Building

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020still operating

  Pix instant payment system

  Brazil's central bank specified, built and ran a mandatory instant payment rail that settled 7.98 billion transactions in July 2026, for 152 million people and 14 million firms transacting in that month.

  7,975,213,950 transactions, pix transactions settled in the month, 2026-07. Banco Central do Brasil, Pix statistics API, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: The central bank wrote the standard, mandated participation for every institution above a size threshold, ran the settlement infrastructure itself and set the price to zero for individuals.

  Limits: Transaction volume shows adoption of one payment rail. It says nothing about cost or schedule performance on a capital project, which is what this indicator asks for. Pix was specified and enforced by a single institution with regulatory power over the participants, so it is weak evidence about delivery that needs several agencies to hold position.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019still operating

  GOV.BR federal identity and service platform

  Brazil consolidated federal public services behind one identity platform, reporting 175 million active accounts and 5,179 digital services in May 2026.

  175,000,000 accounts, active gov.br accounts, 2026-05. Governo Digital, Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: One identity provider for every federal service, with assurance levels tied to records the state already held, and a rule that services migrate to it rather than build their own login.

  Limits: An account count measures registration and a service count measures listing. Neither shows whether a service completes, how long it takes, or what it costs to run. Both numbers are published by the programme about itself, with no external audit attached.

• 🇪🇪Estonialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2001still operating

  X-Road national data exchange layer

  Estonia has run one data exchange layer for the whole state since 2001, and in July 2026 it carried 374.9 million queries between 1,000 connected organizations, 251 of them government bodies, across 3,785 services.

  374,921,341 queries, x-road queries in the month, 2026-07. Estonian Information System Authority, X-tee factsheet, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A distributed exchange layer between agency systems, with a legal once-only rule: an agency may not ask a citizen for data another agency already holds.

  Limits: Query volume measures use of a layer that grew over 25 years. That is evidence of sustained operation and not of bringing one large project in on cost and on schedule, which is what this indicator asks for. The factsheet is published by the authority that operates the system.

• 🇮🇳Indialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana bank accounts

  India opened 590.9 million basic bank accounts through existing banks from 2014, holding 3.17 lakh crore rupees in deposits as of 19 August 2026.

  590,900,000 accounts, accounts opened under the scheme, 2026-08-19. Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, India, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: Existing banks were given a national target and a stripped-down account product, and the identity system removed the documentation barrier that had excluded people.

  Limits: An account count measures opening. Part of the stock is dormant or holds very little, and the release carries no external audit. Reaching 590 million people through banks that already existed is a different problem from delivering a physical project on a schedule.

• 🇺🇾Uruguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  Electricity supply rebuilt on renewable sources

  Uruguay rebuilt its electricity supply between 2010 and 2017 through public tenders and long-term contracts, and in 2025 fossil fuels produced 293 GWh of the 15,855 GWh generated, so 98.2 percent came from hydro, wind, biomass and solar.

  98.2 % of generation, renewable share of electricity generation, 2025. Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining, national energy balance, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: Long-term power purchase agreements at fixed prices, awarded by competitive auction, with the state utility as a single creditworthy buyer carrying the offtake risk.

  Limits: The share is computed from the published generation series by source and is not itself a published headline figure. A generation mix is an outcome, and it hides the cost and schedule record of the projects behind it. A wet or dry year moves the hydro share by several points, so one year is not the programme.

• 🇺🇾Uruguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007still operating

  Plan Ceibal, one connected laptop per child

  Uruguay gave a connected laptop to every child in public primary school from 2007, the first country to do it nationally, and the household survey found a Ceibal computer in the homes of 35.8 percent of the population in 2018.

  35.8 % of people, people with a plan ceibal computer in the household, 2018. Ministry of Social Development, from the national household survey, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A dedicated agency outside the education ministry procured devices and connectivity at national scale and used schools as the distribution channel.

  Limits: Household reach peaked at 40.1 percent in 2014 and the series stops in 2018, so this number says nothing about the programme now. A device in the home measures distribution and says nothing about learning. The record is here because the delivery is documented and the measure of it is weak.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 1988still operating

  Sistema Unico de Saude, universal public health system

  Brazil wrote a right to health into the 1988 constitution and built a single public system that covers everybody in the country, and the WHO service coverage index for Brazil rose from 71 in 2000 to 84 in 2023.

  84 index 0-100, uhc service coverage index, 2023. World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A right to health written into the constitution, funded by earmarked federal transfers and delivered by municipalities under national rules.

  Limits: A service coverage index counts whether services reach people. It says nothing about waiting times, quality, or the difference between a capital city and the interior, and it credits private provision alongside the public system. Brazil spends less per head on public health than most countries with a comparable index, which this number cannot show.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 1973operating below its peak

  Programa Nacional de Imunizacoes, and its erosion

  Brazil's national immunisation programme reached 99 percent DPT coverage in 2003 and held above 95 percent for a decade, then fell to 68 percent by 2021 and had recovered to 91 percent by 2024.

  91 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage, children aged 12-23 months, 2024. 99 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage at its 2003 peak, 2003. World Bank, from WHO and UNICEF estimates, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: Free universal vaccination delivered through the primary care network, with national campaign days that made coverage a visible public event.

  Limits: This record is here because it runs both ways. A delivery capability that reached the whole country lost a third of its coverage in five years and has not fully recovered, which is evidence about durability rather than about peak performance. Coverage is administratively reported, DPT is one antigen among many, and the fall has several causes that the series cannot separate.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003delivered and closed

  Luz para Todos, rural electrification

  Brazil connected the last rural households to electricity through a national programme run with the state and private distributors, taking access from 94.4 percent of the population in 2000 to 99.8 percent in 2024.

  99.8 % of population, access to electricity, 2024. World Bank, from national and utility sources, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: The federal government paid the connection cost and delivered through the existing distribution concessionaires, with connection targets written into their contracts.

  Limits: Access counts a connection. It says nothing about how often the power fails, what it costs, or the isolated Amazon communities that make up most of the remaining gap. Access was already rising before 2003, so the programme accelerated a trend rather than starting one.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003still operating

  Bolsa Familia and the single registry behind it

  Brazil built one national registry of low-income households and paid conditional transfers through it, going from 6.6 million benefits in December 2004 to a peak of 21.0 million in 2022 and 18.6 million in December 2025.

  18,618,236 benefits, benefits paid in december, 2025. Ministry of Social Development, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: One registry of low-income households shared across every social programme, with payments made directly to a card held by the mother, conditional on school attendance and health checks.

  Limits: A benefit count is administrative and says nothing about whether the transfers reduced poverty. The programme was renamed and restructured twice between 2021 and 2023, so the series covers more than one design. The capability worth copying is the registry and the targeting, and neither has a number in this record.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 1996still operating

  Fully electronic national elections

  Brazil has run every election on electronic voting machines since 2000, across an electorate that reached 155.9 million voters in 2024, with results published the same evening.

  155,908,437 voters, registered electorate, 2024. Superior Electoral Court, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: One election authority owns the machines, the software and the count, with public audit ceremonies and results published the same evening.

  Limits: The electorate measures the scale of the operation and not the speed or the integrity of the count. The Superior Electoral Court publishes result timing and audit results separately and neither is in this number. Electronic voting has been contested politically in Brazil despite repeated public audits, which is a fact about trust rather than about delivery.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 1997still operating

  Deepwater and pre-salt oil production

  Brazil developed deepwater extraction, found the pre-salt fields in 2006 and produced them at depths of more than 5,000 metres, with national oil production rising from 71,844 thousand cubic metres in 2000 to 219,032 in 2025.

  219,032.409 thousand cubic metres, oil production, 2025. National Petroleum Agency, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A state oil company sustained deepwater research for decades, and licensing rules concentrated the learning from each field in one operator.

  Limits: Production is an outcome shared between Petrobras and foreign operators, and several individual platforms ran years late and over budget, which is exactly the cost and schedule record this indicator asks for and which this number hides. Expanding oil output also sits against Brazil's climate commitments, and a production figure cannot weigh that.

• 🇲🇽Mexicolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003dismantled

  Seguro Popular, and its abolition

  Mexico built public health insurance for people outside social security from 2003 and abolished it in 2020, and CONEVAL measured the share of the population without access to health services rising from 16.2 percent in 2018 to 39.1 percent in 2022.

  39.1 % of population, population lacking access to health services after abolition, 2022. 16.2 % of population, population lacking access to health services before abolition, 2018. CONEVAL, comunicado no. 7, medicion multidimensional de la pobreza 2022, retrieved 2026-08-27.

  How it worked: The abolition is the mechanism recorded here: a new government replaced a funded, enrolment-based entitlement with a budget-line service that required no affiliation, and affiliation-based coverage disappeared faster than the replacement could deliver care.

  Limits: The metric measures the dismantling, not the programme: CONEVAL's deprivation number is self-reported affiliation, not care received, and Seguro Popular at its peak was itself criticised for shallow coverage and uneven state-level spending. The 2018-2022 change spans the pandemic, which stressed every health system, so not all of the 23-point rise is the reform. CONEVAL itself lost autonomy in a later reorganisation, so the continuity of this series is not assured.

• 🇬🇧United Kingdomlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1998operating below its peak

  Sure Start children's centres, and their erosion

  England built a national network of early-childhood centres reaching 3,632 sites by August 2009, then closed or hollowed out a large part of it after funding was cut, with the official count at 3,123 by October 2017 and independent estimates near 1,000 closures.

  3,123 centres, children's centres open, official count, 2017-10. 3,632 centres, children's centres open at the peak, 2009-08. The Sutton Trust, Stop Start report summary, retrieved 2026-08-27.

  How it worked: Central government funded local one-stop centres for under-fives, ring-fenced the money, and targeted the most deprived areas first; when the ring-fence was removed in 2010, local authorities under cuts converted, merged or closed centres faster than any national decision was ever taken.

  Limits: A site count is the crudest measure of the service: many surviving centres kept the building and lost the staff, which is why the Sutton Trust's estimate of real closures is roughly double the official fall shown here. The count stops in 2017 and later parliamentary answers show further decline. The record shows the erosion of delivered infrastructure under budget cuts, not the effect on children; the IFS separately measured lasting health benefits from the programme at its peak, which is what makes the erosion a loss rather than housekeeping.

• 🇿🇦South Africalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1994operating below its peak

  Grid power, and load shedding

  South Africa ran one of the world's cheapest reliable grids and extended it to most of the population after 1994, then under-invested and lost the surplus, reaching 335 days of load shedding in 2023 before recovering to 83 days in 2024.

  335 days, days with load shedding in the worst year, 2023. 83 days, days with load shedding after the partial recovery, 2024. CSIR, utility-scale power generation statistics in South Africa 2024, retrieved 2026-08-27.

  How it worked: The erosion is the mechanism recorded here: a state monopoly was told to electrify without being allowed to charge for or build ahead of demand, new-build decisions were delayed for a decade, and the two giant plants finally ordered were too large for the delivery capability that remained.

  Limits: The day counts are read from the annual chart in the CSIR report rather than a stated table, and a day with any load shedding counts the same as a day of stage six, so the unit understates severity differences. The 2024 recovery also leans on private rooftop solar that households bought in self-defence, which the report itself notes, so the improvement is not all Eskom's. What the record shows is a delivered capability, generation adequacy, lost over roughly fifteen years of deferred maintenance and failed new build, with Medupi and Kusile late and over budget.

• 🇺🇸United Stateslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2000operating below its peak

  Measles elimination, and its erosion

  The United States eliminated endemic measles transmission by 2000 through school-entry vaccination requirements, and falling coverage brought 2,777 confirmed cases by August 2026, the most since 1991, against 285 in all of 2024.

  2,777 cases, confirmed measles cases in 2026, to 20 august, 2026-08. 285 cases, confirmed measles cases in the last pre-outbreak year, 2024. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, measles cases and outbreaks, retrieved 2026-08-27.

  How it worked: The erosion is the mechanism recorded here: vaccination requirements are enforced at school entry by states, so a delivery that took federal purchasing and decades of practice is being undone state by state through widening exemption rules and falling trust, with no single decision anywhere.

  Limits: A case count is the lagging end of the erosion; the leading end is kindergarten vaccination coverage, which CDC reports separately as falling from about 95 percent before the pandemic to under 93 percent, below the outbreak-prevention threshold. The 2026 number is a year in progress and will rise. Elimination status is a WHO-defined property of transmission chains, not of case counts, and had not been formally revoked at retrieval; what the record documents is a maintained public-health achievement being lost while the infrastructure that delivered it still exists.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 1952still operating

  BNDES, the national development bank

  Founded in 1952, Brazil's federal development bank provides long-term financing and investment across the national economy, and it disbursed R$169.7 billion in 2025.

  169.7 R$ billions, bndes disbursements, 2025. BNDES, Agência de Notícias, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: The federal development bank converts public capital and long-term finance into patient support for firms and infrastructure projects that commercial lenders may not carry through their formation period.

  Limits: Disbursement volume measures the bank's activity, not whether the projects it finances arrive on time, within budget or with durable public value. The source is the institution reporting on itself, and the number mixes market-rate lending with policy-directed finance.

• 🇧🇷Brazillinked to Large project deliverystarted 1694still operating

  Casa da Moeda do Brasil, the national mint

  Founded in 1694, Brazil's national mint has remained a public institution through colonial, imperial and republican regimes and now produces currency, identity documents and passports after more than 330 years of operation.

  330 years, reported institutional history, 2026. Casa da Moeda do Brasil, history of the CMB, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: A permanent public production institution carries the state's credential infrastructure across political and monetary transitions, preserving practical capability while its outputs change with the regime around it.

  Limits: Institutional survival and the ability to produce state credentials show continuity, not the cost, quality or strategic value of every product made by the mint. The institution also changed its technologies and functions over time, so continuity does not mean an unchanged organisation.

• 🇸🇬Singaporelinked to Large project deliverystarted 1960still operating

  Housing and Development Board, public housing at scale

  Singapore set up the Housing and Development Board in 1960 to address a severe housing shortage, and it built more than 21,000 flats within its first three years.

  21,000 flats, flats built in the first three years, 1963. Housing and Development Board, Our history, retrieved 2026-08-30.

  How it worked: A public housing authority combined land, planning, finance and construction into one delivery system, allowing a severe national shortage to be treated as a programme rather than as separate private projects.

  Limits: The early construction count shows delivery at scale, not housing quality, affordability or equal access over the full history of the programme. The account is published by the agency responsible for the programme.

• 🇺🇾Uruguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 1952operating below its peak

  AFE passenger rail and network contraction

  Uruguay's state railway suspended passenger service in January 1988 to focus on freight; by 1990 about half of the national network had been declared non-operational, leaving 1,484 kilometres active from a 2,998-kilometre network, before passenger services returned only partially in 1993.

  1,484 kilometres, rail network remaining active after the contraction, 1990. 2,998 kilometres, rail network before the contraction, 1985. Ministry of Transport and Public Works, National Railway Network Statement 2025, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state railway concentrated scarce operating capacity on freight, suspended passenger service and then allowed half the network to fall outside the active system; the later partial restart could not simply recreate the connections and maintenance routines that had been dropped.

  Limits: Track kilometres are an infrastructure count, not a measure of trains, reliability, passengers or freight capacity, and the source does not establish that every kilometre declared non-operational was physically removed. Passenger service returned on selected routes in 1993, so this is a contraction and partial recovery rather than a permanently closed railway. The network statement is a government description and does not evaluate the decision's social or economic effects.

• 🇫🇷Francelinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007operating below its peak

  Flamanville 3 EPR, and the erosion of nuclear new-build delivery

  France's Flamanville 3 EPR took about 16.5 years from construction beginning in September 2007 to completion in early 2024, and its commissioning was the country's first new nuclear reactor since Civaux 2 in 1999, a 25-year gap.

  16.5 years, construction duration, 2024. 25 years, gap since the previous french reactor commissioning, 2024. French Nuclear Safety Authority, oversight of the Flamanville EPR, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: A state-backed utility attempted a first-of-kind reactor after a long pause in domestic nuclear construction, while the regulator accumulated inspections and prescriptions as construction, manufacturing and testing problems appeared; the project delivered, but the decade-plus gap exposed how much build-and-supply-chain capability had gone unused.

  Limits: The durations are calculated from the start and completion dates and from the previous commissioning date stated by the regulator; they do not isolate the causes of delay, the project's cost or the reactor's long-run availability. Flamanville eventually entered service and the regulator reports nearly 600 construction inspections, so the case documents a thin and difficult delivery capability rather than a project that never completed. The regulator describes its own oversight and is not an independent cost auditor.

• 🇨🇦Canadalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016operating below its peak

  Phoenix pay system, and its prolonged failure

  Canada rolled out the Phoenix federal pay system in 2016, then spent more than C$2.6 billion by April 2022 to support and stabilise it and correct pay-file errors, with a further roughly C$1 billion allocated through the 2024-25 fiscal year.

  2,600,000,000 Canadian dollars, support and correction spending by april 2022, 2022-04. 1,000,000,000 Canadian dollars, further funding allocated through fiscal year 2024-25, 2023. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Modernizing Information Technology Systems, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: A central agency replaced a complex government-wide payroll system through a schedule-driven rollout with insufficient independent oversight; once errors spread across departments, the state converted the project into a permanent stabilisation operation while designing a successor.

  Limits: Spending on stabilisation and correction measures shows the scale of a delivery failure, not the total social cost of late or incorrect pay, nor whether a replacement will perform better. The Auditor General notes that the total implementation cost was still not known, and the figures combine technical support, error correction and later stabilisation rather than one clean project budget. The system continued to operate while the government explored its replacement.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 1963dismantled

  Groningen gas system, and its closure after induced earthquakes

  The Netherlands ended roughly sixty years of Groningen gas extraction with the permanent closure of all production locations on 19 April 2024; by the end of 2024 the response system had handled more than 500,000 damage reports and paid over €2.5 billion in compensation.

  500,000 reports, damage reports handled after the extraction period, 2024. 2,500,000,000 euros, compensation paid for gas-extraction damage, 2024. Dutch House of Representatives, government letter on ending Groningen extraction, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state and a private operator ran a national energy system for decades, then progressively restricted and finally closed the field as evidence of induced earthquakes and resident harm made the old production objective untenable; the institutional challenge shifted from extraction to repair and trust.

  Limits: Damage reports and compensation measure the burden of the extraction system and the state's response, not the engineering reliability or economic value of the gas infrastructure. The figures include cases handled by successor agencies and do not show how many homes are safe or how long recovery will take. Closure was a deliberate response to induced earthquakes, so the case is evidence of a capability being withdrawn after its harms became politically unavoidable, not a verdict on every use of natural gas.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2005still operating

  DigiD, a shared digital identity rail for public services

  The Netherlands has run DigiD as a shared login for public services since 2005; in 2024 it recorded 550,153,271 successful authentications across 16,829,696 accounts and reported 99.94 percent availability against a 99.5 percent norm.

  550,153,271 authentications, successful digid authentications, 2024. 16,829,696 accounts, digid accounts, 2024. Logius, 2024 service figures, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state provided one identity rail that agencies could reuse instead of each building a separate login, then raised assurance levels through SMS, an app and an identity-document check while publishing service-level figures for the shared platform.

  Limits: Authentication volume, account stock and uptime show a durable shared service, not whether online procedures finish, whether users can access it equally or what it cost to build and operate. Logius reports its own service figures, and account counts include people who may use DigiD rarely or not at all. The case is evidence of sustained digital delivery rather than proof that every public service is easy to use.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 1954delivered and closed

  Delta Works, a 43-year national flood-defence programme

  After the 1953 flood, the Netherlands built 13 Delta Works between the first project in 1954 and the completion of the Maeslant Barrier in 1997, creating a long-lived national defence system of dams, sluices and storm-surge barriers.

  13 major flood-defence works, delta works delivered, 1997. 43 years, programme duration to final delivery, 1997. Rijkswaterstaat, institutional history, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: A national authority turned a catastrophic shock into a sequenced portfolio: it set common safety standards, built dams and movable barriers one after another, retained specialist engineering knowledge and kept the programme alive across governments until the final barrier closed the original build cycle.

  Limits: Counting structures and years shows continuity of a national programme, not the cost, construction productivity, maintenance burden or actual reduction in flood probability. Rijkswaterstaat reports the programme's own history and says the works protect the area behind them, but this record does not independently test performance or distributional effects.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 1995operating below its peak

  Betuweroute, a freight railway that missed its operating promise

  The Netherlands opened the Betuweroute freight railway in 2007, but the Auditor General found that state operating support in 2006–2013 reached €170 million against a €76 million maximum subsidy and required another €152 million through 2015; the line was not cost-covering and its promised environmental gain was never measured.

  170,000,000 euros, state operating support in 2006–2013, 2013. 76,000,000 euros, maximum subsidy agreed for 2006–2013, 2013. Netherlands Court of Audit, exploitation of the Betuweroute, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state built a specialised freight corridor on the expectation that private operators and a road-to-rail shift would make it commercially self-sustaining; when those assumptions did not hold, public money filled the operating gap while the promised environmental test remained undone.

  Limits: The support figures show that the operating model missed its financial promise, not the railway's current freight volume, safety or strategic value. The Court of Audit says the environmental modal-shift benefit was never measured, so this is not evidence that the line failed every objective. The 2006–2013 support period also excludes construction costs and later operating decisions.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008still operating

  MijnOverheid, a shared citizen mailbox and data portal

  The Netherlands runs MijnOverheid as one portal for government mail and personal data; in 2024 it carried 103,429,342 messages through 11,015,895 accounts with reported availability of 99.99 percent against a 99 percent norm.

  103,429,342 messages, messages delivered through mijnoverheid, 2024. 11,015,895 accounts, mijnoverheid accounts, 2024. Logius, 2024 service figures, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state made one citizen-facing mailbox and data view that agencies could feed through common services, letting residents find notices and records in one place instead of learning a separate portal for every authority.

  Limits: Message volume, account stock and uptime show a durable shared service, not whether a notice is understood, whether a public procedure finishes or whether people can use the portal equally. Logius reports its own service figures, and an account can be inactive. The case is evidence of sustained digital delivery rather than proof that every government interaction is simple or inclusive.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2002dismantled

  Fyra V250, a high-speed service withdrawn after a failed launch

  The V250 trains for the Netherlands–Belgium Fyra service entered operation six years late and the service was cancelled after only 40 days, leaving the intended passenger service on the HSL-Zuid unrealised and triggering a parliamentary inquiry.

  40 days, days of international fyra service before cancellation, 2013-01-18. 6 years, years late at entry into service, 2012. Dutch House of Representatives, Fyra parliamentary inquiry, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state, rail operators and an international supplier committed to a technically ambitious service without a credible fallback, and the timetable moved ahead before the trains had demonstrated reliable operation; once the fleet was withdrawn, the promised network could not be delivered as contracted.

  Limits: The 40-day service and six-year delay show a failed launch and delivery process, not that the HSL-Zuid railway has no later passenger value or that every actor shared the same responsibility. The metric does not capture the eventual alternative services, the line's wider benefits or the full financial loss. The parliamentary inquiry was convened to examine the interacting procurement, oversight and governance failures rather than a single technical defect.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2023still operating

  OVpay, nationwide contactless transit payments

  Translink and the Dutch public-transport operators rolled out OVpay nationwide in 2023, embedding bank-card and mobile check-in across the country; in 2024 the system processed 390 million travel transactions, 15 percent of all transit transactions.

  390,000,000 transactions, ovpay travel transactions processed, 2024. 15 % of transit transactions, ovpay share of all travel transactions, 2024. Translink, 2024 annual report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Translink gave all operators a common back office and reader software while banks and card networks supplied the payment credentials; a pilot was expanded in stages until passengers could use a familiar bank card or phone on every Dutch operator without buying a separate transit card.

  Limits: Transaction volume and share show that a national payment rail is being used, not its construction cost, reliability, fare equity, privacy effects or the quality of the migration for people who still need an OV-chipkaart. Translink reports the figures and says the rollout and functions such as capping and product sales were still being extended in 2024. Adoption therefore measures delivery and network reach, not a completed replacement of every legacy process.

• 🇳🇱Netherlandslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2024still operating

  Omgevingswet and the Digital Environment System

  On 1 January 2024 the Netherlands put the Omgevingswet and its Digital Environment System into operation, joining municipalities, provinces, water boards and the national government behind one Omgevingsloket for rules, maps and permit applications.

  4 government tiers, government tiers represented in the shared environment portal, 2024. 1 portal, national environment portal, 2024. Rijksoverheid, Omgevingsloket description, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The government consolidated the legal framework and gave four administrative tiers a shared data and application front door, backed by common digital standards and staged chain testing so a resident can check rules and apply without choosing the responsible authority first.

  Limits: The four-tier and one-portal counts show a national institutional and digital launch, not whether local rules are complete, applications are faster, the interface is accessible or the legal simplification has delivered better environmental outcomes. The government describes the portal as under continuous improvement and the transition includes significant local implementation work. This is evidence of coordinated delivery at the point of launch, not a completed evaluation of the new system.

• 🇨🇱Chilelinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007operating below its peak

  Transantiago, an integrated transport reform with rising subsidy dependence

  Chile launched the integrated Transantiago bus–metro system in 2007; an independent 2016–19 evaluation found the state subsidy per passenger fare rose from CLP 640 per CLP 1,000 paid in 2016 to CLP 790 in 2019 even as passenger production rose 7%.

  790 CLP subsidy per CLP 1,000 passenger fare, state subsidy per clp 1,000 passenger fare, 2019. 640 CLP subsidy per CLP 1,000 passenger fare, state subsidy per clp 1,000 passenger fare, 2016. DIPRES, independent evaluation of the National Public Transport Subsidy, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state integrated bus routes and metro under concessions and used subsidies to stabilise fares, but the evaluation exposed weak outcome baselines and growing fiscal dependence. The case shows why a complex service reform needs a measurable fallback plan as well as a unified operating design.

  Limits: The subsidy ratio is not the system's total cost, a schedule overrun or a direct measure of service quality. The evaluation reported missing coverage baselines and global outcome indicators, and the transport network continued operating under later reforms and branding. Rising subsidy dependence is a warning about delivery and contract design, not proof that one institutional choice caused every passenger or fiscal problem.

• 🇨🇴Colombialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013still operating

  4G road concessions, a national infrastructure portfolio

  By September 2024, Colombia's 4G road programme comprised 30 concessions at 86.99% aggregate progress, with 14 in operation, 13 under construction, two in pre-construction and one in early termination.

  30 concessions, 4g road concessions in the national portfolio, 2024-09. 86.99 % aggregate progress, aggregate progress of 4g road programme, 2024-09. Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura (ANI), 2024 accountability report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Colombia bundled road building and rehabilitation into a portfolio of public-private concessions, using a national infrastructure agency to standardise contracts, sequence projects and track construction while private concessionaires supplied capital and delivery capacity.

  Limits: ANI's aggregate progress and stage counts are agency-reported and combine projects with different scopes, concession structures and baselines. They do not establish on-time or on-budget delivery, road quality, travel-time gains or equitable regional benefits; one project had already entered early termination. The portfolio is evidence of sustained delivery capacity and correction inside a large programme, not proof that every concession met its original promise.

• 🇨🇴Colombialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007operating below its peak

  Reficar, a refinery modernization with a fiscal-liability finding

  A 2021 Contraloría fiscal-responsibility ruling on Colombia's Reficar modernization held COP2.945 trillion in damage after finding USD997 million in additional investments that added no value to the project.

  2,945,410,000,000 Colombian pesos, fiscal damage upheld in the reficar modernization case, 2021. 997,000,000 US dollars, additional investments found not to add project value, 2021. Contraloría General de la República, fiscal-responsibility finding (reported in the Cámara de Representantes accountability report), retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state-owned refinery modernization expanded through weak cost, contracting and supervision controls; after the project entered service, Colombia's supreme audit institution traced losses, assigned fiscal responsibility and used the finding to make a failed delivery visible rather than treating the asset's operation as proof of success.

  Limits: A fiscal-responsibility ruling is an oversight finding about quantified damage, not a complete account of every cost increase, engineering decision or criminal question; the refinery itself continues operating. The two figures come from a later accountability summary and mix a peso liability with a dollar project finding, so they should not be added. The case demonstrates failed governance and correction through audit, not that large state-led industrial projects are impossible.

• 🇯🇵Japanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019still operating

  GIGA School, one learning device per student

  Japan's MEXT GIGA School programme reached a one-device-per-student environment in 1,810 of 1,812 local school authorities (99.9%) by the end of fiscal 2022, with the remaining two scheduled to finish during fiscal 2023.

  1,810 local school authorities, local school authorities with one-device environment, FY2022. 99.9 % of local school authorities, local school authorities complete, FY2022. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, GIGA School status survey, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The national ministry set a clear one-device standard and channelled grants, procurement guidance and network support through local school authorities, while vendors supplied hardware and software and schools adapted use to their own classrooms.

  Limits: The completion count means a device was in a student's hands and a school network was usable; it does not measure learning, teacher workload, device quality, replacement costs or equal use at home. MEXT reports the authority survey and the last two authorities were still finishing after the reference year. Delivery of hardware is therefore a national implementation milestone, not proof of better education.

• 🇯🇵Japanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1994dismantled

  Monju, a fast-breeder programme ended before commercial operation

  Japan decided in December 2016 not to restart the Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor and moved to decommissioning after a 1995 sodium leak, a 2010 restart followed by equipment trouble and 2012 inspection failures; the approved plan targets roughly 30 years of decommissioning.

  22 years, years from first criticality to decommissioning decision, 2016. 30 years, planned monju decommissioning period, 2018. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Monju decommissioning plan, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: After repeated technical and inspection failures, Japan stopped trying to restart a strategically important prototype, created a government-led decommissioning team and converted the remaining work into a staged thirty-year plan with external oversight and local coordination.

  Limits: The decision to end the programme and its planned duration do not quantify total cost, opportunity cost, safety performance or the amount of equipment actually removed. The government account describes the policy and management failures and the successor decommissioning plan; it is not an independent assessment of the nuclear programme's full social effects.

• 🇵🇪Perulinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016still operating

  Invierte.pe, a national multi-year investment-management system

  Peru's Invierte.pe system tracks public investment across national, regional and local governments; by 25 July 2024 the three levels had executed S/25.939 billion of a S/67.797 billion investment budget, a reported 38.3% advance.

  25,939,000,000 Peruvian soles, public investment executed by 25 july, 2024-07-25. 67,797,000,000 Peruvian soles, 2024 public investment budget, 2024-07-25. Ministry of Economy and Finance, Invierte.pe daily investment-execution report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Peru replaced a project-by-project approval model with a multi-year investment cycle that registers, prioritises and follows projects across government levels, giving the finance ministry a common pipeline and a basis for tracking execution rather than seeing only annual spending requests.

  Limits: Budget execution is an administrative flow, not evidence that projects were selected well, completed on schedule, delivered value or reached underserved regions. The daily report aggregates three government levels and counts expenditure against a budget that can change during the year. A planning-and-monitoring system can make bottlenecks visible without guaranteeing that agencies resolve them.

• 🇵🇪Perulinked to Large project deliverystarted 2017operating below its peak

  Reconstrucción con Cambios, a delayed recovery portfolio

  A 2023 Contraloría control report found the education portfolio of Peru's Reconstrucción con Cambios programme at 36.6% implementation by July 2023 against a 78% milestone expected in the earlier baseline, with the corresponding target date already expired.

  36.6 % implemented, education-portfolio implementation in july 2023, 2023-07. 78 % expected, earlier baseline milestone for education portfolio, 2021-12. Contraloría General de la República del Perú, concurrent control report on Reconstrucción con Cambios, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Peru created a dedicated reconstruction authority and hired government-to-government technical assistance, then used concurrent audit to expose procurement and schedule risks while projects were still moving. The 36.6% result shows that a new delivery wrapper did not automatically clear local preparation and contracting bottlenecks.

  Limits: The comparison is for one education portfolio and one control milestone, not the whole reconstruction programme or every project type. The Contraloría measures implementation against a management baseline; it does not by itself explain land, procurement or design causes, nor the quality and resilience of completed works. The gap shows a delayed delivery path, not that every intervention failed.

• 🇨🇷Costa Ricalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1949still operating

  ICE and a mostly renewable national electricity system

  Costa Rica's integrated electricity system generated 89.4% of its electricity from renewable sources in 2024, while ICE reported electrical coverage reaching 98.7% of households despite one of the country's driest years on record.

  89.4 % of generation, renewable share of electricity generation, 2024. 98.7 % of households, households with electricity coverage, 2024. Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, 2024 renewable-generation report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: A state utility planned generation and controlled the transmission backbone, combining public hydro and geothermal investment with regulated contracts for private and cooperative wind, solar and biomass while extending the distribution grid to remote households.

  Limits: The renewable share and household coverage are outcomes, not a project-by-project cost or schedule record. Hydrology, imports and thermal backup move the annual mix, and the utility report does not independently audit the full lifetime cost, reliability or distributional effects of the generation portfolio.

• 🇨🇷Costa Ricalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1941still operating

  CCSS universal health-insurance reach

  Costa Rica's Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social reported health-insurance coverage of 92.92% of the national population in 2024, using household-survey and administrative records to include contributors, dependents, pensioners and state-covered households.

  92.92 % of population, population covered by the ccss health insurance, 2024. 360,124 people, population recorded as uninsured, 2024. Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, Institutional Memory 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Costa Rica expanded a contributory social-insurance institution into a near-universal insurer-provider by covering dependents, pensioners and state-financed households through a common pool and an integrated primary-care network.

  Limits: Insurance coverage is not the same as timely access, quality, financial protection or equal outcomes, and the estimate comes from a combination of survey and administrative data. It also does not show the operating cost or schedule of the facilities and workforce that make a legal entitlement usable.

• 🇪🇨Ecuadorlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013still operating

  Metro de Quito, a cross-administration urban rail delivery

  Quito opened the first line of its metro in December 2023 after a multi-administration build, and the operator reported more than 54 million passenger trips during 2024 with uninterrupted service.

  54,000,000 trips, passenger trips in the first full year, 2024. 23 % above projection, reported demand above projection, 2024. Empresa Pública Metropolitana Metro de Quito, 2024 accountability report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Quito combined four multilateral lenders, a metropolitan delivery company and an external operator, then renegotiated the operating contract after a suspended launch to clarify responsibilities and restart service across 15 stations.

  Limits: Passenger trips and uninterrupted operation show use after opening, not whether construction met its original cost and schedule or whether the line changes access fairly across Quito. The operator's accountability report is self-reported, and a first-year demand figure cannot establish long-term maintenance or financial sustainability.

• 🇵🇦Panamalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007still operating

  Panama Canal expansion and self-financing operations

  After the third set of locks opened in 2016, the Panama Canal Authority handled 9,944 deep-draft transits and 423 million tonnes of cargo in fiscal year 2024, reporting B/.4.986 billion in total revenue despite climate constraints.

  9,944 transits, deep-draft vessel transits, FY2024. 423,000,000 tonnes, cargo tonnage through the canal, FY2024. Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, fiscal year 2024 results, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Panama put a strategic infrastructure asset under an autonomous public authority with its own revenue, long-term capital programme and technical workforce, then expanded locks and service rules around the needs of global shipping customers.

  Limits: Traffic and revenue show an operating logistics asset, not the expansion's full cost and schedule record, its distributional effects or the counterfactual value of alternative routes. The canal's own results report is not an independent audit of construction performance, and tonnage varies with world trade and vessel mix.

• 🇵🇦Panamalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  Metro de Panamá network operations

  Panama's public metro network, inaugurated in 2014 and expanded with Line 2, transported 118,351,007 passengers in the twelve-month operating period reported in its 2024 institutional memory.

  118,351,007 passengers, passengers transported in the reported year, 2023-11 to 2024-10. 321,519 passengers in one day, peak daily passengers on line 1, 2024-04-30. Metro de Panamá, Institutional Memory 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Panama built a dedicated metro company, sequenced lines around the capital's commuting corridors and combined central financing, concession contracts and an operating workforce so a new line could be integrated into a growing network rather than run as a one-off project.

  Limits: Ridership demonstrates use and operating scale, not whether each line met its original cost or schedule, how much subsidy it requires or whether travel-time gains are shared across the metropolitan area. The operator reports the figures, and a peak day is not a reliability or maintenance measure.

• 🇧🇴Bolivialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  Mi Teleférico urban cable-car network

  Bolivia's Mi Teleférico network carried 78,715,401 passenger trips in 2024; its management report compared that result with a 97.7 million annual volume required for budget balance, or roughly 80% of the target while the system remained in service.

  78,715,401 trips, passenger trips on the mi teleférico network, 2024. 97,700,000 trips, annual passenger volume required for budget balance, 2024 target. Mi Teleférico, 2024 management report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Bolivia treated steep urban mobility as a network problem: a state company linked multiple cable-car lines, integrated fares and stations and expanded service incrementally rather than waiting for a single road corridor to solve access across La Paz and El Alto.

  Limits: Passenger trips show use of the network, not whether construction stayed on schedule, whether fares cover operating and renewal costs or whether travel time and access improved for low-income residents. The budget-balance target is a management benchmark, not an independent estimate of the system's full social value or lifecycle cost.

• 🇧🇴Bolivialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013operating below its peak

  Industrial lithium carbonate plant below design capacity

  Bolivia's state lithium company doubled lithium-carbonate output to 2,064 tonnes in 2024 after its industrial plant began operating, but the Ministry of Economy reported that technical problems with evaporation ponds and the water-treatment plant kept production below the project's projected capacity of 15,000 tonnes a year.

  2,064 metric tonnes, lithium carbonate produced, 2024. 15,000 metric tonnes, projected annual plant capacity, 2024. Bolivia Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, Economic Bulletin 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Bolivia pursued a state-led value chain from brine extraction to industrial lithium carbonate, retaining control of the resource and plant while learning that evaporation chemistry, water treatment and process reliability—not only mine ownership—set the usable production ceiling.

  Limits: Output and design capacity establish a large production gap, but they do not by themselves show the plant's full economics, product quality, environmental effects, downstream contracts or whether the technical bottlenecks were later resolved. The ministry's bulletin is an official macroeconomic account, not an independent engineering or audit report.

• 🇵🇾Paraguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 1984still operating

  Itaipú binational hydropower operations

  Itaipú supplied Paraguay's grid with 20,383 GWh in 2024, 4.5% more than in 2023, while the binational plant generated 67,089 GWh in total and continued operating after four decades of service.

  20,383 GWh, energy supplied to paraguay, 2024. 67,089 GWh, total itaipú generation, 2024. Itaipú Binacional, 2024 production and supply report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Paraguay sustained a technically complex binational asset through a permanent operating institution, shared dispatch and long-horizon maintenance rather than treating the dam as finished when construction ended; the national grid could then convert a cross-border project into domestic energy security.

  Limits: Annual generation and supply show output from an operating asset, not the original cost and schedule, transmission reliability, environmental effects or the distributional consequences of the binational tariff and power-allocation rules. Hydrology strongly affects the yearly number, and the plant's own report is not an independent project audit.

• 🇵🇾Paraguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015dismantled

  Metrobús, an unfinished bus rapid transit project

  Paraguay's planned Asunción Metrobús corridor ended with an incomplete and unviable works package: in April 2024 the Public Prosecutor's Office said the state had paid certificates for works that did not meet the programme's purpose and alleged a G.180.03 billion patrimonial loss.

  180,030,528,699 Paraguayan guaranies, patrimonial harm alleged in the metrobús prosecution, 2024-04. Paraguay Public Prosecutor's Office, Metrobús prosecution notice, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Paraguay attempted a multi-municipality bus rapid transit corridor through a public works contract, but weak design integration, contract management and escalation left paid works disconnected from a functioning service and triggered an ex-post prosecution rather than an operating system.

  Limits: The loss figure is an allegation in an ongoing criminal case, not a final judicial finding or a complete cost-benefit account. The notice establishes that the works were incomplete and did not serve the stated programme, but it does not measure the corridor's intended passenger benefits, the full financing cost or the later value of infrastructure retained by the state.

• 🇦🇷Argentinalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015dismantled

  ARSAT-3 satellite programme suspended before launch

  Argentina's government review found that the ARSAT-3 construction programme, approved in 2015 with a 2019 launch plan, was suspended in 2016–17; the unbuilt satellite forced two later orbital-protection operations and left the original nationwide broadband objective undelivered.

  1 satellite, third satellite left unbuilt after programme suspension, 2021. 2 operations, orbital-protection operations needed after suspension, 2018–2020. Argentina Secretariat of Public Innovation, 2020–2021 management report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Argentina stopped an already contracted satellite mission when financing and programme continuity broke, then had to buy temporary orbital-protection services while a successor design was reconsidered; the episode exposes how a strategic project depends on continuity beyond one administration.

  Limits: The review documents a suspension and its operational consequences, not the complete engineering, procurement or commercial case for a third satellite. ARSAT later reformulated the mission as SG-1, so the record describes the original ARSAT-3 programme's failure to deliver rather than claiming that Argentina abandoned satellite capability altogether.

• 🇵🇭Philippineslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016still operating

  DPWH national infrastructure delivery and transparency portal

  The Philippine Department of Public Works and Highways' live transparency portal records 209,419 completed contracts and 997 terminated contracts out of 258,645 contracts from 2016 to 2026, against ₱6.4 trillion of listed investment.

  209,419 contracts, completed dpwh contracts, 2026. 997 contracts, terminated dpwh contracts, 2026. Philippine Department of Public Works and Highways, infrastructure transparency portal, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: DPWH exposed a national project portfolio with contract, cost, accomplishment and completion fields, making delivery status inspectable across regions instead of leaving infrastructure performance inside agency spreadsheets and press releases.

  Limits: Contract status and listed investment reveal portfolio scale and a public reporting mechanism, not whether projects met their original cost, schedule, quality or maintenance promises. The portal's totals are live and can change as records are uploaded or corrected; they are not an independent value-for-money audit.

• 🇵🇭Philippineslinked to Large project deliverystarted 1976dismantled

  Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, a mothballed megaproject

  The Philippine Department of Energy's 2017 annual report describes the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant as mothballed and records its reassessment as part of a proposed national nuclear programme, after the original plant failed to become an operating power asset.

  1 plant, mothballed nuclear power plants reassessed, 2017. Philippine Department of Energy, 2017 Energy Annual Report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The Philippines carried a completed but mothballed nuclear asset into later policy reviews instead of treating construction as equivalent to usable capability; the plant became a long-lived governance and maintenance obligation while the country reconsidered nuclear power.

  Limits: The report establishes the plant's mothballed status and later reassessment, but not the full historical cost, safety case, debt burden or counterfactual electricity supply. The record concerns the original plant as a delivery outcome; later feasibility studies and nuclear-policy discussions are separate decisions, not evidence that the original project operated.

• 🇮🇩Indonesialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015operating below its peak

  Trans-Sumatra toll-road programme, still short of its planned network

  Indonesia's public-works ministry reported in January 2024 that the Trans-Sumatra toll-road programme had 596 kilometres operating against a 2,749-kilometre planned network, with another 361 kilometres under construction and later phases still in planning.

  596 kilometres, trans-sumatra toll road operating, 2024-01. 2,749 kilometres, trans-sumatra toll-road network planned, 2024-01. Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol, Ministry of Public Works and Housing, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Indonesia held a long corridor together through a state toll-road regulator, a state-owned lead developer and phased concessions, but the sequence exposed how land acquisition, feeder links and demand assumptions can stretch a national build over decades.

  Limits: The 2,749-kilometre figure is the ministry's planned corridor, not a historical operating peak, so this status records a delivery shortfall rather than physical contraction. Kilometres open say nothing about land-acquisition cost, construction overruns, traffic demand, maintenance or whether the links provide value relative to cheaper roads; the source is a ministry progress account rather than an independent audit.

• 🇻🇳Vietnamlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2024still operating

  National expressway build-out in 2024

  Vietnam's Ministry of Transport reported that seven road projects were completed and opened in 2024, bringing the national expressway network to more than 2,021 kilometres.

  2,021 kilometres, national expressway network in operation, 2024. 7 projects, road projects completed and opened in 2024, 2024. Vietnam Ministry of Transport, 2024 sector review published by Quang Ngai Government Portal, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The transport ministry set a national completion pipeline, combined central investment with local site and land coordination, and reported completed links as an expanding network rather than isolated provincial projects.

  Limits: The network total and projects opened are an annual ministry progress account, not a project-by-project cost or schedule audit. Kilometres aggregate roads begun in different years and do not show construction quality, traffic demand, land-acquisition cost or the distribution of benefits between regions.

• 🇻🇳Vietnamlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010operating below its peak

  Cat Linh–Ha Dong metro, a delayed and over-budget delivery

  Vietnam's State Audit reported in 2019 that the Cat Linh–Ha Dong metro's approved investment had risen from VND8,700 billion to VND18,000 billion and that a line originally due in November 2013 was still unfinished after repeated schedule changes.

  18,000 billion Vietnamese dong, approved investment after revision, 2019. 8,700 billion Vietnamese dong, original approved investment, 2009. State Audit of Vietnam, findings reported by the Government News portal, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The first urban-rail project was allowed to proceed with changing designs, slow site handover and a directly appointed foreign EPC contractor, while operating costs were omitted from the initial economic appraisal; late fixes converted a construction delay into a major cost revision.

  Limits: The audit snapshot predates the line's eventual opening, so it records the delivery failure at the decision and construction stage rather than current ridership or service quality. The figures do not provide a full life-cycle cost, safety record or counterfactual transport benefit; the government news report is a summary of the State Audit findings rather than the complete audit file.

• 🇲🇾Malaysialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015still operating

  MRT Putrajaya Line

  Malaysia completed and opened the 57.7-kilometre MRT Putrajaya Line in two phases, with 36 operational stations serving a corridor of about two million people; full operations began on 16 March 2023.

  57.7 kilometres, putrajaya line length, 2023. 36 stations, operational putrajaya line stations, 2023. Mass Rapid Transit Corporation Malaysia, Putrajaya Line project page, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Malaysia created a dedicated state delivery corporation, divided a technically complex urban railway into phases and used interchange stations and park-and-ride facilities to make the new line part of a larger metropolitan network.

  Limits: Length and station counts show the physical delivery, not the line's final cost, construction schedule, reliability, ridership or operating subsidy. The project page is maintained by the state-owned delivery corporation and describes the corridor's intended population and ridership rather than independently audited outcomes.

• 🇲🇾Malaysialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016dismantled

  Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high-speed rail, terminated before construction

  Malaysia allowed the bilateral Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high-speed rail agreement to terminate on 31 December 2020 and paid Singapore SGD102,815,576 in March 2021 for verified costs incurred on the project and for extending its suspension.

  102,815,576 Singapore dollars, compensation paid after hsr agreement termination, 2021-03-29. MyHSR Corporation and Singapore Ministry of Transport, joint compensation statement, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Malaysia used a treaty-level bilateral project to coordinate a cross-border railway, but a change of government, proposed scope changes and successive suspensions exhausted the agreement's final deadline; termination then converted planning work into a compensable sunk cost.

  Limits: The compensation figure records a bilateral settlement, not the full public cost of years of planning, land work or foregone connectivity. No rail construction was delivered; later proposals to revive or redesign a Malaysian line are separate projects, not evidence that this one operated. The 2016 start year (the bilateral agreement) and the earlier suspensions are not stated in the cited compensation statement; MyHSR's FAQ documents the suspension to 31 May 2020.

• 🇹🇭Thailandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1991dismantled

  Hopewell elevated road-and-rail concession, and its termination

  Thailand approved Hopewell's 60-kilometre Bangkok Elevated Road and Train System concession in 1991, but work stalled at 14 percent completion for more than nine months during the 1997 property-market collapse and the government terminated the concession in spring 1998.

  14 % complete, hopewell project construction progress when work stood still, 1997. 60 kilometres, planned multimodal hopewell system length, 1991. World Bank, Cities on the Move: an urban transport strategy review, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The concession bundled transport delivery with property-development revenue and depended on continuous site handover and a rising Bangkok property market. When the boom collapsed, construction stopped, the state and concessionaire lacked a credible re-scoping path, and the government terminated the agreement rather than deliver the promised integrated system.

  Limits: The 14-percent figure is a contemporaneous project-progress estimate in a World Bank case box, not an audited final account of every structure built or every baht spent. Termination records a failed concession and its loss of optionality, not the performance of Bangkok's later rail network. The project combined an elevated road, MRT, railway grade separation and property-development rights, so the failure cannot be assigned to one technical component.

• 🇪🇸Spainlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1992still operating

  AVE high-speed rail network

  Spain expanded high-speed rail from the first Madrid–Seville line in 1992 to more than 4,000 kilometres of high-speed track by 2024; the Transport Ministry reported that the service reached 70 percent of the population.

  4,000 kilometres (more than), high-speed rail tracks, 2024. 70 % of population, population reached by high-speed trains, 2024. Government of Spain, Ministry of Transport statement to the 2024 International Transport Forum, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Spain treated high-speed rail as a long-horizon territorial network, retained a national infrastructure manager and sequenced corridors over multiple administrations. European funding, domestic engineering capacity and a common technical standard let each new line add value to a growing national system.

  Limits: Track length and population reach show a sustained national build-out, not whether each corridor earns its operating cost, how much construction exceeded initial budgets or whether travel shifted from cars and planes. The ministry's statement uses a rounded lower bound for the network and a population denominator rather than land-area coverage. Lines and services opened over three decades under different governments, so the record is not a single-project causal test.

• 🇪🇸Spainlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008dismantled

  Castor underground gas storage, and its closure

  Spain extinguished the Castor underground gas-storage concession in October 2014 after seismic events halted operation; the state transferred administration to Enagás and the decree recognised €1.350729 billion in compensation for the former concessionaire, with recovery structured over 30 years.

  1,350,729,000 euros, compensation recognised for the extinguished castor concession, 2014. 30 years, recovery period authorised through the gas-system charge, 2014. Boletín Oficial del Estado, Royal Decree-Law 13/2014 and subsequent constitutional review, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: The state granted a private concession for strategic gas storage, then halted injection when induced seismicity made operation unacceptable and transferred administration to the system operator. The exit preserved the physical asset and safety responsibility but socialised a large compensation claim, showing how a rapid stop can still leave a long fiscal tail.

  Limits: The compensation and recovery period show the fiscal and legal consequences of closing the facility, not the full construction cost, the number of earthquakes caused or the eventual cost of sealing the wells. The concession was extinguished and the facility placed in hibernation, with later court decisions changing parts of the payment mechanism. This is evidence of a project that could not be operated safely, not a claim that every underground storage project has the same risk.

• 🇵🇱Polandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2018dismantled

  Ostrołęka C coal block, and its abandonment

  Poland began the 1,000-MW Ostrołęka C coal-block project in 2018 without full financing, suspended construction in 2020 and demolished the built elements in 2021; the Supreme Audit Office later found that the unfinished investment consumed more than PLN1.5 billion.

  1,500,000,000 Polish złoty (more than), cost of the unfinished ostrołęka c investment, 2025. 1,000 megawatts (about), planned electrical capacity of the abandoned coal block, 2018. Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Audit Office), Ostrołęka C closure audit, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Poland committed to a large coal unit before its financing, fuel assumptions and climate-policy fit were fully re-tested. When the economics and policy context changed, the state-owned investors suspended the build and converted the site toward gas, but only after construction and contractual obligations had made the exit costly.

  Limits: The audit's cost figure covers the investment and its close-out as assessed by NIK, not every wider system cost or the value of the later gas-fired replacement. The project was a state-owned-company investment rather than a conventional central-government budget line, and the audit is a retrospective accountability finding. Abandonment can prevent further losses, but it does not recover the sunk expenditure or prove that every original energy-security objective was mistaken.

• 🇸🇪Swedenlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  Nya Karolinska Solna public–private hospital project

  Stockholm delivered Nya Karolinska Solna through a 30-year public–private partnership: the official inquiry reports SEK 22.8 billion for construction and equipment, a projected SEK 57 billion total through 2040 including operation and maintenance, and an external comparison that found construction 53% more expensive per square metre than Scandinavian hospitals.

  22,800,000,000 Swedish kronor, nya karolinska construction and equipment investment, 2020. 53 % above Scandinavian comparison hospitals, estimated construction cost premium per square metre, 2020. Swedish Government Official Inquiry SOU 2020:15, published by Sveriges riksdag, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Stockholm bundled design, construction, financing, operations and maintenance into a long PPP contract, transferring construction risk and locking in a lifecycle payment model. The inquiry shows the trade-off: a complex hospital was delivered and remains in use, but the long contract and specification changes made the full cost harder to compare and challenge.

  Limits: The inquiry distinguishes the 22.8 billion construction-and-equipment investment from the 57 billion projection through 2040, which includes operations, maintenance, financing and additions; those figures are not a like-for-like cash budget. The 53% comparison is an external estimate with explanations including higher standards, site conditions, schedule and PPP risk transfer, so it does not isolate one causal failure or measure clinical performance.

• 🇸🇪Swedenlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1970dismantled

  Barsebäck nuclear plant closure and decommissioning

  Sweden permanently shut Barsebäck 1 in 1999 and Barsebäck 2 in 2005; the national nuclear-safety report lists each reactor at 615 MWe and records the site as undergoing decommissioning, a 1,230-MWe asset retirement completed by political decision rather than construction failure.

  1,230 megawatts electrical (2 × 615 MWe), net electrical capacity permanently retired at barsebäck, 2005. 2 reactors, barsebäck reactors permanently shut, 2005. Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Sweden's Tenth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Sweden converted a political decision into a regulated, staged retirement: operators removed fuel, kept the site under care and maintenance, and moved toward dismantling under the nuclear-safety authority's oversight. The capability is visible in the exit path and accountability after closure, not only in the original build.

  Limits: Retiring a nuclear asset is evidence about a state's ability to close and decommission a major system, not about whether the original plant was safe, economical or replaceable without wider grid effects. Capacity is nameplate output rather than annual generation, and the record does not quantify replacement power, compensation or the final decommissioning cost.

• 🇮🇪Irelandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016operating below its peak

  New Children's Hospital cost escalation

  Ireland's New Children's Hospital project saw its approved budget rise from €1.73 billion to €2.24 billion by February 2024 after an independent review recorded €450 million of earlier escalation and weaknesses in set-up, planning, execution and governance.

  2,240,000,000 euros, current approved budget for the hospital project and programme, 2024-02. 1,730,000,000 euros, previously approved budget, 2022. Department of Health, Government of Ireland, New Children's Hospital budget approval, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Ireland kept a politically necessary hospital project moving after cost escalation, but the state had to reset the budget and strengthen assurance rather than re-tender. The case makes the value of early challenge visible: once design, contracts and site work are locked, correcting an underestimated scope becomes more expensive than revising the approval.

  Limits: The approved budget includes the main hospital, satellite centres, commissioning, information systems and service integration, so it is not a pure construction-cost comparison. The 2019 review attributes escalation to several interacting factors, and the project was still being delivered when the 2024 budget was approved; the record therefore shows an eroded cost and governance promise, not a completed outcome evaluation.

• 🇳🇮Nicaragualinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007still operating

  Rural electrification and near-universal grid coverage

  Nicaragua's Ministry of Energy and Mines reported national electricity coverage of 99.575% in December 2024 after public electrification projects brought power to 732,427 homes and 3,853,005 people.

  99.575 % of households with electricity, national electricity coverage, 2024-12. 732,427 homes, homes electrified through the reported programme, 2024-12. Nicaragua Ministry of Energy and Mines, Electricity Coverage 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Nicaragua combined public transmission and distribution investment with rural electrification projects, tracking household coverage as a national delivery target. Extending the grid into remote departments and reporting the remaining gap made a dispersed infrastructure task legible as one programme.

  Limits: The ministry's coverage and home counts show connection reach, not continuity, affordability, voltage quality, reliability, losses, maintenance or regional inequality. They are government administrative estimates, and the long-run change from the 2006 baseline does not isolate which projects, utilities or financing streams produced the increase.

• 🇻🇪Venezuelalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2011still operating

  Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela's five-million-home milestone

  Venezuela's Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela reported delivery of its five-millionth home on 7 June 2024, with the programme saying that community self-construction supplied 75% of its construction in the preceding four years.

  5,000,000 homes, homes delivered by gran misión vivienda venezuela, 2024-06-07. 75 % of construction, reported share of construction through self-construction, 2024-06-07. Radio Nacional de Venezuela, report on the GMVV five-million-home milestone, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Venezuela used a central housing mission to aggregate land, materials and public construction while shifting more of the build into community self-construction. A national target and local delivery groups linked a large capital programme to household-level participation.

  Limits: The cumulative total is reported by Venezuela's state broadcaster and does not establish independent verification, construction quality, occupancy, maintenance, location, tenure security, cost or whether every unit was newly built rather than rehabilitated. The 75% self-construction figure is a programme claim, and the source supplies no audited project-level cost or schedule data.

• 🇵🇹Portugallinked to Large project deliverystarted 2021still operating

  Plano de Recuperação e Resiliência delivery governance

  Portugal's PRR barometer recorded €21.9 billion across 121 investments and 43 reforms, with €14.43 billion paid to beneficiaries by 27 August 2026.

  14,431,510,367.98 EUR paid, prr funds paid, 2026-08-27. 121 investments, investments in the plan, 2026-08-27. Portal Mais Transparência / Estrutura de Missão Recuperar Portugal, PRR barometer, retrieved 2026-08-31.

  How it worked: Portugal bound a large cross-government investment programme to a reform-and-milestone schedule, central monitoring and payment requests, while leaving implementation to ministries, public bodies, firms and local beneficiaries. The financing contract creates a common delivery clock across otherwise separate projects.

  Limits: Funds paid, investment counts and reform counts are programme inputs and milestones, not completed infrastructure, cost and schedule performance or long-run outcomes. The plan is EU-funded and centrally coordinated but executed through many ministries and beneficiaries; the barometer's aggregate totals cannot attribute results to one delivery unit or show which projects will remain useful after the funding window closes.

• 🇵🇹Portugallinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010dismantled

  Lisbon–Madrid high-speed rail concession, formally abandoned

  Portugal's 2011 Council of Ministers formally abandoned the previous Lisbon–Madrid high-speed rail project, replacing its passenger priority with a freight connection through Sines, Lisbon, Setúbal, Poceirão and Madrid.

  1 project, high-speed rail projects formally abandoned, 2011-11-10. Diário da República, Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 45/2011, retrieved 2026-09-02.

  How it worked: Under fiscal pressure, the government stopped a politically committed passenger megaproject by resolution and redirected the corridor toward freight interoperability, changing the objective before further construction commitments accumulated.

  Limits: The number is categorical: one formally abandoned national project. The resolution records a policy reversal, not the project's final cost, the amount already spent or a completed line; the replacement freight priority and a later revival of high-speed planning mean this is evidence of stop-and-reframe capacity, not proof that Portugal solved rail delivery.

• 🇮🇳Indialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003operating below its peak

  Delhi Commonwealth Games, and the cost-estimate escalation

  India and Delhi hosted the Commonwealth Games in October 2010, but the Comptroller and Auditor General recorded the total estimate rising from ₹1,200 crore in the May 2003 bid to ₹18,532.31 crore by October 2010.

  18,532.31 INR crore, total estimated expenditure by october 2010, 2010-10. 1,200 INR crore, initial bid estimate, 2003-05. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit of XIXth Commonwealth Games, retrieved 2026-09-02.

  How it worked: A multi-agency event was delivered against an immovable deadline, but scope changes, late procurement and fragmented governance allowed the budget estimate to expand more than fifteen-fold between the bid and the event.

  Limits: The Games were delivered, so this is not a failed event; it documents erosion of the original cost promise. The CAG compares estimates assembled at different stages and scopes, and the October 2010 figure is not a single audited final-cost total. The audit identifies fragmented planning, late decisions and weak controls but does not attribute every rupee of the increase to one cause.

• 🇿🇦South Africalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  MeerKAT radio telescope, a delivered national research facility

  South Africa's National Research Foundation and SARAO completed the 64-dish MeerKAT radio telescope in March 2018 on schedule and on budget, then began science operations as a precursor to the Square Kilometre Array.

  64 dishes, meerkat dishes completed, 2018-03. South African Radio Astronomy Observatory, National Research Foundation, retrieved 2026-09-02.

  How it worked: A national research agency led a staged telescope build, using prototype arrays, local engineering and university and industry partners to test components before integrating the full 64-dish facility in the Karoo.

  Limits: SARAO's institutional account states that the array was on schedule and on budget but does not publish an audited cost or baseline schedule in this record. Sixty-four dishes prove physical completion, not scientific productivity, local industrial spillovers or the performance of the larger SKA programme into which MeerKAT is being integrated.

• 🇲🇽Mexicolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019still operating

  CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos

  Mexico's state telecom operator CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos installed 113,683 free public internet sites by September 2024, reaching 81.2 percent of its stated 140,000-site 2025 goal.

  113,683 sites, free public internet sites installed, 2024-09. 81.2 % of goal, share of the 2025 site goal reached, 2024-09. CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.

  How it worked: A state-owned carrier combined satellite, fibre, copper and mobile contracts with public access points, using a federal operator to reach places commercial networks had not served.

  Limits: The management report is self-reported and counts installed sites, not uptime, geographic service quality, affordability after the free offer or actual use. The 81.2 percent figure is calculated from the report's installed count and stated goal, and the programme was still short of that goal at the reference date.

• 🇲🇽Mexicolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014dismantled

  New International Airport of Mexico, and its cancellation

  Mexico cancelled the partially built Texcoco airport after construction and contracts had begun; the government's 2019 cancellation paper estimated a 100 billion peso cancellation cost, including 60 billion pesos already spent and 40 billion in non-recoverable commitments.

  100,000,000,000 Mexican pesos, government estimate of cancellation cost, 2019-04-26. 60,000,000,000 Mexican pesos, construction expenditure already incurred at cancellation, 2019-04-26. Grupo Aeroportuario de la Ciudad de México, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.

  How it worked: A new administration stopped a politically contested megaproject, terminated contracts and redirected the airport strategy to a different site, accepting sunk costs in exchange for a different delivery path.

  Limits: The 100 billion peso figure is the government's own estimate and excludes or treats differently the financing and legal costs that later audits and congressional analyses debated. Cancellation is evidence of a project running backwards and of a political decision to change course, not evidence that the replacement airport delivered better value or schedule performance.

• 🇹🇷Turkeylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2004still operating

  Marmaray, the Bosphorus rail crossing

  Türkiye opened the Marmaray rail tunnel between Europe and Asia in October 2013 and the transport ministry reported 196 million passenger journeys in 2024, with 1.226 billion cumulative journeys since opening.

  196,000,000 journeys, marmaray passenger journeys in 2024, 2024. 1,226,000,000 journeys, cumulative passenger journeys since opening, 2024-12-20. Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Government of Türkiye, retrieved 2026-09-03.

  How it worked: The state assembled a cross-Bosphorus rail link, integrated it with existing suburban lines and then built ridership through frequent service rather than treating the tunnel as a stand-alone monument.

  Limits: Passenger journeys show that the completed line is used at scale, not whether construction met its original budget or schedule. The ministry's cumulative figure is a programme-reported total, and ridership also reflects Istanbul's population, fares and the network of connecting lines rather than the tunnel alone.

• 🇹🇷Turkeylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2011still operating

  FATİH education technology infrastructure

  Türkiye's Ministry of National Education reported that the FATİH project had installed 620,000 interactive classroom boards by 2023 and signed a five-year TÜRKSAT service contract covering about 2,000 schools.

  620,000 boards, interactive boards installed under fati̇h, 2023. 2,000 schools, schools covered by the continuing service contract, 2023. Ministry of National Education, Government of Türkiye, retrieved 2026-09-03.

  How it worked: The education ministry treated classroom hardware, connectivity and content as one procurement programme, then used a national telecom operator for continuing access rather than ending delivery at installation.

  Limits: Equipment counts show installation, not whether teachers use the boards or whether learning improved. The ministry reports the hardware and contract itself, and the article does not give a national uptime, maintenance-cost or student-outcome series; the 2,000-school contract is a subset of the wider rollout.

• 🇹🇷Turkeylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2017dismantled

  YEKA RES-1 renewable tender, and its cancellation

  Türkiye signed the 1,000 MWe YEKA RES-1 wind contract in February 2018 and completed its factory and R&D centre in 2019, but the Energy Ministry records that the contract was cancelled under a 2024 law.

  1,000 MWe, wind capacity under the cancelled yeka res-1 contract, 2024-05-11. 2 milestones, factory and r&d-centre milestones completed before cancellation, 2019. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Government of Türkiye, retrieved 2026-09-03.

  How it worked: The state tied a renewable auction to domestic manufacturing and research obligations, then later used a statutory change to cancel the contract despite preparatory industrial facilities having been completed.

  Limits: The ministry page establishes the contract, capacity, factory and R&D milestones and the later cancellation, but it does not publish the cancellation cost, foregone generation or the reasons for the legislative change. Counting two completed facilities is a direct count of the page's milestones, not an independent audit of their operation; cancellation is evidence about delivery durability rather than renewable output.

• 🇨🇭Switzerlandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1998delivered and closed

  Gotthard Base Tunnel

  Switzerland built the 57 km Gotthard Base Tunnel under the voter-approved NEAT programme and opened it to commercial traffic on 11 December 2016, on the date set, at a final cost forecast of CHF 9.541 billion against a 1998 cost basis of CHF 6.323 billion, both in 1998 prices.

  51 % overrun, 1998 prices, cost growth against the 1998 cost basis, gotthard axis including connections, 2016. 0 months late, commercial opening against the scheduled timetable change, 2016. Swiss Federal Assembly, NEAT supervisory delegation (NAD), report on the oversight of NEAT construction in 2016, BBl 2017 5413, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Voters approved the programme and a ring-fenced rail fund, parliament set a total credit and a standing supervisory delegation that reports every year, and a single-purpose federal subsidiary, AlpTransit Gotthard, built it under that oversight.

  Limits: The 51 percent is computed from the NAD's Table 2 (6,323 to 9,541 million francs, 1998 prices) and is not a headline the publisher states. That column mixes true overrun with scope added after 1998, including extra safety works and the Sedrun geology, so a like-for-like overrun would be lower. The cost basis is in real 1998 francs; the nominal bill, about CHF 12.2 billion with inflation, VAT and interest according to the Federal Office of Transport, is larger. On schedule means against the timetable fixed late in the project, which the NAD calls on time, not against the opening years implied by the 1992 vote. The started year is the 1998 financing vote; main construction contracts followed. The source is a PDF and the figures sit in Table 2 and section 1.8.

• 🇰🇪Kenyalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  Standard Gauge Railway, Mombasa to Naivasha

  Kenya Railways began building the Standard Gauge Railway in financial year 2014/15, completed the 472 km Mombasa to Nairobi Phase I in 2017, and opened the 120 km Phase 2A to Naivasha in September 2019 against a September 2017 start and an 18-month plan, about six months late; the line hauled 7.33 million tonnes of freight in 2025.

  18 months, planned construction period of sgr phase 2a (sept 2017 start, ksh 155.5 billion), against which the line opened in september 2019, about six months (a third) late, 2017. 7,332 thousand tonnes, freight hauled on the sgr, 2025. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2018, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Treasury and Kenya Railways contracted a Chinese state contractor on a design-build-supply basis with Exim Bank finance, which put construction risk and speed on the contractor and left financing, land acquisition and traffic risk with the state.

  Limits: No official source found publishes the outturn cost of either phase against its budget, so the record carries a cost plan (KSh 155.5 billion for Phase 2A) and no cost performance. That is the half of the construct that matters most for a Chinese-financed turnkey contract. The schedule overrun of about six months on Phase 2A, or a third of the 18-month plan, is computed: the plan is from KNBS, and the opening is from the Ministry of Roads and Transport Strategic Plan 2023-2027 draft ('completed Phase 2A ... and was launched for operation in September 2019', https://www.transport.go.ke/sites/default/files/DRAFT%20FINAL%20MINISTERIAL%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN%202023-27%20FEB%202024%20.pdf). Phase I's schedule against its plan cannot be checked from an official copy. The National Assembly's 2014 Public Investments Committee report giving a December 2016 completion date and a USD 3.804 billion contract price was found only on an NGO mirror. The parliamentary repository timed out, so neither figure is used. The railway was meant to run to Malaba and into Uganda, and the Naivasha to Malaba section remained unbuilt for years. The same ministry plan reports rail carrying 19 percent of port throughput in 2021 against a 50 percent target for 2030. Freight tonnage is published by KNBS from Kenya Railways returns. Debt service and fiscal cost are not shown at all.

• 🇨🇦Canadalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1998dismantled

  Canadian long-gun registry, its information system overrun and its dismantling

  Canada began registering all firearms under the 1995 Firearms Act from December 1998. The registry's first information system, CFIS I, had an initial estimate of $13 to 20 million and had cost $190 million by March 2005. Its successor CFIS II rose from $32 million to at least $87 million and was halted. In 2012 Parliament ended long-gun registration and ordered the destruction of about 7.5 million non-restricted registration records, which the RCMP deleted from CFIS in October 2012.

  190,000,000 Canadian dollars, cost of the canadian firearms information system (cfis i), against an initial estimate of $13 to 20 million, 2005-03. 7,500,000 registration records, non-restricted firearms registration records in cfis when parliament ordered their destruction, 2012-04. House of Commons of Canada, Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Report 10 (39th Parliament, 1st Session), on Chapter 4 of the May 2006 Report of the Auditor General, Canadian Firearms Program, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Department of Justice, and later the Canada Firearms Centre, built a universal national registry through contracted IT development while the regulations it had to implement were still changing, and reported the rising cost to ministers before Parliament. In 2012 Parliament ended the long-gun part by statute and had the RCMP destroy its records.

  Limits: The cost figure is a Commons committee's summary of the Auditor General's 2006 follow-up. The Auditor General's own 2002 and 2006 chapters no longer open at their published OAG URLs, so the record rests on Parliament's restatement of them. The $190 million covers CFIS I, the information system, and is not the cost of the whole programme. The often quoted figure of roughly $1 billion for the programme could not be verified at an official URL today and is not used. The baseline is a range of $13 to 20 million given at an early stage, so any overrun ratio, roughly ten times, depends on which end is chosen and on how far the scope of that early estimate matched the system that was built. The committee itself attributes part of the growth to things outside the project team's control: requirements kept changing, and Bill C-10 and its regulations were delayed by more than two years. The dismantling in 2012 was a political decision by a new parliamentary majority. It was not a collapse caused by the delivery, so the status records a policy reversal rather than a technical failure. Licensing and the registry of restricted and prohibited firearms kept running, Quebec residents' records were held back pending litigation, and public agencies still register. The 7.5 million records show the scale the registry reached and say nothing about their accuracy, which the 2006 audit questioned. Like can-phoenix, this is a public IT system rather than physical infrastructure.

• 🇮🇱Israellinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015still operating

  Tel Aviv light rail Red Line

  Israel's government approved the Red Line in December 2010 at an estimated NIS 10.7 billion, and NTA, the state-owned company delivering it, began the main construction works in 2015. By October 2021 the cost estimate had reached NIS 18.71 billion, about 75% above the original, and the completion date had been postponed six times, by about five years in total. The 24 km line opened in August 2023, and in December 2025 the State Comptroller put its construction cost at NIS 18.8 billion.

  75 % overrun, increase in the red line cost estimate over the december 2010 government estimate of nis 10.7 billion, 2021-10. 5 years, cumulative postponement of the red line completion date across six postponements, 2021-10. State Comptroller of Israel, The Progress of the Light Rail Project in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area, November 2022, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The government set the budget and target date by resolution in 2010 and handed delivery to NTA, a state-owned company. NTA revised the cost estimate at least eight times and moved the opening date six times, most of them before main construction began, and still brought the line into service in 2023.

  Limits: The 75% overrun is the audit's figure for the October 2021 estimate and includes indexation. Net of price-index linkage and a VAT cut, the audit puts the real increase at about NIS 7.46 billion, or 69.7%. The audit was finished before the line opened, so the overrun is measured on an estimate rather than a final account. The December 2025 audit's NIS 18.8 billion construction cost comes from a security audit and is not a reconciled final cost. The five-year delay counts slippage to the then target of 2022. The line actually opened in August 2023, about six years after the original 2017 date, so the figure understates the final schedule slip. Most postponements came before main construction began in 2015, so a hostile reader would call them planning slippage rather than construction delay. The project is national in its funding, its government resolution and its state-owned delivery company, but it serves one metropolitan area, and one line is a single case and not a national delivery record. The audit's per-kilometre comparisons with other cities are not used here. Ridership is not established: the 300,000 passengers a day in the 2025 audit is NTA's forecast. The audit also found the framework agreement between NTA and the finance and transport ministries still unsigned more than 20 years after the company was founded.

• 🇨🇳Chinalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003still operating

  National high-speed rail network

  China's railway authorities built a high-speed rail network that the National Railway Administration put at about 47,000 km in operation in December 2024, from a programme that began in 2003; a World Bank review of the 27 lines in operation at the end of 2013 found a weighted average approved unit cost of RMB 129m per km for 350 km/h lines, which it put at no more than two-thirds of costs elsewhere.

  47,000 km (about), high-speed rail track in operation, 2024-12. 129 RMB million per km, weighted average unit cost of 350 km/h lines, approved estimates, lines in operation at end 2013, 2013. Statement of the National Railway Administration of China reported by Xinhua, on the State Council portal (english.www.gov.cn), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The former Ministry of Railways and its successors standardised designs, viaduct and station types and procurement across a national programme, then built continuously for two decades, so each line reused the previous line's templates, supply chain and crews.

  Limits: Neither number is the overrun this gap asks for. The World Bank unit cost is built from estimated cost at project approval, not out-turn cost, so it cannot show whether lines came in over or under budget; the note itself warns that the data exist only in aggregate, that expenditures fall in different years and may not be comparable, and that its inputs come from China Railway and former Ministry of Railways publications. It is a 2014 staff note in a working series, covering about 10,000 km built by 2013, not the 47,000 km now operating, and the World Bank lends to Chinese railway projects. The 47,000 km figure is a rounded administrative statement by the regulator, relayed by Xinhua on the State Council portal, not a statistical table. Neither source shows the financing side: the debt carried by China State Railway Group and its predecessor, the low traffic density on many later lines, or the 2011 Wenzhou collision and the corruption cases at the former Ministry of Railways. Low unit cost also reflects cheap labour and land acquisition terms that are not institutional choices other countries can copy. No schedule-performance figure was found at an official URL.

• 🇦🇪United Arab Emirateslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant

  The UAE, through the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and under licences from the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation issued from 2010, built four APR-1400 reactors at Barakah that ENEC reported in September 2024 were all in commercial operation and providing up to 25 percent of the UAE's electricity; Unit 1 entered commercial operation on 6 April 2021, about four years after the 2017 date the regulator recorded in its 2012 construction licence review.

  25 % of UAE electricity (up to, as reported), share of uae electricity supplied by barakah, all four units operating, 2024. 4 years (about), unit 1 commercial operation delay against the 2012 licensing plan (computed: april 2021 against a planned 2017), 2021. Abu Dhabi Government Media Office, release on Barakah Unit 4 commercial operation (statement of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The UAE federal government set a nuclear policy in 2008, created an independent regulator (FANR) and a single owner-developer (ENEC), and bought a proven reactor design with a turnkey contract, so the state managed one prime contractor against one reference plant rather than a first-of-a-kind design.

  Limits: The 25 percent is the operator reporting on itself, relayed by the Abu Dhabi government's media office, and it is phrased as "up to": it is a capacity claim, not a measured share of national generation in a given year, and no statistical series was opened to confirm it. The schedule figure is computed by us from two documents, a 2012 regulator statement that the first unit was planned for 2017 and the 2021 commercial-operation release; it is a slip of roughly four years for Unit 1 only, and the later units' original dates were not found at an official URL. The plant's construction cost, and any cost overrun, are not published in any source opened, so the cost half of the construct is missing. The reactors were designed and built by a KEPCO-led Korean consortium on the Shin-Kori 3 and 4 reference design, so the UAE's institutional contribution is commissioning, licensing, financing and operating, not engineering. ENEC is an Abu Dhabi entity and the plant sits in one emirate, though it supplies the national grid under federal regulation. The operator's own boast of "a 40 per cent improvement in schedule" from Unit 1 to Unit 4 measures operational readiness to commercial operation, not construction, and is not used here.

• 🇭🇳Honduraslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016still operating

  Aeropuerto Internacional de Palmerola

  Honduras's Infrastructure Secretariat concessioned the Palmerola international airport to Palmerola International Airport S.A., with a USD 87.1 million reference investment. Works began on 5 December 2016 and operations on 11 December 2021, about 60 months after works began, against a 61-month contracted works period (start of operation is not necessarily completion of works).

  60 months, months from start of works (2016-12-05) to start of operation (2021-12-11), computed, 2021-12. 61 months, contracted works execution period, 2016. Superintendencia de Alianza Público Privada (SAPP), Honduras, Palmerola concession fact sheet, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Honduras's Infrastructure Secretariat let a 34-and-a-half-year concession with a fixed works period, had Congress approve it and a trust carry it, and left SAPP and a supervising consortium to hold the concessionaire to the schedule.

  Limits: The schedule figure is ours, computed from two dates on the regulator's fact sheet: about 60 months against a 61-month contracted period. The sheet does not say whether the works period was amended, extended or suspended, or whether 'start of operation' means full completion. The only cost figure is a reference investment set at signature. No final cost, cost overrun or state contribution is published there, so this record shows schedule performance only and is silent on cost, which is half of what the indicator asks. The terminal was built at an existing air base with a runway, which makes it an easier build than a greenfield airport. SAPP is the concession's own regulator. Other SAPP sheets carry copy errors (the EEH sheet cites airport revenues), so treat field values with care. Passenger demand, the concession's financial health and whether the airport displaced Toncontín as intended are not shown.

• 🇸🇻El Salvadorlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008delivered and closed

  El Chaparral (3 de Febrero) hydroelectric plant

  El Salvador's state hydro commission CEL financed the El Chaparral hydroelectric plant on the Torola River through a BCIE loan arranged in September 2008, with four planned years of construction, and inaugurated it as the 3 de Febrero plant on 19 October 2023 at an approximate cost of US$800 million; CEL gives the initial investment as US$207.8 million, so the final cost is about 3.8 times the initial figure, some 15 years after the 2008 loan.

  800 US$ million, approximate final cost of the 3 de febrero (el chaparral) hydroelectric plant, stated at inauguration, 2023-10-19. 207.8 US$ million, initial investment of the el chaparral project, as stated by cel in 2022, 2022. Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del Río Lempa (CEL), inauguration notice for the 3 de Febrero hydroelectric plant, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: CEL contracted a 65.8 MW dam, financed by BCIE loans the Assembly guaranteed, and when the original design failed it refinanced a redesign through two further BCIE loans and completed the plant under a later government. Successive administrations kept financing the asset rather than abandoning it, at the price of a cost multiple.

  Limits: Both cost figures come from the executing agency reporting on its own project, and both are stated loosely: the final figure is the President's "costo aproximado" quoted in a CEL news item, not an audited account, and CEL's own 2022 notice gave the final cost as "more than $750 million" while the President's speech gave the initial cost as $200 million rather than $207.8 million. The overrun ratio of about 3.8 is our computation from two different documents, and CEL gives the initial figure with no year: it appears to be the price for a design later replaced after technical failures, so part of the gap reflects a changed scope, not only cost escalation; no figure separates the two. The cost statements are politically framed, attributing the overrun to previous governments, and the government that completed the plant is the source. No Court of Accounts final audit was retrieved. The start year rests on the date of the first BCIE loan reported by the Assembly, not on a published construction start date, and the 15-year span is computed from that date to inauguration; the four-year planned duration comes only from the President's quoted speech. The figures say nothing about the plant's output, which is 65.8 MW of installed capacity per the Assembly page.

• 🇻🇪Venezuelalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1980operating below its peak

  Programa Ampliado de Inmunizaciones, and its erosion

  WHO and UNICEF estimated Venezuela's national DTP3 coverage among one-year-olds at 50 percent in 2025, down from 87 percent in 2015, and coverage has not returned above 66 percent in any year since 2017.

  50 % of 1-year-olds, estimated dtp3 coverage among 1-year-olds, 2025. 87 % of 1-year-olds, estimated dtp3 coverage at the 2015 peak, 2015. World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory: DTP3 immunization coverage among 1-year-olds (WUENIC), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Venezuela's health ministry ran a free national schedule through public clinics and held DTP3 near or above 80 percent for most of 2009 to 2016; when national procurement of vaccines and syringes failed during the economic collapse, the ministry kept the programme formally in place while coverage fell to around half of infants.

  Limits: Construct fit is borrowed, not literal: DTP3 coverage is not the cost or schedule performance of an infrastructure project. It is filed here only on the bra-pni precedent, which EVIDENCE.md names as the reversal template (hti-immunization-erosion files the same kind of series under disaster_preparedness instead); a reviewer holding to the literal construct should reject it. The 87 percent peak is a single good year in a volatile series (50 in 2008, 87 in 2005 and 2015), and the WHO/UNICEF 2022-revision country profile (https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/country-profiles/immunization/2023-country-profiles/immunization_ven_2023.pdf) says the 2015 rise was 'due in part to a change in the population source', so part of the drop is a denominator artefact. Estimates rest on Venezuelan administrative reports with no nationally representative survey in the last five years; WHO/UNICEF graded recent years as having no accepted empirical data, and values are revised between rounds (2022 was 56 in the 2022 revision and 43 now). The same profile records national vaccine and syringe stockouts from 2016 to 2020, which locates the failure in supply rather than in the programme's design, but the series cannot separate economic collapse, emigration of health workers, sanctions-era procurement limits and denominator error. DTP3 is one antigen. PAHO separately documented that endemic measles transmission was re-established in Venezuela in 2018 and interrupted again in 2019 (https://journal.paho.org/en/articles/comprehensive-approach-achieving-reverification-measles-elimination-venezuela-2019-2023), which supports the erosion but is not part of this metric.

• 🇭🇹Haitilinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008dismantled

  PetroCaribe-financed public investment programme, and its audited failure

  From September 2008 to September 2016, Haiti's Council of Ministers allocated PetroCaribe oil-credit revenue to 409 public projects, and the state fuel monetisation bureau BMPAD disbursed US$1,605,905,287.84 (92.4% of the revised budget), but the Superior Court of Auditors (CSCCA) found cost and schedule overruns across the audited works, including a Cap-Haïtien street rehabilitation that ran 18% over budget and took 21 months against an eight-month contract term.

  1,605,905,287.84 US dollars (cumulative, 92.4% of revised budget of US$1,738,691,909.70), petrocaribe project funds disbursed by bmpad across 409 council-of-ministers projects, 2008-09 to 2016-09. 18 % over contract amount, budget overrun on the audited cap-haïtien street rehabilitation, phase 1 (mtptc), 2010-03-18 start, completed in 21 months. Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (CSCCA), Audit spécifique de gestion du fonds PetroCaribe, rapport 3 (August 2020), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Successive Haitian governments turned Venezuelan oil credit into a parallel capital budget, approving projects by Council-of-Ministers resolution under emergency law and having ministries such as MTPTC and MPCE award contracts directly. Spending reached US$1.6 billion, but without needs analysis, cost estimates or contract supervision, many works overran, stalled or could not be verified, and the money stopped when the oil credit ended.

  Limits: The headline number is money disbursed, not works delivered: the CSCCA itself says missing reception certificates often stop it concluding whether a contract was finished or abandoned, and it documents abandoned works such as the Miragoâne market and bus station, stopped at 35.27% progress, a figure from report 1 (31 January 2019). The court publishes no aggregate cost or schedule overrun for the 409 projects. The 18% overrun is one audited road project picked as the cost figure, with no claim that it is typical; other audited projects show overruns of 9%, 10%, 33% and 54% against contract (reports 1 and 3), and some came in under budget. Report 1 gives the Cap-Haïtien contract an 8-month term but a contractual end date of 14 May 2011 (start 18 March 2010), so the schedule overrun is 21 months against 8 or against about 14 depending on which line of the court's own sheet is read. The audit covers a sample of projects across three reports of roughly 1,000 pages each, every figure has to be read out of a PDF, and contractors contested several findings in report 3's annex. The 'dismantled' status rests on the audit ledger: the last resolution is dated 28 September 2016 and Venezuelan PetroCaribe supply then collapsed; no single Haitian text formally closing the programme was located. Projects were executed in a post-earthquake state of emergency that suspended normal procurement rules, which the court says enabled direct awards.

• 🇺🇸United Stateslinked to Large project deliverystarted 1956delivered and closed

  Interstate Highway System

  Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the federal government and the states built the Interstate System. In nominal dollars, the estimated federal cost to complete it rose from $34 billion in the 1958 Interstate Cost Estimate to $114 billion in the final estimate of 1991.

  114 USD billion, estimated federal cost to complete the interstate system, final (1991) interstate cost estimate, nominal, 1991. 34 USD billion, estimated federal cost to complete the interstate system, first (1958) interstate cost estimate, nominal, 1958. US Federal Highway Administration, Highway History: How many Interstate programs were there?, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Congress set a 90 percent federal match paid from a dedicated Highway Trust Fund fed by fuel taxes, and the Bureau of Public Roads (later FHWA) apportioned it to state highway departments by repeated cost-to-complete estimates, which let the states build to one national standard on a pay-as-you-go basis.

  Limits: Both figures are in dollars not adjusted for inflation, so the 235 percent rise we compute from them, (114-34)/34, is not a real cost overrun. FHWA itself attributes the growth to inflation, mileage added by Congress in 1968 and later, 'more safety and more attention to the environment' in later programs and 'changes in the definition of completion', as well as to the Interstate Program 'evolving'. The page gives no real-terms figure, no schedule baseline and no per-mile comparison, so it cannot separate execution failure from scope change. The 1958 ICE was a cost-to-complete estimate used to apportion funds, not a contract budget. The source gives no schedule baseline; the final estimate came 35 years after the Act. The source says later Interstate Programs have not ended, so 'concluded' refers to the end of Interstate Construction apportionments under ISTEA. The figures are federal share only.

• 🇨🇺Cubalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019operating below its peak

  Programa Nacional de la Vivienda, and its collapse

  Cuba's national housing programme, run by the Ministry of Construction under the housing policy presented in 2018 to close a deficit of 929,695 homes in ten years, completed 20,232 homes in 2022 and 5,493 in 2025, of which the state built 1,791.

  5,493 homes, homes completed in the year, state and self-build, 2025. 20,232 homes, homes completed in 2022, 2022. Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI), Construcción en Cuba. Indicadores seleccionados, enero-diciembre 2025, tables 5 and 6 (source SIEC, Ministerio de la Construcción), archived copy, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Construction sets an annual national housing plan, builds part of it through state enterprises and counts the rest through subsidised self-build by households, with municipal governments responsible for local materials.

  Limits: The count is of homes finished, not of the housing deficit, quality, cost or who received them. Two thirds of the 2025 total (3,702 of 5,493) is self-build by households ('población', 'esfuerzo propio'), which the programme subsidises and counts toward its plan but does not build, and the state-built part fell from 2,756 in 2024 to 1,791. The 2022 figure is from the 2024 edition of the same ONEI publication (https://web.archive.org/web/20260621201114/https://www.onei.gob.cu/sites/default/files/publicaciones/2025-05/construccion-en-cuba-indicadores-seleccionados-2024_0.pdf, table 5), which gives 32,874 for 2020, 18,645 for 2021, 20,232 for 2022, 16,065 for 2023 and 7,427 for 2024. In the 2025 edition's table 5, headed 2021 to 2025, the province rows sum to 18,645, 20,232, 16,065, 7,427 and 5,493, but the national total row is shifted one year back in its first three columns (32,874, 18,645, 20,232) and drops 16,065, so the national row is wrong there and the provinces are right; Granma (27 February 2024) independently reports 16,065 homes for 2023, 65 percent of the plan, from the ministry's annual review. 2022 is not the peak: 2020 was higher, and the series before 2020 is not in these editions. The 2018 policy and the 929,695 deficit are from Cubadebate's report of the policy's presentation (21 November 2018), state media rather than a statistical release, and the started year is the first full year under that policy. The collapse coincides with the 2021 to 2025 economic crisis, the loss of construction materials (ONEI reports corrugated steel bar output down 80 percent in 2025) and 40,191 stalled self-build homes, so the record documents a delivery capacity that ran backwards without separating the programme's management from the economy around it. onei.gob.cu refused connections on 2 October 2026, so both editions are Internet Archive copies; the PDF text layer uses a shifted font encoding and the tables were read after decoding it.

• 🇩🇴Dominican Republiclinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013still operating

  Punta Catalina thermoelectric plant, and its cost overrun

  The Dominican state electricity holding CDEEE awarded the Punta Catalina coal plant in November 2013 and agreed a final contract price of US$1,945.0 million after the award, including the unloading port; after construction delays and a March 2020 dispute settlement with the contractor, the value carried into the plant's 2022 public trust was US$2,340.54 million, about 20 percent above the contract price.

  2,340.54 US$ million, value of punta catalina stated in the 2022 public-trust contract, per the epc contract and the march 2020 dispute settlement, 2020-03-03. 1,945 US$ million, epc contract price finally agreed after award, including the unloading port, 2013. Presidency of the Dominican Republic, statement on the Punta Catalina public trust (15 January 2022), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The government declared a generation emergency by decree, had CDEEE tender a 2-unit coal plant as a single EPC contract with a foreign consortium, and financed milestone payments from the budget and export credit; when payments and works fell behind, it settled the disputes in 2020 at a higher value and later placed the plant in a public trust run by Banreservas' fiduciary.

  Limits: The 20 percent overrun is computed here from two documents by different bodies, not published as a figure. The presidency itself calls the US$2,340.54 million a reference number, "no es definitivo, ni como valor del activo ni como monto final de inversión", pending a financial audit, so it is a floor on cost, not the final cost. The US$1,945.0 million comes from a commission appointed by the president who built the plant, hosted by the Consejo Económico y Social, whose chair led it; it was written in 2017 at about 70 percent completion. The same report records that CDEEE was paying milestones against the higher offered price of US$2,040.7 million, so the baseline itself is disputed. No schedule figure with a planned and actual date was found in an opened official source; the commission only puts the cost of delay at about US$25 million a month. The award followed a tender later investigated for Odebrecht bribery, which the overrun figure does not capture.

• 🇫🇷Francelinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016still operating

  Grand Paris Express

  The Société du Grand Paris, the state's public builder, renamed Société des grands projets by the law of 27 December 2023, has been building the Grand Paris Express automatic metro since works began in June 2016. The project's estimated total cost rose from 22.6 billion euros in March 2013 to 36.1 billion euros from October 2021, about 60 percent above the 2013 estimate.

  36.1 billion EUR, updated total cost estimate of the grand paris express, 2021-10. 22.6 billion EUR (2012 euros), cost estimate of the grand paris express when the route was set, 2013-03. Sénat, commission des finances, rapport général sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2026, Écologie, développement et mobilité durables, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The state created a dedicated public builder with its own earmarked taxes and the right to borrow on bond markets, so that a 200 km metro could be built in parallel rather than paid for line by line. The Senate notes this borrowing moved full delivery from 2075 to 2030, at the price of cost estimates that were revised upward as studies deepened and the Olympic deadline compressed the schedule.

  Limits: The 60 percent overrun is our calculation from two Senate figures. The 2013 baseline is stated in 2012 euros. The 2026 page does not state the price basis of the 36.1 billion figure, but the 2020 Senate report (r20-044) gives the preceding estimate as '35,6 milliards d'euros aux conditions économiques de 2012', which points to constant 2012 euros, so the overrun is mostly real rather than inflation. Both figures are estimates to completion and not an audited outturn, and the network is still unfinished. The Senate reports that in February 2025 the builder announced new delays to line 15 south and the first sections of lines 16 and 17, so the cost figure, unchanged since 2021, may rise again. The 36.1 billion excludes the further 3.5 billion euros, and 700 million more in 2024, that the builder pays toward other Île-de-France transport projects. The source does not quantify schedule slippage against the 2013 or 2018 timetables. The Cour des comptes reports on the project, the primary audit source, did not open from this machine, so the figures come from parliament's reading of the builder's answers to its questionnaires.

• 🇪🇹Ethiopialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015delivered and closed

  Modjo-Hawassa expressway, World Bank-financed Lot 3

  The Ethiopian Roads Administration built the 57.4 km Batu/Zeway-Arsi Negele section (Lot 3) of the 202 km Modjo-Hawassa expressway under a project that became effective in 2015. The civil works were substantially complete by mid-2026, but only after cumulative extensions of 57 months to the project's closing date.

  57 months, cumulative extension of the project closing date, 2026-06. 57.4 km, expressway constructed on lot 3 (asphalt concrete completed), 2026-02-25. World Bank, Ethiopia Expressway Development Support Project (P148850), restructuring project paper, June 2026, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Ethiopian Roads Administration split a 202 km toll expressway into lots with different financiers: Bank-financed, government-financed and Chinese EXIM-financed. It carried the World Bank lot through material shortages, contract suspensions and repeated restructurings until the civil works were done.

  Limits: This is one 57 km road section, not a national programme, and the schedule figure is a slip in the World Bank financing's closing date, not a construction schedule measured against a contractual completion date. The 57 months run from the original 31 December 2021 closing to 30 September 2026, and part of that time came before Lot 3 works began: the paper says phase 2 started about two years after phase 1. The World Bank documents name cost overruns from material price inflation but give no figure, and the financing was partly cancelled (about 105 million dollars cumulatively by June 2026, including 9.31 million on the additional-financing credit) and topped up with 37 million in additional financing, so no cost-performance number can be drawn from them. The status 'concluded' is provisional. The road had been provisionally taken over by the roads authority, but the documents tie public opening to installing tolling and transport systems, which were moved to another project, and no source seen here confirms the section is open to traffic. Lots 1 and 2 have been open since September 2021, while Lot 4 is financed by China EXIM Bank and is not covered. All figures are the World Bank's own supervision reporting on a project it finances.

• 🇺🇾Uruguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013operating below its peak

  Línea Rivera rail rehabilitation, and its decay

  Uruguay's transport ministry signed a FOCEM-funded contract in November 2013 to rehabilitate 422 km of the Pintado to Rivera line within 36 months, cut the scope to the 310 km between Paso de los Toros and Rivera in January 2017, took the last provisional handover in May 2019, and by June 2025 reported the line in a degraded state with freight limited to 10 to 25 km/h against its set maximum of 40 km/h and no freight carried in recent years.

  10 km/h, lowest freight speed under the line's standing speed restrictions, 2025-06. 40 km/h, maximum freight speed set for the rehabilitated rivera line, 2025-06. Ministry of Transport and Public Works, reply to the Chamber of Representatives (Oficio 615/2025, technical report of the National Directorate of Rail Transport), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The transport ministry used a regional cohesion fund to finance a capital rehabilitation, contracted a state-owned rail company to deliver it, and then let the maintenance contract lapse in 2021 without a successor, so the rebuilt track degraded within four years.

  Limits: The source is a scanned ministerial reply to a parliamentary information request, so the quoted text comes from the PDF's OCR layer (it names the contractor "CEU" where the contracting firm was CFU), and checking it means reading the scan. The two speeds measure the asset's condition, not cost or schedule, which is what the construct asks for. The schedule slip is our computation: 36 months from a November 2013 signature against a last provisional handover in May 2019, about two and a half years late, and on a scope that had been cut from 422 to 310 km in January 2017, so a like-for-like slip cannot be stated. The final cost of the works was not found at an official URL: only the 2013 budget of US$75 million and a CND contract figure of 1,462 million pesos, which cannot be compared without exchange-rate and indexation assumptions, so no cost overrun is claimed. The 10 km/h figure is the bottom of a range of speed restrictions and does not apply along the whole line. The absence of freight reflects demand and operator choices as well as track condition, since the pulp traffic that justified the Ferrocarril Central runs south of Paso de los Toros. This is a different delivery from the 1988 to 1990 contraction recorded in ury-rail-network, but both concern AFE's network, and the record leans on the same ministry describing its own asset.

• 🇰🇷South Korealinked to Large project deliverystarted 1992delivered and closed

  Gyeongbu high-speed railway (KTX), and its cost and schedule overrun

  Korea built the Seoul to Busan high-speed line planned in 1990 at 5,846.2 billion won for opening in early 1999; by 1993 the Ministry of Transportation re-estimated the cost at 12,174.3 billion won, the first phase opened in April 2004 and the whole line opened in 2010.

  12,174.3 billion won, 1993 re-estimated project cost of the gyeongbu high-speed railway, 1993. 5,846.2 billion won, original project cost in the 1990 basic plan (1989 prices), 1990. National Archives of Korea, 주요 정책기록 해설집 Ⅳ 교통 편, Chapter III railways (commentary on Ministry of Transportation record DA0762778), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The government committed to a TGV-based Seoul to Busan line on a rough estimate derived from conventional rail costs, discovered within a year of breaking ground that the cost had doubled, then cut scope, created a dedicated construction authority and passed a 1996 promotion act to keep the build going until it opened in stages.

  Limits: The 108% increase is computed from two published figures, and it compares a 1993 re-estimate with the 1990 plan, not the final outturn with the plan; the price basis of the re-estimate is not stated, so part of the gap may be inflation. The final outturn cost was not taken from an opened source. The 1993 plan cut scope (underground Seoul, Daejeon and Daegu sections replaced with upgraded existing alignments) to save 1.43 trillion won, so the delivered line is not the planned one, and phase one ran on electrified conventional track south of Daegu. The archive commentary is written by an outside researcher; the figures are read from a scanned-document PDF. The record documents overrun on one megaproject, not Korea's general project delivery performance.

• 🇵🇪Perulinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015dismantled

  Gasoducto Sur Peruano, a terminated pipeline concession

  Peru's Gasoducto Sur Peruano concession, signed in July 2014 for a US$7.328 billion gas pipeline due in commercial operation by March 2019, stood at 37.32% overall progress against 76.49% scheduled in December 2016, according to the energy regulator Osinergmin, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines terminated the concession in January 2017 after the consortium failed to reach financial close.

  37.32 % complete, actual overall project progress, 2016-12-25. 76.49 % complete, scheduled overall project progress at the same date, 2016-12-25. Osinergmin (energy regulator), Gas Natural supervision division, monthly supervision report on the GSP project, December 2016, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Peru's energy ministry awarded a single private consortium a design-build-finance-operate concession for a strategic southern gas pipeline, backed by a guaranteed-revenue charge on electricity bills, and then terminated it when the consortium could not close financing; the regulator was left administering the half-built assets.

  Limits: Both progress figures are the concessionaire's own report as relayed by the regulator (the table cites 'Fuente: Reporte de Concesionario Gasoducto Sur Peruano SA'); Osinergmin supervised but did not independently measure overall progress. The figure is a weighted composite of permits, engineering, logistics and construction, so 37% overstates what was built: construction and assembly stood at 10.37% against 63.78% planned. The record does not show the final cost to the state, the arbitration outcome, the value of stranded assets, or how far the collapse stemmed from the Odebrecht corruption case and lost bank financing rather than from Peruvian institutions' project management. It is a concession (design, finance, build, operate), so the schedule failure is shared between the grantor and a private consortium. The numbers sit inside PDFs, not a statistical API. Later governments have repeatedly proposed reviving the pipeline under new names; this record concerns the 2014 concession, which ended by decision.

• 🇵🇪Perulinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  Talara refinery modernisation, delivered late and over cost

  Petroperú's Talara Refinery Modernisation Project, begun with the May 2014 EPC contract, reached full operation in 2023 after Peru's Contraloría found its estimated investment had risen from US$1.3 billion to more than US$5 billion by October 2020, about 400%, and a cumulative schedule slippage of more than three years in the project's execution schedule, traced to the auxiliary-units contracting.

  400 % increase, increase in estimated investment from feasibility estimate (us$1.3bn) to october 2020 (over us$5bn), 2020-10. 3 years (more than), cumulative schedule slippage, auxiliary units and complementary works, 2021-09-09. Contraloría General de la República del Perú, press release on compliance audit N° 15543-2021-CG/MPROY-AC of the PMRT, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Peru legislated a state-owned refiner's modernisation, let the company contract a single EPC builder and then improvise the auxiliary works, and the Contraloría's audit traced repeated procurement reversals to a schedule slip of over three years and a several-fold cost rise before the plant reached full operation.

  Limits: The 400% figure is a conditional statement ('estaría significando') attributed to the Comptroller General in a press release, comparing a feasibility-study estimate with an October 2020 cost, not an audited final cost; part of the rise reflects scope changes (Flexicoking, auxiliary units) rather than pure overrun, and the press release does not separate them. The press release's own figures (US$1.3bn to over US$5bn) imply an increase of about 285%, or roughly 3.85 times the estimate, so the stated 400% is the Comptroller's rounding and not the arithmetic; the metric keeps 400 because it is the published figure. The three-year slippage is the audit's figure for the auxiliary-units component over its 2014 to 2018 review window, not a measured end-to-end delay. Petroperú is a state-owned company, not a ministry: the record judges the state as project owner, and Petroperú's subsequent financial distress and government bailouts are not shown here. 'Operating' rests on a ministry press release declaring 100% operability in September 2023, not on independent utilisation data. The evidence is of a delivery that was completed late and far over cost, not a success.

• 🇮🇩Indonesialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015still operating

  Program 35.000 MW power generation programme, and its schedule slip

  Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources launched the 35,000 MW generation programme in May 2015 to be completed by 2019; by December 2022, 415 units with 16,596 MW, 47 percent of the programme, had reached commercial operation.

  16,596 MW (47 percent of 35,000 MW), capacity at commercial operation, share of the 35,000 mw programme, 2022-12. 35,000 MW, original programme target completed by 2019, 2019 target, restated by the minister on 2018-03-06. Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, press release 040.Pers/04/SJI/2023, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources set a single national capacity target, signed PPAs and EPC letters of intent with private producers and PLN at launch, and issued pricing and licensing rules to pull IPP finance into it; when demand undershot, the minister rephased the target instead of holding the deadline.

  Limits: This is a schedule record, not a cost record: no official source located gives the programme's budgeted against actual cost, so the cost half of the construct is missing. The 47 percent is the ministry reporting on its own flagship. It is a capacity count at commercial operation, not a measure of whether plants run, at what availability, or at what tariff burden on PLN. The target moved: launched as a need for 35,000 MW over 2015 to 2019, it was restated in March 2018 as about 20,000 MW by 2019 with the rest in 2024 to 2025, on the argument that demand grew more slowly than the 7 percent growth assumption. Even the restated 2019 milestone had not been reached by December 2022. The ministry attributes the shortfall partly to over-forecast demand, so part of the slip may be a deliberate deferral rather than a delivery failure, and a reviewer can read the low completion as prudence. Most capacity (about 70 percent of units) is built by private IPPs under PLN purchase agreements, so delivery is joint and not attributable to the state alone. The latest official progress figure found is December 2022; nothing later was verified, and the share may be higher now.

• 🇧🇴Bolivialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016operating below its peak

  El Mutún steel complex, inaugurated in 2025 and found never to have operated

  Bolivia's Empresa Siderúrgica del Mutún, whose turnkey contract with Sinosteel was awarded in 2016 and whose complex the President inaugurated in February 2025, reported in its 2026 initial accountability review that the project stood at 92% physical progress against 100% accumulated financial execution, that its own supervision found the complex had never entered operation, and that it had served notice of intent to terminate the contract in January 2026.

  92 %, physical progress of the mutún steel project, 2026 (initial accountability review). 100 %, accumulated financial execution of the eximbank and treasury financed contract, 2026 (initial accountability review). Empresa Siderúrgica del Mutún (state steel company), Rendición Pública de Cuentas Inicial 2026, published by Bolivia's Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Bolivia's Ministry of Mining had its state steel company sign a single turnkey design-build-operate contract with a Chinese state contractor, financed 85% by a China Eximbank credit, and accepted provisional and final receptions of each plant before the complex had run as a whole; the next administration's site supervision rejected those receptions.

  Limits: The source is a slide presentation, not an audit: the figures are read off slides whose PDF text extracts garbled, and a reviewer will need to open slide 11 to check them. The review was written by the company's management under the government that took office in late 2025, which has an interest in blaming the previous administration and the contractor; Sinosteel answered the termination notice on 11 February 2026 and the dispute is unresolved, and the external audit and Contraloría opinion the review schedules had not been published at retrieval. The 100% financial execution covers the EXIMBANK and Treasury tranche only; an additional FINPRO credit stood at 55.79%. No official baseline schedule was opened, so the record carries no percentage schedule overrun, and the 2020 suspension under the interim government is part of the delay. The contract amendment from USD 422.6 million to USD 443.98 million on slide 13 is legible only as chart labels and is not used as the metric. The status 'eroded' records the withdrawal of a completion the state had declared in 2025, not the loss of an operating peak, because the plant never produced at scale; a reviewer may prefer to read it as a failed delivery.

• 🇻🇳Vietnamlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2024still operating

  Quang Trach to Pho Noi 500kV circuit-3 transmission line

  Vietnam built the 519-kilometre Quang Trach to Pho Noi 500kV circuit-3 transmission line across nine provinces after construction began on 18 January 2024, and the Government reported it in operation on 29 August 2024 'after six months of construction', meeting the Prime Minister's deadline of completion before September, at an investment of over VND22.3 trillion.

  519 kilometres, length of the 500kv circuit-3 transmission line put into operation, 2024-08-29. 6 months, construction period as reported by the government, 2024-08-29. Viet Nam Government News (Government Office portal), inauguration report, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Vietnam's Prime Minister made the line a dated national priority with his own progress reviews, Vietnam Electricity's transmission corporation split it into four component projects built in parallel, and the nine provinces on the route were held responsible for site clearance at the same time as construction.

  Limits: The duration is the Government's own framing: 18 January to 27 to 29 August 2024 is over seven months of construction, not six, and design, investment approval and land clearance before January are not counted. The deadline it met was set during construction by the Prime Minister, so 'on schedule' measures against a political target, not an original baseline, and no approved budget was published to compare with the outturn: the Government's own articles give the investment as VND22 trillion on 14 August and over VND22.3 trillion on 29 August. A single line built under emergency priority after the 2023 northern power shortages shows what the state can do when it concentrates resources; it does not show routine project performance. Construction quality, safety, compensation paid to displaced households and the line's actual utilisation are not in the source, and the outlet is the Government's news portal, not an audit.

• 🇪🇨Ecuadorlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009still operating

  Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant

  Ecuador contracted the 1,500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair plant in October 2009 for USD 1,979.7 million with a 60-month term ending 5 October 2014; the plant entered commercial operation in November 2016, and a National Assembly oversight report found it had cost USD 2,712.5 million by August 2021, about 37 percent above the contract price, excluding a USD 599 million transmission line.

  2,712.49 USD million, cost of the project to the state by august 2021, 2021-08. 1,979.7 USD million, epc contract price at signature, 2009-10. Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, Comisión de Fiscalización y Control Político, Informe General de Fiscalización sobre el Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Coca Codo Sinclair (Informe Nro. CEPFCP-2021-2023-004-I), retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Ecuador's government declared the plant a national priority, signed a turnkey EPC contract with Sinohydro financed by China Eximbank, and let the contractor set implementation costs, which delivered a 1,500 MW plant two years late and well above the contract price.

  Limits: The 37 percent overrun and the roughly 25-month delay are our arithmetic on two figures in the report, not a figure the report states; the report itself compares against the USD 987 million planning estimate, which would make the overrun far larger, so the baseline choice matters. The source is a parliamentary oversight committee report produced in a politically adversarial investigation, written partly as narrative with annexes, inside a 346-page PDF; it is not an audited cost statement, and the 'USD 2.712.490.418,04 millones' wording mixes units. The report also documents thousands of cracks in the turbine distributors, regressive erosion of the Coca river threatening the intake, and net output of 37,927 GWh from April 2016 to May 2022 against about 62,934 GWh expected, so the plant operates well below design; none of that is in the cost metric. The construction contract was signed before financing was firm and outside the public procurement law. Started is the contract signature year, not the start of physical works.

• 🇵🇾Paraguaylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020delivered and closed

  Puente Héroes del Chaco, Asunción to Chaco'i bridge

  Paraguay's Ministry of Public Works began building the Héroes del Chaco cable-stayed bridge, the first road link from Asunción to the Chaco, in 2020 on an estimated 36-month schedule; at the end of 2023 it reported 90% physical progress against 100% planned, and the bridge was inaugurated on 3 March 2024 and recorded as concluded with provisional acceptance in the 2024 balance.

  90 % physical progress, physical progress against plan at year end (planned 100%), 2023-12. 36 months, estimated execution period, 2021 balance. Paraguay Ministry of Public Works and Communications (MOPC), Balance Anual de Gestión Pública 2023, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: MOPC tendered the bridge through national public tender MOPC No 156/2019, awarded it to Consorcio Union, financed it from the general budget, and tracked planned against physical progress each year in its public balance.

  Limits: All figures are the ministry's own reports; no audit-office or independent value-for-money review was opened. The schedule figure is a progress-against-plan percentage in a year-end table, which says the works were behind their own plan at end-2023 but not by how many months; the official sources opened give the construction start only as a year, so a month-precise overrun cannot be computed (a 2020 start plus 36 months gives completion within 2023, against an inauguration on 3 March 2024, i.e. at least two months late, and the 2021 balance showed the works ahead of plan, 43.25% against 32.30%). No total contract cost, original award value or cost overrun appears in the balances opened: the 2024 table carries only that year's spending (G. 98,099,704,513). Press reports describing the bridge as delayed and more expensive were leads only and are not the source.

• 🇩🇪Germanylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2022still operating

  Floating LNG import terminals of 2022

  After Russia's invasion of Ukraine the federal government chartered floating storage and regasification units, commissioned the first at Wilhelmshaven in December 2022, and by February 2023 expected to spend about 10 billion euros renting and running five units, against 2.94 billion euros of federal funding made available for four in May 2022.

  10,000,000,000 euros, expected expenditure for chartering and operating five fsrus (government estimate), 2023-02. 2,940,000,000 euros, federal funding available for four fsrus at the may 2022 decision, 2022-05. Deutscher Bundestag, heute im bundestag (hib 137/2023), reporting the federal government's answer in Drucksache 20/5784, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The economy ministry chartered ready-built floating terminals through the utilities RWE and Uniper instead of building onshore plants, and Parliament passed an acceleration act letting authorities skip environmental assessment and relax procurement for these projects.

  Limits: The two cost figures are not like for like and must not be read as an overrun percentage: the May 2022 figure was funding made available for four units, the February 2023 figure is an expected spend for five units over charter terms the government puts at five to 15 years, and the government says a large part will flow back through landing fees. The charter contracts are classified (VS-Vertraulich), so no outside reader can check either number. The schedule claim, decision in late February 2022 to commissioning in December 2022, is computed from two documents rather than published as one figure, and it covers only the first unit; the sources verified here give no commissioning dates for the others, and plans for Stade and a second Wilhelmshaven unit were only targets for end 2023. Part of the speed was bought by suspending process: the government's answer confirms that under the LNG Acceleration Act no environmental impact assessment was carried out at Wilhelmshaven or Brunsbüttel. Nothing here shows how fully the terminals have been used, which is the main criticism of the build-out.

• 🇦🇷Argentinalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1981still operating

  Atucha II nuclear plant, and its 33-year build

  Argentina's state nuclear operator connected Atucha II to the grid in June 2014, almost 33 years after construction began in July 1981, and began commercial operation in May 2016, after a build halted in 1994 and restarted in 2006.

  32.9 years (computed from IAEA dates), time from construction start (1981-07) to first grid connection (2014-06), 2014-06. 52.59 %, energy availability factor, 2015 to 2025, 2015-2025. International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series No. 2, 2026 edition, Table 14, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The state nuclear company NA-SA and the atomic energy commission CNEA restarted a German-designed reactor abandoned mid-build, under a 2006 national reactivation plan, and finished it with Argentine engineering after the original vendor's nuclear business had left the field.

  Limits: The 32.9 years is computed from two month-precision dates in an IAEA table, and the national regulator dates the start to 1982, so the figure could be a year shorter. No cost figure was found at an official source, so the record carries schedule only, and the indicator asks for cost too. Most of the delay is a 12-year suspension (1994 to 2006) caused by fiscal crisis and policy, not slow building, so the number mixes a stopped project with a slow one. The IAEA data are reported to the IAEA by the national authorities. The plant's energy availability factor of about 53 percent over 2015 to 2025 shows that completion did not bring reliable output, and the record should not be read as a success story beyond the fact of delivery.

• 🇵🇱Polandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019still operating

  Vistula Spit shipping canal (Przekop Mierzei Wiślanej)

  Poland's Maritime Office in Gdynia signed the first construction contract for the Vistula Spit waterway on 4 October 2019 and opened the canal on 17 September 2022. The Supreme Audit Office found that by April 2023 the programme's value had risen 125 percent, from PLN 880 million to over PLN 1,984 million, and that its completion deadline had slipped two years to the end of 2024.

  125 % overrun (PLN 880 million to over PLN 1,984 million), cost overrun of the vistula spit waterway programme against its original value, 2023-04. 2 years (to end of 2024), extension of the programme's completion deadline, 2023-05. Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Audit Office), audit of the programme 'Budowa drogi wodnej łączącej Zalew Wiślany z Zatoką Gdańską', retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Council of Ministers established a multi-year programme and the Maritime Office in Gdynia contracted and built it. The minister responsible raised the budget twice and extended the deadline without telling the cabinet that the project no longer passed its own cost-benefit test. A strategic objective, sea access that bypassed Russian-controlled waters, overrode the economic appraisal.

  Limits: This is a delivery with a large documented overrun, and it should be read as evidence of poor cost and schedule performance, not as a success. The 125 percent is NIK's figure for the programme budget as revised up to April 2023. Against the further revision to PLN 2,127.5 million in May 2023 the overrun is about 142 percent, a figure computed here and not published by NIK. Final outturn cost after 2024 was not checked. NIK found that the cost-benefit threshold was crossed at a 20 percent cost increase, and that the minister knew of a more than 100 percent rise before the first contract was signed. The project is therefore uneconomic on the state's own appraisal, and NIK said it was considering notifications of suspected crime and of breaches of public finance discipline. Only the canal and lock are open. NIK states that the sea-going vessels the programme was designed for cannot call at Elbląg until port works there are finished, so the canal's stated purpose was not delivered on the date the first metric describes. The ministry's count of more than 1,770 vessels in the first year is mostly small craft and is not used. The programme was set up by a Council of Ministers resolution of 24 May 2016. 'Started' uses the first construction contract in 2019, and a reviewer could set it at 2016.

• 🇮🇱Israellinked to Large project deliverystarted 2000still operating

  Israel Railways electrification and the Jerusalem express line, and their delays

  Israel Railways began electrifying the national network in 2000 and opened the electric express line to Jerusalem in September 2018, but by May 2020 only about 64 of 480 planned route kilometres were electrified, and the forecast completion date had moved from 2019, set in 2013, to the end of 2025, on an estimated cost of ILS 12.1 billion.

  2025 year, forecast completion year of the electrification project, as updated in march 2020, 2020-03. 2019 year, forecast completion year defined in 2013, 2013. State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, Annual Report 71A (2020), Execution of the Railway Lines Electrification Project and Opening of the Express Line to Jerusalem, follow-up audit, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: A state-owned rail company ran a network-wide electrification programme alongside a new flagship line and opened the line first, diverting cars from other lines to do it. Completion dates were reset repeatedly while the State Comptroller ran follow-up audits.

  Limits: This is a delivery still in progress, not a finished one. At the audit date it had reached 13.3 percent of the planned route, and no official source that opened on the retrieval date gave a later figure, so whether the 2025 date held is not shown. The audit gives an estimated cost (ILS 12.1 billion) but no original budget, so the cost overrun cannot be computed from this source; the schedule slip from 2019 to 2025 is the only performance figure. The completion dates are Israel Railways' own forecasts, which the Comptroller reports. The audit also found that the Jerusalem line opened without its own rolling stock and ran with passengers in test mode for about a year, cancelling 2.6 percent of trips against 0.5 percent on other lines. A hostile reviewer would say the record shows a slipping project, not a delivered one.

• 🇨🇦Canadalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015delivered and closed

  Samuel De Champlain Bridge corridor

  Infrastructure Canada delivered the Samuel De Champlain Bridge corridor in Montreal as a public-private partnership signed in 2015, opening the bridge in July 2019 against a contractual in-service date of December 1, 2018, at a total project cost the department reports as C$4.2 billion, after a C$235 million settlement in 2018 that paid for delay-recovery measures and oversized-part transport issues.

  4,200,000,000 Canadian dollars, total cost of the project as reported by the department, 2019. 235,000,000 Canadian dollars, settlement paid to the private partner for delay recovery and oversized-part transport, 2018-04. Housing, Infrastructure and Communities Canada (formerly Infrastructure Canada), Samuel De Champlain Bridge project story, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Infrastructure Canada replaced a failing federal bridge through a design-build-finance-operate-maintain contract with liquidated damages for late opening, then bought back schedule with a negotiated settlement when transport restrictions and disputes threatened the date.

  Limits: No published figure states the outturn against the baseline, so overrun has to be pieced together by the reader. The value-for-money report gives a 2015 total of C$4.239 billion and a contractual in-service date of December 1, 2018; the department's own story page gives a rounded C$4.2 billion total and a July 2019 opening; the 2018 settlement adds C$235 million and moved the delivery date to December 21, 2018, which was itself missed. The C$4.2 billion therefore cannot include the settlement and appears to restate the original envelope, so the true outturn is at least about 5.5% above it (a computed figure, not published) and the bridge opened about seven months after the contract date. Costs also bundle a 30-year operation and maintenance period and financing, so the number is not a construction cost. All figures are the department's own; the Auditor General's 2018 doubts about the schedule are reported only in the press here. The canada.ca news release refused a scripted curl request and was read through a browser-like fetch. This is one megaproject, not a national portfolio.

• 🇯🇵Japanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2012delivered and closed

  Hokuriku Shinkansen Kanazawa to Tsuruga extension, and its overrun

  Japan's Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency built the 125 km Kanazawa to Tsuruga extension of the Hokuriku Shinkansen from 2012; its authorised cost rose from 1.1858 trillion yen in 2017 to 1.6779 trillion yen after a second increase of 265.8 billion yen in March 2021, completion slipped one year to the end of fiscal 2023, and the line opened on 16 March 2024.

  16,779 100 million yen (oku-yen), authorised project cost after the march 2021 revision, 2021-03. 2,658 100 million yen (oku-yen), cost increase approved in the march 2021 revision, 2021-03. Board of Audit of Japan, fiscal 2020 audit report, chapter 4 item 11, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The transport ministry authorised a state construction agency to build the line on a politically accelerated deadline; when the agency disclosed a second overrun late, the ministry set up an external verification committee, downgraded the agency's performance rating and issued a statutory improvement order, and the Board of Audit examined the causes in its annual report.

  Limits: This is a delivery with a large overrun, filed because the construct asks for cost and schedule performance, not as a success. The overrun against the 2017 authorised cost is about 41 percent (1.6779 against 1.1858 trillion yen), a figure computed here, not published; against the 2012 plan it cannot be computed from this source. The final outturn cost after the March 2021 revision is not in the audit report, and the opening date comes from the delivery agency's own page. The one-year slip is measured against a deadline that the government had itself pulled three years forward in 2015, so part of the 'delay' is a political acceleration that did not hold. Some of the increase reflects new seismic standards and a consumption-tax rise, which an auditor might count as scope or price change rather than poor management; the audit office and the ministry's own verification committee nonetheless found weak reporting from site to headquarters and inadequate ministry oversight, and the ministry issued a formal business-improvement order. One project is not a national track record.

• 🇸🇪Swedenlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1999still operating

  Botniabanan coastal railway

  Sweden built the Botniabanan railway between Nyland on the Ångermanälven and Umeå through the state and municipally owned company Botniabanan AB, starting construction in 1999 and opening it in August 2010, four years after the original 2006 schedule, at a final cost of almost SEK 16 billion in 2010 prices, which the national audit office calculated as 73 percent above the original estimate.

  73 % overrun, final construction cost increase over the original cost estimate, 2010 prices, 2010. 140 % above the pre-decision estimate, total cost of delivering the planned botniabanan traffic, including follow-on investments on connecting lines, above the estimate before the decision, 2011. Riksrevisionen (Swedish National Audit Office), audit RiR 2011:22 as reproduced in Government communication 2011/12:20, published by Sveriges riksdag, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: Parliament chose to build the line through a dedicated company, Botniabanan AB, owned by the state and the municipalities along the route and loan-financed so it could build quickly, while Banverket kept the physical planning; the state then rents the line back from the company.

  Limits: The 73 percent is Riksrevisionen's own recalculation in constant 2010 prices; the government's communication in the same document gives SEK 15 billion in current prices, about 3 billion more than at the 1997 decision, so the size of the overrun depends on the price basis chosen. The 140 percent counts follow-on investments on Ådalsbanan and other connecting lines that the audit office judged necessary, a boundary Trafikverket disputed. The four-year delay is computed from two sentences, not published as a figure, and much of it came from environmental permitting under the 1999 Environmental Code rather than construction. The start year rests on a 1999/2000 parliamentary motion saying construction had just begun, because the audit itself dates only the 1997 decision. One railway line is a single project, so this is not a portfolio-level overrun rate, and the audit predates a decade of operation, so whether ridership and freight benefits arrived is not shown.

• 🇬🇧United Kingdomlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020operating below its peak

  High Speed Two, and the cancellation of Phase 2

  The Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd began building High Speed Two in 2020. The government cancelled everything beyond Birmingham in 2023. By May 2026 the London to Birmingham railway alone was estimated at £87.7 billion to £102.7 billion, more than double the 2020 Phase 1 estimate, with services from Old Oak Common expected between 2036 and 2039 against a 2012 plan to complete the full network by 2033.

  100 % overrun (more than, excluding inflation), cost increase over the 2020 phase 1 estimate, low end of the may 2026 range, 2026-05. 2033 year, year dft expected the full london, manchester and leeds network to be complete at the 2012 approval, 2012. National Audit Office (UK), High Speed Two reset, HC 52, Session 2026-27, 29 June 2026, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Department for Transport approved a national high-speed line, set up an arm's-length company to build it, and committed to construction contracts in 2020 before designs and costs were stable. It then responded to the cost growth by cutting the northern phases instead of the scope of Phase 1.

  Limits: No HS2 train has run. This is a record of a build in progress, not a delivered railway, and the erosion is to planned scope: the Manchester and Leeds legs were cancelled before they were built, so nothing in service was lost. The May 2026 estimate is in a mixed price base and the NAO says it carries a high level of uncertainty until a baseline is set in spring 2027. The over 100% figure compares a London to Birmingham estimate with the 2020 Phase 1 estimate, which excluded inflation and was itself a rebaseline after the 2019 Oakervee review, so the overrun against the 2012 approval is larger and is not stated as one number by the NAO. The 2033 completion year is for a network that no longer exists, so it is a schedule reference, not a like-for-like comparison. Both figures are read from PDFs, with text-extraction spacing artefacts cleaned in the quotes. Spend to March 2026 was £46.8 billion in nominal prices, including the cancelled Phase 2.

• 🇬🇧United Kingdomlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009delivered and closed

  Crossrail, the Elizabeth line

  The Department for Transport and Transport for London built Crossrail through Crossrail Ltd from 2009. The NAO put its forecast cost at 28% above the 2010 budget of £14.8 billion and its opening at up to three and a half years past the original December 2018 date. The central section opened in 2022 and carried 257.4 million journeys between April 2025 and March 2026.

  28 % overrun (nominal), nominal cost increase to build the railway over the 2010 budget of £14.8 billion, 2021-05. 257,400,000 journeys, passenger journeys on the elizabeth line, 2025-04 to 2026-03. National Audit Office (UK), Crossrail: a progress update, HC 299, Session 2021-22, 9 July 2021, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Department for Transport and Transport for London set up a dedicated delivery company, Crossrail Ltd, with private delivery partners, and when it missed its 2018 opening they replaced its leadership, added £825 million and more, and handed the finished asset to Transport for London to operate.

  Limits: The 28% is the NAO's May 2021 forecast, made before the line opened; this record has not verified the final outturn cost from an audit source, and the NAO itself notes that later funding packages kept moving. The schedule figure is also a 2021 forecast of 'at least 3 years' late; the opening in 2022 is confirmed only by the regulator's statement that the central section opened that year. The cost is nominal, so part of the 28% is inflation over a decade. Crossrail is a London line co-sponsored and part funded by Transport for London and the Greater London Authority, including a business rate supplement, so it is not purely a national delivery, and its success in carrying passengers says nothing about the governance failures the NAO documented in 2018 to 2019. The journey count is a regulator's estimate from ticketing data.

• 🇮🇳Indialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008still operating

  Dedicated Freight Corridors, Eastern and Western

  Indian Railways, through the Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation, built two freight-only corridors approved by Cabinet in 2008 at ₹28,181 crore and reassessed in 2015 at ₹81,459 crore, and by March 2025 had commissioned 2,741 of their 2,843 route kilometres.

  189 % overrun (nominal, computed), increase of the 2015 revised project cost over the 2008 cabinet-approved estimate, computed from cag figures, 2015. 2,741 route km, dedicated freight corridor route kilometres commissioned and operational, of 2,843, 2025-03-19. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. 22 of 2021 (Railways), para 3.1, Implementation of Dedicated Freight Corridor Project, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Railways created a dedicated special-purpose company in 2006 to build freight-only lines alongside the trunk network, financed largely by World Bank and JICA loans, and kept building through large cost revisions until almost the whole length was commissioned.

  Limits: The 189% is computed here from two CAG figures; the CAG does not publish it as a percentage. The two estimates are not like for like: the scope changed between them, route lengths were revised upward, the Sonnagar to Dankuni section was added in 2008 and is not part of the corridors now reported as 2,843 km, and both figures are nominal across seven years. The 2015 figure is itself old, and no later audited completion cost is used here. The CAG found avoidable price escalation of ₹2,233.81 crore from delays, contract awards 13 to 25 months late, and a target of March 2017 for the first Eastern section, so the schedule slipped by years, but the report states no single schedule overrun figure. The commissioning figure is a ministry press release, self-reported and unaudited. The PIB page refused an automated fetch tool (HTTP 403) but opened with a standard browser user agent.

• 🇲🇽Mexicolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019still operating

  Olmeca refinery at Dos Bocas

  Pemex built the Olmeca refinery at Dos Bocas, authorized in December 2018 and fully operational from February 2025, under an authorized budget of US$15,963.0 million, 79 percent above the US$8,918.5 million Class IV estimate stated when its board authorized the FEL II phase in July 2020.

  15,963 US$ million including VAT, authorized project budget after the august 2022 rebaseline, excluding us$853.3 million for start-up, 2022. 8,918.5 US$ million, class iv cost estimate approved at fel ii, 2020-07. Petróleos Mexicanos, annual report on Form 20-F for fiscal year 2023, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, retrieved 2026-10-01.

  How it worked: The federal government chose a greenfield refinery as a political flagship and had Pemex deliver it through a dedicated subsidiary, PTI Infraestructura de Desarrollo, funded through equity contributions from Pemex Industrial Transformation (2020 to 2023). The board re-authorized the scope and budget mid-construction in August 2022.

  Limits: Pemex is the state oil company reporting on its own project. The filing is made under US securities law and carries legal liability, but it is not an audit, and Mexico's audit office (ASF) is not reachable from outside Mexico to check against. The publisher is a state enterprise, not a ministry or statistics office, so a strict reading of the publisher rule could exclude it. The 79 percent overrun is our computation from two figures that do not measure the same thing. The Class IV estimate excludes external works, escalation, contingency and administrative costs and carries a stated range of +30 to -25 percent, while the later budget includes VAT. A share of the gap is therefore a change of definition and not an overrun. The government's original public figure, around US$8 billion, appears only in press reports and is not used here. The schedule is shown only by the issuer's own changing expectations. The FY2025 filing (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000932782/000093278226000006/ck0000932782-20251231.htm) says the refinery "has been fully operational since February 2025". No filing states an original completion date to measure the slip against. Full operation is a claim about start-up, not about utilisation or margins, which the FY2025 filing excludes from its refining margin series.

• 🇦🇺Australialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2018operating below its peak

  Inland Rail, and its consolidation at Parkes

  The Australian Government began building Inland Rail, a Melbourne to Brisbane freight railway, in 2018 through the Australian Rail Track Corporation, which passed delivery to its subsidiary Inland Rail Pty Ltd in May 2024; a verification report delivered to the infrastructure department in November 2025 reported the company's estimate at completion of A$45.6 billion (P90, Target scenario, estimate current as of December 2024) with completions finalised in May 2036, and the 2026-27 Budget then consolidated the project at Parkes and returned $4.4 billion in equity.

  45.6 billion Australian dollars, estimate at completion of the full inland rail programme, target scenario (p90), 2024-12. 2,036 year (May 2036), month in which completions are finalised under the target scenario schedule, 2024-12. ACIL Allen for the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, Verification and assurance of Inland Rail scope, design, delivery and cost, final report of 20 November 2025, tabled at Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Budget Estimates 2026-27, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Commonwealth committed to a 1,700 km freight line through a government-owned track company and started construction before the route ends, approvals and designs were settled; when successive reviews put the cost far above the budget, it moved delivery into a dedicated subsidiary, commissioned independent cost assurance and then cut the line back to the sections already under way.

  Limits: Both numbers are forecasts, not outturn: they are Inland Rail Pty Ltd's own December 2024 estimate as reviewed by a consultancy (ACIL Allen) for the department, and the report itself says IRPL's core assumptions have not been met and the cost is likely to increase with further delay. The faster Stretch scenario is A$44.7 billion with completions by June 2035. Both figures are in Table 1.1 on PDF page 12; the 2018 start and the 2015 business case are on page 8. The truncation is not in this report: it comes from Budget Paper No. 2, 2026-27 (https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2026-27.pdf, PDF page 139, printed page 124), which says the government will 'consolidate the Inland Rail project at Parkes and preserve the remaining rail corridor and intermodal sites for future investment, with $4.4 billion in equity to be returned to the Budget'. The 2015 business case cost and the estimates in the 2023 Schott review are published on infrastructure.gov.au, which did not answer from the machine used for this record, so no original baseline is given here and the overrun against it is not stated. The erosion is to planned scope: Beveridge to Parkes is still being built and nothing in service was lost, and no section of the full line has opened to double-stacked through traffic.

• 🇫🇮Finlandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009delivered and closed

  Kehärata airport rail loop, and its cost overrun

  The Finnish state, with the City of Vantaa paying part of the cost, began building the Kehärata (Ring Rail Line) through Helsinki Airport in Vantaa in 2009; construction costs came in above estimate, a glycol leak found at the airport took a year to resolve and reset the schedule, passenger service began on 1 July 2015, and the construction cost finally came to 770 million euros.

  770 million euros, final construction cost of kehärata, 2020-07. 1 year, delay attributed to resolving the glycol leak at the airport, 2020-07. Väylävirasto (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency), news article 'Kehärata on ollut ilonamme jo viisi vuotta', 1 July 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The state rail administration and the City of Vantaa cofunded an airport loop tied to new housing zoned along the line; when the cost forecast rose before construction, the ministry renegotiated the cost split and kept the start date, then absorbed a further overrun from ground contamination at the airport.

  Limits: The 770 million euro figure is stated by the delivery agency in an anniversary news article ('Hankkeen rakennuskustannukset olivat lopulta 770 miljoonaa euroa'), not taken from an audited final account, and the page flags itself as an old article. The page says only that costs were higher than estimated; the size of the overrun comes from a different source: the Ministry of Transport and Communications release of 10 March 2008 (https://lvm.fi/-/keharadan-kustannukset-ylittyvat-770641) put the forecast at 590 million euros, 75 million more than the estimate before it, so the final cost is about 30 percent above the 2008 forecast and about 50 percent above the earlier one. Those percentages are computed here, and neither source states the price basis, so part of the gap is inflation over 2008 to 2015. The originally planned opening date is not on either page, so the schedule slip is given only as the one year the agency attributes to the glycol problem. The state and the City of Vantaa shared the cost (73 and 27 percent under the original agreement, per the 2008 release). The same article says population growth along the line has been slower than forecast, especially in Kivistö, and that not all of the line's targets had been met by 2020. One line is not a national delivery record.

• 🇬🇹Guatemalalinked to Large project deliverystarted 1977delivered and closed

  Chixoy hydroelectric project, and its cost and time overrun

  Guatemala's state electricity institute INDE built the 300 MW Chixoy hydroelectric project under contracts signed in 1977 and 1978; after the power-tunnel lining collapsed in late 1983 it entered commercial operation in November 1985, 41 months later than originally planned, at a final cost of US$823.1 million excluding finance charges against an appraisal estimate of US$372.7 million, an increase of 120 percent.

  823.1 million US dollars, final project cost excluding finance charges, as estimated by inde, 1991-12. 372.7 million US dollars, appraisal cost estimate excluding finance charges, 1977. World Bank, Project Completion Report, Guatemala Chixoy Hydroelectric Power Project (Loan 1605-GU), Report No. 10258-GU, 31 December 1991, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The state utility chose a single-stage scheme with a 26 km power tunnel through poorly understood geology, contracted the works on winning bids before the seismic redesign that followed the 1976 earthquake was settled, and financed the doubling of cost with supplementary loans and local funds.

  Limits: The final cost is INDE's own figure as reported in the World Bank's completion report, which says INDE's data 'reflect shortcomings' and could not reconcile cost increases with physical quantities (para. 4.26, PDF page 32). Both costs and the 120 percent increase are in the table under para. 4.04 (PDF page 25), in para. 4.24 (PDF pages 31 to 32) and in Table 3 (PDF page 71); the 41-month delay against the original plan is in para. 4.04 (PDF page 24) and the summary's 'about 3.5 years' on PDF page 8; para. 3.18 (PDF page 19) records that the bids implied commercial operation by October 1981 while the appraisal team judged it unlikely before June 1982; the November 1985 start of operation is in para. 2.08 (PDF page 13). The text is OCR of a scanned 1991 document. The appraisal estimate is dated to the March 1977 appraisal; its exact price basis is not stated, and price increases account for US$141.1 million of the overrun by INDE's breakdown. The power tunnel's lining remained structurally unreliable after repair, so 'concluded' means built and operating, not sound. The project was co-financed by the World Bank, the IDB and others, though INDE owned and built it. The PCR records that the resettlement programme was judged flawed in conception; the 1980 to 1982 killings of Río Negro residents displaced by the reservoir, documented elsewhere, are outside what this cost figure measures and are the larger failure of this project. This is a 1977 to 1985 build and says little about Guatemala's delivery capacity now.

• 🇳🇬Nigerialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2018operating below its peak

  Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano dual carriageway, and the termination of its 2017 contract

  Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Works awarded the rehabilitation of the Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano dual carriageway to Julius Berger on 20 December 2017 at an initial N155.7 billion with a 36-month completion period; after repeated variations and augmentations, the Federal Executive Council cut the contract sum under Section I from N797.3 billion to N740.8 billion on 23 September 2024, and the ministry issued a 14-day termination notice on 4 November 2024 after the contractor rejected the reviewed sum and stopped work.

  797.26 billion naira, contract sum (contract no. 6350) before the september 2024 downward review, 2024-09. 155.75 billion naira, initial contract sum at award, 2017-12. Federal Ministry of Works (Nigeria), press release 'Notice of Termination of Contract for the Rehabilitation of the Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano Dual Carriageway, Section I (Abuja-Kaduna)', 4 November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The federal government let one large contract for a 375 km corridor, paid for it through repeated variations and augmentations, and when a new minister demanded a lower fixed price the contractor refused and the ministry terminated, split the work among other contractors and took direct control.

  Limits: The source is the ministry's own statement in a dispute with the contractor, so it carries the government's side. Figures are nominal naira across years of high inflation and a large devaluation, so most of the roughly fivefold growth may be price change rather than poor delivery; the ministry also re-scoped Section I to concrete pavement and gave 38 km of it to Dangote, so the 2024 sum buys a different road from the 2017 one. The termination release frames the N797.3 billion review as concerning 'Section I' while the N155.7 billion award covered all three sections; a ministry release of 7 October 2024 (https://www.fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/3233) describes the same N740 billion as the total contract sum within Julius Berger's scope, with N391 billion already paid, so the two sums may or may not cover identical scope. What ended is the 2017 contract, not the road: Sections II and III were partly completed and handed over before 2023, and a ministry update dated 9 September 2026 (https://www.fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/3425, also shown as a banner on the source page) says the government took over the project, finished 118 km of lot 1, has lot 2 over 60 percent complete and schedules completion for December 2026. Earlier ministry pages (https://fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/2352) give a 36-month completion period from 21 May 2018, so the road is at least five years late; a 2018 ministry release (https://fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/1299) states the award sum as N155.47 billion, slightly different from the N155.75 billion here. No audit or Bureau of Public Procurement document was opened.

• 🇵🇰Pakistanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008operating below its peak

  Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project, and its shutdown

  WAPDA's subsidiary NJHPC's 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum project, under construction from January 2008 and substantially completed in 2018, had cost Rs 423,446 million by June 2023 against Rs 84,502 million in the 2002 revised PC-I, nine years late; it peaked at 4,940.67 GWh in 2020 and was forced into complete shutdown by a head race tunnel failure on 2 April 2024 (the auditor counts 1,797.704 million units lost in FY2023-24), after an earlier tail race tunnel collapse in July 2022.

  338,944 Rs million, cost overrun against the 1st revised pc-i (2002), actual expenditure to june 2023, 2023-06. 4,940.67 GWh, peak annual generation, before the 2022 and 2024 tunnel collapses, 2020. Auditor-General of Pakistan, Performance Audit Report on Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project, audit year 2022-23, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: WAPDA started tunnelling in difficult Himalayan geology before design issues were settled, and the planning ministry re-approved the cost four times rather than stopping or re-scoping the project, so the bill rose with each revision and the tunnels later failed where weak rock had been flagged.

  Limits: This is a delivery that ran backwards twice: badly over cost and schedule while it was being built, then lost its output after it was finished. The overrun is measured against the 2002 revision, which is the auditor's choice of baseline; against the 1989 original (Rs 15,012 million) it would be far larger, and against the 2018 fourth revision (Rs 506,808 million) the project came in under. Part of the rupee overrun is exchange-rate depreciation and interest during construction, which a cost-performance reading should not charge entirely to delivery. The plant never reached its design output of 5,150 GWh even at its 2020 peak, partly because India's upstream Kishanganga project and a higher environmental flow reduced water, which management cites and the auditor rejects. The overrun percentage (about 400 percent) is our computation from two published figures, and the Rs 338,944 million is the auditor's own subtraction. The 2024 shutdown is documented in a second AGP report; the expected restart date circulating in the press is not from this source and is not claimed here. Management disputes several findings and never convened the Departmental Accounts Committee, so the report records the auditor's view without a settled reply.

• 🇵🇰Pakistanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2012delivered and closed

  Tarbela Fourth Extension Hydropower Project

  WAPDA built a 1,410 MW powerhouse on Tarbela Dam's fourth tunnel, effective April 2012 and commissioned in 2018; the World Bank recorded it as completed on time and below its estimated cost, with a capital cost expected at US$749 million.

  749 US$ million, expected capital cost of t4hp, physical works and supervision excluding interest during construction, 2019-09. 21,000 GWh, electricity generated since commissioning, 2023-09. World Bank, Tarbela Fourth Extension Hydropower Project (P115893) restructuring paper RES40334, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: WAPDA added generating capacity to an existing dam's spare tunnel under World Bank procurement and supervision, so the geological and resettlement risks that sink greenfield hydropower were mostly absent.

  Limits: The lender is grading its own project: 'on time and in less than estimated cost' is the World Bank's sentence in a restructuring paper, not an audit, and the paper gives no baseline figure, so the size of the saving cannot be checked from this source. The cost is an expectation in 2019, before every work was closed; the intakes for tunnels 3 and 4 were still being finished, and the loan closing date moved from 2018 to 2024 because the same project was extended to build T5HP. That fifth extension, financed under the same project number, is rated Moderately Satisfactory in the 2023 ISR and was due for completion in 2025; T4's record is not the record of the whole project. The World Bank financed about 90 percent of the civil and electro-mechanical works, so the case shows WAPDA delivering under a lender's procurement and supervision regime, which is a precondition rather than proof of domestic capability. Building a powerhouse on an existing dam and tunnel is much less risky than a greenfield dam, which is part of why it came in on budget.

• 🇮🇹Italylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003still operating

  MOSE, the Venice lagoon flood barrier

  Works on MOSE, Italy's system of 78 mobile gates at Venice's three lagoon inlets, began in 2003. All the gates were first raised on 10 July 2020, and 6,689.07 million euros had been appropriated by mid-2022 with the works about 95 percent complete and still unfinished past their planned 2021 completion.

  6,689.07 EUR million, total funds appropriated for mose by the end of the first half of 2022, 2022-06. 95 % complete, share of the infrastructure completed at 17 june 2022, against a completion planned for 2021, 2022-06-17. Corte dei conti, Sezione centrale di controllo sulla gestione delle Amministrazioni dello Stato, deliberazione 92/2024/G (follow-up to deliberazione 35/2023/G), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The state handed design and construction of the lagoon barrier to a single concessionaire consortium under a special law for Venice, and when delays and judicial proceedings stalled it, it appointed extraordinary commissioners to finish and operate the gates provisionally.

  Limits: This is a delivery record with a bad cost and schedule history, not a success story: the barrier works, but late and expensive. The source gives total appropriations, not a baseline estimate, so a percentage overrun cannot be computed from it; the Court's report names a 'progressive increase in costs' without a starting figure here, and the original estimate quoted in the press is not used. Appropriated funds are not spending, and the total includes related works (Piano Europa, decarbonisation, San Marco basilica defences). The 95 percent completion figure is from June 2022 and the 2021 completion date had already passed; the record does not say when, or whether, the works were finished after that. The Court lists well-known judicial proceedings, a progressive increase in costs, technical difficulties, environmental questions and Covid-19 among the complexities of the build. The Court reports the gates have repeatedly protected the city, but the source gives no count of closures, so the record does not claim one.

• 🇧🇩Bangladeshlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009delivered and closed

  Padma Multipurpose Bridge

  Bangladesh's Bridge Authority completed the 6.15 km Padma road-rail bridge with government funds. It opened to traffic on 26 June 2022 at a reported actual cost of Tk 30,770 crore, six and a half years after the 31 December 2015 completion date in the 2010 Asian Development Bank appraisal, which had costed the project at $2,915 million.

  30,770.14 Tk crore (published as 3,077,013.55 lakh taka), actual project cost reported by the bangladesh bridge authority, 2024-06. 2,915 US$ million, August 2010 prices, appraised total project cost and completion date, adb report and recommendation of the president (completion 31 dec 2015), 2010-11. Bangladesh Bridge Authority, Bridges Division, Ministry of Road Transport and Bridges: Padma Bridge project page, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: After its external co-financing package changed, the government kept the Bridge Authority as executing agency and paid for the bridge from its own budget. The Authority revised the project document as costs rose and opened the road deck in 2022, with rail running on the lower deck since.

  Limits: Neither source publishes an overrun percentage. Converting the ADB appraisal at the RRP's own rate of Tk 70.11 per dollar gives about Tk 20,440 crore, so the actual cost is about 51 percent higher. That figure is our computation, and it mixes a 2010 dollar estimate with a taka outturn after more than a decade of taka depreciation and inflation, so much of the gap is currency and price level, not overrun. The ADB estimate includes $99 million of financing charges and appraised a co-financed project. The bridge was built with government funds, as the Bridge Authority page states, after that financing structure changed, so the two figures do not describe the same contract package. Against the government's own revised estimates on the same page, the outturn is about 5 percent below the Tk 32,306 crore figure and about 2 percent above the Tk 30,193 crore figure, which is why the cost record depends on which baseline is chosen. The Bridge Authority page is itself inconsistent: it lists two different estimates under the third revised project document. The schedule slip is clearer: an appraised completion of December 2015 against road opening in June 2022 and project closure in June 2024. The started year is the project start the Bridge Authority states, before main construction contracts were let.

• 🇲🇦Moroccolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  Noor-Ouarzazate solar complex

  Morocco's solar agency MASEN had the Noor-Ouarzazate I, II and III concentrated solar plants (510 MW) built, grid-connected and fully operational by October 2018, at a completed capital cost of US$1,962 million, about 7 percent below the appraisal estimate of US$2,093 million. Noor II and III then generated an average of 739 GWh a year in 2019 to 2023, against the 1,144 GWh expected at appraisal.

  1,962 US$ million, completed capital cost of the noor-ouarzazate complex (appraisal estimate us$2,093 million), 2024. 739 GWh per year, average annual generation of noor-ouarzazate ii and iii, against 1,144 gwh expected at appraisal, 2019-2023. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00043, Morocco Noor Solar Power Project (P131256, P164288), March 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: MASEN, the state agency set up for the Moroccan Solar Plan, tendered the plants to private developers under power purchase agreements and sat between them and the national utility ONEE. A World Bank-financed cost mitigation mechanism covered the gap between the solar tariff and what the utility paid.

  Limits: The lender graded its own project here. The World Bank financed it, and the report rates the outcome 'Moderately Unsatisfactory', with efficacy and efficiency both 'Modest'. The cost figure is the Bank's economic-analysis number for the Ouarzazate plants. A footnote says it nets a 14 percent saving at Noor I against an overrun at Noor III. On schedule the report gives no figure, only that Noor II and III were built 'with a delay of just a few months'. Cost was on budget, but output was not. Generation ran about 35 percent below the appraisal expectation. Noor II missed its peak-hour share, at 32 percent against a 41 percent target. The Noor III tower plant had two prolonged outages caused by cracks in its molten salt tank: September 2021 to December 2022, and April 2024 to at least October 2024, when the report says it was still offline. The second phase financed under the same operation, Noor-Midelt, had not started construction by the June 2024 closing date. The project therefore delivered 510 MW against a 1,310 MW target. The economic rate of return was negative without carbon benefits. Generation-mix forecasts did not materialise either: coal's share rose to almost 70 percent by 2020. The capital came largely from concessional international lenders, with about US$4.1 billion disbursed from all financiers. A copy of this design would need that finance. All figures are read from a 40-page PDF.

• 🇺🇿Uzbekistanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013delivered and closed

  Pap-Angren railway and Kamchik tunnel

  Uzbekistan's government and its state railway UTY began building the 124 km Pap-Angren line with a 19 km tunnel in mid-2013 and finished the works within nine months of the World Bank loan's 2015 effectiveness, with the main infrastructure costing US$1,475.68 million against an estimate of US$1,438.75 million, about 2.6 percent over, and benefits flowing about 18 months earlier than appraisal assumed.

  1,475.68 US$ million, actual cost of railway main infrastructure (line and tunnel), 2020 (project close). 1,438.75 US$ million, original estimated cost of railway main infrastructure, 2015 (appraisal). World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Pap-Angren Railway Project (P146328), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Cabinet of Ministers decreed the line and put it on a fast track, with the state railway UTY building the track with its own crews and equipment while design proceeded, and a Chinese contractor driving the tunnel in parallel.

  Limits: The overrun of 2.6 percent is our computation from two figures in the ICR's cost table. The baseline is weak: construction ran simultaneously with detailed design and cost estimation, and by the Bank's appraisal in late 2014 the works were already very advanced, so the estimate was set when much of the cost was known, which flatters the overrun. The ICR gives no planned and actual completion dates for the line itself, only that works finished within nine months of loan effectiveness and benefits began about 18 months early. The 19 km tunnel was built by China Rail and Tunnel Company with China Exim Bank financing, so not all of the delivery was Uzbek institutional capacity, though the rail line was built by UTY's own workforce. The World Bank's own components went badly: the signaling contract was cancelled for misprocurement, US$72.87 million of the loan was cancelled, resettlement compliance was downgraded to moderately unsatisfactory, and UTY declined a second user survey. Passenger demand came in lower than projected. The source is the World Bank evaluating a project it part-financed (about 12 percent of cost), read from a PDF.

• 🇨🇩Democratic Republic of the Congolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008delivered and closed

  Pro-Routes high-priority road reopening and maintenance

  Between October 2008 and June 2020 the Ministry of Infrastructure's Cellule Infrastructure reopened 2,752 of a targeted 2,762 km of high-priority earth roads across five provinces and maintained 3,335 km, finishing 3.6 percent over the financing-agreement total and 28 months behind the combined original schedule.

  3.6 % overrun, total project cost at closure against the values in the financing agreements (parent project plus two additional financings), 2020. 28 months, implementation delay against the combined original timeline of the three financings (113 months planned, about 141 actual), 2020. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, High Priority Reopening and Maintenance Project (P101745), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Infrastructure's project unit (Cellule Infrastructure) bought the cheapest passable standard, spot-improved earth roads, through output-based contracts and the Office des Routes, so that mileage, not finish quality, set the pace and kept civil works inside budget.

  Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed, and the PDF has to be read (table 3 and paragraph 50, pages 19-20). IDA carried 61.6 percent of the money and DFID, through World Bank-administered trust funds, 24.2 percent; the government's own Road Maintenance Fund put in 14.2 percent, so the delivery is Congolese institutions spending donor money under Bank supervision. The 3.6 percent total overrun is measured against financing agreements that were enlarged twice, so it does not compare with the 2008 appraisal cost (US$123 million for 1,800 km); the road works came in 22.6 percent under budget while institution building ran 1,656 percent and the environmental and social programme 235 percent over. The 28-month delay includes a 12-month suspension of disbursements in 2017-18 for non-compliance with environmental and social obligations, including gender-based violence, after an Inspection Panel investigation. The roads are low-standard reopened earth roads, about one fifth of the 15,800 km priority network; the ICR says ten kilometres are unaccounted for, rates M&E quality Modest, and says road-sector management and the maintenance fund's allocation remain opaque. Nothing in the report shows whether the roads stayed open after June 2020.

• 🇺🇬Ugandalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013delivered and closed

  Karuma Hydropower Project

  Uganda began building the 600 MW Karuma hydropower station in August 2013 against a 60-month plan. By the end of June 2023 the Auditor General reported it 54 months late at 99.9 percent physical progress, and UEGCL records commercial operation from 12 June 2024.

  54 months, schedule overrun of karuma hpp at the end of fy2022/23 (actual duration 114 months against a 60-month plan), 2023-06. 60 months, planned construction duration of karuma hpp, 2013. Office of the Auditor General of Uganda, Report of the Auditor General to Parliament for the Financial Year ended 30th June 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and UEGCL let the dam as a single turnkey EPC contract to a foreign state contractor, financed mostly by an export-credit loan. That handed design and construction to the contractor, and land, resettlement and transmission stayed with Ugandan agencies, where much of the delay arose.

  Limits: The record carries schedule performance only. No official baseline-against-outturn cost figure was found: UEGCL's page states a project cost of US$1.398 billion with no original budget beside it, so cost overrun is unknown. The Auditor General names USD 30 million of interest claims on delayed payments, which is one cost of the delay and not the overrun. The 54-month figure is measured at June 2023, when the plant was not yet in commercial operation. Commercial operation on 12 June 2024 implies a total overrun near 66 months, more than double the plan, but that figure is our computation from two sources. The 60-month plan is the Auditor General's statement of the plan, and the contract itself was not checked. The same report finds that the community development projects promised with the dam were largely unfunded (UGX 3 billion of 38.3 billion received) and that resettlement lagged, so the delivery is incomplete beyond the powerhouse. The record says nothing about how the plant has performed since commissioning.

• 🇹🇿Tanzanialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2018delivered and closed

  Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project

  TANESCO contracted the 2,115 MW Julius Nyerere hydropower dam on the Rufiji in December 2018 for TZS 6.56 trillion over 42 months to June 2022. The contractor completed it on 31 March 2025, and claims settled in the contractor's favour raised the cost to TZS 7.44 trillion.

  7.44 trillion TZS, adjusted cost of the julius nyerere hydropower project after usd 400 million of contractor claims, 2024/25. 6.56 trillion TZS, original epc contract price of the julius nyerere hydropower project, 2018. National Audit Office of Tanzania, Controller and Auditor General, Annual General Audit Report on Public Authorities and Other Bodies for FY 2024/25 (Ripoti Kuu ya Mwaka ya Ukaguzi ya Mashirika ya Umma kwa Mwaka wa Fedha 2024-25), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government had TANESCO let the whole dam as one EPC contract to an Egyptian joint venture and financed it from the domestic budget rather than concessional loans. That kept the project moving and kept it in national hands, but left contract management and the transmission build with TANESCO, where the audited losses arose.

  Limits: The sources are Swahili PDFs. The quotes are from extracted text with spacing artifacts removed, and the English in the claim is our translation. Neither overrun is published as a percentage. The cost overrun of about 13.4 percent (6.56 to 7.44 trillion) and the schedule overrun of about 33.5 months against a 42-month plan (roughly 80 percent) are our computations from the Auditor General's dates and figures. The cost figure counts only the USD 400 million of claims the dispute board awarded. Price adjustment, financing costs, transmission, resettlement and supervision are not shown, so the true overrun is likely larger. The Auditor General adds that the contractor was granted two ex-gratia extensions to 14 January 2024, that TZS 327.03 billion of liquidated damages had not been deducted by November 2025, and that the contractor was released from TZS 262.34 billion of community projects. At completion, three of nine turbines had not been tested because the reservoir was too low, and the full-capacity test was not done on time because TANESCO lacked transmission capacity. Completion of the civil contract therefore does not mean the plant delivers 2,115 MW. The record says nothing about the dam's environmental cost in the Selous (Nyerere) protected area.

• 🇷🇴Romanialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009still operating

  A1 motorway, Bucharest to Nadlac

  Romania's national road administration has built the 582 km A1 motorway in sections, and construction of the sections the auditors timed began in 2009, and in November 2025 the European Court of Auditors found its latest cost estimate 11 percent below the original estimate in real terms, while one EU co-funded section had run 79 months, or 263 percent of its planned time, late.

  -11 % change, change in the a1 motorway's latest cost estimate against the original estimate, 2019 prices, 2025-11. 79 months, longest delay on an eu co-funded a1 motorway action against its planned completion, 2020. European Court of Auditors, Special report 02/2026, EU transport infrastructure (update of special report 10/2020), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Romania's national road company split a 582 km corridor into many small procurement lots and financed most of them with EU cohesion and connecting-Europe funds, which kept unit prices visible and auditable but multiplied permits and interfaces.

  Limits: The cost figure is the auditors' aggregate of many sections planned and priced in different years, reindexed to 2019 values from an original estimate whose own date the auditors do not give, and it excludes the Bucharest-Pitesti section; the 2020 report warned that the unfinished Pitesti-Sibiu and Deva-Lugoj stretches left the figures subject to significant change. A real-terms fall can come from cheaper design, deferred scope or optimistic pricing of unbuilt sections, and the report does not say which. The auditors did not compute a schedule delay for the A1 as a whole because its timeline varies by section, and the 2020 report took 2030 as the original opening date only because the TEN-T regulation sets it, so the motorway's schedule performance cannot be read from the cost row. The 2026 update was a desk review of figures supplied by the Commission, national authorities and project promoters, with no site visits. The 79 months is one EU co-funded action, not the whole road, and it compares the Lugoj-Deva lots 2-4 action's planned end of May 2016 with an end date of December 2022 that was still a forecast in 2020. The 2020 report also found €3.7 million of EU co-funding wasted, a finished Lugoj-Deva stretch left unused and 800 metres of built motorway demolished, and one building permit needed for every 7 km.

• 🇰🇿Kazakhstanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009delivered and closed

  South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China corridor (CAREC 1b and 6b)

  Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads upgraded 1,281 km of the Western Europe-Western China corridor and connecting roads under a US$2.5 billion programme between 2009 and 2024, for an actual cost of US$2,468.6 million against US$2,500 million appraised, but over 15 years against a planned four and a half.

  15 years, implementation duration, actual (planned at appraisal: 4.5 years), 2024. 2,468.6 US$ million, actual total project cost (appraised: us$2,500 million), 2024. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00317, South-West Roads Project (P099270), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads borrowed from the World Bank to rebuild its stretch of the Western Europe-Western China corridor to dual carriageway, procured it in large international civil works packages, and used the savings from low bids to extend the scope across three oblasts.

  Limits: The cost line looks on budget only because the scope was moved to fit the money: bid prices came in low and the tenge depreciated, and the savings bought 219 km of extra road, so the total says nothing about cost per km against plan. The schedule figure is the honest one, and it is poor: the closing date was extended four times, the first three to absorb added scope and the last for COVID-19 and the termination of several civil works contracts, and a 42 km Otar-Uzynagash section was still unfinished at closing after two contractors were terminated for non-performance. The source is the lender's own completion report; the World Bank financed 85 percent of the cost, so this is a borrowed-money build supervised by the lender, though executed and repaid by Kazakhstan. Traffic came in about a third below forecast. It is one corridor programme, not a portfolio, so it cannot stand for Kazakhstan's average project performance.

• 🇹🇳Tunisialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  Reseau Ferroviaire Rapide de Tunis, lines D and E, and its overruns

  Tunisia's transport ministry and the Societe du RFR built the first two lines of the Tunis rapid rail network, about 18 km plus 28 trains, financed from December 2010; the EIB's approximate total cost for the same scheme rose from EUR 550 million at the 2009 appraisal to EUR 653 million at the 2017 appraisal, Line E opened in March 2023 and Line D on 25 January 2025, against a 2015 project study that scheduled construction of the Line E viaduct for 2014 to 2017.

  653 million EUR, approximate total cost of rfr lines d and e (eib appraisal, operation 2015-0288), 2017. 550 million EUR, approximate total cost of rfr lines d and e (eib appraisal, operation 2009-0154), 2009. European Investment Bank, project summary sheet 20150288 (RESEAU FERROVIAIRE RAPIDE II), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Transport created a dedicated project company, the Societe du RFR, assembled a 40 percent state and 60 percent multi-donor financing package, and built the first two lines through civil works contracts while SNCFT took the operating role; when the Bardo municipality stopped the works, the company went to the administrative court and the cabinet chose a design variant in December 2023.

  Limits: The cost figures are the EIB's approximate appraisal totals, not an audited out-turn: the 18.7 percent rise from 550 to 653 million EUR is our computation across two appraisals whose scope wording differs slightly (the 2017 sheet names a maintenance facility and 28 trains, the 2010 sheet only rolling stock), and in January 2025 the French Treasury still quoted a total of 550 million EUR including rolling stock, so the publishers do not agree on the out-turn. The cost is in euros and says nothing about dinar costs after the currency's depreciation. The record has no official original line-opening date: the only official schedule is a 2015 impact study placing the Line E viaduct's construction in 2014 to 2017, so the roughly six-year slip to the March 2023 Line E opening is a comparison of one structure's plan against the line's opening, not a published overrun. The EIB suspended disbursements in 2016 over construction companies' failures to implement safeguards (ESDS 18 July 2017), and works at Bardo were halted by the municipality until an administrative court annulled the stop on 29 December 2023 (EIB register 236943929), so part of the delay is litigation rather than delivery. About 60 percent of financing came from foreign lenders and French and Korean firms supplied engineering and trains. This is a city network, not a national programme, and it records poor delivery rather than good: it is evidence of the construct's weak end.

• 🇱🇰Sri Lankalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003delivered and closed

  Southern Expressway (Southern Transport Development Project)

  Sri Lanka's Road Development Authority built the country's first access-controlled expressway, about 126 km from Kottawa to Godagama. Sections I to III opened on 26 November 2011 and section IV on 15 March 2014. The project took 13 years against a planned six. Its total cost rose from US$295.9 million at the 1999 appraisal to US$906.5 million at completion in 2014, partly because it was widened from two to four lanes.

  906.5 US$ million, actual total project cost at completion, 2014. 295.9 US$ million, total project cost estimated at the 1999 appraisal (two-lane design), 1999. Asian Development Bank, Completion Report, Sri Lanka: Southern Transport Development Project (Project 26522, Loans 1711 and 2413), August 2014, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Road Development Authority ran one project management unit for an expressway financed in sections by ADB, JICA, the Nordic Development Fund and later China Exim. When prices rose and the design changed, it went back to the lenders for a supplementary loan instead of cutting the scope.

  Limits: The cost growth is not a like-for-like overrun. In 2008 the scope was widened from a two-lane road to four lanes, and against the 2008 re-appraisal of $757.7 million the overrun is about 20 percent, not about 206 percent. Both ratios are our computation from the report's figures. The cost table is sourced to the borrower's own completion report (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011), and ADB, as lender, judges a project it financed. The PCR's cost-by-financier table puts China Exim at $159.48 million within the $906.47 million total, so the section it financed is included. The schedule figure (13 years against six) runs from the 1999 approval and includes four years of design and land acquisition before construction.

• 🇳🇵Nepallinked to Large project deliverystarted 2001operating below its peak

  Melamchi Water Supply Project, and its erosion after the 2021 flood

  Nepal's government built the Melamchi River diversion tunnel and headworks to pipe an additional 170 million litres a day into the Kathmandu Valley, closing the project in June 2021, more than 14 years after its original March 2007 closing date; the 2021 flood then damaged the headworks, and water has since been diverted for about eight months a year.

  14 years, delay of project closing beyond the originally planned closing date (march 2007 planned, june 2021 actual), 2021-06. 8 months per year, months per year melamchi water could be diverted after the 2021 flood damaged the headworks, 2025-08. Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation Department, Validation Report PVR-1165 (Melamchi Water Supply Project and Kathmandu Valley Water Services Sector Development Program), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Physical Planning and Works and later the Ministry of Water Supply, with ADB as lead financier, tied a trans-basin water diversion to a reform of Kathmandu's water utility in a single loan. The infrastructure was delivered and the institutional reforms largely were not.

  Limits: The 14 years is the gap between two loan closing dates, which is a lender's administrative milestone, not a measured completion date for the tunnel; the source gives no physical completion schedule against a baseline. The cost figure is not usable as an overrun: appraisal was $464 million and completion $345.3 million, but the 2008 scope change and the exit of the World Bank, NORAD and Sida mean the two totals price different projects, and ADB says separately that a 2014 additional loan covered tunnel cost overruns without stating the overrun in percent. The erosion is stated in words and one current number: the source publishes no figure for the year-round flow before the 2021 flood, so the secondMetric holds the post-flood level, not a measured peak. The flood is an exogenous shock, though ADB attributes the vulnerability to design that did not fit the terrain. The validation rests on the project completion report written by the lender and the executing agency, and ADB was itself a party to the project's design. The delay mixes national causes (slow decisions, leadership turnover, poor contractor management) with contractor failure, the cancelled and re-bid contracts of nonperforming contractors.

• 🇿🇼Zimbabwelinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020still operating

  Harare-Masvingo-Beitbridge highway rehabilitation, behind schedule

  Zimbabwe's government, funding the works from the budget, set out in its 2021 Budget to finish upgrading the roughly 580 km Harare-Beitbridge highway by 2022; it had opened 355 km to traffic by October 2022, and in July 2025 the Finance Ministry still reported 88 km outstanding, more than two and a half years past the 2022 target.

  88 km, kilometres of the harare-masvingo-beitbridge highway still outstanding, against a 2022 completion target, 2025-07. 355 km, kilometres of the 580 km harare-beitbridge highway opened to traffic, 2022-10. Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion of Zimbabwe, 2025 Mid-Term Budget and Economic Review, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Transport split the corridor into sections and paid local contractors from the national budget, opening the road section by section as money arrived.

  Limits: This is a schedule record with no cost figure: the ministry publishes allocations in a currency that was redenominated twice in the period (ZWL to ZiG) and gives no baseline budget for the whole road, so no cost overrun can be computed. The schedule slip of more than two and a half years (end of 2022 to July 2025) is our arithmetic from targets and progress the same ministry wrote in successive budget documents. It is not an audited figure, and the ministry itself kept moving the target (2022, then 2023, then 2025). The documents give the road's length as 560 km in 2020 and 580 km from 2022 onward without explaining the change. Kilometres 'opened to traffic' are self-reported and say nothing about pavement quality. The start year is that of the earliest official progress note, July 2020. Delivery used several local contractors under a national emergency programme, so this is evidence about a fiscally funded, multi-contractor build, not a single tender.

• 🇿🇲Zambialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016operating below its peak

  Solar powered milling plants contract, and its erosion

  Zambia's government contracted Shandong Dejian Group for a fixed-price US$200 million national programme of solar powered milling plants, financed in 2016 and due 24 months after the March 2016 deposit. The Auditor General found it still incomplete at 31 March 2022, 38 months after the scheduled completion date, and found 555 of the completed plants non-functional at audit in January 2024.

  555 plants, solar powered milling plants found non-functional at audit, January 2024. 1,583 units, units contracted (1,553 solar powered milling plants plus 30 solar powered rice mills), 2016. Office of the Auditor General of Zambia, Special Audit Report of the Auditor General on Public Debt for the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2022, section 7.6.4, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Ministry of Finance borrowed from China Development Bank to buy a turnkey national programme of off-grid milling plants from one Chinese contractor, and appointed the Zambia Co-operative Federation to run them through local co-operatives. No public body was funded to maintain the equipment, so delivery slipped for years and a third of the completed plants stopped working.

  Limits: The Auditor General never publishes the peak number of working plants. The secondMetric is the contracted count, not the peak installed or working count. The 555 non-functional plants are counted among the 1,553 milling plants, about 36 percent; that share is our inference. The audit inspected selected sites, so the 555 figure may rest partly on progress reports rather than visits to every plant. The report is internally inconsistent: the loan paragraph describes 1,000 plants for US$200 million, while the finding counts 1,583 contracted units. It also dates the deposit (March 2016) before the China Development Bank loan (July 2016). The section gives no final cost and no completion date, so neither a cost overrun nor a final schedule overrun can be computed. 38 months is the delay at 31 March 2022 against the revised January 2019 date; against the original 6 March 2018 date it is about 49 months. The plants are distributed small units rather than a single structure, which makes the record a weaker fit for major public infrastructure. The Zambia Co-operative Federation, the implementing agent, is a federation and not a ministry. The audit also found K15.5 million in lease fees that were never paid into the Treasury. Nothing here shows how many households used the mills, or whether the non-functional plants were later repaired.

• 🇲🇱Malilinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014delivered and closed

  Urban Water Supply Project (PEMU), part of the Kabala programme for Bamako

  Mali's water assets company SOMAPEP-SA built the reservoirs, transmission mains and 1,016 km of distribution networks that brought water services to 803,000 people in Bamako and six other towns, alongside the Kabala treatment plant that came into service in June 2019. Of the US$130 million approved, US$119.6 million was spent, and the project closed in December 2022 against an original closing date of December 2018.

  119.57 million US$, actual project cost disbursed at closing, 31 Dec 2022. 130 million US$, approved project cost, original 2013 credit plus 2016 additional financing, 2016. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Mali Urban Water Supply Project (P122826), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Mali's government split urban water into an asset-holding company (SOMAPEP-SA) that builds and a utility (SOMAGEP-SA) that operates, under a regulator (CREE). SOMAPEP-SA then used an IDA credit to build the transmission and distribution side of an eleven-donor Kabala programme, while other donors financed the treatment plant.

  Limits: The source is the World Bank's self-evaluation of its own credit. Spending US$119.6 million of an approved US$130 million is not a cost underrun against a fixed scope. The approved amount grew from US$80 million to US$130 million in 2016, when six towns were added. The report says savings were used to raise targets, and it publishes no unit cost or contract-level overrun. The four-year schedule slip, from a December 2018 to a December 2022 closing, is our reading of the key dates. Three of those years were added with the 2016 scope expansion and one year in 2021 for COVID-19 and the disbursement suspensions that followed the 2020 and 2021 coups, so most of the slip was planned. Targets outside Bamako were not met because distribution networks were finished late. The Kabala treatment plant itself was financed by AFD, the EU and the EIB, and its cost and schedule are not in this record. The project was designed to make the urban water sector financially sustainable, and that objective failed: tariffs were frozen for eight years, and the indicator was removed in 2021. The project was IDA-financed throughout. The national contribution was implementation by SOMAPEP-SA and SOMAGEP-SA, not money.

• 🇧🇫Burkina Fasolinked to Large project deliverystarted 2001delivered and closed

  Ouagadougou Water Supply Project (Ziga)

  Between 2001 and 2007, ONEA, Burkina Faso's national water utility, delivered the Ziga project through a dedicated project unit. The project built the Ziga earth dam and its transmission main to Ouagadougou, plus 56,000 subsidised connections and 400 standpipes. Eleven external financiers and the government paid US$269.37 million, 131 percent of the US$205.88 million estimated at appraisal, and the project closed on its original date of 31 December 2007.

  269.37 million US$, actual total financing of the ouagadougou water supply project, all financiers, 2007-12-31. 205.88 million US$, total financing estimated at appraisal, 2000-07. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Burkina Faso Ouagadougou Water Supply Project (P000306), ICR705, April 2008, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government gave ONEA a mandate by decree in 1996 to set up a dedicated Ziga project unit. That unit ran one investment programme for eleven external financiers and the government, with joint annual supervision meetings, while the government adjusted tariffs and paid its own water bills so the utility stayed solvent.

  Limits: The 31 percent overrun is in US dollars, and much of it is exchange rate. The ICR's own note puts the dollar at 640 CFA francs at appraisal and 506 at closing. Converted at those two rates, the appraisal total of about CFAF 132 to 134 billion and the actual total of about CFAF 136 billion are within a few percent of each other. Spending happened between the two dates, so neither conversion is exact, and the ICR prints both 640 and 650 for the appraisal rate. The real cost overrun in local currency is therefore unknown and probably small, and the dollar figure overstates it. The schedule figure only covers the 2001 to 2007 financing window. The project was conceived in the early 1990s and launched in 1994, so on-time closing says nothing about the decade of preparation before it. The ICR is the World Bank grading an operation it financed and supervised, and it relies on the borrower's reporting. The people-served figure is an estimate the ICR computes at 10 people per connection and 120 per standpipe, not a count. Donors provided almost all of the money, and the borrower's share was about US$8.8 million, so the record shows execution by ONEA, not national financing. The data are from 2007 and say nothing about Burkina Faso's delivery of large projects since then.

• 🇧🇮Burundilinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020delivered and closed

  Jiji and Mulembwe hydropower project

  The Government of Burundi, through REGIDESO and a World Bank project unit, built the 49.5 MW Jiji (32.5 MW) and Mulembwe (17 MW) run-of-river plants with their transmission lines and substations. The project was approved in 2014 at US$270.3 million with an original closing date of December 2019. Construction began only in February 2020, after the 2015 political crisis. The World Bank put the estimated cost at US$319.1 million in November 2024. Jiji was inaugurated in June 2025 and Mulembwe in June 2026.

  319.1 million USD, estimated total cost of the jiji and mulembwe hydropower project, all financiers, November 2024. 270.3 million USD, appraised total cost at board approval, April 2014. World Bank, Project Paper for Additional Financing, Burundi Jiji and Mulembwe Hydropower Project (P133610), December 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Burundi bundled two run-of-river plants, transmission and utility reform into one donor-pooled project under a World Bank-supervised implementation unit. It held the scheme together through a political crisis and two additional financings until both plants were commissioned.

  Limits: The cost figure is the World Bank's estimate in November 2024, before either plant was commissioned. At that date it reported a financing gap of US$41.7 million still to close. The 18 percent is the Bank's own ratio in its cost table, set against the 2014 appraisal. It excludes a further estimated US$19 million lost to currency depreciation on the 2014 pledges. The schedule slip is not published as a figure. The original closing date of 31 December 2019 against inauguration in June 2025 (Jiji) and June 2026 (Mulembwe) is our reading of a 6.5-year slip. Much of it comes from the 2015 to 2020 political crisis, which delayed hiring the owner's engineer to 2017 and the contractor's mobilisation to 2020, so it is not purely an execution failure. The project was financed and supervised by IDA, the EU, the EIB and the AfDB. Delivery was shared, and the Bank reports weak contract management in the project unit. Completion rests on press releases: the Presidency's June 2025 release for Jiji, and the EIB's June 2026 release for Mulembwe. Neither release shows that the plants deliver the planned 235 GWh a year.

• 🇲🇬Madagascarlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2004delivered and closed

  Transport Infrastructure Investment Project (national roads, ports and the Northern Railway)

  Madagascar's road authority and transport agencies delivered road, port, airport and Northern Railway works under the Transport Infrastructure Investment Project from 2004, cutting travel time on the RN44 from 24 to 6 hours, with the closing date extended four years from 30 June 2008 to 30 June 2012 and IDA-financed costs of US$169.39 million against US$150.00 million at appraisal plus US$15.60 million of additional financing added in 2007.

  169.39 million US dollars, total project costs, actual or latest estimate, 2012-06. 150 million US dollars, total project costs, appraisal estimate, 2003. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Madagascar Transport Infrastructure Investment Project (P082800), 2013, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Madagascar's road authority and port and rail agencies ran a multi-modal investment programme on a lender credit, re-scoping it repeatedly as priorities and the political situation changed, and finished four years late.

  Limits: The costs are in Annex 1 of the World Bank's own completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory. They are IDA disbursements only (the borrower's own contribution is shown as US$1.11 million against 17.42 appraised), and the 112.9 percent of appraisal is almost entirely the US$15.60 million additional financing of 2007 for the Northern Railway component, which was not in the appraisal; against the revised estimate including that financing, the outturn is 102.3 percent, so the record shows no meaningful cost overrun and should not be read as one. Port and airport components spent a fraction of their estimates and the RN5a upgrade was dropped at the January 2006 restructuring, so scope shrank in some places while it grew in others. The RN44 travel-time result is the report's own indicator comment. The closing date moved through five restructurings, and the 2009 political crisis froze disbursements during implementation. The project is a portfolio of works, not one build, so no single project's baseline and outturn are shown. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.

• 🇲🇼Malawilinked to Large project deliverystarted 2012still operating

  Energy Sector Support Project (substations and distribution lines)

  Malawi's electricity utility ESCOM completed and energised all 10 substations and seven of nine planned distribution lines under the Energy Sector Support Project approved in 2011, closing on 15 October 2018 against an original closing date of 30 October 2016, having disbursed US$72.1 million of US$84.7 million.

  10 substations, substations completed, energised and loaded, 2018-10. 7 lines, distribution lines completed out of nine planned, 2018-10. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Malawi Energy Sector Support Project (P099626), 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Malawi's state utility reinforced the grid in its load centres with a package of substations and lines on concessional credit, and finished the works itself after its supervising consultant ran out of budget.

  Limits: The World Bank's completion report, which rated the outcome Satisfactory, is the source; the substation and line counts are in paras. 103 and around 583 of the text file and the dates and amounts in the data sheet. The report gives no appraisal cost per work package, so cost performance cannot be read beyond the undisbursed balance, which reflects delay and cancellation rather than savings. The two-year extension followed procurement delays the report attributes to the political situation and inexperience with Bank procedures, and the implementation consultant stopped work in December 2017 when its budget ran out, leaving ESCOM to finish alone. At US$85 million this is a modest programme of grid reinforcement, not a single major build, so it is weak evidence on major project delivery. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.

• 🇧🇼Botswanalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009still operating

  Morupule B coal power station, and its underperformance

  Botswana Power Corporation built the 600 MW Morupule B coal power station under an EPC contract appraised in 2009, taking the plant over with known defects on 4 May 2014 against a target of 31 December 2013, after which it ran at a capacity factor of 52 percent from April 2015 to January 2016 against the 80 percent projected at appraisal.

  52 percent, plant gross capacity factor, measured (table 2), 2015-04 to 2016-01. 80 percent, capacity factor projected at appraisal, 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Botswana Morupule B Generation and Transmission Project (P112516; P116784), Report No. ICR3301, revised January 2017, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The state utility bought a large coal plant on a turnkey contract from a lowest-cost bidder, accepted it with a punch list of defects to meet a power shortfall, and then imported power and ran diesel units while the defects were chased.

  Limits: The World Bank's completion report rated outcome, Bank and borrower performance all Unsatisfactory. The 52 percent is the measured gross capacity factor for the whole plant in Table 2 for April 2015 to January 2016 (54 percent for April 2014 to March 2015); Table 1 gives about 38 percent from grid connection to March 2014, and paras. 91 and 96 describe availability 'hovering around 50 percent'. On cost the project did not overrun: the power-station, transmission and water component came to US$1,188.6 million against an appraisal estimate of US$1,539.6 million (Annex 1), so the failure is in schedule and performance, not budget. The report attributes the defects mainly to the Chinese EPC contractor's design and construction quality, with some operation and maintenance issues, and records three site fatalities; the plant was financed largely by an ICBC loan with a World Bank guarantee. The report does not cover the plant after 2016, so whether it later reached its design output is not shown. 'Operating' is used because the plant generates; the record documents a delivery that never reached its design performance rather than one that eroded from a peak.

• 🇱🇸Lesotholinked to Large project deliverystarted 2011still operating

  Metolong Dam and Water Supply Programme

  Lesotho's Metolong Authority built the Metolong Dam and raw water pump station near Maseru, starting impoundment on 15 February 2014 against a contract date of 31 October 2012 and delivering 93 megalitres a day on 8 October 2014 against a contract date of 1 July 2013, with every component of the programme overrunning its cost.

  15.2 months, delay in reaching water delivery of 93 ml/day (contract date 1 july 2013, achieved 8 october 2014), 2014-10-08. 15.5 months, delay in starting impoundment (contract date 31 october 2012, achieved 15 february 2014), 2014-02-15. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lesotho Water Sector Improvement APL Phase II: Metolong Dam and Water Supply (P108143), 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Lesotho created a dedicated authority to deliver a dam, treatment works and bulk pipelines for the lowlands with many co-financiers, and delivered water about 15 months behind contract after price escalation and procurement delays.

  Limits: The contract and revised dates are in Table 9.1 (Annex 9, page 53 of 59) of the World Bank's completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory; both delays in months (15.2 and 15.5) are computed here from the dates in that table. The report states that all components overran their cost, attributing it partly to construction-price inflation from South Africa's 2010 World Cup works (para. 72), but gives no programme-wide baseline and outturn cost, and the World Bank financed only part of a programme co-financed by the Kuwait Fund, Arab and other lenders, the EIB and the government. The project closing date was extended three times for a cumulative 42 months, to 31 December 2018. Impoundment coincided with the 2015 to 2016 drought. Plain-text file of a PDF.

• 🇲🇺Mauritiuslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  B6 Belle Rive to Quartier Militaire road upgrade

  Mauritius's Ministry of Public Infrastructure upgraded the 12.1 km B6 Belle Rive to Quartier Militaire road under the World Bank Infrastructure Project approved in 2009, at a cost of US$33.88 million against an appraisal estimate of US$21.60 million, 157 percent of the estimate.

  33.88 million US dollars, cost of upgrading works on the belle rive to quartier militaire road, actual, 2014-12. 21.6 million US dollars, cost of upgrading works, appraisal estimate, 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Mauritius Infrastructure Project (P091828), Report No. ICR3303, 2015, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The infrastructure ministry procured a rural road upgrade on an estimate that was never checked against designs, then added scope under local pressure, and paid half as much again as appraised.

  Limits: The costs are in Annex 1 of the World Bank's own completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory and the borrower Moderately Unsatisfactory. Para. 41 explains most of the increase as poor checking of the estimate at appraisal and added scope requested by stakeholders (junctions, a bridge, village works), with further increases from weather and flooding, and gives slightly different totals (about US$32 million, then about US$35 million for the contract), so the 157 percent is the annex figure and the narrative does not match it exactly. A 12 km road is a small project for the construct, chosen because it is the one Mauritian build with an official baseline and outturn found; Mauritius's larger Metro Express light rail was not assessed. The project closed on its original date, 31 December 2014. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.

• 🇸🇩Sudanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 1973delivered and closed

  Rahad Irrigation Project, and its cost and time overrun

  Sudan's government and the Rahad Corporation (RAHCO) built the Rahad irrigation scheme, 300,000 feddans east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile, with a main pumping station, a siphon under the Dinder River and a barrage on the Rahad River, under credits approved in March 1973; the physical works were completed in December 1982 against a planned June 1978, at a final cost of US$395.6 million against an appraisal estimate of US$125.0 million.

  395.6 million US dollars, final estimated total project cost at completion, 1983. 125 million US dollars, total project cost estimated at appraisal, 1973. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Project Performance Audit Report, Sudan: Rahad Irrigation Project (Credits 364 and 364-1-SU), Report No. 5130, 13 June 1984, with the Project Completion Report attached, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government let a large pump irrigation scheme go to tender before detailed design was finished, then refinanced a doubling of cost through a second round of Arab and IDA credits and absorbed the remainder in the national budget.

  Limits: The report is the World Bank auditing a project it financed alongside the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund, the Saudi Fund and others, so the delivery was Sudanese but the money and the judgement were largely external. Much of the threefold overrun came before construction: the project was reappraised in 1975 at US$320.7 million, 156 percent above 1973, because detailed designs had not been done at appraisal and the 1973 oil shock drove inflation, so only a 23 percent overrun is measured against a design-based estimate. The final cost is itself an estimate: the report says local costs such as administration and settlement are approximate and that better information had been requested. Figures are nominal dollars at the exchange rates of the time. The schedule comparison uses the dates for completing physical components in the report's data table (June 1978 appraised, December 1982 actual); the text says the project finished more than four years late. The scheme did develop the full planned area, and the auditors re-estimated its economic return at 20 percent against 14 percent at appraisal, so a cost overrun did not mean a failed asset. The text file is an OCR of a 1984 typescript and some table cells are garbled.

• 🇬🇭Ghanalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007delivered and closed

  Accra bus rapid transit under the Ghana Urban Transport Project, and its cancellation

  Ghana's Department of Urban Roads, joined in 2012 by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, set out in 2007 to build Sub-Saharan Africa's first bus rapid transit corridor in Accra for an estimated US$46 million of infrastructure, but after a design review raised that estimate to US$100.7 million and counterpart funds did not arrive, the BRT was dropped in the 2014 restructuring without its 9.1 km of dedicated lanes being built, and the project closed in December 2015, 35.5 months after its original December 2012 closing date.

  100.7 million US dollars, revised cost estimate for the brt infrastructure after the 2013 design review, 2013. 46 million US dollars, original cost estimate for the brt infrastructure (component 3), 2007. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Ghana Urban Transport Project (P100619, P092509), January 2017, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Two government agencies split responsibility for the roads and the buses of a first-of-its-kind BRT, tendered it before the design was complete, and when bids came in at double the estimate and the treasury could not pay its share, cut the corridor and spent the remaining credit on cheaper bus lanes elsewhere.

  Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed with AFD and GEF money, and it rates the outcome Unsatisfactory, so it judges the Bank's design as well as Ghana's delivery: the report says the BRT design was not fully developed at appraisal and that bid documents were prepared during implementation. The US$100.7 million is a revised estimate, not money spent, because the BRT was cancelled before Lots 2 and 3 were contracted; what was built under Lot 1 (the Odaw Bridge expansion and a railway flyover) cost US$14.7 million against US$9.2 million estimated, a 60 percent overrun. The 35.5 months is computed from the original and actual closing dates in the report's key dates table (31 December 2012 and 15 December 2015); the text gives the extensions as 29.5 months for two of them. The remaining funds went to quality bus services on two other corridors, which were not operating at closure. What happened to bus services in Accra after 2015 is not covered here.

• 🇨🇮Côte d'Ivoirelinked to Large project deliverystarted 1973delivered and closed

  Yabayo-Gagnoa road under the Fourth Highway Project, and its cost and time overrun

  Côte d'Ivoire's Ministry of Public Works built the 70 km Yabayo-Gagnoa road and rebuilt the bridge over the N'Zi River under the Fourth Highway Project (Credit 406-IVC, approved June 1973), completing it in September 1978 against a planned June 1976, at a cost of US$24.7 million against an appraisal estimate of US$12.3 million, an overrun of 101 percent.

  24.7 million US dollars, actual total project cost (fourth highway project), 1978. 12.3 million US dollars, appraisal estimate of total project cost, 1973. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Project Performance Audit Report, Ivory Coast Second Highway Project (Loan 761-IVC), Third Highway Project (Loan 837-IVC) and Fourth Highway Project (Credit 406-IVC), Report No. 3665, 28 October 1981, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The public works ministry split a new road into separate contracts for earthworks, paving and aggregate, gave the first to an inexperienced state enterprise, and the later contracts stalled waiting for it, doubling cost and tripling the construction time.

  Limits: This is a modest project by today's standards: a 70 km road and one bridge, US$24.7 million in 1970s dollars, of which the IDA credit was US$7.5 million and the rest the government's, so it is a mid-sized public works delivery rather than a national megaproject; no larger Ivorian project with a published baseline and outturn was found. The source is the World Bank auditing its own lending. The audit attributes the overrun to the road construction and the 27-month delay mainly to the decision, accepted by the Bank, to split the works by function: a government-owned enterprise lacking managers and trained operators did the earthworks late, holding up the French-Ivorian joint venture that was to lay the base and surface. The schedule figures come from the audit's basic data sheet (June 1976 planned, September 1978 actual, a 175 percent time overrun); the text gives completion as 27 months after the project completion date. Despite the overrun, the auditors re-estimated the economic return at 24 percent against 14 percent at appraisal. The text is an OCR of a 1981 typescript.

• 🇬🇳Guinealinked to Large project deliverystarted 1989delivered and closed

  Fourth Highway Project: paving of the Mamou-Kankan and Dubreka-Kolaboui roads

  Guinea's Ministry of Transport and Public Works paved the Dubreka-Kolaboui (196.5 km) and Mamou-Kankan (401 km) national roads under the Fourth Highway Project, approved in June 1988, at a latest estimated cost of US$207 million against an appraisal estimate of US$200 million, with the IDA credit closing on 31 December 1996, three years late, and the last 94 km of Mamou-Kankan still under construction in 1997.

  207 million US dollars, latest project cost estimate at completion, 1997-06. 200 million US dollars, project cost estimated in the staff appraisal report, 1988. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Republic of Guinea Fourth Highway Project (Credit 1915-GUI), Report No. 16646, 5 June 1997, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The public works ministry packaged two long trunk-road upgrades with spot repairs and labour-based maintenance into one programme, and paid for it by assembling seven donors in parallel, each financing particular sections.

  Limits: The report is the World Bank's own completion report on a credit it made, and the IDA credit was only US$55 million of the US$207 million: parallel finance of US$143 million came from the AfDB, the French CFD, USAID, Japan's OECF, BADEA and the European Community, so the cost figure covers a multi-donor programme run through the ministry. The cost is a 'latest estimate', not an audited outturn, and the 3.5 percent overrun is small partly because the scope changed: about 500 km of cement-stabilised base and asphalt concrete on 310 km were added, so the money bought a higher standard than appraised. The three-year delay is on the credit's closing date, not on road completion dates; the report says the last 94 km of Mamou-Kankan, financed by the EC, was to be finished by the end of 1999. The government paid about US$8 million of its planned US$19.2 million contribution. The report blames delays on a slow restructuring of the ministry, poor technical studies, cumbersome procurement and late payments to contractors.

• 🇨🇬Republic of the Congolinked to Large project deliverystarted 1976delivered and closed

  Realignment of the Congo-Ocean Railway through the Mayombe, and its overruns

  The Republic of the Congo's transport agency ATC rebuilt an 88 km section of the Brazzaville to Pointe-Noire railway through the Mayombe range, with 19 bridges, three tunnels including one of 4.6 km and 17 million m3 of earthworks, completing it in mid-1985 against an expected end of 1979 at a cost of US$399 million against an estimate of US$149 million, an overrun of 168 percent.

  399 million US dollars, total cost of the cfco realignment at completion, 1985. 149 million US dollars, cost of the cfco realignment estimated at appraisal, 1976. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Project Performance Audit Report, People's Republic of the Congo Second Railway Project (Loan 1228-COB, Credit 1047-COB), Report No. 8898, 29 June 1990, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The state transport agency, running the railway at the same time, managed a mountain realignment with tunnels on engineering that underestimated the ground, and when bids came in high and the works slipped, ten lenders refinanced the doubling of cost rather than stop.

  Limits: The audit is the World Bank's evaluators on a project the Bank appraised and part financed: the realignment had ten financiers, including France, the European Community and the Bank's US$38 million loan and US$30 million supplementary credit, so the money was largely external and the audit judges the Bank's appraisal as much as ATC's execution; it says the Bank accepted detailed engineering based on inadequate soil, topographic and geological study and allowed physical contingencies of only 10 percent for earthworks and 15 percent for tunnels. Figures are nominal dollars over a decade of high inflation, so part of the overrun is price escalation. The 168 percent and five and a half year delay (a 157 percent time overrun) are the audit's own computations. Traffic, expected to double, stayed flat, and the audit puts the economic return at zero or negative and calls the project unsustainable, so the record is a delivery that was finished but did not pay off. The text is an OCR of a 1990 typescript and some words are garbled.

• 🇬🇲Gambialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2019still operating

  Banjul Rehabilitation Project (roads, drainage and sewage), and its delay

  The Gambia's Ministry of Transport, Works and Infrastructure contracted the US$35.7 million (D1.8 billion) Banjul roads, drainage and sewage rehabilitation in May 2019 without tender, for completion by November 2021; by August 2021 12,953 m of the 15,216 m of roads, 85 percent, were built and 63 percent of the contract price paid, the pumping and lifting stations were outstanding, and the completion date had been extended to November 2022.

  12,953 metres, road length completed as at august 2021 (85 percent of 15,216 m), 2021-08. 35.7 million US dollars, contract sum of the epc contract, 2019-05. National Audit Office of The Gambia, Banjul Rehabilitation Project, Final Management Letter for the period 1 January 2019 to 31 August 2021, April 2022, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The works ministry accepted a contractor's unsolicited offer to pre-finance the reconstruction of the capital's roads and drains, signed a single-source design-and-build contract, then switched to paying it from the budget in interim instalments ahead of the hardest components.

  Limits: The audit is a compliance management letter, not a completion audit: it stops at 31 August 2021, three months before the original deadline, so it shows progress and a one-year extension of the deadline to November 2022, not an outturn. Whether the project was finished, at what final cost and on what date is not shown here, and the status 'operating' rests only on the audit's finding that most roads were built and in use. The 85 percent is of a road length that an addendum had raised from 14,614 m to 15,216 m, and the audit does not report a cost increase from that addendum. The figures are in a 24-page PDF (site verification on page 23). The audit's main findings are about process, not schedule: the contract was single sourced and gazetted only in February 2021, works began on 18 March 2019 before the contract was signed on 11 May 2019, no performance security was provided, withholding tax was not deducted, and 63 percent had been paid while critical components worth US$2.47 million, 6.9 percent of the sum, were outstanding. A contractor-initiated, pre-financed offer is how the project began, so the institutional delivery is partly the contractor's proposal.

• 🇬🇼Guinea-Bissaulinked to Large project deliverystarted 1984delivered and closed

  Bissau Port Project, delivered two and a half years late

  Guinea-Bissau's port authority (JAPG) rehabilitated the old commercial wharf of Bissau Port, built river ports and ferry ramps and, with a new deepwater wharf financed in parallel by four Arab funds, completed the IDA-financed Bissau Port Project on 30 June 1990 against a planned 31 December 1987, at a final cost of US$20.0 million against an appraisal estimate of US$17.36 million.

  20 million US dollars, final cost of the ida-financed bissau port project, 1990-06. 17.36 million US dollars, cost of the project estimated at appraisal, 1983. World Bank, Project Completion Report, Guinea-Bissau Bissau Port Project (Credit 1392-GUB), Report No. 9901, 16 September 1991, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government split its port programme into an IDA part and an Arab-funded new berth awarded to the same contractor, so when the Arab funds suspended payments over the country's arrears the contractor slowed work on both, and IDA supervision kept the project going to completion.

  Limits: The report is the World Bank on its own credit, and it notes that the government sent no comments for Part II, the borrower's review, despite repeated requests; consultants acting for the borrower prepared a final report the PCR drew on, so the borrower's own view is largely missing. The cost figures cover only the IDA-financed part (wharf repair, river ports, technical assistance and supervision of the new berth); the new deepwater wharf itself was financed separately by the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Fund, BADEA and the OPEC Fund, and its cost and schedule are not reported here, though the report blames repeated suspensions of Arab Fund disbursements, triggered by the government's late repayment of earlier loans, for most of the delay. The 14.9 percent overrun is in dollars; the report says the credit, made in SDRs, covered the work without an overrun, and scope grew with four extra ferry ramps, container storage and more technical assistance. The project is small in absolute terms, about US$20 million, but Bissau is the country's main port and the report credits the project with a modern deepwater facility where only a badly damaged wharf had existed. The text is an OCR of a 1991 typescript.

• 🇸🇮Slovenialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008delivered and closed

  Šoštanj thermal power plant unit 6 (TEŠ 6), and its cost overrun

  Slovenia's state-owned power holding HSE and its subsidiary TEŠ raised the estimated cost of the 600 MW Šoštanj unit 6 from 1,302,747 thousand euros in the August 2011 investment programme, the ceiling written into the 2012 law guaranteeing its 440 million euro EIB loan, to 1,428,457 thousand euros in the February 2014 programme, breaching the condition on which the state guarantee was given, according to the Court of Audit.

  1,428,457 thousand euros, estimated investment value of unit 6, revised investment programme no. 6 (nip 6), 2014-02. 1,302,747 thousand euros, estimated investment value in revised investment programme no. 4 (nip 4), the ceiling set as a condition of the state guarantee, 2011-08. Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije (Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia), post-audit report 'Popravljalni ukrepi pri reviziji obvladovanja denarnih tokov skupine HSE zaradi investicije v blok 6', no. 321-1/2014/70, 7 January 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: A state-owned utility group committed to a single large lignite unit, financed it with a state-guaranteed EIB loan conditioned on a cost ceiling, and then revised the investment programme upward several times while construction ran, leaving the state as guarantor to accept the breach.

  Limits: Both figures are in a PDF, on PDF page 9 of the post-audit report, which restates finding 2.1.2 of the main audit report of 19 August 2015 (no. 321-1/2014/49). The main report itself is published with the investment values redacted as business secrets (marked (P)) in its OCR copy, so the post-audit report is the readable source. The comparison is between two revisions of the investment programme, not between the first approved estimate and the final outturn: the record does not show the earlier, much lower estimates of the original 2006 to 2008 investment documents, which this protocol did not read at an official source, and so understates the full growth. NIP 6 is an estimate made while the unit was being built, not a final account. The court's main finding concerns HSE's management of the group's cash flows, and it also found the assumed coal cost (2.25 euros per GJ) and electricity prices unachievable, so the unit's financial case failed on more than construction cost. The unit was built under contract by an Alstom consortium; the delivering institutions are the state-owned HSE and TEŠ, and the state as guarantor and owner (through AUKN, SOD and SDH), whose oversight the court also faulted. The started year is the main construction contract with Alstom, as commonly reported; it was not read at the cited source. Status is concluded because the unit was built and operates; the record says nothing about its economics after 2016 or Slovenia's coal exit plans.

• 🇱🇻Latvialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016still operating

  Rail Baltica in Latvia, and its cost and schedule overrun

  The Latvian State Audit Office found in June 2024 that the estimated construction cost of Rail Baltica's main line in Latvia had risen sevenfold since 2017 to about 8.7 billion euros, that design work due by the end of 2021 was only 54 percent complete and now planned to finish by the end of 2027, and that the Riga Central Station works contracted in 2019 at 430 million euros had risen to 565 million euros.

  8.7 billion euros (about), estimated construction cost of the rail baltica main line, latvian section, 2024-06. 54 %, share of main line design work completed, against an original deadline of end 2021, 2024-06. Valsts kontrole (State Audit Office of the Republic of Latvia), news release 'Rail Baltica tvērums Latvijā mainījies bez vienotas pieejas un lēmumi ir grūti izsekojami', 12 June 2024, with the attached infographic of the national situation review, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The transport ministry approved scope changes and cost increases for stations, the Riga node and the main line itself, often without bringing a full cost picture to the Cabinet, while design guidelines kept changing and EU co-financing deadlines kept slipping.

  Limits: The source is a situation review (situācijas izpēte), which the audit office itself describes as a short compilation of facts with no conclusions or recommendations, not a full audit. The 8.7 billion is stated as 'aptuveni' (about) and as a sevenfold rise since 2017, so the 2017 baseline (roughly 1.2 billion) is implied, not printed; it is not used as a metric here. Much of the rise is scope and specification change (the design guidelines were revised more than 100 times after 2018, and the station node went from two tracks to four), so the multiple measures how far the 2017 estimate was from a buildable project as much as delivery performance. The project is not finished: the release says only 4.5 percent of the needed main line financing was available, and the joint Baltic review it summarises puts the whole three-country project at 23.8 billion euros in 2023 against 5.8 billion in 2017, with the first phase now due in 2030. Rail Baltica is a joint Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian project funded about 85 percent by the EU; this record covers only the Latvian section and the Latvian ministry's management. Status is operating because the project is under construction; a decision to phase or cut the Latvian scope after June 2024 was not checked at an official source. The started year is the 2016 Cabinet approval of the project scope named in the release. The 565 million euro station figure is computed here: the release says the 2019 contract cost of 430 million euros rose by a further 135 million in 2024, and does not print 565.

• 🇦🇹Austrialinked to Large project deliverystarted 1998delivered and closed

  Koralmbahn Graz to Klagenfurt, opened seven years after its contracted completion date

  Austria's federal rail infrastructure company ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG forecast the Koralmbahn's total cost at 6.139 billion euros at the end of 2023, 282.4 million euros or 5 percent above the 2012 baseline, but missed both the 2018 completion date in the 2004 Koralmbahn contract and the 2023 opening date in the 2012 to 2017 framework plan, according to the Court of Audit, and the line entered passenger service on 14 December 2025.

  6.139 billion euros, forecast total cost of the koralmbahn project, 2023-12. 282.4 million euros (5 percent), cost increase against the 2012 baseline, including the later addition of the airport branch, 2023-12. Rechnungshof Österreich (Austrian Court of Audit), news release 'Rechnungshof veröffentlichte Bericht Projekt Koralmbahn', 4 April 2025, on report Bund 2025/14, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The federal government funded a new high-speed line through the federal rail framework plan and its state-owned infrastructure company managed the build, holding total cost close to the 2012 estimate while a hard-rock tunnel lot overran in cost and time and pushed the opening back twice.

  Limits: The cost figure is ÖBB-Infrastruktur's own forecast, which the court reports; it is a forecast at the end of 2023, not a final account, and the 5 percent increase is measured from 2012, when the project was already well advanced, so it says nothing about growth from the first estimates of the 1990s and 2000s, which the release does not give. The court's audit covered 2012 to 2023. The release says the tunnel lot KAT 2 alone rose 297.75 million euros and took about 31 months longer, with contractor claims above a third of the original contract sum, and that the company paid tunnel stoppages contrary to the contract. The opening date of 14 December 2025 is taken from ÖBB's own project page (https://www.unsereoebb.at/de/suedstrecke, 'Am 14. Dezember 2025 geht die Koralmbahn in den Fahrgastbetrieb'), not from the court. The full report PDF (https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home/2025_14_Koralmbahn.pdf) was not opened; the figures come from the release. The started year is approximate and was not read at either source: preparatory works on the line began in the late 1990s and the Koralm tunnel drives later. ÖBB-Infrastruktur is a state-owned company, so the delivery is institutional, but the record reports cost and time only, not ridership.

• 🇩🇰Denmarklinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020still operating

  Fehmarn Belt fixed link, and its cost and schedule overrun

  The European Court of Auditors found in 2020 that the Fehmarn Belt fixed link, the 18 km rail and road tunnel that Denmark finances, designs and builds through its state company Femern A/S, had an initial cost estimate of 4.4 billion euros at 2008 prices (5.0 billion at 2019 values) against a latest estimate of 7.7 billion, a 54 percent increase, and that construction planned to start in 2012 for opening in 2018 had started in 2020 with opening expected in 2028.

  7.7 billion euros, latest cost estimate of the fehmarn belt fixed link transport flagship infrastructure, 2019 values, 2019. 5 billion euros, initial cost estimate re-indexed to 2019 values (4.4 billion euros at 2008 values), 2008 estimate, 2019 values. European Court of Auditors, Special Report 10/2020 'EU transport infrastructures: more speed needed in megaproject implementation to deliver network effects on time', Annexes II and III and Table 3, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Denmark took on the whole financing and construction risk of a cross-border tunnel through a state-owned company repaid from future tolls, under a state treaty that limits the neighbouring country to its own access lines.

  Limits: The figures are in a PDF: the timeline table is Annex II (PDF page 66) and the cost table Annex III (PDF page 67), with the 5,016 to 7,711 million euro comparison and 54 percent in the table on PDF page 36. The ECA compares the latest estimate with the first political estimate on purpose, so part of the increase reflects scope settled after 2008, and the re-indexation uses the GDP deflator, not construction prices. The ECA's 'transport flagship infrastructure' includes the Danish and German rail access lines, and Germany finances and builds its own access lines, so the 7.7 billion is not a purely Danish cost; the report states that the tunnel itself is financed, designed and built by Denmark (paragraph 23, PDF page 21) and that the fixed link is therefore a Danish project. The figures are from 2019 and 2020; the tunnel is still under construction, and later Danish estimates and the current opening date were not checked at a Danish source, so the 2028 opening is the ECA's estimate at the time. The ECA reports that the construction start slipped largely because of the German planning approval process and litigation, which is outside Danish institutions' control. The EU co-finances the project, and the ECA audits EU spending, not Femern A/S's management.

• 🇨🇿Czechialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2020still operating

  Motorway construction by the Road and Motorway Directorate, and its unit cost

  The Czech Supreme Audit Office reported in June 2026 that 41 motorway sections totalling more than 300 km were opened to traffic between 2020 and 2024, after years with almost none (no kilometre in 2014, four in 2018), but that the average cost the state paid per kilometre of motorway opened rose from nearly CZK 275 million in 2020 to CZK 505 million in 2024, an increase of nearly 84 percent.

  505 million Czech koruna per km, average cost to the state per kilometre of motorway opened, 2024. 275 million Czech koruna per km, average cost to the state per kilometre of motorway opened (nearly), 2020. Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad (Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic), press release on the comprehensive report on the state's investment policy 2020 to 2025 from the perspective of audits of transport infrastructure, 8 June 2026, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The transport ministry and its Road and Motorway Directorate prepare motorway sections through long zoning and permitting processes and then build many of them in a short window financed by the State Fund for Transport Infrastructure and EU funds, paying whatever the market price is when the sections finally reach construction.

  Limits: The source is the audit office's English press release; the comprehensive report it summarises, based on 13 audits completed from 2020 to 2025, was not opened. Cost per kilometre opened is an average over whatever sections happened to open in each year, so it mixes simple and complex sections (tunnels, bridges, terrain) and nominal prices across a period of high construction inflation; the office says the rise 'cannot be attributed solely' to inflation or complexity, which is a judgement, not a decomposition, and no baseline against outturn is given for any single section. The 2020 figure is stated as 'nearly' 275 million. The same release gives project-level findings that support the schedule side: preparation of the D4 section took the Ministry of Transport and the Road and Motorway Directorate 21 years and was delivered as a PPP whose payments run to 2049, and the directorate had not completed the modernisation of 20 sections of the D1 for CZK 28 billion after 10 years. The record shows delivery volume rising and unit cost rising together; it does not show whether the 2020 to 2024 output was on its planned schedule. The started year is the first year of the audit office's comparison, not the start of the motorway programme.

• 🇭🇷Croatialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2018delivered and closed

  Pelješac Bridge, the first stage of the road connection to South Dalmatia

  Croatia's road authority awarded the 2,440-metre Pelješac Bridge to China Road and Bridge Corporation in 2018 for HRK 2.081 billion excluding VAT with a 36-month completion deadline, works started on 31 July 2018, the last steel segment was installed by 28 July 2021, and the government expected the bridge and access roads to open in June 2022, in a project whose eligible costs of 420 million euros were 85 percent financed by an EU grant of 357 million euros.

  2.081 billion Croatian kuna, contract price for the bridge, excluding vat, 2018. 36 months, contracted completion period from the start of works on 31 july 2018, 2018. Government of the Republic of Croatia (vlada.gov.hr), news item 'Pelješac Bridge joined together', 28 July 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government revived a cancelled bridge as an EU cohesion-funded major project, tendered it on price with a fixed deadline, and let it to the lowest bidder, a Chinese state contractor, while EU money covered 85 percent of eligible costs.

  Limits: The source is a government news item written by the national news agency Hina at the moment the span was closed, so it carries the government's framing and gives a contract price and a deadline, not a final cost: no final account or audit of the bridge's outturn cost was read. The page puts the total project value at '€526 billion', an evident typing error for 526 million, and the EU grant figure appears as '€357' without a unit; the record uses the 420 million euro eligible cost and 357 million euro grant stated elsewhere on the same page, and the European Commission's release of 7 June 2017 (read through the Internet Archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20190715235249/https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2017/06/06-07-2017-commission-approves-eu-financing-of-the-peljesac-bridge-in-croatia) confirms 357 million euros and 85 percent. The 36-month deadline from 31 July 2018 fell at the end of July 2021, when the span was joined; the expected June 2022 opening was a forecast on the page, and the actual opening date (reported as 26 July 2022) was not read at an official source, so the record can say only that the structure was joined on its contract deadline and opened about a year later with its access roads. The project had an earlier history the page omits: a first construction contract from 2007 was cancelled by a later government, according to press reports not used as a source. The bridge was built by a Chinese state-owned contractor, so the delivery attributable to Croatia is the procurement, financing and project management.

• 🇸🇰Slovakialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2015still operating

  Decommissioning of the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant, and its four-year slip

  Slovakia's state decommissioning company JAVYS, which the European Court of Auditors reported in 2016 as holding the Bohunice V1 decommissioning end date at 2025 with a cost estimate of 1,239 million euros, reported in its 2025 annual report that the final decontamination and demolition contract signed on 18 December 2024 runs 60 months, putting the end of decommissioning at the end of 2029, at a total estimated cost of 1,220 million euros, with 66 decommissioning projects completed by 31 December 2025.

  1,220 million euros, total estimated cost of decommissioning bohunice v1, 2025-12-31. 2029 year, expected year of completion of the whole v1 decommissioning process, against 2025 in the plan the eca reviewed in 2016, 2025-12-31. JAVYS, a.s. (Jadrová a vyraďovacia spoločnosť, state-owned), Výročná správa 2025 (annual report 2025), section on V1 decommissioning, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: A state company created to decommission shut-down reactors runs dozens of EU-funded projects under a detailed decommissioning plan monitored by the European Commission and the EBRD, and reschedules the end date when the final demolition contract is procured.

  Limits: JAVYS reports on its own programme; the figures are in a PDF, the 2029 end date and the 60-month contract of 18 December 2024 on PDF page 17, the 1,220 million euro estimate and the 735 million EU share on PDF page 19, and the 66 completed projects on PDF page 20. The baseline comes from a different publisher: the European Court of Auditors' Special Report 22/2016 (https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_22/SR_NUCLEAR_DECOMMISSIONING_EN.pdf) says the Slovak end date 'has remained at 2025' (paragraph 64, PDF page 40) and gives estimated costs of 1,146 million euros in 2011 and 1,239 million in 2015 (Table 8, PDF page 46). The two cost figures are not on the same basis, so the record does not claim the cost fell; it claims cost was held roughly flat while completion slipped about four years. Decommissioning is a stretch for 'major public infrastructure projects': it is a large state engineering programme that builds waste facilities and demolishes a plant rather than a new asset, and it is mostly paid for by the EU (735 million euros of the 1,220 million, through the EBRD-managed BIDSF fund and the Slovak Innovation and Energy Agency). The started year is 2015, the start of the second decommissioning stage under the nuclear regulator's licence of 23 December 2014; the first stage began earlier. Whether the 2029 date holds is not known.

• 🇱🇹Lithuanialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010still operating

  Decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, and its delays

  The European Court of Auditors found in 2016 that Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant decommissioning had pushed its end date back by a further nine years since 2011 to 2038, that the interim spent fuel storage facility was ten years behind the 2005 decommissioning plan, and that the estimated decommissioning cost had risen 15 percent from 2,930 million euros in 2011 to 3,376 million in 2015, and 67 percent since the 2010 estimate.

  3,376 million euros, estimated total cost of decommissioning ignalina, 2015. 2,930 million euros, estimated total cost of decommissioning ignalina, 2011. European Court of Auditors, Special Report 22/2016 'EU nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia: some progress made since 2011, but critical challenges ahead', retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: A state enterprise decommissions a large Soviet-designed plant under EU accession commitments, building fuel and waste storage through international contracts paid by an EU fund, and its end date moves each time a key facility is delayed.

  Limits: The figures are in a PDF: the 2038 end date and the nine-year postponement in paragraph 60 (PDF page 38), the ten-year delay of the interim spent fuel storage facility in Table 6, the 67 percent rise in paragraph 73 (PDF page 44) and the 2011 and 2015 estimates in Table 8 (PDF page 46). The report is ten years old and the current end date and cost estimate were not checked at a Lithuanian source; the Lithuanian audit office's site (valstybeskontrole.lt) returned a Cloudflare challenge. The ECA audits EU spending, and the EU funds most of the programme, so the figures describe a jointly financed delivery carried out by the state enterprise Ignalina NPP. Decommissioning is a stretch for 'major public infrastructure projects': it builds waste and fuel storage facilities and dismantles a plant, and the report says delays came partly from contractual disputes with a foreign contractor and from poor information on how the Soviet-built plant was constructed. The started year is approximate: 2010 is the base year of the ECA's cost comparison, and the report does not give a start date for decommissioning itself.

• 🇷🇸Serbialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010delivered and closed

  Corridor X motorway sections (E-75 and E-80)

  Serbia's state road company Koridori Srbije built 45.5 km of Corridor X motorway on the E-75 towards North Macedonia and the E-80 Dimitrovgrad bypass towards Bulgaria under a loan approved in July 2009, finishing at a total project cost of EUR316.2 million against an appraisal estimate of EUR318.2 million, but taking about 10 years from approval to full completion against a planned 6.5, with the loan closing in September 2019 instead of December 2015.

  316.2 million euros, final project cost including government counterpart funds, 2019-09. 318.2 million euros, project cost estimated at appraisal, including contingencies, 2009-07. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Serbia Corridor X Highway Project (P108005), March 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: A dedicated state motorway company procured large lots under development bank rules, held the cost line by re-bidding failed contracts and drawing an additional loan, and accepted years of delay rather than scope cuts.

  Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, in a completion report on a project it financed and rated, written with data from the implementing agency. The two costs are in para. 11 and Table 2 (printed page 8) and para. 54 (page 19); the 10 years against 6.5 and the closing dates are in para. 32 (page 13) and the datasheet (page 2). Staying on budget was helped by a 2016 additional loan of EUR35 million that covered overruns (datasheet and para. 58), and the construction cost alone rose 21 percent over the initial contract prices, so 'on budget' means within an appraisal estimate that carried contingencies, not within contract prices. The Dimitrovgrad bypass contractors were terminated twice and its works finished in November 2019 against an April 2012 contract date (Table 6). The record covers only the World Bank financed sections of a longer corridor co-financed by EIB, EBRD and others, whose cost and schedule are not reported here. Traffic in 2018 was 46 percent of the appraisal forecast on the E-80. The start year is the first works contract (April 2010, Table 6).

• 🇺🇦Ukrainelinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016delivered and closed

  Road Sector Development Project on the M-03 and M-12, and its cut scope

  Ukraine's road agency Ukravtodor rehabilitated or upgraded 156.3 km of the M-03 Kyiv to Kharkiv and M-12 corridors under a US$560 million loan approved in November 2015, after slow progress led the government in 2017 to cancel US$222.2 million of the loan, dropping three M-03 bypasses and two long-term maintenance contracts, so the loan closed at US$337.8 million in September 2022, nine months after its original date.

  337.8 million US dollars, loan amount after cancellation, fully disbursed, 2022-09-30. 560 million US dollars, original loan amount at approval, 2015-11-03. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Ukraine Road Sector Development Project (P149322), November 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The national road agency delivered the widening of a corridor it had already been rebuilding with the same lender, and when bypasses stalled on land acquisition the government cancelled them rather than extend the loan.

  Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, in a completion report on its own loan, and the loan amount is not the full cost of the works; no figure for the cost of the delivered roads against an appraisal estimate per km was used. The cancellation and its reasons (land acquisition not started at Poltava, community objections at Kopyly, a realignment at Chutove) are in paras. 23 and 26 to 27 (printed pages 10 to 12); the 156.3 km is in para. 41 (page 16); amounts and dates are on the datasheet (page 2). In 2019 disbursement was about 11 percent with over 60 percent of the period elapsed, and some lots were moved in from a parallel World Bank road project, so the delivered kilometres mix two programmes. Russia's invasion in February 2022 stopped the civil works under force majeure seven months before closing, so the final delay is not all the agency's. The record shows a scope cut, not a cost overrun, and says nothing about the separate Great Construction programme.

• 🇧🇾Belaruslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016delivered and closed

  M6 Minsk to Grodno transit corridor upgrade

  Belarus's Ministry of Transport and Communications widened 154 km of the M6 Minsk to Grodno highway to dual carriageway under a loan approved in December 2014, against 86 km planned, after civil works for the planned sections were awarded for less than half the estimate; the corridor component cost US$242.15 million against US$259.28 million at entry, and the loan closed in June 2022 against an original June 2020.

  154 km, length of single carriageway reconstructed and widened to dual carriageway, 2022-06-15. 86 km, length planned at entry, 2014-12-19. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Belarus Transit Corridor Improvement Project (P149697), December 2022, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The transport ministry tendered the corridor in lots to joint ventures of local state-owned contractors, and when bids came in far below estimate it used the savings to add 67 km of the same corridor without new financing.

  Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan, with costs reported by the borrower. The component costs are in Table 2 (printed page 9), the 154 against 86 km in para. 32 (page 14), the savings in para. 52 (page 21) and the dates on the datasheet (page 2). The low cost was helped by a government decision to exempt the works from VAT, so part of the saving is a transfer within the state, not efficiency. The actual cost excludes design, supervision and land acquisition, which the government paid separately. Works were not contracted until July 2016, more than a year after effectiveness, because of a dispute over whether state-owned Belarusian contractors were eligible, and the road safety centre was incomplete at closing. The report was written in 2022, after which World Bank engagement with Belarus stopped, so later maintenance of the road is unknown.

• 🇧🇦Bosnia and Herzegovinalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2017delivered and closed

  Federation Road Sector Modernization Project, and its shrunken rehabilitation scope

  The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's public road company PC Roads FBH delivered 76.9 km of road works, including a 35 km upgrade of the Neum to Stolac road, under a project approved in August 2016, but rehabilitated only 41.75 km of main roads against an appraisal target of 178 km, which was cut to 42.23 km in 2021, and the closing date moved from December 2021 to September 2023.

  41.75 km, roads rehabilitated, non-rural, achieved at closing, 2023-09-30. 178 km, target for roads rehabilitated, non-rural, at appraisal, 2016-08-02. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation Road Sector Modernization Project, April 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The entity road company took a multilateral loan for a list of sections whose designs did not yet exist, then cut the list to what designs, land and budget allowed and concentrated on one strategic coastal link.

  Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on a project it co-financed with the EIB. The 178 and 42.23 km targets are in para. 55 (printed page 19), and the 41.75 km achieved against the revised 42.23 km target is in the outcome table (Table 4, page 13), the 76.9 km and the Neum to Stolac upgrade in paras. 30 to 31 (page 11), the cost per km in para. 45 (page 17) and the dates on the datasheet (page 2). The Bank attributes the cut to designs that were only 1.0 km complete at entry, so the 178 km target may have been an error of preparation rather than a delivery that shrank; the report says rehabilitation cost per km came out more than five times the plan for the same reason. Total project cost rose from US$101.3 million to about US$105.5 million, mostly as an EIB increase. Land acquisition and COVID-19 delayed the Crnaja tunnel and led to sections being cancelled. The project covers one of the country's two entities, not Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

• 🇲🇩Moldovalinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016delivered and closed

  Local Roads Improvement Project, and its halved scope

  Moldova's State Roads Administration upgraded 149.3 km of unpaved local roads to paved standard under a project approved in October 2015, after unit costs doubled from US$230,000 to about US$415,000 per km and contracts on 42.3 km were terminated, so a 2019 restructuring cut the target from 300 km to 150 km and the project closed in July 2023 instead of March 2021.

  149.3 km, rural roads rehabilitated, 2023-07-31. 300 km, rural roads to be rehabilitated, target at appraisal, 2015-10-30. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Moldova Local Roads Improvement Project (P150357), January 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The road administration designed for a low-cost paving technique, failed to attract bidders able to build it, then redesigned for asphalt at twice the unit cost and halved the length.

  Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own credit, which rated it. The 300 to 150 km cut and the unit cost doubling are in para. 54 (printed page 26), the terminated contracts on 42.3 km in para. 39 (page 21), the 149.3 km in the results table (page 16) and the dates on the datasheet. The doubling followed a switch from a cheap surface treatment that local contractors could not build to conventional asphalt, so part of the cost rise bought a more durable road. These are local roads, a programme of many small contracts rather than one major build, and the US$102.5 million project is small against Moldova's national road spending.

• 🇦🇱Albanialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2018delivered and closed

  Regional and Local Roads Connectivity Project

  Albania's Albanian Development Fund rehabilitated about 70 km of regional and local roads under a US$50 million loan approved in April 2018, against 55 km planned, after civil works were awarded at up to 48 percent below estimate, with the closing date extended by 18 months to June 2024.

  70 km, regional and local roads rehabilitated, 2024-06-30. 55 km, regional and local roads to be rehabilitated, original target, 2018-04-25. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Albania Regional and Local Roads Connectivity Project (P163239), December 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: A development fund that has implemented donor-financed roads since 1993 ran competitive bids among local firms, and used the savings to extend the list of roads.

  Limits: This is a small programme of regional road contracts, not a major national build, and it is filed because no official cost or schedule outturn for a larger Albanian project (the Arbri road concession, the Durres to Kukes motorway) was found; it is weak evidence for the construct. The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan. The 55 and 70 km are in para. 12 and para. 58 (printed page 16); the report attributes the savings partly to the Albanian Development Fund's own cost estimation method, which it says overestimated costs, so 'under budget' partly measures a padded estimate. The 18-month extension is on the datasheet and in para. 21; the report cites COVID-19, the 2019 earthquake and land acquisition at Pogradec. 'About 70 km' is approximate in the source, and the source is inconsistent: the summary results table reports 62 km rehabilitated against the 55 km target, while the annex results table and the text give 70 km as of October 2024. The start year is the approval and signing year (2018); the first works date is not stated on the pages read.

• 🇲🇰North Macedonialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014still operating

  Kicevo to Ohrid motorway, and its cost and time overrun

  North Macedonia's Public Enterprise for State Roads contracted Sinohydro in November 2013 to build the 56.7 km Kicevo to Ohrid section of motorway A2 for EUR411 million by January 2018; by December 2021 five annexes had moved completion to December 2023 and raised the contract value by EUR187 million (45 percent) to EUR598 million, and the State Audit Office found works 72 percent complete by value in August 2023.

  598 million euros, contract value after annexes, 2021-12. 411 million euros, contract value at signing (contracted completion january 2018), 2013-11. State Audit Office of North Macedonia, Final report on the financial and compliance audit of the Public Enterprise for State Roads for 2022, February 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government named a Chinese contractor by statute under a bilateral loan agreement and started construction on an old design, then absorbed the redesign of tunnels, cuttings and landslide sections through successive annexes that raised the price and moved the deadline.

  Limits: The figures are in a PDF in Macedonian, in the key audit matter section 5.1 (printed pages 25 to 27); the 45 percent increase is also stated in the summary (printed page 4). The road was still under construction when the audit was written, so the record shows an overrun in progress, not an outturn; later annexes and deadlines reported in the press (a further increase and a 2027 deadline) were not checked against an official document. The EUR598 million is the contract value; the audit puts total investment, including expropriation, interest and exchange differences, at about EUR575 million spent by November 2023, and financing at US$685 million in two Chinese loans. The audit attributes the overrun to a basic design drawn up between 2002 and 2010 that did not match the terrain, giving 42 variations, which is the auditor's reading. The contractor was named by a 2013 law rather than chosen by open tender, so the record also reflects a procurement choice. 'Operating' means the build is still running, not that the road is open.

• 🇭🇺Hungarylinked to Large project deliverystarted 2006delivered and closed

  Budapest metro line 4, first section, and its cost and time overrun

  Hungary's State Audit Office reported in September 2010 that the first section of Budapest metro line 4, approved by the capital in September 2004 at a cost of HUF236.5 billion with a deadline of end 2009, was forecast to cost HUF370 billion, 56.4 percent more, and to open in the second half of 2013.

  370 billion forints, forecast investment cost of the first section, current prices, 2010. 236.5 billion forints, investment cost in the 2004 permit document, current prices, 2004-09. State Audit Office of Hungary (Allami Szamvevoszek), Report 1023 on the audit of the investment process of metro line 4, September 2010, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The capital set a deadline in its 2004 permit before permits and land were secured, signed works contracts in 2006 with penalty deadlines it then had to relax, and redesigned stations after an architectural competition while construction was under way.

  Limits: The figures are in a PDF in Hungarian (summary findings, printed pages 12 to 13, with a chart of planned dates and costs); they are a mid-construction forecast, not the final outturn, and the line's opening in March 2014 and its final cost are not in this source. The auditor attributes part of the increase to scope added after the permit: EU-supported municipal works around stations (HUF39.5 billion), a single-vault station redesign (HUF44.8 billion) and reserves of about 14 percent, so not all of the 56.4 percent is overrun on the same scope. The report's chart puts the opening date in the 1996 feasibility study at 2005, so the delay looks larger against that baseline. The investor was the City of Budapest through its project directorate, with central government paying a large share under a 2004 agreement, so the delivery is a joint municipal and national one. Later OLAF findings on irregularities were not used.

• 🇧🇬Bulgarialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008delivered and closed

  Road Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, and its cut after the 2009 budget squeeze

  Bulgaria's Road Infrastructure Agency rehabilitated national roads under a EUR144 million project approved in June 2007, but after budget cuts in 2010 cancelled three lots on about 87 km where works had not started, reducing the length from 450 km to 307 km, and closed in June 2013, two years late, at EUR97.1 million, 67 percent of the appraisal estimate.

  97.146 million euros, total project cost, actual, 2013-06-30. 144 million euros, total project cost, appraisal estimate, 2007-06-26. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Bulgaria Road Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, December 2013, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The road agency contracted nine regional rehabilitation lots on a loan, then, when the national budget could not cover its co-financing and payments, cancelled the lots not yet started and stretched the rest over two more years.

  Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan, which reproduces the agency's own implementation report as an annex. The 450 to 307 km reduction and the cancelled lots are in section 1.6 (printed page 4); the costs in Annex 1 (page 19); the original and revised closing dates on the datasheet. Spending fell because scope was cut, not because works came in cheap, so the 67 percent is a measure of a shrunken programme, not of savings. The cause the report names is the government's fiscal restraint after the 2008 to 2009 crisis, with 2010 budget funds spent on 2009 obligations, and only 8 to 9 percent of the loan disbursed by mid-2009. These are rehabilitation lots on existing class I to III roads, not a new motorway, and the record says nothing about the EU-funded motorways built in the same years.

• 🇪🇬Egyptlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009still operating

  Ain Sokhna supercritical power plant

  The Egyptian Electricity Holding Company built the 1,300 MW Ain Sokhna supercritical thermal power plant, with its first unit entering commercial operation on 3 March 2015 and the second on 4 June 2015, at a final cost of US$1,159.4 million against a base cost of US$2,139.6 million estimated at appraisal in 2009.

  1,159.4 million US dollars, final cost of the ain sokhna power plant component, 2019-03. 2,139.6 million US dollars, base cost of the power plant component at appraisal (pad), excluding us$50.2 million contingencies, 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Egypt Ain Sokhna Power Project (P100047), 26 June 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The state power holding company procured a large thermal plant in a few big packages co-financed by four lenders, priced the appraisal estimate conservatively, and redeployed the savings into grid works.

  Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$600 million of the cost, wrote the report. The costs are in Table 1 and para. 23 (ICR pages 8 to 9), the commercial operation dates in para. 20 of the annex on design and implementation; the report says construction was 'initially delayed' but finished 'about when expected' and gives no original target date for commercial operation, so schedule performance rests on that judgement and on the 2015 dates. The ICR does not explain why the plant cost 46 percent less than estimated; a 2013 restructuring had already cut the estimate to US$1,655.3 million, which suggests the 2009 estimate was high rather than that delivery was unusually efficient, and the savings went into a transmission component. That transmission component ran late: it was not finished at the extended loan closing of 31 December 2018 (original closing 31 December 2015), and its final cost was not known. The plant was designed to burn heavy fuel oil as well as gas, which the report says raised its cost and lowered its efficiency against a combined-cycle plant. The status rests on the report's account of operation in 2015 to 2018, not on a current source.

• 🇮🇶Iraqlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010delivered and closed

  Hartha power station units 2 and 3 rehabilitation, and its halt

  Iraq's Ministry of Electricity set out in 2007 to restore 400 MW at Hartha power station units 2 and 3 by December 2010 under the Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project, but when the project closed on 30 June 2015 no capacity had been restored, the works were about 70 percent complete, the cost estimate had risen from US$150 million to US$187.62 million with a US$98.97 million financing gap, and the contractor withdrew from the site.

  0 MW, generating capacity of hartha units 2 and 3 restored at project close (target 400 mw), 2015-06-30. 187.62 million US dollars, latest estimate of total project cost, against us$150 million at appraisal, 2015-06-30. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Iraq Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project (P087734), report ICR3577, 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The ministry tried to finish a rehabilitation begun under sanctions by contracting one turnkey supplier to install equipment bought a decade earlier, and when disputes and budget shortfalls stalled the works, it could neither fund a variation nor terminate.

  Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated both itself and the borrower unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory, and it says blame for the delays was shared between the ministry and the contractor (para. 53, PDF page 29). The 0 MW and 70 percent figures are in the results table (PDF page 7); the cost table and the US$98.97 million gap are in Annex 1 (PDF page 43); the halt is para. 46 (PDF page 25: 'works have practically stopped'). The cost estimate excludes about US$19 million the government paid for contractor security and an unsettled price adjustment. Much of the failure came from the design: the project had to reuse equipment bought in 1999 under the Oil for Food Programme, which narrowed bidding and bred disputes, and the security situation from 2014 raised costs. The status is 'concluded' because the financed project closed and its result, no capacity restored, stands; it is a delivery failure, not a reversal, since nothing delivered was later lost and the report does not say the rehabilitation was terminated. Whether the ministry later completed the units with its own money was not read at any Iraqi source. The units are part of one station, a modest project by value; the record evidences delivery failure on a rehabilitation, not on a new build.

• 🇱🇧Lebanonlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2012operating below its peak

  Greater Beirut Water Supply Project (Awali to Beirut conveyor), and its unfinished delivery

  Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction and the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment built most of a system to bring 250,000 cubic metres a day from the Awali to 1.2 million people in Greater Beirut, but when the World Bank loan closed on 30 April 2025, 106 months after the original June 2016 closing date, no additional water had been delivered, the 24/7 supply reached in a 20,000-customer pilot zone in 2018 had not been maintained, and component costs had risen from US$370 million at approval to US$561.7 million.

  0 customers, customers in the achrafieh pilot zone receiving 24/7 water supply at closing, 2025-04-30. 20,000 customers, customers in the achrafieh pilot zone receiving 24/7 water supply when the target was reached, 2018. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lebanon Greater Beirut Water Supply Project (P103063, Loan 7967-LE), report ICR00441, 16 December 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The reconstruction council and the regional water utility split a gravity conveyance, treatment and distribution system between them, financed the start with a World Bank loan, and depended on utility surpluses and a second loan for the rest; when the utility's revenue and the state's finances collapsed, the scheme stopped short of delivering water.

  Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Highly Unsatisfactory and its own performance Moderately Unsatisfactory. The 106 months are in para. 17; the zero water delivered, the 75, 84 and 89 percent completion of tunnels, pipelines and treatment plant and the 20,000-customer pilot are in Table 2 and paras. 29 to 31 (ICR pages 8 to 9). The US$561.7 million is the project budget at closing printed in Table 3 of the report against US$370 million at appraisal, and matches the sum of the three components in Annex 3 (US$434.0, 112.7 and 15.0 million; page 31) against 294.0, 61.0 and 15.0 at approval. Lebanon's 2019 financial collapse, COVID-19, the 2020 port explosion and a contractor's insolvency all fall inside the delay, so it is not a clean measure of institutional capacity in normal times, and a US$90 million additional financing approved in 2018 lapsed because Lebanon did not make it effective. The erosion is the pilot zone's 24/7 supply, reached in 2018 and lost; that is a small part of the project, and the main failure is non-completion, not loss. A follow-on Second Greater Beirut Water Supply Project was approved on 14 January 2025 to finish the works, so the delivery may still complete. The related Bisri dam, financed under a separate project, was partly cancelled before construction (footnote in para. 8) and is not counted here.

• 🇯🇴Jordanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2004delivered and closed

  Amman Development Corridor (Amman Ring Road phase 1), and its overrun

  Jordan's Ministry of Public Works and Housing built the 40 km first phase of the Amman Ring Road under the Amman Development Corridor Project, whose estimated total cost rose from US$160.6 million at appraisal in 2004 to US$455.97 million in March 2013, with the road works alone rising from US$106.92 million to US$279.87 million, while the loan closing date moved from June 2009 to December 2012 and one of three sections was 65 percent complete at closing.

  455.97 million US dollars, actual or latest estimated total project cost (15 march 2013), 2013-03-15. 160.6 million US dollars, total project cost estimated at appraisal, 2004. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Jordan Amman Development Corridor Project (P081505, Loan 7634), report ICR2661, 10 June 2013, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The public works ministry split a 40 km expressway around Amman into three sections financed by three lenders, acquired land late and at rising prices, and absorbed design changes during construction with additional financing rather than rescoping.

  Limits: The World Bank, which financed one of three road sections (with the Arab Fund and the EIB financing the others), wrote the report and rated the outcome, its own performance and the borrower's Moderately Unsatisfactory. The costs are in Annex 1 (printed page 18): land acquisition rose from US$40.9 million to US$158.43 million and is a large part of the overrun, and the latest estimate includes US$42 million of payments due after closing to finish Section 1 and settle bills. Against the 2008 additional-financing estimate of US$343.18 million the overrun is 32 percent, so much of the growth was already recognised mid-project. The 65 percent figure for Section 1 is in the results table; the report says in para. 48 that the road remained uncertain of reaching operation 'when nearly twice the expected construction time has passed', and that the inland port and customs depot were 'gradually dropped'. The text is a scanned 2013 report with OCR errors in the data sheet. When the whole road opened was not read at an official source; 'concluded' means the financed project closed with the road mostly built.

• 🇬🇪Georgialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016delivered and closed

  East-West Highway Corridor Improvement Project (Rikoti Pass sections)

  Georgia's Roads Department completed most civil works on the Zemo Osiauri to Chumateleti and Chumateleti to Khevi sections of the East-West Highway across the Rikoti Pass by the project's closing on 30 June 2025, four and a half years after the original loan closing date of 31 December 2020, and the government's own financing rose to US$91.03 million against US$44 million planned for the enlarged project (US$24 million at approval plus US$20 million under the 2017 additional financing).

  91.03 million US dollars, borrower co-financing actually disbursed, 2025-06-30. 44 million US dollars, borrower co-financing planned, parent project (us$24 million) plus 2017 additional financing (us$20 million), my sum of table 2, 2017-12. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Georgia East-West Highway Corridor Improvement Project (P149952, Loans 8547-GE and 8788-GE), 2026, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Roads Department carried the national east-west highway over its hardest mountain pass in contracts financed by the World Bank and the EIB, and when contracts failed or were re-tendered the government covered the gap from its own budget instead of cutting scope.

  Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory and efficiency Modest. The financing figures are in the data sheet and Table 2 (ICR page 4); the closing-date changes in the restructuring table (paras. 10 to 11) and para. 23. Much of the extra time and government money followed a 2017 decision to add the 11.6 km Chumateleti to Khevi link, co-financed by an EIB loan of EUR 67.47 million, so the plan the outturn is set against grew mid-project; Table 2's component 1 estimates (parent plus additional financing, US$273.48 million including EIB) against actuals (US$359.72 million) give a 32 percent overrun by my own sum, which the report does not state. The report attributes the 18-month extension of 2023 to re-tendering, COVID-19 and mountain construction, and the parallel Fourth East-West Highway project's ICR (2020) records that a Zemo Osiauri to Chumateleti lot was terminated in December 2018 and re-bid under this project. Most civil works were complete at closing, with residual works finished afterwards on government money; the date of full opening was not read at an official source.

• 🇦🇲Armenialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010delivered and closed

  North-South Road Corridor Investment Program, Tranche 1

  Armenia's Ministry of Transport, Communication and Information Technologies reconstructed about 30 km of the M1 Yerevan to Ashtarak and M2 Yerevan to Artashat roads under the first tranche of the ADB-financed North-South Road Corridor programme for an implementation cost of US$68.70 million against US$68.0 million at appraisal, but completed the project on 16 June 2016 against a planned 31 December 2013, after one round of bids was rejected and the M1 section was cut from 18.4 km to about 10 km.

  68.7 million US dollars, total implementation cost, actual, 2018-02-23. 68 million US dollars, total implementation cost at appraisal, 2009-09. Asian Development Bank, Completion Report, Armenia North-South Road Corridor Investment Program (Tranche 1), Project 42145-023, Loan 2561, January 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The transport ministry used a multitranche ADB facility to rebuild the national north-south corridor section by section, adjusting each tranche's scope to land acquisition and fiscal limits instead of extending its budget.

  Limits: ADB, the lender, wrote the report. The completion dates and costs are in the basic data table at the front of the PDF (pages 2 to 4); the scope changes are paras. 8 to 16. The 30-month slip from December 2013 to June 2016 is my subtraction from the two dates; the loan closed on 23 February 2018 against 30 June 2014 in the loan agreement. Cost held near appraisal only because the scope moved: the M1 section was cut to about 10 km because of land acquisition, 2 km was transferred to tranche 2 when Armenia hit fiscal limits, and 19.6 km of the M2 was added, so the outturn buys different roads; the combined tranche 1 and 2 works contract was US$10 million above the engineer's estimate and the government undertook to fund overruns (para. 14 and footnote 13). This is the first and smallest tranche of a programme to rebuild a 550 km corridor; later tranches, including the Talin to Gyumri works, were not read, and the programme's overall delivery is not evidenced here.

• 🇦🇿Azerbaijanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2009delivered and closed

  Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project (rayon centres), and its downsizing

  Azerbaijan's water agencies built water supply and sanitation systems in eight regional (rayon) centres under the Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project, after a 2012 restructuring cut the scope from 21 rayons to 8 because of cost increases, while the total project cost rose from US$560 million to US$641.8 million and the loan closed on 30 June 2019 instead of 28 February 2013.

  641.8 million US dollars, total project cost, actual disbursed (world bank us$407.8 million plus government us$234 million), 2019-06-30. 560 million US dollars, total project cost at approval, for 21 rayons, 2008-05. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Azerbaijan Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P109961), 18 December 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government launched a national programme to rebuild water systems in all regional centres on rough cost estimates, financed slices of it with World Bank loans, and when real costs emerged, cut the number of towns and stretched the timetable instead of finding the money.

  Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory. The financing and dates are in the data sheet (ICR pages 1 to 2); the cut from 21 to 8 rayons, the reasons and the closing extensions are in Box 1 (page 8), and footnote 7 attributes the reduction to cost increases and unanticipated investments. The approval cost and the final cost cover different scopes: the original estimates for 43 rayons across both national projects were 'not supported by thorough technical studies', so the 2008 figure was not a real baseline, and a US$150 million additional financing in 2014 paid for design changes required by new government policy (legalised dwellings, EU standards), not only for overruns. Implementation moved from AzerSu to the irrigation agency SAWMA in 2009 and then to its successor company after mis-procurement in Nakhchivan, so 'the country's institutions' here are several, and the record does not separate their performance. People served and service quality are in the report but are not the subject of this record.

• 🇰🇬Kyrgyzstanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010delivered and closed

  National Road Rehabilitation (Osh-Batken-Isfana) Project

  The Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications rehabilitated 50 km of the Osh-Batken-Isfana road corridor, against about 30 km planned at approval in 2009, for a total project cost of US$52.46 million against US$30.72 million estimated, over four years and ten months instead of three, closing on 31 December 2014 instead of 30 June 2013.

  52.46 million US dollars, total project cost, actual, with scope increased through two additional financings, 2014-12-31. 30.72 million US dollars, total project cost at appraisal, for about 30 km, 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Kyrgyz Republic National Road Rehabilitation (Osh-Batken-Isfana) Project (P107608), report ICR3239, 2015, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The transport ministry's implementation group rehabilitated a corridor section on a World Bank credit and, delivering on budget, was given two additional financings to extend the works along the same road.

  Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36), the 30 km plan in para. 1.5.2, the 50 km outturn in para. 3.2.2, and the schedule in para. 1.7.2. Most of the cost rise followed added scope: two additional financings added road length and the repair of about 350 km of Osh urban roads, both paid from the road component (US$27.29 million estimated, US$50.27 million actual), so no cost per kilometre of the corridor can be computed from the report and the record cannot separate overrun from added scope. The 18-month extension also followed the added scope. This is a 50 km rehabilitation, small against the country's network, and it says nothing about larger state-financed builds; no Kyrgyz audit was read.

• 🇮🇷Iranlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2000delivered and closed

  Tehran Sewerage Project (first phase: interceptors, trunk main and southern treatment plant)

  The Tehran Sewerage Company built interceptors, trunk mains, tunnels and a wastewater treatment plant under the first phase of the Tehran Sewerage Project at a latest estimated cost of US$359.22 million against US$341.45 million at appraisal in 2000, with the treatment works costing 189 percent of their estimate and the loan closing on 30 June 2008, two years late, before the plant and the eastern trunk main were finished.

  359.22 million US dollars, actual or latest estimated total project cost, 2008-06-30. 341.45 million US dollars, total project cost estimated at appraisal, 2000. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Iran Tehran Sewerage Project (P069941), report ICR1028, 29 June 2009, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The capital's sewerage company built the network in parallel with a design-build-operate contract for the treatment plant, letting the network race ahead on cheap domestic pipe while the plant ran late and over budget under inflation and a foreign-currency contract.

  Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$145 million, wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The component costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36); the US$28.7 million funding shortfall, high inflation (12 to 24 percent a year) and a euro-denominated plant contract as the cause of the two-year extension are in para. 50 (PDF page 20). The total stayed near the estimate only because interceptors and laterals came in at 61 percent of estimate while the trunk main (178 percent) and treatment works (189 percent) overran, so the aggregate hides the overrun on the hardest parts. The plant and the eastern trunk main were unfinished at closing, and the report says only that the company had resources to finish them; completion was not read at a current source. The figures are 2000 to 2008 and say little about Iranian delivery under sanctions since.

• 🇷🇺Russialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2014delivered and closed

  Central Ring Road around Moscow (TsKAD), audited by the Accounts Chamber

  Russia's Accounts Chamber found in June 2020 that the state company Avtodor's Central Ring Road project, whose first stage was originally to be built in 2014 to 2018 and was now scheduled for 2014 to 2021, had risen in cost by 2.6 billion roubles in 2019 to 315.9 billion roubles, and that launch complexes 1 and 5 were only 49 and 61 percent complete on 1 January 2020.

  315.9 billion roubles, project cost after the 2019 increase, 2019. 49 %, technical readiness of launch complex no. 1, 2020-01-01. Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (Schetnaya palata), check report summary 'Stroitelstvo TsKAD dorozhaet, no ne zakanchivaetsya', 16 June 2020, archived copy, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The federal road company procured a ring road around Moscow as long-term investment concessions, financed by the National Wealth Fund, budget subsidies and investors, and as works lagged the government extended deadlines and the Accounts Chamber audited the project year by year.

  Limits: The live ach.gov.ru did not answer a script today, so the cited copy is the Internet Archive's of 15 September 2020. The page is the audit office's summary of its check, not the full report, and it does not state the original cost, so the record shows cost growth in one year, not the full cost overrun against an approved baseline; the schedule baseline is in the page's footnote, which gives the construction period of the first stage as 2014 to 2021, originally 2014 to 2018; the Chamber's 5 August 2015 release on the same project (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20210717054203/https://ach.gov.ru/news/sredstva-fonda-nacionalnogo-blagosostoyaniya-napravlennye-na-stroitelstvo-ckad-ne-ispolzuyutsya-v-po-22619) says construction of complexes 1 and 5 had not started a year after their agreements were signed and that National Wealth Fund money sat unused in a bank. The road is a concession-based project of a state company with private investors (33.8 billion roubles of 186.5 billion invested by end 2019), so delivery is partly private. The 2014 start is the year of the first concession agreements cited by the 2015 release. Status 'concluded' assumes the ring opened in the years after the audit; no official source for the final opening date or final cost was read, which is the record's main weakness.

• 🇵🇬Papua New Guinealinked to Large project deliverystarted 2003delivered and closed

  Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project

  Papua New Guinea's Department of Works restored or maintained 600 km of national roads against a 640 km target under the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, closing in June 2012 five and a half years after the original December 2006 closing date, with national road works under the original loan costing US$35.62 million, 158 percent of their US$22.52 million appraisal estimate.

  35.62 million US dollars, actual cost of maintenance and rehabilitation of national roads, 2012-06-30. 22.52 million US dollars, appraisal estimate for maintenance and rehabilitation of national roads, 2002. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Papua New Guinea Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, 20 December 2012, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The works department ran a lender-financed maintenance and restoration programme on national and provincial roads, absorbed a cost surge on roads by cutting bridges, and extended the programme twice.

  Limits: The component costs are in Annex 1 (project cost by component, original loan) and the dates and road lengths on the datasheet (sections B and F), read from the plain-text version. The appraisal figure excludes VAT and the actual includes it, so part of the 158 percent is a tax difference the table itself flags. Total project cost was on budget (US$58.21 million against US$58.78 million) because bridge components were cut, so the overrun on roads was paid for by building fewer bridges: provincial bridges spent 11 percent of their estimate. The ICR attributes the road cost rise to the construction boom from the PNG LNG project and to sealing more gravel roads than planned. The World Bank rated the outcome Satisfactory, and the programme is maintenance and rehabilitation rather than one new structure. The cost comparison covers the original IBRD loan only; a 2007 IDA additional financing scaled the programme to two more provinces and extended it, and its national road works also overran, at US$40.86 million against US$28.72 million (142 percent, Annex 1 table b), so the June 2012 closing reflects added scope as well as delay. The government paid US$2.28 million of the US$25.07 million counterpart planned at appraisal, with provinces and other donors covering part of the gap.

• 🇱🇦Laoslinked to Large project deliverystarted 1997delivered and closed

  Road No. 13 South upgrading under the Third Highway Improvement Project

  Laos's Ministry of Communication, Transport, Post and Construction upgraded about 200 km of Road No. 13 between Banlak 35 and Pakse to a bituminous standard, completed in March 2002, at US$157,785 per km against an appraisal estimate of US$209,670 per km, and the project closed on its original June 2003 date at US$63.78 million against US$68.92 million appraised.

  157,785 US dollars per km, actual unit cost of upgrading road no. 13 south (calendar 2002 dollars), 2002. 209,670 US dollars per km, appraisal unit cost estimate (sar), 1997. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Lao PDR Third Highway Improvement Project, 26 May 2004, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The transport ministry upgraded a 200 km trunk road under two international contracts and ran a multi-year routine and periodic maintenance programme alongside it.

  Limits: The unit costs are in section 4.3 of the ICR and the totals in Annex 2 (printed page 30), read from the plain-text version; the record states the two published unit costs and does not compute a percentage. The saving is on unit cost, not on the road works line: Annex 2 shows Roads No. 13 and A-1 at US$34.58 million against US$33.45 million appraised even though the A-1 bypass was removed and financed under another project, and the project total came in under appraisal only because physical and price contingencies of US$9.96 million were not needed (actual US$63.78 million against a US$58.96 million baseline before contingencies). The Annex 3 table labels both unit costs 'Calendar 2002 US$ per km' and puts the contract cost at US$153,785, so the actual came in at 103 percent of contract; the 25 percent saving is against the appraisal estimate, which was set before the 1997 Asian crisis and may have been pessimistic. Actual construction took 45 months against 42 contracted, 7 percent longer. Annex 2 prints 88 percent beside the road works line although its own figures give 103 percent, so the table is not internally consistent. JICA separately financed 44 bridges on the road, about six of whose approaches still showed unacceptable settlement. The World Bank wrote and rated the report, and it describes a delivery finished more than 20 years ago.

• 🇲🇳Mongolialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2017delivered and closed

  Second Energy Sector Project, distribution rehabilitation and the 10 MWp western solar plant

  Mongolia's Ministry of Energy and its distribution companies rehabilitated the Baganuur and Erdenet-Bulgan distribution networks and built a 10 MWp solar plant in the Western Energy System under the Second Energy Sector Project, spending US$53.35 million against a US$55.40 million appraisal estimate but closing in August 2024, 25 months after the original September 2022 closing date.

  53.35 million US dollars, actual disbursement at closure, 2024-08-31. 55.4 million US dollars, appraisal cost estimate, 2017-06-15. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, ICR Review, Mongolia Second Energy Sector Project (P152343), ICRR0024731, 14 January 2026, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The energy ministry split a lender-financed programme into distribution upgrades run by regional companies and one turnkey solar plant, kept costs inside the envelope and took two extensions to finish.

  Limits: The cost and date figures are in section 2e of the IEG review (pages 2 to 3), read from the plain-text version; the full ICR was not opened. IEG attributes 18 of the 25 months to subprojects added in the western system at the 2022 restructuring and seven months to inefficiencies, with COVID-19 equipment delays, government changes after elections and procurement problems named as causes, so roughly seven months is slippage on the original scope. The planned US$1.0 million borrower contribution was cancelled, so the project was wholly grant financed. The project is mid-sized, about US$55 million, so it shows delivery on a modest programme rather than on Mongolia's flagship builds such as the new Ulaanbaatar airport, for which no completion figures were found. The solar plant was reported operational in 2022, ahead of the formal closing, so the schedule figure mostly concerns the distribution works. IEG rated the outcome Satisfactory.

• 🇳🇿New Zealandlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2016delivered and closed

  City Rail Link, Auckland, and its cost and time overrun

  City Rail Link Limited, owned by the Crown and Auckland Council, achieved practical completion of Auckland's 3.45 km underground City Rail Link on 30 June 2026 against a target delivery cost of NZ$5,493 million, up from a NZ$3.4 billion estimate made in 2014, and the line opened to the public on 13 September 2026, after its company had planned completion for late 2024.

  5,493 million NZ dollars, target delivery cost in the project delivery agreement, 2026-06-30. 3,400 million NZ dollars, project cost estimate made in 2014, 2014. City Rail Link Limited, Annual Report 2025/26 (accessible Word version), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Crown and Auckland Council set up a jointly owned delivery company, let the main stations and tunnels to an alliance, and re-baselined the budget twice as costs rose rather than cutting scope.

  Limits: The NZ$5,493 million and the 30 June 2026 practical completion are in the 2025/26 annual report, a Word document; the 13 September 2026 opening is on the company's home page (https://www.cityraillink.co.nz/). The NZ$3.4 billion 2014 estimate and the 'late 2024' completion plan come from the company's cost page as archived on 26 January 2023 (https://web.archive.org/web/20230126164501/https://www.cityraillink.co.nz/city-rail-link-cost-timeline), which also gives the April 2019 revision to NZ$4.419 billion; the live page no longer carries them. The 62 percent increase over the 2014 estimate is our calculation and mixes price bases: the company attributes the 2019 rise to construction inflation, a larger contingency and a scope change for nine-car trains. Total spend to 30 June 2026 was NZ$5,283 million against approved funding of NZ$5,644 million, and the company reports itself within budget, which is true only against the 2019 and later baselines. The company is reporting on itself; no Auditor-General review of the outturn was opened. 'Started' is the year main works began, which the cited report does not state.

• 🇹🇯Tajikistanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007still operating

  Rogun hydropower plant

  The Government of Tajikistan resumed construction of the Soviet-era Rogun hydropower plant in 2007 from the state budget, signed the main dam contract in 2016 and commissioned two temporary units (400 MW) in 2018 and 2019. It invested about US$3.3 billion in 2007 to 2022, and in November 2024 the World Bank put the cost to complete the plant at US$6.29 billion, with construction completion moved to 2033 and full reservoir impoundment not before 2039, 63 years after construction first began in 1976.

  6.29 billion USD, estimated cost to complete the rogun hpp programme, November 2024. 3.3 billion USD (about), government of tajikistan investment in rogun hpp, 2007 to 2022, 2007-2022. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document PAD00208, Sustainable Financing for Rogun Hydropower Project (P181029), 19 November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Tajik government restarted a stalled Soviet megaproject from its own budget and a Eurobond, brought two temporary turbines online early to earn revenue during construction, then used World Bank-backed safety and environmental studies to draw in a donor financing package for the rest.

  Limits: No cost overrun can be computed: the appraisal document gives no original budget or baseline completion date to set the US$6.29 billion against, so the gap's unit (percent overrun) is not met. The US$6.29 billion is a forward estimate of remaining cost with contingencies, not an outturn, and adding it to the US$3.3 billion already spent is our arithmetic, not the Bank's. The schedule slip is our reading of milestone dates: construction began in 1976, the Soviet works stopped in 1992, and completion is now 2033 with impoundment in 2039. The Bank itself expects 'some further delays' to the March 2024 milestones. It attributes slow progress to financing shortfalls. The source is the lender's appraisal for its own grant, written to justify financing. The project is now financed by ten development partners, so delivery after 2024 is shared rather than purely Tajik. Spending close to 39 percent of GDP and a US$500 million Eurobond left the country at high risk of debt distress. 'Operating' means two temporary units run, not that the 3,780 MW plant is built.

• 🇩🇰Denmarklinked to Large project deliverystarted 2007still operating

  Kvalitetsfonden hospital building programme (supersygehuse), and its overruns

  Denmark set up Kvalitetsfonden in 2007 to fund a new hospital structure. Through it the regions are building or rebuilding 16 hospitals with a combined investment frame of about DKK 57 billion (2023 prices). Rigsrevisionen reported in November 2023 that the programme's largest overrun, Nyt Hospital Nordsjælland, had its budget raised by DKK 2.3 billion, or 44 percent, and was expected six years later than planned.

  44 % overrun, budget increase over the grant frame, nyt hospital nordsjælland (largest overrun in the programme), 2023. 6 years, schedule delay, nyt hospital nordsjælland, expected completion end of 2026 against plan, 2023. Rigsrevisionen (National Audit Office of Denmark), Beretning 4/2023 om byggeriet af Nyt Hospital Nordsjælland, November 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: Parliament created a state fund that gave each region a fixed, inflation-indexed grant frame per hospital and made the regions carry any overrun. The health ministry supervised changes against the grant conditions, and Rigsrevisionen audited the projects repeatedly while they were being built.

  Limits: The headline 44 percent belongs to one project, the worst in the programme, so it is not the programme's cost performance. The report gives no programme-wide overrun in its text. Figure 2 of the same report lists original and latest budgets in 2009 prices for 15 of the 16 projects, leaving out Nyt Hospital Bispebjerg, whose budget had not been published. Summed by hand, the 15 come to about DKK 43.9 billion against frames of DKK 39.2 billion, roughly 12 percent over. That is our calculation from chart labels, not a published figure. Several projects held their frame partly by cutting scope through savings catalogues, which Rigsrevisionen criticised in Beretning 11/2019 and its follow-ups. A frame that holds after cuts is not a delivery on time and on specification. 2007 is the year the fund was set up. Grants were confirmed project by project afterwards (2013 for Nordsjælland), so construction started years after 2007. The programme is unfinished: Rigsrevisionen's January 2025 follow-up still counted seven projects under construction, six of them under heightened ministry supervision, so final outturns are not known. The figure is a budget forecast in 2023 prices and is reported as a region's estimate, not an audited final account.

• 🇨🇿Czechialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013still operating

  Modernizace dálnice D1 (D1 motorway modernisation, Mirošovice to Kývalka)

  Czechia's Road and Motorway Directorate (ŘSD) rebuilt 160.8 km of the D1 motorway between Mirošovice and Kývalka in 20 sections from April 2013, reopening the last sections in October 2021, three years later than the 2012 schedule, with costs projected at CZK 29.844 billion including the Šmejkalka bridge against CZK 28.208 billion planned.

  3 years, slip in reopening the whole modernised motorway, measured against the 2012 schedule, August 2021 schedule update, audited to November 2022. 29.844 CZK billion, including VAT, nominal, projected total cost including the šmejkalka bridge, against czk 28.208 billion in the 2012 investment plan, 31 May 2022. Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad (Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic), audit conclusion 21/37 on the D1 motorway modernisation, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Road and Motorway Directorate rebuilt the country's main Prague to Brno motorway section by section with traffic still running. The Ministry of Transport approved 20 separate section projects instead of one programme budget, and EU cohesion funds paid CZK 14.0 billion of the cost.

  Limits: The cost figure looks good only because of the baseline it is compared with. The 2012 plan of CZK 28.208 billion was never approved: the audit office says the Ministry of Transport rejected the summary investment plan and approved 20 separate section projects, with no binding overall budget or schedule. The roughly 6 percent overrun is our computation from two published totals, in nominal crowns, with no inflation adjustment. The final cost is unknown. The audit office says the figure is not final, several sections had not been financially settled, and the Šmejkalka bridge cost is a forecast for work planned from 2022 to 2026. Against an earlier baseline the project looks worse. The audit office's 2017 release (audit 16/06) gave the expected total as CZK 20.5 billion and found unit costs up 73 percent, from CZK 74 to 128 million per km, between the 2013 sections and those begun in 2015 and 2016. The three-year slip is measured to the August 2021 schedule, which ŘSD revised 73 times. In November 2022 eight sections still lacked final approval, and nine bridges and three overpasses were in poor or very poor condition. The audit says the modernisation is not complete, so a later finish date would lengthen the slip. This is a rebuild of an existing motorway kept open to traffic, not a new build. The audit looked closely at only five sections, worth CZK 6.792 billion, and a cyber attack on ŘSD's systems limited what auditors could see. The figures are ŘSD's own, reviewed by the auditor, not independently measured.

• 🇵🇬Papua New Guinealinked to Large project deliverystarted 2012delivered and closed

  Lae Port Development Project (Lae Tidal Basin, phase 1)

  Papua New Guinea's Independent Public Business Corporation, using ADB and OPEC Fund loans, built the first phase of the Lae tidal basin, a new berth and container terminal at the port of Lae, between April 2012 and December 2014. It was about four years later than planned and cost $310.4 million, against a $154 million project at the 2007 approval.

  310.4 USD million, total project cost at completion, Project completion report 2017, validated December 2017. 4 years, approximately, delay in completing the civil works against the appraisal schedule, December 2014 completion, validated December 2017. Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation Department, Validation Report: Papua New Guinea, Lae Port Development Project (PVR-540), December 2017, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The government had its state enterprise holding company, IPBC, borrow concessionally from ADB and the OPEC Fund. IPBC procured a single design-and-build contract for reclamation, berth and terminal, and the Morobe Provincial Administration ran the livelihood programme for displaced settlers and the Labu community.

  Limits: The headline 7 percent overrun is against a 2011 revised estimate that had already absorbed $137.4 million of design changes found by later geotechnical work. Against the $154 million package approved in 2007 the increase is about 100 percent. That is our computation and is not like for like, because the scope grew. The validation reports civil works costs up 116 percent and involuntary resettlement costs up 3,590 percent against appraisal. Figures are nominal US dollars. The evaluator is the lender's own evaluation department, validating a completion report the lender wrote. It rated the project less than successful overall, less than effective, less than efficient and less than likely sustainable. The validation attributes the four-year delay to the combination of post-approval design changes and resettlement: 482 settler households on government marshland and a landing site used by three Labu villages, for which a supplementary resettlement plan acceptable to the affected communities had to be prepared. The contractors were foreign: a Korean design-build consultant and China Harbour Engineering. The national institutions' role was procurement, finance and resettlement. A post-completion audit found siltation back to 11 m below chart datum, from the dredged 14 m, at the basin's western entrance. The source says it appeared to have stabilised and does not report lost berth capacity. We have not treated it as an eroded delivery, but a reviewer could. The validation finds handling capacity of 2.0 million revenue tons a year, above the 1.4 million target, so the cost and delay bought a working asset. One project says nothing about PNG's record on other major works.

• 🇬🇷Greecelinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008delivered and closed

  Second-wave motorway concessions (Central E-65, Olympia Odos, Moreas), and their reset

  Greece procured 744 km of motorway as three PPP concessions that commenced in 2008; after works were suspended in 2011 and the contracts were renegotiated in 2013 and 2015, the European Court of Auditors found the three projects delayed by four years on average, their combined cost per km up 36 percent, from 9.1 to 12.4 million euro, and the planned road length cut to 486 km.

  36 % overrun (cost per km), increase in total project cost per km across the three audited motorway concessions, initial plan to post-reset, Post-reset position as audited in 2017, published March 2018. 4 years, average construction delay of the three motorways against their initial completion dates, Estimated/actual completion dates as audited, 2016-2017. European Court of Auditors, Special Report 09/2018, Public Private Partnerships in the EU: Widespread shortcomings and limited benefits (paragraphs 34(d), 37-40, Tables 2 and 3), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Greek state bundled several hundred kilometres of motorway into three design-build-finance-operate concessions, transferred traffic risk to the concessionaires, and paid toll-backed private finance plus EU co-financing; when traffic collapsed the state renegotiated, deferred sections and paid about 1.2 billion euro more rather than stop the works.

  Limits: This is a record of poor cost and schedule performance, not of good delivery, and it is filed because the gap asks for exactly that figure. The 36 percent is a cost per km, and it mixes two movements: the absolute cost of the Central motorway fell (2,375 to 1,594 million euro) while its length was cut by 55 percent, and Olympia's length was cut by 45 percent, so per-km cost rises partly because fixed and financial costs were spread over fewer kilometres. It is not a like-for-like overrun on a fixed scope. Table 3 of the report shows the combined total project cost of the three concessions falling from 6,743 million euro (2,375 + 2,825 + 1,543) to 6,004 million euro (1,594 + 2,619 + 1,791) as length fell from 744 to 486 km, so the 36 percent per-km increase coincides with an absolute cost about 11 percent lower on a 35 percent smaller scope. The ECA computed the figures from information provided by the Greek authorities and audited only three of the five second-wave concessions (Aegean and Nea Odos are not covered). The completion dates in Table 2 are labelled estimated/actual as of the audit, so the four-year average includes forecasts for the Central and Olympia sections due in August 2017. The ECA attributes much of the cost to the 2009 financial crisis, under which traffic fell around 50 percent below the lenders' worst case, and to the public partner's poor preparation (archaeology, environmental permits, expropriation): the record cannot separate those causes. The deferred northern and southern sections of E-65 and the deferred Olympia stretches were taken out of these contracts; whatever was built later under other contracts is not in this number. The report is from 2018. The ECA also records that Greece's PPP route procured 744 km in three tenders where the earlier 82 km of Olympia took up to 20 years and 31 procurements, which is the strongest point in the programme's favour.

• 🇦🇿Azerbaijanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2010delivered and closed

  Third Highway Project: M4 Baku-Shamakhi and M3 Yenikend-Shorsulu motorways

  Azerbaijan's road administration upgraded 94 km of the M4 Baku-Shamakhi highway to a four-lane road and built 48 km of new M3 motorway under the World Bank-financed Third Highway Project, at US$2.47 million per km against US$2.96 million estimated at appraisal, with the loan closing in March 2021 instead of March 2015.

  2.47 US$ million per km, actual cost per km of the upgraded m4 baku-shamakhi highway (appraisal estimate us$2.96 million per km), 2021. 72 months, slip of the actual loan closing date against the original closing date, 2021-03. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00005553, Azerbaijan Third Highway Project (P118023), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The road administration borrowed from the World Bank for a defined corridor, accepted the lender's procurement and engineering review, held to the original alignment instead of the ministry's costlier viaduct proposal, and reused savings by adding a motorway section through restructuring.

  Limits: The completion report is the lender's own evaluation of its loan, drafted with the borrower's data. The cost saving is not mainly efficiency: the report says the lower dollar outcome is mainly attributable to the manat losing more than half its value in 2015 to 2017 while works contracts were priced in local currency, so in local terms the project may have overrun. The 72-month slip is computed here from the two closing dates; the scope also changed twice (the M3 section added, part of the M4 dropped in a landslide zone), and the report concedes the final extension may have been avoidable, so not all of it is construction delay. The efficiency rating is only Modest. It is one corridor of 142 km, with a lender supervising procurement, so it is weak evidence about Azerbaijan's road programme outside donor projects.

• 🇧🇬Bulgarialinked to Large project deliverystarted 2008dismantled

  Belene nuclear power plant, and its cancellation

  Bulgaria's state utility NEK ordered long-lead reactor equipment for the Belene nuclear plant from Atomstroyexport in 2008. The project was cancelled before any unit was completed, and on 6 December 2016 the Ministry of Energy transferred 601,617,133 euros to NEK so it could pay the damages awarded against it in ICC arbitration case 18086/GZ/MHM.

  601,617,133 EUR, state financial assistance transferred to nek to pay the belene arbitration award to atomstroyexport, 2016-12-06. 1,400,000,000 BGN, costs incurred on the belene construction to date, as stated by the minister of energy, 2016. Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Bulgaria, press release of 6 December 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: NEK, the state utility, ordered long-lead reactor equipment from a single foreign vendor in 2008 before financing or a final contract price was settled. The government cancelled the project in 2012, the Ministry of Energy advanced NEK repayable assistance in 2016 to pay the vendor's arbitration claim, and the project was revived in 2018.

  Limits: Belene never produced electricity, so this record documents a delivery that failed before it operated, not a capability that eroded. The headline number is a termination cost, the arbitration damages for equipment ordered in 2008, and not a cost overrun against a budget: the record carries no official baseline budget or schedule for the 2008 phase. The 1.4 billion leva of costs incurred comes from a minister speaking in a television interview. The ministry republished the transcript without a printed date; the 2016 year is inferred from the special assistance law the interview discusses. It is not an audited figure. The project was decided in April 2005, cancelled in March 2012, and revived by a National Assembly decision of 7 June 2018 and a Council of Ministers decision of 29 June 2018. Later decisions on the site and the equipment are not covered by these sources. The 601.6 million euros was advanced to NEK as repayable assistance, not a grant, so the final fiscal loss is not shown here. The later disposal or reuse of the equipment the payment bought is not covered.

• 🇧🇾Belaruslinked to Large project deliverystarted 2013still operating

  Belarusian nuclear power plant (BelAES), delivered behind schedule

  Belarus started building its first nuclear power plant at Ostrovets in November 2013, a two-unit WWER-1200 plant totalling 2,400 MW. Its regulator's 2019 report scheduled unit 1 for 2019 and unit 2 for 2020. Unit 1 was commissioned in 2021 and unit 2 in October 2023, three years after the 2019 schedule.

  2023 year, year power unit no. 2 entered commercial operation, 2023-10. 2020 year, year power unit no. 2 was scheduled for commissioning in the 2019 national report, 2019. Gosatomnadzor, Ministry for Emergency Situations of the Republic of Belarus, National Report on the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (2025), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Belarusian state chose a single foreign state vendor to build a reference design turnkey, and built up a domestic regulator and operator in parallel under a sequence of IAEA review missions, accepting slippage on the vendor's schedule.

  Limits: This is a schedule figure only. The record carries no official budget or final cost for the plant, so cost performance is unknown. The slip is measured against a schedule that the 2019 report itself calls 'updated'. This record uses the 2019 schedule because it is the one stated in an official source. The schedule is given in years, not months, so the three-year slip for unit 2 is approximate. The 2019 schedule speaks of commissioning while the 2023 figure is the start of commercial operation, so the two milestones may not be identical. Both figures come from the Belarusian regulator reporting on its own country's flagship project. The plant was built turnkey on a Russian design, financed from the republican budget and a Russian state export credit, as the 2019 national report states. The delivery is therefore only partly attributable to Belarusian institutions: they decided, licensed, supervised, financed and now operate it. The source does not show capacity factors or outages after commissioning.

• 🇰🇬Kyrgyzstanlinked to Large project deliverystarted 2002delivered and closed

  Bishkek-Osh road rehabilitation, third phase

  The Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications completed the third and final phase of the Bishkek-Osh road rehabilitation in July 2007, bringing the rehabilitated length of the only internal surface connection between Bishkek and Osh to 463 km, with a 31.7 percent cost overrun on base cost items and civil works finished 33 months after the October 2004 appraisal schedule.

  31.7 % overrun, cost overrun on base cost items, third road rehabilitation project, 2007. 33 months, civil works completion delay (appraisal schedule october 2004, actual july 2007), 2007-07. Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation Department, Validation Report PCV: KGZ 2009-40, Third Road Rehabilitation Project (Loan 1853), retrieved 2026-10-02.

  How it worked: The Kyrgyz government, through the Ministry of Transport and Communications and a project implementation unit staffed by local consultants experienced on the earlier phases, rehabilitated its only north-south trunk road in phases over a decade, financing each phase with an ADB concessional loan and a counterpart share.

  Limits: The record covers phase three only: 120 km of the Bishkek-Osh road and 125 km of secondary roads, not the two earlier phases. The 31.7 percent is on base cost items and is driven by the secondary roads and an added bridge ($7.6 million of the $13.6 million); main-road civil works ran 11.6 percent over per km, and total project cost rose from $50.0 million to $57.1 million, about 14 percent, because contingencies and currency gains absorbed part of the overrun. The 33 months is computed from two dates in the text, and 22 of the delay months came before construction, in loan effectiveness and bidding against a 7-month plan; one civil works contract was terminated and the supervision consultant was sanctioned. The road was 80 percent financed by an ADB concessional loan, and the validation is ADB's evaluation office reviewing ADB's own completion report; it rated the project 'less effective' pending a later performance evaluation that this record does not carry. Traffic grew about 4 percent a year against a forecast of 6 to 7, accidents rose in number and severity after the works, and the road maintenance funding covenants were not met until 2007, so nothing here shows the condition of the road today.