.3
- Brazil: 30.6
- China: 29.9
- Azerbaijan: 23.9
- Republic of the Congo: 22.9
- Panama: 22.7
- Angola: 21.0
| Albania | 46.4 | 0.38 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Angola | 21.0 | 0.24 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Argentina | 33.4 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | -2.6(2) |
| Armenia | 76.1 | 0.32 | 2 of 6 | +8.8(2) |
| Australia | 70.8 | 0.36 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Austria | 57.7 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | -0.6(2) |
| Azerbaijan | 23.9 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Bangladesh | 37.2 | 0.37 | 3 of 6 | +2.6(2) |
| Belarus | 46.0 | 0.38 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Belgium | 77.8 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | +1.2(2) |
| Bolivia | 46.8 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 49.5 | 0.40 | 3 of 6 | +4.4(2) |
| Botswana | 37.3 | 0.18 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Brazil | 30.6 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | +6.8(2) |
| Bulgaria | 40.3 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +2.1(2) |
| Burkina Faso | 56.7 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | +3.6(2) |
| Burundi | 47.9 | 0.22 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Canada | 58.0 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | +3.5(2) |
| Chile | 44.7 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | +4.4(2) |
| China | 29.9 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | +0.8(2) |
| Colombia | 46.4 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | -2.6(2) |
| Costa Rica | 37.7 | 0.32 | 2 of 6 | +4.5(2) |
| Cรดte d'Ivoire | 51.5 | 0.26 | 2 of 6 | +11.0(2) |
| Croatia | 55.5 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | +0.1(2) |
| Cuba | not measured. No score. 0 indicators are observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.00 | 0 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Cyprus | 62.0 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +2.2(2) |
| Czechia | 73.2 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | -1.9(2) |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 34.8 | 0.24 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Denmark | 75.0 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | -2.6(2) |
| Dominican Republic | 48.7 | 0.32 | 2 of 6 | +11.9(2) |
| Ecuador | 39.3 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | -3.4(2) |
| Egypt | 44.5 | 0.28 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| El Salvador | 57.7 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | +6.6(2) |
| Estonia | 48.8 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +2.1(2) |
| Ethiopia | 45.8 | 0.40 | 3 of 6 | -1.2(2) |
| Finland | 65.6 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +5.8(2) |
| France | 52.9 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | -0.4(2) |
| Gambia | not measured. No score. One indicator is observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.11 | 1 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Georgia | 48.0 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | +5.5(2) |
| Germany | 50.7 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | -4.8(2) |
| Ghana | 39.0 | 0.20 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Greece | 53.1 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +2.7(2) |
| Guatemala | 49.0 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +6.1(2) |
| Guinea | not measured. No score. One indicator is observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.08 | 1 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Guinea-Bissau | 47.4 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Haiti | not measured. No score. One indicator is observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.02 | 1 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Honduras | 39.7 | 0.26 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Hungary | 51.8 | 0.34 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| India | 63.2 | 0.38 | 3 of 6 | -1.4(2) |
| Indonesia | 84.3 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Iran | 72.8 | 0.26 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Iraq | 50.1 | 0.36 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Ireland | 67.5 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | +4.4(2) |
| Israel | 62.0 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +1.2(2) |
| Italy | 51.5 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +2.0(2) |
| Jamaica | 60.3 | 0.22 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Japan | 41.7 | 0.23 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Jordan | 31.3 | 0.26 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Kazakhstan | 46.4 | 0.38 | 3 of 6 | 0.0(2) |
| Kenya | 65.6 | 0.40 | 3 of 6 | +2.0(2) |
| Kyrgyzstan | 56.2 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | +2.8(2) |
| Laos | 51.0 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +0.6(2) |
| Latvia | 43.1 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +1.0(2) |
| Lebanon | 37.7 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | -8.7(2) |
| Lesotho | 70.1 | 0.22 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Lithuania | 44.2 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +10.2(2) |
| Madagascar | 46.4 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | +10.7(2) |
| Malawi | 50.7 | 0.25 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Malaysia | 55.7 | 0.40 | 3 of 6 | -1.0(2) |
| Mali | 49.4 | 0.22 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Mauritius | 60.2 | 0.22 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Mexico | 45.2 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | +8.6(2) |
| Moldova | 71.5 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +2.3(2) |
| Mongolia | 58.7 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | +9.1(2) |
| Morocco | 60.6 | 0.28 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Mozambique | 43.9 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +8.7(2) |
| Myanmar | 60.2 | 0.28 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Namibia | 47.8 | 0.20 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Nepal | 60.3 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | +26.9(2) |
| Netherlands | 82.7 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | +7.7(2) |
| New Zealand | 82.0 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Nicaragua | 48.1 | 0.31 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Nigeria | 65.6 | 0.25 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| North Macedonia | 55.2 | 0.37 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Norway | 69.6 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +7.5(2) |
| Pakistan | 61.7 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Panama | 22.7 | 0.32 | 2 of 6 | -3.2(2) |
| Papua New Guinea | not measured. No score. One indicator is observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.16 | 1 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Paraguay | 36.5 | 0.32 | 2 of 6 | +7.8(2) |
| Peru | 37.5 | 0.40 | 3 of 6 | +8.1(2) |
| Philippines | 52.4 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +9.4(2) |
| Poland | 49.3 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | +6.4(2) |
| Portugal | 46.6 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +1.5(2) |
| Republic of the Congo | 22.9 | 0.13 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Romania | 63.9 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | +5.2(2) |
| Russia | 51.7 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | +7.7(2) |
| Rwanda | 45.8 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +4.0(2) |
| Serbia | 70.7 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | +10.6(2) |
| Singapore | 32.3 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Slovakia | 76.6 | 0.30 | 2 of 6 | +3.6(2) |
| Slovenia | 71.2 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | -1.5(2) |
| South Africa | 43.4 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +8.6(2) |
| South Korea | 40.6 | 0.40 | 3 of 6 | +3.3(2) |
| Spain | 44.6 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | +5.2(2) |
| Sri Lanka | 43.6 | 0.24 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Sudan | 45.0 | 0.08 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Sweden | 73.3 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | -1.3(2) |
| Switzerland | 47.4 | 0.41 | 3 of 6 | -0.9(2) |
| Tajikistan | 49.2 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | -2.3(2) |
| Tanzania | 43.7 | 0.24 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Thailand | 65.4 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | +3.5(2) |
| Trinidad and Tobago | not measured. No score. One indicator is observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.09 | 1 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Tunisia | 50.5 | 0.26 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Turkey | 35.7 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | -3.6(2) |
| Uganda | 40.5 | 0.25 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Ukraine | 76.7 | 0.26 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| United Arab Emirates | 46.3 | 0.24 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| United Kingdom | 75.6 | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | +3.3(2) |
| United States | 54.3 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | -0.8(2) |
| Uruguay | 56.3 | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | -6.0(2) |
| Uzbekistan | 47.3 | 0.42 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
| Venezuela | not measured. No score. One indicator is observed here; this model needs two before it can average a dimension score. | 0.12 | 1 of 6. Below the coverage floor: this model needs 2 observed rows before it publishes a score. | no trend |
| Vietnam | 44.3 | 0.25 | 2 of 6 | no trend |
| Zambia | 36.9 | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | +14.0(2) |
| Zimbabwe | 35.7 | 0.29 | 3 of 6 | no trend |
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
Shared Purpose indicators
7 indicators define this capability. Gaps and retired rows remain because they lower confidence. Click a heading to sort.
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Shared Purpose
| Note | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic participation | direct capability measure | % mentioning | higher is better | Joint EVS/WVS | 0.10 | A reported behaviour: the publisher-weighted share of respondents mentioning membership of a humanitarian or charitable organisation, the membership item closest to acting for strangers, in the official Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 results table, release 5.0.0. Religious membership is left out because it reads religiosity, and a count of any membership is not published in the aggregate table. The two programmes ask differently: EVS shows a list and asks which the respondent belongs to, WVS reads each type aloud and asks about active or inactive membership, and the joint file counts both kinds of WVS member as mentioned. Where one country has both samples, the WVS share is higher in eight of ten, so part of the spread is question format. Membership is not activity. China reads 2.7% and Vietnam 9.4%, so state mass organisations do not inflate this item. Fieldwork runs from 2017 to 2023 and every value carries the release year 2022. Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are held, as for interpersonal trust. See D128 and A15. |
| Income inequality | downstream outcome | Gini 0-100 | lower is better | World Bank | 0.20 | Included as a structural constraint on seeing yourself in a common project, not as a value judgement. Contested and worth challenging. |
| Political polarisationno dataset | perception proxy | index 0-4 | lower is better | V-Dem | 0.05 | V-Dem political polarization (v2cacamps) is published beside this dimension as a behavioral check and is not scored, because a regime with no organized opposition reads as calm (D121, A13). The gap stays open for a measure that can tell calm between competing camps from calm where no camp may compete. Pluralism is the target, so only hostile polarization should count against a country. |
| Sense of national belongingno dataset | perception proxy | % expressing belonging | higher is better | Joint EVS/WVS | 0.05 | A declared gap again since 2026-10-02 (D151, which supersedes the retirement in D143). The project still wants to know whether people count themselves members of the community whose common project this capability asks about, so the row stays even though no series can fill it. The only cross-national item aimed at it, national pride (G006) in the Joint EVS/WVS, is not wired: pride is not belonging, and it fails the regime test of artefact A13, with electoral autocracies at 75 percent very proud against 47 in liberal democracies. ISSP 2023 asks about closeness to the country in 16 countries. Wireable on an item that reads the same in every regime class, or on a behaviour of belonging, for half the frame or more. High national pride must never be read as the capacity for collective action. |
| Tax revenue | downstream outcome | % of GDP | higher is better | World Bank | 0.30 | Revealed willingness to fund public goods, confounded by federal structure and by resource revenue. Treat with suspicion. |
| Voice and accountabilityretired | perception proxy | z-score -2.5 to 2.5 | higher is better | World Bank | 0.35 | Retired 2026-08-26. Artefact A5: it measures the democratic channel while Shared Purpose asks whether people can see themselves in a common project. Singapore scored 20.9 while being one of the most effective collective actors in the set. Volunteering and civic participation are the observable replacements and are declared gaps; voter turnout is published beside Shared Purpose as a check, because it reads the same democratic channel and compulsory voting (D129). See D23 and A5. |
| Volunteeringno dataset | direct capability measure | % of adults | higher is better | Gallup World Poll / CAF | 0.10 | CAF publishes country figures but the underlying Gallup microdata is proprietary, so it fails the inspectability rule. |
A check beside the score
This check measures something real about the capability, but it does not meet the model's test for scoring. Country pages show its value.
Political polarizationV-Dem (v2cacamps_osp), 125 of 125 countries, latest 2025
Whether supporters of opposing political camps generally meet in a friendly or a hostile manner, rated by V-Dem country experts from 0, friendly, to 4, hostile.
The question counts hostility and leaves disagreement alone, which is what pluralism asks for. It is not scored because a low reading has two causes the number cannot tell apart. Where camps compete openly, a calm reading means people who disagree still meet as fellow citizens. Where no opposition may organize, it means there is no camp left to be hostile to. In 2025 the five closed autocracies in the frame average 2.18 and the liberal democracies 1.67, while electoral democracies and electoral autocracies sit near 2.8 and 3.3. Scored, the reading would have lifted the United Arab Emirates about 11 points on this capability for a uniformity the benchmark does not count as shared purpose. Income is not why it is left out: richer countries read only somewhat calmer, at about -0.41 against log GDP per capita.
Voter turnoutV-Dem (v2eltrnout), 124 of 125 countries, latest 2025
Share of registered voters who cast a vote in the latest national election up to 2025, according to official results, as coded by V-Dem from IDEA, IPU and IFES sources. Where executive and legislative elections fall on the same day, the executive turnout is coded.
Turnout is the one act in which a whole population takes part in a common decision, so it is the closest behavioral reading of shared purpose the benchmark has. It is not scored for three reasons the number cannot separate. It reads the democratic channel, which is why voice and accountability was retired from this capability (A5): a country with no competitive elections cannot score well for reasons unrelated to whether its people see themselves in a common project. Compulsory voting turns it into a reading of the law: Brazil enforces it, and the eight countries that enforce sanctions average 83 percent against 65 where voting is voluntary. And closed and electoral autocracies manage it: Vietnam reads 95.6, Rwanda 98.2 and Singapore 92.8, which is mobilization, not participation (A13). The year shown is the latest national election, because elections are coded only in the year they happen.
Documented examples
These records describe something a country has done that this capability should capture. They stay outside the score because one case is not a comparable series.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Internet voting in national elections
Estonia has run legally binding internet voting since 2005, and at the 2023 Riigikogu election 312,182 votes, 51.1 percent of all votes cast, came in online, the first national election anywhere in which more than half the vote was digital.
51.1 % of votes, share of votes cast online, 2023 riigikogu election, 2023. 9,287 votes, internet votes at first use, 2005 local elections, 2005. State Electoral Office of Estonia, internet voting statistics, retrieved 2026-08-27.
How it worked: The state let any voter cast and re-cast a ballot online during the advance period, with the last vote counting and a paper vote overriding, which turned the coercion problem into a game the voter can always exit.
Limits: Turnout by channel measures adoption, not democratic quality: an online share says nothing about coercion outside the polling station, verifiability, or trust in the count, and Estonian i-voting has standing academic critics on all three. Adoption also rides on the national identity infrastructure recorded elsewhere in this dataset, so as evidence for civic participation it shows a lowered cost of voting rather than a raised desire to participate; overall turnout moved far less than the channel share.
Australia has required citizens to vote since 1924 and turnout at the 2025 federal election was 90.7 percent of enrolled voters, a level no large voluntary-voting democracy reaches.
90.7 % of enrolled voters, house of representatives turnout, 2025 federal election, 2025. Australian Electoral Commission, participation in the 2025 federal election, retrieved 2026-08-27.
How it worked: Parliament made voting a legal duty with a token fine, paired it with automatic-style enrolment, Saturday voting and easy postal and early options, so the state removed every excuse at the same time as it imposed the duty.
Limits: Turnout under compulsion measures compliance, not civic desire, which is exactly the objection to filing it under civic participation; the record is here because the indicator's construct is participation behaviour, and ninety percent of a country voting for a century is behaviour, whatever its cause. The denominator is enrolled voters, and enrolment itself is near-complete only because it is also compulsory. The fine is small and enforcement light, so the mechanism is closer to a maintained norm than to coercion.
Rwanda requires a morning of community work on the last Saturday of each month, and the government's own assessment reports average participation of 91.3 percent of adults countrywide in fiscal year 2015-2016, up from 87.8 percent two years earlier.
91.3 % of adults 18-65, umuganda participation rate, 2016. 87.8 % of adults 18-65, umuganda participation rate two years earlier, 2014. Rwanda Governance Board, impact assessment of umuganda 2007-2016, citing MINALOC annual reports, retrieved 2026-08-27.
How it worked: The state fixed a single national morning each month, closed roads and shops for it, assigned works through the lowest administrative level, and had officials up to the president participate visibly, converting an old rural practice into a synchronised national institution.
Limits: The number is the state assessing its own compulsory programme in a country where declining to participate carries social and administrative cost, so it cannot be read as volunteering in the survey sense the indicator intends, and no independent measurement exists. Participation is legally required, which is the opposite of the construct's voluntariness. The record is filed anyway because the indicator is a gap and the case is the strongest documented instance of state-organised mass civic labour, provided the compulsion is read alongside the number.
SUS health councils, permanent public participation
Since Law 8.142 established them in 1990, Brazil's SUS has required permanent, deliberative health councils at the national, state and municipal levels, with users holding 50 percent of seats and health workers and government or providers holding 25 percent each.
50 % of seats, user share of health council seats, current. Ministry of Health, SUS councils, with Law 8.142/1990, retrieved 2026-08-30.
How it worked: Brazil made participation part of the health system's operating structure: users, workers, government and providers share a permanent council whose decisions feed into policy formulation and control of execution.
Limits: A mandated seat structure creates a route for participation but does not show whether councils meet regularly, deliberate independently, change health priorities or attract people beyond organised representatives. The 50/25/25 composition is a legal and administrative design, not a measure of actual attendance or influence, and the ministry describes the system without an independent evaluation of outcomes.
THW, volunteer civil protection as a federal institution
Germany's federal civil-protection agency trains and equips a volunteer force that reached about 88,000 people across 669 local units in May 2025, supported by about 2,200 paid staff.
88,000 people, volunteer thw members, 2025-05. 669 local units, local thw units, 2025-05. Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, agency overview, retrieved 2026-08-30.
How it worked: The federal government supplies equipment, doctrine and a small professional backbone while local volunteer units recruit, train and retain the people who operate it, turning civic participation into standing disaster-response capacity.
Limits: Membership in one emergency-service organisation is not the share of adults who volunteered in the last month, which is what the indicator asks for, and it cannot be compared directly with countries that organise civil protection through paid services. The agency reports its own membership, the count includes more than 17,000 youth members, and it does not show how often each member trains or deploys.
Volunteer fire corps, and its membership erosion
Japan's Fire and Disaster Management Agency reported 732,223 volunteer fire-corps members on 1 April 2025, a fall of 14,458 in one year in the local disaster-response corps that it describes as a core of community resilience.
732,223 members, volunteer fire-corps members, 2025-04-01. 14,458 members lost, one-year membership decline, 2025-04-01. Japan Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2025 White Paper on Fire Service, retrieved 2026-08-31.
How it worked: Japan embeds trained local volunteers in municipal fire organisations, gives them equipment and a formal role in prevention and disaster response, and is now adding function-specific and student units as the general membership base shrinks. The erosion shows that a long-standing civic institution needs an active recruitment and role-design strategy to remain deployable.
Limits: Membership is a capacity proxy, not the number of volunteers who turn out, hours trained, response quality or lives and property protected. The agency reports a one-year decline but this record does not identify its causes or establish a long-run causal trend; local corps differ in duties, age structure and recruitment, and the national total can hide uneven resilience.
Federal funding gaps and the 2019 shutdown
The Congressional Research Service records 20 federal funding-gap shutdowns with at least one full day between FY1977 and FY2019, including the 35-day partial shutdown from 21 December 2018 to 25 January 2019, the longest in the period it surveys.
35 days, longest partial federal shutdown, 2019-01-25. 20 shutdowns, funding-gap shutdowns with at least one full day, 1977-2019. Congressional Research Service, Past Government Shutdowns: Key Resources, retrieved 2026-08-31.
How it worked: The US appropriations process allows a lapse in budget authority to stop or furlough parts of the federal government, turning unresolved political conflict into an interruption of administration. Continuing resolutions and contingency plans soften the shock but do not remove the incentive or the coordination cost of brinkmanship.
Limits: Shutdown duration and frequency are institutional consequences that can reflect constitutional rules, divided government and bargaining strategy, not a direct measure of public attitudes or latent polarisation. The CRS series ends in FY2019 for this historical resource, and a shutdown's operational cost varies with which agencies lose budget authority.
Orรงamento Participativo Portugal
Portugal's first national participatory-budget cycle drew almost 80,000 votes and committed โฌ3.18 million to winning projects, which were written into the 2018 state budget.
80,000 votes, votes cast in the first opp cycle (approximately), 2017. 3,180,000 EUR, investment committed to winning projects, 2017. Presidรชncia e Modernizaรงรฃo Administrativa, OPP 2017 results, retrieved 2026-08-31.
How it worked: The central government opened a national proposal and voting platform, reserved a defined slice of the state budget, and promised to place winning projects in departmental budgets so participation could produce a visible delivery rather than only consultation.
Limits: A single cycle's votes do not establish sustained civic participation, representativeness, deliberative quality or whether every winning project was delivered on time. The government announcement reports the programme's own participation and budget totals, and the national cycle was later redesigned rather than becoming a stable annual measure of citizen voice.
Read how the benchmark turns an indicator into a score on the method page. The limits page records where this capability is still poorly observed.