downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 1544.24articles per million people
- Year
- 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC)
- History
Azerbaijan
Strongest usable evidence: Agency, at 54.4. Raise Building first, at 27.7. Shared Purpose needs more evidence: confidence is 0.28.
Raise, lowest first
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Building | 0.57 | 27.7 |
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 30.6 |
| Learning | 0.55 | 37.1 |
| Adaptability | 0.48 | 41.4 |
| Trust | 0.50 | 47.0 |
Measure before managing
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Shared Purpose | 0.28 | 23.9 |
| Experimentation | 0.33 | 8.7 |
| Coordination | 0.41 | 61.8 |
These lists are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 18 gaps in the registry.
Why this country is included: Added in the 9.0.0 completion, which takes every country of a million people or more that is measurable in all nine capabilities.
Anticipation30.6Confidence0.46usableHow capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
Azerbaijan
Read Azerbaijan beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
| Coordination | 0.41 | 3 of 5 | 0.86 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Agency | 0.56 | 4 of 5 | 0.75 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Trust | 0.50 | 5 of 7 | 0.85 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Adaptability | 0.48 | 4 of 6 | 0.78 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Learning | 0.55 | 3 of 4 | 0.81 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 2 of 4 | 0.96 | +15.6(2) | 29.0 | -1.6 | |
| Building | 0.57 | 4 of 6 | 0.90 | +1.2(3) | no data | no estimate | |
| Shared Purpose | 0.28 | 2 of 6 | 0.92 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Experimentation | 0.33 | 4 of 9 | 0.81 | +1.4(3) | no data | no estimate |
How to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 125 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
+15.6 over 10 years, from 15.0 in 2016 to 30.6 on 2 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 69.489index 0-100
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL)
- History
Government foresight capacity
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable international dataset. OECD and UN work is descriptive, not scored. Envisioning would have to build this.
Long-horizon research commitments
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of new grants
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the share of R&D spending classed as basic research, which is the make-up of a spending stock, the construct D142 retired business R&D share for. OECD MSTI publishes that share for its members only, and UNESCO UIS no longer serves R&D by type of research (construct audit, 2026-10-02). The behaviour behind it is a funder committing to a horizon: a grant awarded for five years or more is a decision to wait for a result. Untried: no memo has triaged a grant register. National funders publish award lists one by one with their own durations, and commercial grant aggregators fail the inspectability rule. Wireable on a grant-level register with award and end dates, on one definition of a competitive public grant, for half the frame or more.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2024
0.21 % of GDP, rank 88 of 118. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well (D122).
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6), 2024
1,663 per million people, rank 44 of 114. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found (D122). Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
541 per million people, rank 74 of 125. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation (D122). Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 29.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Panelist B's late reaction to the 2015 devaluation is a concrete preparation failure despite SOFAZ, so I move down one point; long-horizon planning is concentrated in a personalised presidency rather than autonomous bodies.
- 29.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Near hold. The oil fund is a real long-horizon commitment, but planning sits in a narrow presidential circle and the 2015 devaluation came late; the panel agrees the indicator score is about right.
- 27.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
I rise slightly from 26 to 27. Panelists A and B note an oil fund built for the long term, which is some conversion of rents, but planning is concentrated in the presidency, the 2015 devaluation was met late, and research output is near the floor.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 2.001per 1,000 aged 15-64
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 3.5days
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.DURS.MA.DY)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 3count
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO)
- History
Adults doing digital tasks
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- ITU / UNESCO UIS (SDG 4.4.1, ICT skills by type)
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked whether adults can perform standard digital tasks, which reads a skill level, the kind of stock D122 moved out of the scores with internet users. It now counts the act: a person who did the task. It is not the internet users condition beside it, which counts access. Candidate: ITU ICT skills by type (SDG 4.4.1) through the UNESCO UIS API, probed 2026-10-02. Sent a message with an attached file reaches 33 of the 53 countries then in the frame, 25 at 2018 or later, with no United States, India or China and most of Africa and Central America missing; two other task items reach 31 and 16. The items are self-reported and the task list has changed between rounds. Wireable on one task observed for half the frame or more at 2018 or later.
perception proxyobserved
- Raw value
- 6.4mean 1-10
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A173)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2025
90.8 % of population, rank 37 of 125. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting (D122). Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
56.3 % aged 15+, rank 87 of 122. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action (D122). Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2025
24.9 % of GDP, rank 91 of 124. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it (D122). High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Government effectiveness
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_GE.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The WGI aggregate the opinions of experts and firms, and in this set the four WGI series correlate with each other between 0.93 and 0.98 while correlating with log GDP per capita at 0.91. That is one perception of national wealth counted in three dimensions. Cross-agency delivery records are the replacement and they are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Regulatory quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RQ.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. Same measurement as government effectiveness, filed under a different name, correlating with it above 0.93. See D23 and A4.
Logistics performance
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The LPI is a survey of international freight forwarders, so it records how a country looks to global logistics firms. A small country with a small port scores low whatever its state can organise, which is artefact A9. Container throughput and border time are observable and stay. See D23.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 11.944hours
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (TRD.ACRS.BRDR.EXPT.BRDR.COMP.HR.DB1619)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 104.84percentage points from approved budget
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS)
- History
University-industry collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Innovation Index
- History
- no data
Note: GII carries it, but the underlying item is a WEF executive opinion survey whose microdata is not inspectable. Excluded on principle 4.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 0.079index 0-1
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2x_cspart)
- History
- one year
Public-private collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable dataset. PPP investment databases measure infrastructure finance, not collaboration capacity.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2024
1.511 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Private solar and wind plants under government investment agreements
Azerbaijan's government brought its first utility-scale private solar plant, Masdar's 230 MW Garadagh plant built with US$262 million of foreign investment, into operation on 26 October 2023, followed on 16 September 2026 by the 100 MW Gobustan plant won at a 2024 auction, with further private wind and solar plants under investment agreements and power purchase contracts.
230 MW, capacity of the garadagh solar power plant, the first private utility-scale plant, in operation, 2023-10-26. 262 million US$, foreign investment in the garadagh plant, 2023. Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 'Use of renewable energy sources in Azerbaijan', retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The government signed investment agreements, land leases, power purchase, grid connection and balancing agreements with foreign developers, first bilaterally with Masdar and then through an auction, for private plants connected to the national grid.
Limits: The ministry describes its own programme on an undated web page that has been updated at least to September 2026; the investment figure and capacities are the ministry's, with no audited cost and no published tariff. Two private plants are operating, 330 MW together by our sum, against 2,170 MW of renewable capacity the same page reports in operation, most of it state hydropower; the rest of the private pipeline (ACWA Power's 240 MW Khizi-Absheron wind farm, bp's 240 MW Shafag plant, Masdar's 1 GW 'mega project', two 50 MW plants in Jabrayil) is under construction or planned, and the page gives no completion dates. 'Implemented jointly with local and international partners' covers different structures: Garadagh and Gobustan are built and owned by foreign developers, though the page does not name their buyer or contract terms, Shafag serves bp's own terminal through a 'virtual' transmission swap, and the page does not say which plants were competitively tendered beyond Gobustan. The collaboration is recent, so the record shows a start, not a sustained programme. The ministry's page describes Garadagh as 'put into operation as a pilot project'; it is a 230 MW grid-connected plant, so we read the word as first-of-kind rather than as a trial, but the source uses it.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Rule of law
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RL.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite correlating with control of corruption above 0.95 and with log GDP per capita at 0.83. Court throughput and case clearance rates are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Control of corruption
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_CC.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite. It measures reputation for corruption, which is not the same thing as corruption, and it tracks income closely. Prosecution and audit records are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 277days
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (ENF.CONT.DURS.DY)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 0.746% of firms
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 0.113scale 0-4 (never to always)
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2jucomp_osp)
- History
- one year
Intentional homicide rate
downstream outcomeretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataper 100,000 people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (VC.IHR.PSRC.P5)
- History
- no data
Note: Added 2026-08-26 by D23 as the observable replacement for two retired WGI perception composites, and retired 2026-08-27 by D44 when the diagnostic built in D42 measured what it was doing. It raised this dimension's correlation with log GDP per capita by 0.288, from 0.096 to 0.385, the largest single wealth contribution anywhere in the model. It was added to fix wealth contamination and it was the wealth contamination. The dataset is sound and the objection is to what it measures here: homicide is driven heavily by organised crime, a society can be physically safe while trusting very little, and across this country set the variation it carries is mostly income. Behavioural trust measures remain a gap.
perception proxyobserved
- Raw value
- 26.3% agreeing
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A165)
- History
- one year
Trust in public institutions
perception proxyno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% expressing confidence
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD Trust Survey / WVS
- History
- no data
Note: The OECD survey covers members only. Mixing it with WVS items for India and South Africa would break comparability. The Joint EVS/WVS confidence battery (E069) reaches 37 countries from one release, and confidence in the courts (E069_17) is published beside Trust as a check under this id rather than scored: every item of the battery tested (courts, civil service, police, parliament and government) reads higher in the closed and electoral autocracies of the frame than in its democracies, which is deference as much as confidence (A13). The gap stays open for a measure that does not reward a court that cannot rule against the state. See D132.
perception proxyobserved
- Raw value
- 13.7% expressing trust
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (G007_34_B)
- History
- one year
Court case clearance rate
downstream outcomeno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of incoming cases
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- CEPEJ / OECD / national court statistics
- History
- no data
Note: Whether a court finishes what it starts, counted from case records rather than asked in a survey. D23 named it as the observable replacement for the two retired WGI composites and it has stayed unfilled since. CEPEJ publishes it for Council of Europe members and OECD for its own members, so no single publisher reaches this country set, and a harmonised series needs the project second source adapter. See D57.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Confidence in the courtsJoint EVS/WVS (E069_17), 2022
10 % a great deal, higher is better. Share of survey respondents saying they have a great deal of confidence in the justice system and courts, of the four answers a great deal, quite a lot, not very much and none at all, in the Joint EVS/WVS 2017 to 2022 survey round.
Confidence in the courts is the public half of what this capability asks: whether people expect the rules to be enforced when a stranger breaks them. It is not scored because the survey answer reads two things the number cannot tell apart. Where courts are independent, confidence is a judgment of how they perform. Where they answer to the state, it is also deference, and saying otherwise to an interviewer has a cost. In this frame the pattern runs the wrong way. India, the Philippines and Indonesia, all electoral autocracies in the V-Dem 2025 classification, lead on the share saying a great deal, and Vietnam and China, the two closed autocracies surveyed, lead once quite a lot is counted too. The ten electoral autocracies average 21.8 percent saying a great deal and the two closed autocracies 28.1, against 13.6 for liberal and 8.4 for electoral democracies. Scored, it would rank highest the states whose courts are least able to rule against them. Income is not why it is left out: the share correlates about -0.18 with log GDP per capita. The value is the share saying a great deal; the share saying quite a lot is in the source note.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 0.578index 0-1
- Year
- 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 33.955% of firms
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS)
- History
Adult learning participation
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Eurostat / OECD PIAAC
- History
- no data
Note: The best available measure of continuous learning capacity, and it exists only for European and OECD members.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 0.643ratio to world average
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- OpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2024
41.3 % gross, rank 74 of 124. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned (D122).
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2023
3.7 % of GDP, rank 77 of 125. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about (D122).
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 2019
15.3 % of secondary, rank 50 of 125. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better (D141). It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Self-Employment Program business training
Azerbaijan's State Employment Agency trained 24,399 successful applicants to the national Self-Employment Program in business skills and business planning between May 2021 and November 2024, 2,155 of them in the third quarter of 2024, as a condition of receiving start-up assets.
24,399 people, successful sep applicants who completed business training (cumulative), May 2021 to 30 November 2024. 2,155 people, applicants who completed training and prepared business plans in one quarter, Q3 2024. World Bank, Azerbaijan Employment Support Project (P171250), Implementation Status and Results Report, sequence 9, archived 23 January 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The employment agency selects vulnerable jobseekers into a self-employment programme, trains them to write a business plan, and transfers start-up assets to those whose plans pass, with mentoring visits afterwards.
Limits: The count is from the World Bank's monitoring of a loan it finances, reported by the implementing agency, and covers only programme participants financed under the project from May 2021, not the Self-Employment Program's earlier cohorts, which the state budget financed from 2017. The training is short business training that gates an asset transfer, not vocational or general education, so it is a narrow slice of adult learning. The same report gives 27,452 SEP beneficiaries 'in training or have completed trainings' and 'over 27,000' participating in business training, so the denominator varies by indicator; the completed count is used. About 3,000 people a year passed through the ministry's two vocational training centres, by the 2020 appraisal document's account, and the vocational certification and on-the-job training windows of the restructured project had not started by December 2024.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
+1.4 over 10 years, from 4.7 in 2016 to 6.1 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
-1.3 over 20 years, from 7.4 in 2006 to 6.1 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 119per million people
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.PAT.RESD)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 5657per million people
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 63per million people
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 97102per million people
- Year
- 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- GitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv)
- History
- no data
Venture deals
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD / national VC associations
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The id keeps its first name so evidence records, links and published files still resolve. The row asked for venture capital deployed as a share of GDP, a level of financial depth of the kind private credit is (D122). A count of first rounds counts attempts started with outside risk money, which is what this capability asks about, and a large round counts once. Candidates, none wireable: the OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Financing scoreboard carried venture capital for 6 of the 16 countries the frame held on 2026-08-26, as amounts in national currency, latest year 2022, with Brazil, India, South Africa and Singapore absent (D21); national venture capital associations publish counts on their own definitions; commercial deal databases cover the world and are not inspectable (D10). Wireable on an inspectable deal count with one definition of a first round for half the frame or more. Read A1 before treating this dimension as measured.
Early-stage entrepreneurial activity
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no data% aged 18-64
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate)
- History
- no data
Note: From the GEM Adult Population Survey, entered by hand because GEM has no open API. TEA counts every new business, so necessity self-employment scores the same as a funded startup, which is why Chile and Argentina sit above the United States here. Read it as how many people are trying, not as how much value the attempts create. GEM does not run every economy every year: Singapore last took part in 2014 and the recency term marks that value down hard.
Tolerance of entrepreneurial failure
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no data% not deterred
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate)
- History
- no data
Note: Stored as 100 minus the published GEM fear of failure rate, so the direction matches the rest of the registry. GEM measures that rate among adults who already see good opportunities, not among all adults, so the denominator differs from the label. Attitudinal: bankruptcy law and time to discharge would be the observable substitute and are still worth wiring beside it.
Firms through regulatory sandboxes
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no datafirms per million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national regulators
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the number and breadth of live sandboxes, which is a policy stock: a regime can exist with nobody in it. It now counts what passes through: firms a regulator let test under relaxed rules, and firms that came out, authorised, withdrawn or failed. Regulators publish cohort lists and exit reports one by one. The evidence corpus holds 22 records against this row, most of them counts of firms admitted or exited, each on the definition and window of its own regulator, and no register assembles them on one definition (O1 triage sweep, 2026-10-01). A realistic candidate for Envisioning to build from those lists. Wireable on a register that counts admissions and completions on one definition for half the frame or more.
University spinouts
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national TTO associations
- History
- no data
Note: Reported nationally with incompatible definitions of what counts as a spinout.
Business share of R&D
capability inputretired, see notes- Raw value
- no data% of R&D
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD MSTI / RICYT
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-02. The only working source, OECD MSTI joined with RICYT for Latin America, covers 34 of the 53 countries then in the frame, but the row reads the make-up of a spending stock: who performs the R&D a country pays for. R&D spending itself is a condition since D122, and the share is high both where business research is large (Israel) and where total research is tiny and one firm dominates it (Thailand). State enterprises count as business, so China and Vietnam read their ownership model. UIS stopped publishing the series in 2023. Firms trying new things are read through patents, trademarks, designs and entrepreneurship instead. See D142.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Central Bank of Azerbaijan regulatory sandbox
The Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan began testing its first regulatory sandbox participant in December 2024 and admitted three more whose testing began in 2026, out of 14 applicants.
3 firms, firms whose sandbox testing began in 2026, counted from the registry, 2026. 14 applicants (cumulative), applicants to the sandbox since launch, 2026-10. Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Regulatory Sandbox Registry, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The central bank wrote rules on a special regulation regime that exempt participants from licensing, opened cohort application windows, and admitted a handful of banks and crypto firms to test products with capped users under its supervision.
Limits: The year count of three is computed from testing start dates in the registry; the central bank publishes only undated cumulative counters (14 applicants, 4 participants), so the series has no official annual figure and earlier years cannot be reconstructed if entries are removed. The registry's completed projects section shows no entries although the first test was scheduled to end in February 2026 and is still listed as current, so firms completing the regime, half of what the indicator asks for, cannot be counted. Only one regulator is covered. A sandbox of four firms is not a national flagship in the sense of a programme policymakers name first; it is filed because it evidences this gap's construct literally.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 5.457% of labour force
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 67% of unemployed
- Year
- 2013. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- ILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB)
- History
- one year
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 0.548index 0-1, lower = more diversified
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- UNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices)
- History
- one year
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 1.66% of products not exported competitively at the start
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Harvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ))
- History
- one year
Disaster preparedness and recovery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- INFORM / UNDRR
- History
- no data
Note: No source observes a country preparing for or recovering from a real shock. INFORM publishes its lack of coping capacity apart from hazard and exposure, but that dimension averages government self-assessments and governance perception indices with stocks such as roads, phones and physicians, which is the perception layer D23 retired plus conditions money buys (D122). Sendai and WHO reporting are governments grading themselves. A warning-reach survey item is a check candidate. See the disaster preparedness memo.
Institutional responsiveness
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No dataset exists. Measurable in principle from legislative and regulatory timestamps, which no one has assembled comparably.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
70.9 % aged 15+, rank 60 of 125. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating (D141). Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
21.8 per 100 people, rank 57 of 125. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D122). Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2023
7.6 % of output, rank 45 of 117. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D141). Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT)
No value for this country. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating (D150). Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
AZN 190 monthly allowance to people who lost work, April to June 2020
After Azerbaijan's first COVID-19 case on 28 February 2020 and the first lockdown in March, the government paid a monthly allowance of AZN 190 to 600,000 unemployed citizens, formal and informal, from April to June 2020, and in 2020 also granted targeted social assistance to 9,000 newly poor families without the usual household assessment and extended expired assistance for 9,408 households.
600,000 people, unemployed citizens paid the azn 190 monthly allowance, april to june 2020, 2020-06. 9,000 families (37,350 persons), newly poor families granted targeted social assistance without a full household assessment, 2020. World Bank, Project Information Document, Azerbaijan COVID-19 Emergency Response Project (P176503), 11 May 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The government created a temporary flat allowance for anyone who registered as having lost work, including informal workers, through an online registration with the State Employment Service, and relaxed the targeted social assistance rules so newly poor families could be added without a home assessment.
Limits: The figures are in paragraph 14 and footnote 4 on page 6 of 9 of a World Bank project information document, written a year later to prepare a loan that would retroactively finance the payment for 170,000 of the 600,000 recipients; it relays the government's figures and is not an evaluation. The document says 'from April to June 2020' but not whether all 600,000 were paid in April or how many months each received, so the speed shown is the month, not days; registration was online, with a phone route through district employment centres. 600,000 is a round number. The first case date and 'three lockdowns between March 2020 and January 2021' are in paragraph 4 (page 4). The document calls AZN 190 commensurate to the cost of living, and the payment stopped after three months; the 9,000 families added to targeted social assistance were few next to 600,000 allowance recipients, which suggests the standing safety net expanded little.
Housing reconstruction after the February 2019 Shamakhi earthquake
Azerbaijan's Minister of Emergency Situations reported on 5 December 2019, ten months after the February 2019 Shamakhi earthquake, that 580 houses had been built and 1,175 houses restored in Shamakhi district with state funds, while three apartment buildings with 174 flats were, by the President's account on the same page, still under construction.
1,175 houses, houses restored in shamakhi district, 2019-12-05. 580 houses, new houses built in shamakhi district (three apartment buildings with 174 flats still under construction), 2019-12-05. Official website of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 'Ilham Aliyev viewed conditions created at newly constructed building for earthquake-affected families in Shamakhi', 5 December 2019 (statement by Minister of Emergency Situations Kamaladdin Heydarov), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Ministry of Emergency Situations acts as the builder after an earthquake, demolishing damaged houses and building replacements with state money within the year, under direct presidential instruction instead of through insurance.
Limits: The figures are spoken by the emergency minister during a presidential visit and published on the President's website, in a text that is largely praise of the President; there is no independent verification, no count of houses damaged to set them against, and no cost. The President says on the same page that the three high-rise buildings with 174 flats were still under construction and that work was also done in Aghsu and Ismayilli districts, which the figures do not cover. The page says there were no fatalities, which reflects the earthquake's size as much as preparedness. The earlier May 2012 Zagatala and Gakh earthquake, where the ministry's commission found 3,336 private houses unusable in Gakh alone and construction had started on 266 by September 2012 (president.az articles 4823 and 5940), shows the same model at larger scale but with no completion figure read. The record shows rapid state-financed reconstruction, not risk reduction: nothing on the page concerns seismic codes or warning.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
+1.2 over 10 years, from 5.3 in 2016 to 6.5 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 5.98% of GDP
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 2.911% of manufactured exports
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS)
- History
Logistics infrastructure quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.INFR.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. An LPI sub-index, so the same freight-forwarder survey as logistics performance and the same problem. Electricity connection speed stays as the observable infrastructure measure in this dimension. See D23.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 91.304score 0-100
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.ELC.TIME.DFRN)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 0.029index
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD)
- History
Large project delivery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 2 records- Raw value
- no data% overrun
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: The single best measure of execution capability and there is no comparable international dataset. Assembling one is a defensible Envisioning project. Building mixes industrial output with state delivery capacity, and this indicator carries the delivery side: the other six indicators cannot see a national programme that was delivered. Documented deliveries are recorded in data/evidence and never scored, see D20.
Firm scale-up rate
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of firms
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD DynEmp
- History
- no data
Note: OECD business dynamics work covers members irregularly. Nothing comparable for India, Brazil or South Africa.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
47,327 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 64 of 123. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context (D122).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project (rayon centres), and its downsizing
Azerbaijan's water agencies built water supply and sanitation systems in eight regional (rayon) centres under the Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project, after a 2012 restructuring cut the scope from 21 rayons to 8 because of cost increases, while the total project cost rose from US$560 million to US$641.8 million and the loan closed on 30 June 2019 instead of 28 February 2013.
641.8 million US dollars, total project cost, actual disbursed (world bank us$407.8 million plus government us$234 million), 2019-06-30. 560 million US dollars, total project cost at approval, for 21 rayons, 2008-05. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Azerbaijan Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P109961), 18 December 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The government launched a national programme to rebuild water systems in all regional centres on rough cost estimates, financed slices of it with World Bank loans, and when real costs emerged, cut the number of towns and stretched the timetable instead of finding the money.
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory. The financing and dates are in the data sheet (ICR pages 1 to 2); the cut from 21 to 8 rayons, the reasons and the closing extensions are in Box 1 (page 8), and footnote 7 attributes the reduction to cost increases and unanticipated investments. The approval cost and the final cost cover different scopes: the original estimates for 43 rayons across both national projects were 'not supported by thorough technical studies', so the 2008 figure was not a real baseline, and a US$150 million additional financing in 2014 paid for design changes required by new government policy (legalised dwellings, EU standards), not only for overruns. Implementation moved from AzerSu to the irrigation agency SAWMA in 2009 and then to its successor company after mis-procurement in Nakhchivan, so 'the country's institutions' here are several, and the record does not separate their performance. People served and service quality are in the report but are not the subject of this record.
Third Highway Project: M4 Baku-Shamakhi and M3 Yenikend-Shorsulu motorways
Azerbaijan's road administration upgraded 94 km of the M4 Baku-Shamakhi highway to a four-lane road and built 48 km of new M3 motorway under the World Bank-financed Third Highway Project, at US$2.47 million per km against US$2.96 million estimated at appraisal, with the loan closing in March 2021 instead of March 2015.
2.47 US$ million per km, actual cost per km of the upgraded m4 baku-shamakhi highway (appraisal estimate us$2.96 million per km), 2021. 72 months, slip of the actual loan closing date against the original closing date, 2021-03. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00005553, Azerbaijan Third Highway Project (P118023), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The road administration borrowed from the World Bank for a defined corridor, accepted the lender's procurement and engineering review, held to the original alignment instead of the ministry's costlier viaduct proposal, and reused savings by adding a motorway section through restructuring.
Limits: The completion report is the lender's own evaluation of its loan, drafted with the borrower's data. The cost saving is not mainly efficiency: the report says the lower dollar outcome is mainly attributable to the manat losing more than half its value in 2015 to 2017 while works contracts were priced in local currency, so in local terms the project may have overrun. The 72-month slip is computed here from the two closing dates; the scope also changed twice (the M3 section added, part of the M4 dropped in a landslide zone), and the report concedes the final extension may have been avoidable, so not all of it is construction delay. The efficiency rating is only Modest. It is one corridor of 142 km, with a lender supervising procurement, so it is weak evidence about Azerbaijan's road programme outside donor projects.