Mexico
Strongest usable evidence: Adaptability, at 65.7. Raise Experimentation first, at 24.6. Shared purpose needs more evidence: confidence is 0.32.
A solid dot has usable or good evidence and a hollow dot has thin evidence. The tick is the median of the 10 countries nearest in income. A score is a position among the 135 countries, not a percentage.
Raise, lowest first
- ExperimentationPeers 18.80.64 usableno trend
- AgencyPeers 55.70.49 usableno trend
- LearningPeers 37.30.54 usable+12.3(2)
- AnticipationPeers 43.70.46 usable+10.7(2)
Measure before managing, thinnest first
- Shared purposePeers 61.50.32 thin+8.4(2)
- TrustPeers 64.20.33 thin-18.7(2)
- CoordinationPeers 76.30.44 thin-1.7(2)
Keep watching, highest first
- AdaptabilityPeers 58.50.46 usable-6.0(3)
- BuildingPeers 28.30.63 usable+3.2(3)
These groups are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 22 gaps in the registry.
Read Mexico beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
Why this country is included: Second largest Latin American economy; deep manufacturing base tied to North America.
Download this country as CSVHow to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 135 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
The record behind each score
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
49.90.46 usable2 of 4
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
Recency 0.96About AnticipationMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+10.7 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +10.7 to +10.7. Median change: all countries +11.2, Latin America +11, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +8.4.
+11.3 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +3.8 to +19.7. Median change: all countries +13.4, Latin America +12.1, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +12.4.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 16 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2015. The replay starts in 2016, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+10.7 over 10 years, from 39.2 in 2016 to 49.9 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC) | 146articles per million peoplefrom 18,981.87 national total | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL) | 91index 0-100 | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Government foresight capacity, Long-horizon research commitments.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2024
0.25 % of GDP, rank 85 of 123. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well.
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6), 2024
438 per million people, rank 71 of 118. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found. Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
532 per million people, rank 75 of 135. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation. Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel median43.0-6.9 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 43.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Moved up from 40: panelist B is right that SASMEX has run seismic early warning as a standing institution since 1991; CONAHCYT restructuring still weakens long-horizon research.
- 45.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Moved 46 to 45: panelist A's point that the cuts to the research council weaken long-horizon research is fair; INEGI and SASMEX seismic warning keep me above 40 to 42.
- 42.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Held. INEGI is strong but peers at 40-46 agree that federal foresight is weak and the science council was cut; SASMEX is a real hazard warning.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
41.80.49 usable3 of 5
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
Recency 0.86About AgencyMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+0.5 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -4.4 to +5.3, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +1.9, Latin America +2.1, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +0.8.
+2.9 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -3.6 to +8.9, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +9.3, Latin America +9.3, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +6.8.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2013, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS) | 0.95per 1,000 aged 15-64 | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BE.P3) | 66.4score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO) | 7.8count | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Adults doing digital tasks (1 case below), Perceived control over life.
This project retired one row: Time to start a business.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
83.1 % of population, rank 64 of 135. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting. Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
53 % aged 15+, rank 97 of 131. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action. Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2025
35.5 % of GDP, rank 73 of 134. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it. High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2015MexicoPuntos México Conectado, national digital learning centresdelivered and closed
Puntos México Conectado, national digital learning centres
Mexico's communications ministry operated Puntos México Conectado centres in all 32 states, reporting more than 410,000 enrolled members and over 260,000 course enrolments by June 2017.
410,000 members, punto méxico conectado enrolled members, 2017-06. 260,000 enrolments, course enrolments reported by the network, 2017-06. Secretaría de Infraestructura, Comunicaciones y Transportes, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: The communications ministry put free digital classrooms in every state, then used equipment and curriculum partnerships with firms such as Samsung to turn connectivity points into places where people could practise new tools.
Limits: The ministry reports registrations and course enrolments, not a comparable adult-skills test, completion rate or retained ability. The article is a programme announcement about a partnership and does not establish how many of the 410,000 members completed training or whether the network continued at that scale after 2017.
Panel median51.0+9.2 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 46.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 46. Density of 0.954, entry efficiency of 66.4 and 7.83 procedures give a derived 41.8. Panelist C's 50 uses North American supply chain firms, which I already credit in northern clusters. Panelist B's 58 relies on informal tianguis and family workshops, which act despite weak institutions and pay cartel taxes, so that is the compensation I discount. Informality above half of employment, from my own knowledge, limits access to credit and contracts.
- 58.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 58, a defended disagreement with panelist A's 46. Density of 0.954 misses the majority of workers INEGI classes as informal, from my own knowledge, including tianguis and family workshops. A's little step above the derived 41.8 treats informality as a block when it is also the channel. Extortion and cartel taxes cap scale and are already in my score.
- 51.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Raise slightly from 50 to 51. Density 0.954 (5.4), entry efficiency 55.9 and 7.83 procedures. Panelist B (58) argues registered firms miss informal work in tianguis and family workshops; panelist A (46) cites extortion blocking scale. Supply-chain integration in the north is firm-level execution, own knowledge.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
57.10.44 thin3 of 5
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
Recency 0.92About CoordinationMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-1.2 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -6.4 to +4.2, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -1.7, Latin America -1.4, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -3.2.
-5.1 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -10.4 to +0.5, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -2.7, Latin America -5.2, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -3.4.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-1.7 over 10 years, from 67.1 in 2016 to 65.4 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.IT.P3) | 39.6score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS) | 107percentage points from approved budget | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureV-Dem (v2x_cspart) | 0.49index 0-1 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration (1 case below).
This project retired 4 rows: Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Logistics performance, Border compliance time to export.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2023
20.549 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2019MexicoJóvenes Construyendo el Futuro, government-workplace trainingstill operating
Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro, government-workplace training
Mexico's labour ministry linked young people to more than half a million registered workplaces for on-the-job training, reporting 2.95 million beneficiaries nationwide after five years of Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro in February 2024.
2,950,000 people, young people benefited, 2024-02. 500,000 workplaces, workplaces registered to host training, 2024-02. Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: The labour ministry paid a stipend and social insurance while firms, shops and civil-society organisations supplied real work placements, with a shared digital platform matching young people to host workplaces.
Limits: The ministry's total is a cumulative programme count and the workplace figure is rounded; neither shows unique completions, the quality of mentoring or whether trainees stayed employed. The government funds the stipend and insurance, so the record demonstrates a large public-private delivery interface rather than private financing of the programme.
Panel median47.0-10.1 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 45.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
I hold at 45. C's strained federal-state coordination and my point on folding autonomous regulators into the executive both stand; B's 2017 earthquake response was spontaneous, not institutional.
- 49.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised down from 52: A's point that the 2024-25 abolition of autonomous regulators folds coordination into the executive is one I cannot answer. The 2017 earthquake response showed strong spontaneous coordination, which keeps me above A and C.
- 47.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised 46 to 47. Panelist A cites abolition of autonomous regulators and weak trade compliance; panelist B cites the 2017 earthquake grassroots response and fragmentation by crime. Budget execution at 85 is good, so I sit between A and B.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
52.60.33 thin3 of 7
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
Recency 0.97About TrustMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-10.6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -16.5 to -4.9. Median change: all countries +1.9, Latin America +1.1, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +0.1.
-12.4 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -18.1 to -7.2. Median change: all countries +2.1, Latin America +2, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +0.1.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2006, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-18.7 over 20 years, from 67.7 in 2006 to 49.0 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.DR.P3) | 60.1score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS) | 15.8% of firms | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeV-Dem (v2jucomp_osp) | 1.2scale 0-4 (never to always) | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 4 rows, each a gap: Generalised interpersonal trust, Trust in public institutions, Cooperation beyond the in-group, Court case clearance rate.
This project retired 4 rows: Rule of law, Control of corruption, Time to enforce a contract, Intentional homicide rate.
Panel median35.0-17.6 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 34.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Held at 34. The panel is within one point. Dispute efficiency of 60.1 and bribery of 15.8% look fair and court compliance of 1.16 reads poor, for a derived 52.6. The compliance row carries the argument, supported by the 2024 judicial reform, the June 2025 vote of low turnout and the removal of INAI, from my own knowledge. The 2025 row may still lag the seating of elected judges, so the downside remains.
- 35.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 35, and the panel is within 1 point. Compliance of 1.16 reflects executive conflict with courts, and I give dispute efficiency of 60.1 and bribery of 15.8% less weight. From my own knowledge very high impunity pushes people to tandas and kin. The June 2025 judicial election is too recent to test.
- 35.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Hold 35. Compliance 1.16 (29.3) outweighs dispute efficiency 59.8 and bribery 15.8%. Panelists at 34 and 35 agree. The 2024 judicial reform to elect judges and removal of INAI cut checks; impunity is very high. Own knowledge.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
43.00.54 usable3 of 4
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
Recency 0.78About LearningMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-1.9 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -4.8 to +0.9, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -1.3, Latin America -3.5, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +0.8.
+9.6 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +4.6 to +14.6. Median change: all countries +0.8, Latin America +2.2, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +1.9.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 10 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2009. The replay starts in 2006, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+12.3 over 20 years, from 24.9 in 2006 to 37.2 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL) | 0.61index 0-1 | 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS) | 37.8% of firms | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeOpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent) | 0.7ratio to world average | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for one row, each a gap: Adult learning participation (1 case below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2024
48.2 % gross, rank 67 of 134. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned.
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2022
4.1 % of GDP, rank 71 of 135. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about.
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 2018
27.7 % of secondary, rank 23 of 135. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better. It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
1981MexicoINEA adult basic educationstill operating
Mexico's Instituto Nacional para la Educación de los Adultos certified 651,473 young people and adults as having completed a level of literacy, primary or secondary education in 2024, with 352,600 learners in its services at the close of the year.
651,473 people, people who completed a level (literacy, primary or secondary) with inea, 2024. 352,600 learners ('352.6 mil'), learners in inea services at the close of the year, 2024-12. Instituto Nacional para la Educación de los Adultos, Programa Institucional 2025-2030, published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: A federal institute and state adult education institutes run a semi-open model in which volunteers with a small stipend tutor adults in community spaces, and learners sit module examinations when ready, so a credential can be earned without a classroom timetable.
Limits: The figures are INEA reporting on itself from its own tracking system (SASA). A completed level is a credential, often obtained by examination after self-study, and says nothing about how much was learned; one person can complete more than one level in a year. Against 27.5 million people aged 15 and over who, by the same document, have not finished basic education, a year's completions are about two percent of the backlog. The same document's indicator series shows completions fell sharply in 2019 and 2020 and rebounded from 2021, and it notes a fall in people served in 2024; chaining those published rates back from the 538,741 completions the document gives for 2023 puts 2019 at about 680,000 and 2018 at about 853,000, so 2024 is below both, by about 4 and 24 percent (our computation, from rounded rates).
Panel median42.0-1.0 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 42.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
I hold at 42. B agrees; C's income argument does not change mid-frame human capital and training rows.
- 42.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 42: A sits at the same score and C's small cut for income-tracking is not specific. HCI and firm training are mid-frame and citation impact is below the world average.
- 38.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised 36 to 38. Both others hold at 42, and I accept a Human Capital Index of 55 and training at 38 percent are mid-frame; citation impact below world average and the income link keep me below 43.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
24.60.64 usable7 of 10
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
Recency 1.00About ExperimentationMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 7 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+0.6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -3.9 to +4.2, which includes no change. Median change: all countries 0, Latin America +0.5, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -4.2.
+2.4 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -1.9 to +6.7, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +0.1, Latin America +0.5, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -5.
The model fills at least one of the 7 indicators in 26 of 27 years, at most 5, last in 2025. The replay starts in 2000, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.PAT.RESD) | 9per million peoplefrom 1,172 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT) | 1,216per million peoplefrom 159,140 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT) | 8.3per million peoplefrom 1,088 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeGitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv) | 7,158per million peoplefrom 944,479 national total | 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate) | 19.4% aged 18-64 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| perception proxyGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate) | 59.6% not deterred | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BI.P3) | 13.7score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 3 rows, each a gap: Venture deals, Firms through regulatory sandboxes, University spinouts.
This project retired one row: Business share of R&D.
Panel median34.0+9.4 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 30.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 30: TEA of 50.7 and failure tolerance are already in the 24.6 indicator, so others lift on double-counted evidence; insolvency efficiency of 13.9 makes exit costly.
- 36.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Moved 38 to 36: panelist A's point that insolvency (13.9) makes failure very costly is one I weigh more now; measured TEA (50.7) and failure tolerance (61.8) still confirm strong grassroots trial above 30 to 34.
- 34.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Held. TEA (50.7) and failure tolerance (61.8) are direct rows, but insolvency efficiency (13.9) makes exit costly and TEA may be necessity entrepreneurship.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
65.70.46 usable3 of 6
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
Recency 1.00About AdaptabilityMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -6 to -6. Median change: all countries -0.8, Latin America -1.7, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -0.9.
-11.5 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -15.8 to -7.2. Median change: all countries -1, Latin America -4, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -1.9.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 10 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2009. The replay starts in 2000, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-6.0 over 10 years, from 71.7 in 2016 to 65.7 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS) | 2.7% of labour force | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Long-term unemployment sharedownstream outcomeILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB) | no data% of unemployed | no data | no data |
| direct capability measureUNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices) | 0.15index 0-1, lower = more diversified | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeHarvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ)) | 1.7% of products not exported competitively at the start | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Disaster preparedness and recovery (2 cases below), Institutional responsiveness (2 cases below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
66.3 % aged 15+, rank 87 of 135. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating. Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
21.7 per 100 people, rank 58 of 135. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2025
11.3 % of output, rank 72 of 122. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT), 2025
56.9 % of employment, rank 52 of 111. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating. Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2023MexicoCOFEPRIS digital regulatory proceduresstill operating
COFEPRIS digital regulatory procedures
Mexico's medicines and health-products regulator COFEPRIS completed 509,921 procedures entirely online with traceability by 5 September 2024, replacing paper hand-offs for a large share of its regulated users.
509,921 procedures, procedures completed fully digitally, 2024-09-05. Comisión Federal para la Protección contra Riesgos Sanitarios, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: The regulator converted submission, tracking and completion into one traceable digital workflow, so applicants could see a case move without physically carrying documents between offices.
Limits: COFEPRIS publishes the number of completed digital procedures but not a before-and-after median processing time, rejection rate or compliance outcome. It is a regulator's own operational tally, and the article does not establish that every procedure type or every applicant could use the digital path.
2024MexicoSimulacro Nacional 2024, a nationwide emergency exercisedelivered and closed
Simulacro Nacional 2024, a nationwide emergency exercise
Mexico's national civil-protection system coordinated a countrywide earthquake exercise in September 2024 in which 9,727,000 people participated, with alerts carried over 14,490 public loudspeakers and a multi-agency task force of 1.9 million personnel.
9,727,000 people, participants in the national drill, 2024-09-19. 14,490 loudspeakers, public loudspeakers activated, 2024-09-19. Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: The national protection agency set one scenario, aligned federal, state and municipal responders, pushed the same alert through public infrastructure and used the exercise to expose protocol gaps before a real shock.
Limits: A drill records mobilisation and protocol testing, not performance in a real disaster. Participation is self-reported by agencies and organisations, and the loudspeaker count covers only listed jurisdictions; the exercise used a hypothetical earthquake and cannot establish casualty reduction or recovery speed.
2014MexicoPROSPERA, and its replacement by a new scholarship authoritydismantled
PROSPERA, and its replacement by a new scholarship authority
Mexico abolished the 2014 decree creating PROSPERA on 31 May 2019 and ordered its people, assets and budget to transfer to the new Benito Juárez scholarship coordination within 90 days.
90 days, legal transition window for prospera assets and staff, 2019-05-31. 1 decree, prospera founding decree abrogated, 2019-05-31. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: The executive used a new coordinating body and a single transition clause to move PROSPERA's staff, resources and education components into a different delivery model rather than preserve the old agency by inertia.
Limits: The decree proves a formal policy and organisational change, not that the 90-day transfer happened on time or that beneficiaries experienced a seamless handover. It also does not compare PROSPERA's outcomes with the replacement scholarships, and the transition combined a programme redesign with a change in political administration.
1999MexicoFONDEN, the natural disaster fund, and its abolitiondismantled
FONDEN, the natural disaster fund, and its abolition
Mexico's federal government ran FONDEN from 1999 as a pre-arranged national fund for post-disaster reconstruction, allocating a record US$833 million to it in 2011 and insuring it with catastrophe bonds, and abrogated the FONDEN trust by the decree of 6 November 2020, moving disaster spending onto ordinary budget lines.
833 US$ million, fonden annual federal budget allocation, the highest to that date, 2011. World Bank, GFDRR and Government of Mexico, FONDEN: Mexico's Natural Disaster Fund, A Review (2012), retrieved 2026-10-01.
How it worked: The Finance Ministry and the Interior Ministry built a rules-based trust that set aside budget for reconstruction before disasters and reinsured it through catastrophe bonds. A new administration and Congress then folded the trust into ordinary budget lines through a decree converting it into a budgetary scheme, justified by transparency.
Limits: The metric shows the fund at its peak, not its dismantling. The abolition rests on a second World Bank document with no number in it: the Mexico Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth DPL (P178224, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/556411654274244589/pdf/Mexico-Inclusive-and-Sustainable-Economic-Growth-Development-Policy-Loan.pdf) refers to "the abrogation of the Mexico's National Disaster Fund (FONDEN)" (page 31), and the government's own letter in its annex says that after "the Decree published on 6 November 2020, the financial instrument FONDEN is changing from a trust to a budgetary scheme". So disaster spending did not stop. What ended was the trust, its reserve-building and its inter-institutional rules, and the same DPL says the 2022 emergency budget covered only an average year's losses. The record has no post-abolition figure for reconstruction spending or speed, so the claim that capacity fell is the World Bank's reading, not a measurement. The 2011 allocation is one year inside a volatile series. The same review says spending exceeded FONDEN's resources in five of the years from 1999 to 2011 and needed transfers of over US$3.3 billion in 2010, so the fund was never fully self-sufficient. The review was co-authored with the Mexican government it describes.
Panel median55.0-10.7 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 55.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
I hold at 55. B and C agree that low unemployment reads informality; nearshoring is real but driven by firms and US policy, and new export products at 18.9 are low.
- 58.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 58: the panel agrees 2.7 percent unemployment reads informality. A says nearshoring is firm-driven more than institutional, but firms reallocating is still the system adapting.
- 54.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised 52 to 54. Panelists A and B at 55 and 58 agree that nearshoring is real reallocation, mostly driven by firms; I still hold that 2.7 percent unemployment hides 55 percent informality and the long-term row is missing.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
64.60.63 usable4 of 6
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
Recency 1.00About BuildingMexico beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+2.4 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -0.4 to +6.7, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -0.3, Latin America -1.2, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest +0.3.
+5.6 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +1.5 to +10.1. Median change: all countries -0.5, Latin America -2.6, Income quartile 4 of 4 in 2000, highest -0.2.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+3.2 over 10 years, from 53.5 in 2016 to 56.7 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS) | 20% of GDP | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS) | 19.3% of manufactured exports | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.US.P3) | 89.6score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD) | 2.4index | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Large project delivery (5 cases below), Firm scale-up rate.
This project retired 2 rows: Logistics infrastructure quality, Electricity connection speed.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
48,141 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 61 of 133. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2003MexicoSeguro Popular, and its abolitiondismantled
Seguro Popular, and its abolition
Mexico built public health insurance for people outside social security from 2003 and abolished it in 2020, and CONEVAL measured the share of the population without access to health services rising from 16.2 percent in 2018 to 39.1 percent in 2022.
39.1 % of population, population lacking access to health services after abolition, 2022. 16.2 % of population, population lacking access to health services before abolition, 2018. CONEVAL, comunicado no. 7, medicion multidimensional de la pobreza 2022, retrieved 2026-08-27.
How it worked: The abolition is the mechanism recorded here: a new government replaced a funded, enrolment-based entitlement with a budget-line service that required no affiliation, and affiliation-based coverage disappeared faster than the replacement could deliver care.
Limits: The metric measures the dismantling, not the programme: CONEVAL's deprivation number is self-reported affiliation, not care received, and Seguro Popular at its peak was itself criticised for shallow coverage and uneven state-level spending. The 2018-2022 change spans the pandemic, which stressed every health system, so not all of the 23-point rise is the reform. CONEVAL itself lost autonomy in a later reorganisation, so the continuity of this series is not assured.
2019MexicoCFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todosstill operating
CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos
Mexico's state telecom operator CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos installed 113,683 free public internet sites by September 2024, reaching 81.2 percent of its stated 140,000-site 2025 goal.
113,683 sites, free public internet sites installed, 2024-09. 81.2 % of goal, share of the 2025 site goal reached, 2024-09. CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: A state-owned carrier combined satellite, fibre, copper and mobile contracts with public access points, using a federal operator to reach places commercial networks had not served.
Limits: The management report is self-reported and counts installed sites, not uptime, geographic service quality, affordability after the free offer or actual use. The 81.2 percent figure is calculated from the report's installed count and stated goal, and the programme was still short of that goal at the reference date.
2014MexicoNew International Airport of Mexico, and its cancellationdismantled
New International Airport of Mexico, and its cancellation
Mexico cancelled the partially built Texcoco airport after construction and contracts had begun; the government's 2019 cancellation paper estimated a 100 billion peso cancellation cost, including 60 billion pesos already spent and 40 billion in non-recoverable commitments.
100,000,000,000 Mexican pesos, government estimate of cancellation cost, 2019-04-26. 60,000,000,000 Mexican pesos, construction expenditure already incurred at cancellation, 2019-04-26. Grupo Aeroportuario de la Ciudad de México, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
How it worked: A new administration stopped a politically contested megaproject, terminated contracts and redirected the airport strategy to a different site, accepting sunk costs in exchange for a different delivery path.
Limits: The 100 billion peso figure is the government's own estimate and excludes or treats differently the financing and legal costs that later audits and congressional analyses debated. Cancellation is evidence of a project running backwards and of a political decision to change course, not evidence that the replacement airport delivered better value or schedule performance.
2019MexicoOlmeca refinery at Dos Bocasstill operating
Pemex built the Olmeca refinery at Dos Bocas, authorized in December 2018 and fully operational from February 2025, under an authorized budget of US$15,963.0 million, 79 percent above the US$8,918.5 million Class IV estimate stated when its board authorized the FEL II phase in July 2020.
15,963 US$ million including VAT, authorized project budget after the august 2022 rebaseline, excluding us$853.3 million for start-up, 2022. 8,918.5 US$ million, class iv cost estimate approved at fel ii, 2020-07. Petróleos Mexicanos, annual report on Form 20-F for fiscal year 2023, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, retrieved 2026-10-01.
How it worked: The federal government chose a greenfield refinery as a political flagship and had Pemex deliver it through a dedicated subsidiary, PTI Infraestructura de Desarrollo, funded through equity contributions from Pemex Industrial Transformation (2020 to 2023). The board re-authorized the scope and budget mid-construction in August 2022.
Limits: Pemex is the state oil company reporting on its own project. The filing is made under US securities law and carries legal liability, but it is not an audit, and Mexico's audit office (ASF) is not reachable from outside Mexico to check against. The publisher is a state enterprise, not a ministry or statistics office, so a strict reading of the publisher rule could exclude it. The 79 percent overrun is our computation from two figures that do not measure the same thing. The Class IV estimate excludes external works, escalation, contingency and administrative costs and carries a stated range of +30 to -25 percent, while the later budget includes VAT. A share of the gap is therefore a change of definition and not an overrun. The government's original public figure, around US$8 billion, appears only in press reports and is not used here. The schedule is shown only by the issuer's own changing expectations. The FY2025 filing (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000932782/000093278226000006/ck0000932782-20251231.htm) says the refinery "has been fully operational since February 2025". No filing states an original completion date to measure the slip against. Full operation is a claim about start-up, not about utilisation or margins, which the FY2025 filing excludes from its refining margin series.
2019MexicoCoDi, and its adoption gapstill operating
Banco de México began operating CoDi on its SPEI interbank rail on 30 September 2019 with no fee to users and a list of obliged participants, yet by 20 September 2026 only 2.87 million accounts had ever made a CoDi payment, and the rail carried 4.35 million payments in all of 2025.
2,870,066 accounts, accounts that have made at least one codi payment, cumulative since launch, 2026-09-20. 4,354,930 transactions, codi operations sent in the calendar year, 2025. Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, table CF882 (accounts with at least one transaction) and table CF884 (operations through CoDi), retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: Banco de México specified a request-to-pay standard on top of its existing real-time interbank system, named the institutions obliged to implement it and removed fees for users. It did not set a single consumer brand, a merchant price incentive or a simple proxy such as a phone number for paying, and the obliged banks implemented it inside their own apps.
Limits: This is a record of a delivery that ran at national scale and stayed small, not of a loss: daily CoDi volume has grown slowly every year since 2019 and nothing documented has been withdrawn, so the status is operating. The account figure is cumulative, so it counts any account that paid once in seven years and overstates current use. The 2025 total is computed here by summing the daily series SF335701 (total operations sent) exported from table CF884 of the same system; Banco de México publishes no annual total, and its note says the last day is preliminary and past values were revised in March 2021. The series covers CoDi messages only, while ordinary SPEI transfers from the same banking apps are much larger and are not counted, so a reader cannot tell how much CoDi lost to plain transfers that already worked. The central bank reports on its own product.
Panel median56.0-8.6 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 55.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
I hold at 55. C reaches the same score; B's 60 does not answer the cost and time overruns at Tren Maya and Dos Bocas, which are the state delivery side of this dimension.
- 60.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 60: manufacturing depth, utility connection and fitness are strong, and A and C cite the same Tren Maya and Dos Bocas overruns. The auto and electronics chains are executed systems, not endowment.
- 56.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised 55 to 56. Economic fitness at 81, manufacturing at 20 percent and utility connection at 88 show built industrial systems; I accept panelists A and B that Tren Maya and Dos Bocas overran badly, which is why I stay under 64.6.