Ukraine
Strongest usable evidence: Adaptability, at 67.1. Raise Building first, at 14.4. Trust needs more evidence: confidence is 0.16.
A solid dot has usable or good evidence and a hollow dot has thin evidence. The tick is the median of the 10 countries nearest in income. A score is a position among the 135 countries, not a percentage.
Raise, lowest first
- BuildingPeers 23.80.47 usable-5.5(3)
- LearningPeers 34.90.46 usableno trend
- AnticipationPeers 36.80.46 usable+12.5(2)
Measure before managing, thinnest first
- TrustPeers 64.00.16 very thinno trend
- AgencyPeers 44.00.19 very thinno trend
- Shared purposePeers 48.20.26 thinno trend
- CoordinationPeers 74.60.28 thin-19.6(2)
- ExperimentationPeers 19.60.37 thin-13.3(3)
Keep watching, highest first
- AdaptabilityPeers 70.00.54 usable-7.9(4)
These groups are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 22 gaps in the registry.
Read Ukraine beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
Why this country is included: Added in the 9.0.0 completion, which takes every country of a million people or more that is measurable in all nine capabilities.
Download this country as CSVHow to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 135 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
The record behind each score
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
41.40.46 usable2 of 4
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
Recency 0.96About AnticipationUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+12.5 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +12.5 to +12.5. Median change: all countries +11.2, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +12.5.
+13.5 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +6.7 to +20.4. Median change: all countries +13.4, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +15.2.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 16 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2015. The replay starts in 2016, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+12.5 over 10 years, from 28.9 in 2016 to 41.4 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC) | 411articles per million peoplefrom 15,498.36 national total | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL) | 76index 0-100 | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Government foresight capacity (1 case below), Long-horizon research commitments.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2024
0.37 % of GDP, rank 70 of 123. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well.
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6), 2022
586 per million people, rank 63 of 118. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found. Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
9,937 per million people, rank 44 of 135. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation. Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
1992UkraineNatsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, and its falling staff ceilingoperating below its peak
Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, and its falling staff ceiling
Presidents of Ukraine kept the National Institute for Strategic Studies, created by decree in 1992 to carry out analytical and forecasting research for the President and the National Security and Defence Council, through every change of president, but cut its staff ceiling from 350 posts, set by Decree 662/2010 when it took over the tasks of two liquidated security institutes, to 260 posts by Decree 120/2015 and to 234 posts by Decree 737/2019, which is in force.
234 posts, staff ceiling of the national institute for strategic studies set by presidential decree, 2019-10 (Decree 737/2019, in force on 2026-10-17). 350 posts, staff ceiling under decree 662/2010, in force from june 2010 to march 2015, 2010-06 to 2015-03. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Legislation of Ukraine portal, Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 737/2019 of 7 October 2019 and the Statute of the Institute it approves, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: The President kept a strategic studies institute directly subordinate to the office and resized it by decree, enlarging it in 2010 by absorbing two liquidated security institutes and then cutting its staff ceiling twice, in 2015 and 2019, without closing it.
Limits: Both figures are staff ceilings set by decree, not headcounts, budgets or output: they show how many posts the President allowed, not how many were filled or what the institute produced. The 350 ceiling of 2010 included the tasks of the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems, which Decree 662/2010 liquidated and folded in, so part of the later cut undoes a merger rather than removing a capacity the institute always had. The 350 and 260 values were read from dated editions of Decree 662/2010 on the same portal (https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/662/2010/ed20100720/print and https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/662/2010/ed20150306/print); a short-lived edition of July 2010 carried 315 posts before Decree 760/2010 restored 350. Forecasting is one task among several: the 2019 statute names analytical and forecasting research on the development and national security of Ukraine, drafting the President's annual messages to parliament and expert review of draft laws, so the institute is a presidential think tank with a forecasting mandate rather than a dedicated foresight unit. The ceiling has not changed in law since 2019, through the full-scale war; this record does not show staffing after 2022.
Panel median40.0-1.4 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 40.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Hold 40, near the panel: wartime planning is response rather than anticipation, and Ukrainian statistical publication was cut back after 2022.
- 42.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Moved from 44 to 42. Panelist C is right that wartime planning and the digital state are mostly response, not anticipation, and statistics releases were cut back.
- 40.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Held at 40. Statistics are solid for the income and research moderate; wartime planning and digital state adaptation show response, not anticipation.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
41.60.19 very thin2 of 5
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
Recency 0.50About AgencyUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+0.4 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +0.4 to +0.4. Median change: all countries +1.9, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +2.1.
+15.3 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +15.3 to +15.3. Median change: all countries +9.3, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +10.6.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 6 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2005. The replay starts in 2006, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS) | 1.6per 1,000 aged 15-64 | 2017. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Business entry efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BE.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO) | 6count | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Adults doing digital tasks, Perceived control over life.
This project retired one row: Time to start a business.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
82.5 % of population, rank 65 of 135. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting. Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
87.6 % aged 15+, rank 40 of 131. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action. Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2025
16.4 % of GDP, rank 113 of 134. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it. High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Panel median66.0+24.4 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 66.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised from 62 to 66. C's Brave1 is a formal state platform for defence tech that I did not weigh, in addition to Diia and Prozorro (my own knowledge). The 41.6 rests on 2017 density and 2019 procedures, which predate the invasion. I reject B's 80: volunteer workshops under fire are heroic but they do not show which organisations last after the war, and martial law restricts movement.
- 76.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revise from 80 to 76. Panelist A's limits apply: displacement, martial law and exit restrictions constrain what people may do, and I did not price this fully. Density is from 2017 and procedures from 2019, so the 41.6 predates the invasion. From my own knowledge, volunteer drone workshops, sole-proprietor registrations and business relocation show people acting under fire, which keeps me above 62 and 66.
- 62.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
The 41.6 indicator rests on a 2017 density and 2019 procedures, both prewar; entry efficiency missing. Own knowledge: Diia, Prozorro, Brave1 and a drone industry built since 2022, plus volunteer logistics, show intent converted to action under fire; this is adaptation and not wealth. I move from 66 to 62 because martial law, displacement and the missing rows widen uncertainty, so panelist A at 62 persuades me against B at 80.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
66.90.28 thin2 of 5
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
Recency 0.96About CoordinationUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-19.6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -19.6 to -19.6. Median change: all countries -1.7, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +0.5.
-9.8 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -9.8 to -9.8. Median change: all countries -2.7, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 -1.8.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 4 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2003. The replay starts in 2004, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-19.6 over 10 years, from 86.5 in 2016 to 66.9 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trade compliance efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.IT.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS) | 118percentage points from approved budget | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureV-Dem (v2x_cspart) | 0.73index 0-1 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: University-industry collaboration (1 case below), Public-private collaboration (1 case below).
This project retired 4 rows: Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Logistics performance, Border compliance time to export.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2019
3.851 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2023UkraineBrave1 defence technology clusterstill operating
Brave1 defence technology cluster
Ukraine's government set up the Brave1 cluster in 2023 under the Ministry of Digital Transformation. By September 2026 it had awarded more than 1,000 non-repayable grants worth UAH 6.2 billion to private defence-technology developers, whose products it tests with the armed forces and moves toward serial production.
6.2 UAH billion, defence technology development funded by brave1 since 2023, 2026-09. 1,000 grants (published as more than 1,000), grants awarded to ukrainian defence developers since 2023, 2026-09. Brave1 defence innovation cluster (state institution under the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine): news release, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Ministry of Digital Transformation, with the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, set up a state cluster. It registers private developers, funds them through tiered grants, arranges battlefield testing and military feedback, and steers money toward priority areas the military defines.
Limits: The source is the cluster reporting on itself in a news release, with a minister's quote. Neither the 6.2 billion nor the grant count is broken down by year or audited. The figures measure money and grants going out, not what was delivered: they do not show how many funded products reached serial production or the front. The impact claims on the page, a 1.7-point gain in technology readiness and 79 percent of firms saying they had no alternative, come from a survey of defence-tech manufacturers in a study by the BRDO Office for Effective Regulation and are self-reported. Grants are one-way subsidies, so the record evidences public funding of private developers plus joint testing, which is a thin reading of joint delivery. The standard grant programme accounts for UAH 2.3 billion of the total; most of the rest, UAH 3.7 billion, went to 34 competition projects for missiles, air defence and autonomy, so the money is concentrated in a few large awards. Wartime urgency and secrecy limit what can be verified.
2000UkraineTechnological parks under the 1999 special regime, and their collapsedismantled
Technological parks under the 1999 special regime, and their collapse
Ukraine's technological parks, set up from 2000 under the 1999 law on a special regime of innovation activity to join research institutes and universities with industrial enterprises in state-registered projects, had 120 projects approved from 2000 to 2014 and raised the annual output of their innovative products from UAH 0.18 billion in 2001 to UAH 2.6 billion in 2007; after the state cut their benefits from 2005, project approvals were blocked from 2005 to 2010, no project was accepted after the 2010 Tax Code, and the parks' performance came to nothing by 2010 to 2014.
2,600,000,000 hryvnias, annual output of innovative products from technopark projects under the special regime, at the peak, 2007. 120 projects, technological park projects approved, cumulative, 2000-2014. Mazur, A.A. and Pustovoit, S.V., Paton Electric Welding Institute of the NAS of Ukraine, Social and economic efficiency of academic technoparks in Ukraine, Science and Innovation 12(3), 2016, pp. 59-69, table and text from Ministry of Education and Science departmental reporting, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: Parliament gave named technological parks, built mostly on academy research institutes, tax and customs relief on state-registered projects that took their research into production with industrial partners, and the relief was reinvested in the projects. The government withdrew the relief from 2005 and stopped approving projects, and output fell with it.
Limits: The figures are in a PDF and come from authors at the Paton Electric Welding Institute, whose own technopark is the largest in the table, so the account is written by a beneficiary arguing for the regime's return. The authors say the table rests on the Ministry of Education and Science's departmental reporting, which the ministry does not publish at an open URL. More than 98 percent of the parks' sales came from three parks built on National Academy of Sciences institutes, so the evidence is mostly about academy institutes working with enterprises, and much less about universities. Sales of innovative products measure the commercial output of registered projects, often made by enterprises tied to the institutes, and do not count joint research projects or the firms involved one by one. The peak and the 2001 value are read from the text; the annual series is drawn in a chart without printed values, so the 2010 to 2014 level is stated only in words ('came to nothing'). The law was not repealed: the source describes cut benefits and blocked project approvals, and some incentives were later restored, so the collapse is of the delivery, not of the legal form. The source ends in 2014 and does not show whether projects were registered after its publication.
Panel median68.0+1.1 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 67.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised up 1 to 67. Panelist B's grid repair runs through Ukrenergo and the municipalities, which is institutional coordination. An 18-point budget overrun is war-driven but real.
- 70.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised slightly from 72: budget overrun of 18 points is war-driven but still shows strain. Coordination of volunteers, municipalities and state under attack is observed.
- 68.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Moved down two points. State, municipalities, volunteers and firms coordinated under attack, which B stresses, but budget execution of 118% reflects war overspend and I cannot separate that from planning weakness.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
28.70.16 very thin2 of 7
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
Recency 0.79About TrustUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+12.8 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +9.2 to +16. Median change: all countries +1.9, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +1.4.
+1.8 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -2.6 to +6.5, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +2.1, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +2.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 8 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2007. The replay starts in 2008, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dispute resolution efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.DR.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS) | 37.4% of firms | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeV-Dem (v2jucomp_osp) | 1.2scale 0-4 (never to always) | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 4 rows, each a gap: Generalised interpersonal trust, Trust in public institutions, Cooperation beyond the in-group, Court case clearance rate.
This project retired 4 rows: Rule of law, Control of corruption, Time to enforce a contract, Intentional homicide rate.
Panel median48.0+19.3 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 48.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised from 44 to 48. B's mass donations are a point I cannot answer: Come Back Alive is a registered and reporting organisation (my own knowledge) that takes money from people who will never meet the recipients. Bribery of 37.4% is from 2019. Compliance of 1.24 stays poor, and the July 2025 NABU law shows how fragile the institutions are, so I stop below 55.
- 55.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Hold 55 against 44 and 45. Bribery of 37% is from 2019 and compliance of 1.24 shows real weakness. But the question is cooperation beyond personal networks, and from my own knowledge mass donations to Come Back Alive and Prytula are money given to strangers. The others cite institutions only. The quick reversal of the July 2025 anti-NABU law is further evidence that citizens enforce a check.
- 45.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Bribery 37% of firms is from 2019, before the war; compliance 1.24/4. The July 2025 law against NABU and SAPO independence was reversed within days after protest (own knowledge), which shows accountability capacity. Mass donations to Come Back Alive and Prytula are trust in strangers. I hold 45, above the 28.7 indicator.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
31.30.46 usable3 of 4
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
Recency 0.67About LearningUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+1.5 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -1.3 to +5, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -1.3, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 -1.6.
-7.7 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -13.2 to -2.6. Median change: all countries +0.8, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 -0.3.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 10 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2009. The replay starts in 2002, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL) | 0.63index 0-1 | 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS) | 24.3% of firms | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeOpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent) | 0.32ratio to world average | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for one row, each a gap: Adult learning participation (1 case below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2024
87.2 % gross, rank 14 of 134. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned.
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2021
5.1 % of GDP, rank 41 of 135. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about.
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 2019
7 % of secondary, rank 89 of 135. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better. It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
1991UkraineState Employment Service vocational trainingstill operating
State Employment Service vocational training
Ukraine's State Employment Service put 93,000 people through vocational training in 2025, 55,000 of them registered unemployed and 38,000 in its own vocational education centres, after 33,000 in 2023, the second full year of the war.
93,000 people, people who completed training through the state employment service in the year, 2025. 33,000 people, unemployed people in vocational training through the service in 2023, 2023. Government of Ukraine portal (kmu.gov.ua), State Employment Service results for 2025, 6 January 2026, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: The State Employment Service funds training for registered unemployed people through its own vocational education centres and contracted providers, and since 2023 also issues training vouchers that let adults choose a course and provider themselves.
Limits: Both figures are the service reporting on itself in government news items, rounded to the thousand, and not a statistical table; the 2023 figure comes from a separate item (https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/derzhavna-sluzhba-zainiatosti-osnovni-zdobutky-2023-roku) and counts unemployed trainees only, while the 2025 figure counts all trainees, so the two are not strictly comparable. 93,000 people is about one percent of the working-age population the service can reach, far below the indicator's construct of all adult participation. The same service reported 93,000 trainees for 2020, before the full-scale invasion, so 2025 is a recovery to the pre-war level and not an expansion. The 88 percent employment rate after training is self-reported and has no comparison group. The service trains inside territory under government control, so the count does not cover occupied regions or the millions of Ukrainians abroad.
Panel median38.0+6.7 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 38.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Held at 38. Panelist B's battlefield learning is real but sits in the military; citation impact of 0.32 shows that the civilian research system does not update well.
- 42.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised down from 45: C is right that citation impact of 8 is very weak. Battlefield learning cycles are real but sit mostly in the military.
- 35.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Moved up two points. B and A cite fast battlefield knowledge transfer and solid human capital; I give some credit but citations of 0.32 and training data from 2019 hold me near the derived score.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
22.30.37 thin4 of 10
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
Recency 1.00About ExperimentationUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-10 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -14.2 to -6.9. Median change: all countries 0, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 0.
-5.7 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -9.7 to -1.4. Median change: all countries +0.1, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +0.8.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 26 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2025. The replay starts in 2004, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-13.3 over 10 years, from 36.2 in 2016 to 22.9 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.PAT.RESD) | 25.6per million peoplefrom 969 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT) | 1,006per million peoplefrom 38,101 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT) | 66.7per million peoplefrom 2,527 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeGitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv) | 11,592per million peoplefrom 451,850 national total | 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Early-stage entrepreneurial activitydirect capability measureGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate) | no data% aged 18-64 | no data | no data |
| Tolerance of entrepreneurial failureperception proxyGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate) | no data% not deterred | no data | no data |
| Insolvency efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BI.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
No dataset exists for 3 rows, each a gap: Venture deals, Firms through regulatory sandboxes (1 case below), University spinouts.
This project retired one row: Business share of R&D.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2025UkraineSandbox for AI and blockchain products, Ministry of Digital Transformation and Ukrainian Startup Fundstill operating
Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Ukrainian Startup Fund opened a sandbox for AI and blockchain products in 2025 and, in its first year, received more than 80 applications and admitted 15 companies to a first cohort that completed testing.
15 companies, companies admitted to the first cohort that completed testing, 2026-06-04. 80 applications, applications received in the first year (more than), 2026-06-04. Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, AI portal, news item 'One year of the AI and blockchain Sandbox' (4 June 2026), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The digital ministry, with a state startup fund, invites AI and blockchain firms to submit products for an expert audit across law, technology and business, and feeds what it learns into drafting AI legislation aligned with the EU AI Act.
Limits: The ministry reports on its own programme in a news item, not a statistics page, and 80 is a floor ('more than 80'). The sandbox grants no statutory derogation that this check found: what participants receive is a free legal, technical and business audit by outside experts with recommendations, and the ministry's statement that firms test 'without fines or legal risks' is not backed by a legal instrument read today, so this is closer to an advisory sandbox than to a regime that relaxes rules, and it sits at the weak edge of the D152 construct. 'Completed testing' means completed the audit cycle; the ministry's page of 21 October 2025 names Artellence as the first company to finish it. Higher figures in the press (over 100 applications, 25 companies under review) were not found at an official publisher and are not used. The National Bank of Ukraine runs a statutory regulatory platform under the payment services and financial services laws, open only to firms it already licenses, but its page (promo.bank.gov.ua/sandbox) publishes no participant count, so the figure covers one programme and not every regulator.
Panel median40.0+17.7 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 40.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Hold 40, the panel's shared score: Diia and Brave1 are state institutions that run trials at scale, which the filing indicators miss.
- 40.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 40. The panel agrees: Diia and Brave1 are real trial channels and much drone iteration happens in volunteer and military units outside registers.
- 40.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Held at 40. All three of us land here: Diia and Brave1 convert scarce resources into trials that registers miss, set against low filings and missing insolvency.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
67.10.54 usable4 of 6
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
Recency 0.88About AdaptabilityUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-7.9 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -7.9 to -7.9. Median change: all countries -0.8, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 +0.8.
-14.8 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -18.8 to -10.2. Median change: all countries -1, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 -1.5.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 10 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2009. The replay starts in 2000, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-7.9 over 10 years, from 75.0 in 2016 to 67.1 on 4 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS) | 9.8% of labour force | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB) | 25.1% of unemployed | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureUNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices) | 0.18index 0-1, lower = more diversified | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeHarvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ)) | 4.6% of products not exported competitively at the start | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Disaster preparedness and recovery (1 case below), Institutional responsiveness (1 case below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2021
66.8 % aged 15+, rank 85 of 135. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating. Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
21.7 per 100 people, rank 59 of 135. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2024
10.1 % of output, rank 68 of 122. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT)
No value for this country. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating. Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2023UkraineeRecovery (ัะัะดะฝะพะฒะปะตะฝะฝั) housing compensation programmestill operating
eRecovery (ัะัะดะฝะพะฒะปะตะฝะฝั) housing compensation programme
Ukraine's government, through the Ministry for Development and the Diia digital platform, paid war-damage housing compensation to 231,681 families totalling UAH 119.1 billion by 10 July 2026. Of these, more than 153,000 families received repair payments, and more than 74,000 received certificates to buy replacement housing for homes that were destroyed.
231,681 families, families that received erecovery compensation, cumulative, 2026-07-10. 119.1 UAH billion, total erecovery compensation paid, cumulative, 2026-07-10. Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine (Ministry for Recovery): eRecovery programme results, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Rada created a statutory right to compensation for war-damaged housing. The ministry and the Ministry of Digital Transformation then ran claims, damage inspection and payment through the Diia app and the state register of damaged property, paying repair grants to bank accounts and issuing purchase certificates for destroyed homes.
Limits: These are the ministry's own running totals, published as press releases and not as a statistical series, and nothing independent audits them. The page shows recovery for households whose claims were accepted, not the share of all damaged housing compensated. For destroyed homes, more than 161,000 applications produced certificates for about 74,000 families, and only about 33,000 had bought a home, so most of the destroyed-housing caseload is unresolved. The page ties the repair payments to the World Bank HOPE project and the own-plot rebuilding payments to the Council of Europe Development Bank HOME project, and does not say who funds the certificates for destroyed homes, so how much of the delivery rests on external money is not shown here. The record evidences recovery after a war shock and says nothing about preparedness before one. Amounts are nominal hryvnias. The figure is the ministry's results update of 10 July 2026.
2022UkraineeSupport one-off 6,500 hryvnia payment to workers in combat regions, March 2022delivered and closed
eSupport one-off 6,500 hryvnia payment to workers in combat regions, March 2022
After Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine's Cabinet allocated UAH 21,450 million for a one-off eSupport payment by Resolution 199 of 4 March 2022, opened applications in the Diia app on 8 March to insured employees and sole proprietors in regions with active fighting, paid the first 6,500 hryvnia transfers on 21 March, and by 27 March had paid 2.7 million people UAH 17.9 billion against 4 million applications.
2.7 million people, people paid the 6,500 hryvnia esupport payment, cumulative, 2022-03-27. 25 days, days from the invasion to the first esupport payments (24 february to 21 march 2022), 2022-03-21. Government of Ukraine portal (kmu.gov.ua), Ministry of Digital Transformation release 'Mintsyfry: maiemo 4 mln zaiavok na yePidtrymku', 27 March 2022 (Internet Archive copy of 31 March 2022), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Cabinet reused the existing eSupport payment rail, let insured workers in combat regions apply in the Diia app, checked them against social insurance records and paid a flat sum to their bank cards within four weeks of the invasion.
Limits: The 2.7 million and the UAH 17.9 billion are the Ministry of Digital Transformation's own running count on the Government portal, not an audited outturn; the final number of recipients is not on this page. The live page at kmu.gov.ua answered a captcha to a script on the day of retrieval, so the record cites the Internet Archive copy of 31 March 2022, which carries the same text. The release says the service opened on 8 March and was open to employees for whom the single social contribution was paid and to sole proprietors of all groups in 14 listed regions and Kyiv, so eligibility was by region, not by a test that the person's work had stopped. The 25 days is our count: the start date of payments comes from a second Government portal release of 22 March 2022 ('Pochalysia pershi vyplaty 6500 hrn yePidtrymky', kmu.gov.ua), which says payments began the day before and had reached almost 500,000 people, and the allocation and its date come from Cabinet Resolution 199 of 4 March 2022 on kmu.gov.ua. Speed was bought with eligibility checks that were later found loose: press reports from August 2022 cite tens of thousands of payments to ineligible people, a figure this record does not carry because no official page with it was opened. A one-off flat transfer to workers in listed regions is a fast payment, not a durable programme change, and it relied on a payment rail (the Diia app and the existing eSupport scheme) that already existed before the shock.
Panel median68.0+0.9 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 66.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 66. Panelist B's Black Sea corridor and the relocation of firms are already in my score, and unemployment is from 2021.
- 73.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Held near 73: unemployment data are from 2021, but firms moved west, exports rerouted through the Black Sea corridor and the grid kept running.
- 68.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Moved down two points. Export rerouting and plant relocation are strong reallocation, but unemployment is a 2021 figure and A at 66 is nearer the indicator.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
14.40.47 usable3 of 6
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
Recency 1.00About BuildingUkraine beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-5.5 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -5.5 to -5.5. Median change: all countries -0.3, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 -0.3.
-11.1 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -17 to -7.8. Median change: all countries -0.5, Income quartile 3 of 4 in 2000 -0.8.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 11 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2010. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-5.5 over 10 years, from 19.9 in 2016 to 14.4 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS) | 8.3% of GDP | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS) | 6.4% of manufactured exports | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Utility connection efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.US.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD) | 0.35index | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Large project delivery (1 case below), Firm scale-up rate.
This project retired 2 rows: Logistics infrastructure quality, Electricity connection speed.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2021
40,308 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 71 of 133. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2016UkraineRoad Sector Development Project on the M-03 and M-12, and its cut scopedelivered and closed
Road Sector Development Project on the M-03 and M-12, and its cut scope
Ukraine's road agency Ukravtodor rehabilitated or upgraded 156.3 km of the M-03 Kyiv to Kharkiv and M-12 corridors under a US$560 million loan approved in November 2015, after slow progress led the government in 2017 to cancel US$222.2 million of the loan, dropping three M-03 bypasses and two long-term maintenance contracts, so the loan closed at US$337.8 million in September 2022, nine months after its original date.
337.8 million US dollars, loan amount after cancellation, fully disbursed, 2022-09-30. 560 million US dollars, original loan amount at approval, 2015-11-03. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Ukraine Road Sector Development Project (P149322), November 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The national road agency delivered the widening of a corridor it had already been rebuilding with the same lender, and when bypasses stalled on land acquisition the government cancelled them rather than extend the loan.
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, in a completion report on its own loan, and the loan amount is not the full cost of the works; no figure for the cost of the delivered roads against an appraisal estimate per km was used. The cancellation and its reasons (land acquisition not started at Poltava, community objections at Kopyly, a realignment at Chutove) are in paras. 23 and 26 to 27 (printed pages 10 to 12); the 156.3 km is in para. 41 (page 16); amounts and dates are on the datasheet (page 2). In 2019 disbursement was about 11 percent with over 60 percent of the period elapsed, and some lots were moved in from a parallel World Bank road project, so the delivered kilometres mix two programmes. Russia's invasion in February 2022 stopped the civil works under force majeure seven months before closing, so the final delay is not all the agency's. The record shows a scope cut, not a cost overrun, and says nothing about the separate Great Construction programme.
Panel median36.0+21.6 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 32.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Held at 32. I already depart from 14.4 for defence production and grid repair. Panelist B's millions of units have no verified data in the brief.
- 38.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Revised down from 40: I hold well above 14.4 for drone production and grid repair, but C's point that output series are weak still stands.
- 36.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Moved down two points. Drone production and grid repair are delivered systems the industrial series miss, per A and B, but much is financed and supplied by allies; B at 40 credits too much.