Zambia
No capability reaches 50 on usable evidence. Raise Building first, at 8.7. Trust needs more evidence: confidence is 0.21.
A solid dot has usable or good evidence and a hollow dot has thin evidence. The tick is the median of the 10 countries nearest in income. A score is a position among the 135 countries, not a percentage.
Raise, lowest first
- BuildingPeers 15.60.47 usable-10.7(3)
- AnticipationPeers 23.50.46 usable+7.3(2)
- LearningPeers 31.80.55 usable-11.6(2)
- AdaptabilityPeers 54.80.62 usable-1.2(3)
Measure before managing, thinnest first
- TrustPeers 56.50.21 very thin+5.1(2)
- CoordinationPeers 62.20.29 thin+9.8(2)
- Shared purposePeers 44.60.29 thin+13.9(2)
- AgencyPeers 43.60.30 thinno trend
- ExperimentationPeers 4.50.37 thin-0.1(3)
These groups are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 22 gaps in the registry.
Read Zambia beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
Why this country is included: Added in the 9.0.0 completion, which takes every country of a million people or more that is measurable in all nine capabilities.
Download this country as CSVHow to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 135 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
The record behind each score
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
23.30.46 usable2 of 4
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
Recency 0.96About AnticipationZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+7.3 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +7.3 to +7.3. Median change: all countries +11.2, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +11.6.
+7.4 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -0.2 to +12.6, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +13.4, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +11.7.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 16 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2015. The replay starts in 2016, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+7.3 over 10 years, from 16.0 in 2016 to 23.3 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC) | 17.7articles per million peoplefrom 367.3 national total | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL) | 64.2index 0-100 | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Government foresight capacity, Long-horizon research commitments.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2008
0.28 % of GDP, rank 79 of 123. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
The value is from 2008, more than 15 years old.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well.
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6), 2008
41.9 per million people, rank 104 of 118. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
The value is from 2008, more than 15 years old.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found. Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
80.5 per million people, rank 107 of 135. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation. Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel median21.0-2.3 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 20.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Hold 20: the panel agrees; the 2020 default shows weak fiscal anticipation in Zambia.
- 21.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Moved from 22 to 21. The 2020 debt default shows weak fiscal anticipation; the panel agrees.
- 22.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Held at 22. Mid-low statistics, 18 articles per million, and the 2020 default suggests weak fiscal foresight; panelists agree.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
38.60.30 thin2 of 5
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
Recency 0.79About AgencyZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+1.6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +1.6 to +1.6. Median change: all countries +1.9, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +1.5.
+2.7 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +2.7 to +2.7. Median change: all countries +9.3, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +10.9.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 6 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2005. The replay starts in 2006, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS) | 1.5per 1,000 aged 15-64 | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Business entry efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BE.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO) | 7count | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Adults doing digital tasks, Perceived control over life.
This project retired one row: Time to start a business.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
17.1 % of population, rank 131 of 135. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting. Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
72.7 % aged 15+, rank 67 of 131. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action. Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2025
19.2 % of GDP, rank 106 of 134. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it. High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Panel median38.0-0.6 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 38.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised from 36 to 38. B and C both name mobile money, which is regulated by the Bank of Zambia (my own knowledge) and gives traders a formal channel I did not count. Density of 1.5 and 7 procedures still sit at 38.6 with no B-READY reading. PACRA's registry works, but thin credit and copper dependence limit firms, so B's 48 credits too much unorganised activity.
- 48.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Hold 48. Density of 1.5 and missing entry efficiency say little about marketeers, small farmers and artisanal Copperbelt mining, from my own knowledge. Panelist C admits a large informal trade and high mobile-money use and yet scores 36, under the indicator. Copper dominance, as A says, limits firms, not traders. The drought and power cuts in 2024 limit follow-through, so I stay under the middle.
- 36.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Density 1.5 per 1,000 (8.7/100) and 7 procedures; entry efficiency missing. Large informal trading, high mobile money use and artisanal mining (own knowledge) exist, but drought and power cuts in 2024 limited follow-through. I hold 36.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
85.00.29 thin2 of 5
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
Recency 1.00About CoordinationZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+9.8 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +9.8 to +9.8. Median change: all countries -1.7, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +2.6.
+0.7 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -3.5 to +5.6, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -2.7, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.7.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 7 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2006. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+9.8 over 10 years, from 75.2 in 2016 to 85.0 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trade compliance efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.IT.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS) | 111percentage points from approved budget | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureV-Dem (v2x_cspart) | 0.92index 0-1 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration (1 case below).
This project retired 4 rows: Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Logistics performance, Border compliance time to export.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2025
1.598 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2003ZambiaZambia Railways concession to Railway Systems of Zambia, and its cancellation in 2012dismantled
Zambia Railways concession to Railway Systems of Zambia, and its cancellation in 2012
Zambia concessioned its national railway, after a decade in which traffic halved from 1,072 million net ton kilometres in 1993 to 540 million in 1999, to the private operator Railway Systems of Zambia, which took over on 3 December 2003 and raised traffic by about 30 percent in net ton kilometres in 2004 against 2003; the World Bank later reported that the network and service kept deteriorating and that the concession was cancelled in September 2012.
30 %, increase in rail freight traffic (net ton kilometres) in the first year of the concession, 2004 against 2003, 2004. 3.7 million US dollars, concession fees paid to government by the concessionaire since takeover, per the concessionaire's auditors, 2005 (third quarter). World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Zambia Railways Restructuring Project, Report No. 32520, December 2005, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: After two decades of falling traffic under the state railway, the government retrenched staff with World Bank money and let one private consortium run all freight and passenger services and the track under a vertically integrated concession; the operator lengthened hauls and paid fees for a few years, then a later government judged the network was still deteriorating and took the railway back.
Limits: The cited completion report was written two years into the concession and supports the start and the early gains only; it says the 30 percent rise came with a fall in tonnage as the operator dropped short hauls, and that the borrower disputed the concessionaire's fee compliance and Parliament set up a review in December 2005. The cancellation rests on a second World Bank document, the Country Partnership Strategy for FY13 to FY16 (Report No. 75089-ZM, February 2013, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/182591468178437607/pdf/750890CORRIGEN0IC00IDA0R20130002703.pdf, PDF page 22, paragraph 49), which says the rail network condition and service continued to deteriorate and the concession was cancelled in September 2012 with a commitment to recapitalise the railway, and elsewhere (page 11) calls it a reversal of the railway concession that stakeholders saw as policy incoherence. Neither document gives traffic for the later concession years, so the record shows a delivered early gain and a cancellation, not a measured decline from a peak. Both documents come from the lender that financed the concession process and argued for privatisation. The figures are in PDFs (the 1993 and 1999 traffic on page 5, the fees on page 10, the 2004 traffic gain on page 19, the 20-year term on page 43). The concession was originally 20 years with possible extensions (Annex 10), so it ran about nine years of a 20-year term, a figure computed here.
Panel median50.0-35.0 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 50.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 50, between B and C. Civil society strength is real, but an 11-point budget deviation and the slow Common Framework restructuring show weak fiscal coordination.
- 52.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised down from 55, toward A's 50: the long Common Framework restructuring and supplier arrears are fiscal coordination failures I cannot answer. Civil society at 93 is real organisation among independent actors, which is why I stay above C's 45.
- 47.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Revised up from 45 to 47. Panelist B notes civil society at 93 and peaceful power transfers are real organising capacity, and my sharp cut to 45 underweighted that. Arrears and the long Common Framework restructuring keep me below B's 55.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
77.40.21 very thin2 of 7
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
Recency 1.00About TrustZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+2.6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -0.4 to +6, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +1.9, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +4.7.
-5.5 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -10.3 to -0.6. Median change: all countries +2.1, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +6.2.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 7 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2006. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+5.1 over 10 years, from 72.3 in 2016 to 77.4 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dispute resolution efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.DR.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS) | 6.1% of firms | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeV-Dem (v2jucomp_osp) | 2.6scale 0-4 (never to always) | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 4 rows, each a gap: Generalised interpersonal trust, Trust in public institutions, Cooperation beyond the in-group, Court case clearance rate.
This project retired 4 rows: Rule of law, Control of corruption, Time to enforce a contract, Intentional homicide rate.
Panel median54.0-23.4 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 54.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Hold at 54. Bribery of 6.1% and compliance of 2.57 give 77.4 on thin coverage. Peaceful transfers support real institutions (my own knowledge), which B and C accept. Selective prosecution and the contested 2025 amendment process are real pressure. B's chilimba groups are among known members, so I do not move to 60, and C's 52 is close enough to mine.
- 56.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Revise from 60 to 56. Only bribery of 6.1% and compliance of 2.57 stand, so 77 is thin. Panelist A's point about selective anti-corruption prosecution, which I had not weighed, lowers my reading of the courts. Chilimba groups are common, from my own knowledge, but mainly among acquaintances. The peaceful 2021 turnover shows that rules bind, so I stay above 52 and 54.
- 54.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Bribery 6.1% of firms (2025) and compliance 2.57/4 are decent but only two rows exist; dispute resolution is missing. Peaceful turnover in 2021 (own knowledge) shows rule respect; selective anti-corruption prosecution, the contested 2025 constitutional amendment process and cyber laws pull the other way. I move from 52 to 54, a small shift toward panelist B at 60.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
34.60.55 usable3 of 4
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
Recency 0.81About LearningZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-8.4 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -12.5 to -4.8. Median change: all countries -1.3, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -2.3.
+3.4 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -2.8 to +9.3, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +0.8, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.6.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 17 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2016. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-11.6 over 10 years, from 54.5 in 2016 to 42.9 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL) | 0.4index 0-1 | 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS) | 26% of firms | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeOpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent) | 1.2ratio to world average | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for one row, each a gap: Adult learning participation (1 case below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2012
4 % gross, rank 128 of 134. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned.
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2023
4.1 % of GDP, rank 69 of 135. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about.
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 1994
4.5 % of secondary, rank 100 of 135. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
The value is from 1994, more than 15 years old.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better. It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
1998ZambiaTEVET Fund training for MSMEs and the informal sectorstill operating
TEVET Fund training for MSMEs and the informal sector
Zambia's TEVET Fund, set up under the TEVET Act and financed mainly by the Skills Development Levy, paid 101 training institutions to train micro, small and medium enterprise operators, informal sector workers and out-of-school youth, and enrolled 10,270 trainees in 2025 against a target of 9,350; its employer-based in-service window trained 1,188 employees against a target of 8,602.
10,270 trainees, trainees enrolled under the tevet fund msme and informal sector training window, 2025. 1,188 employees, employees trained under the tevet fund employer-based in-service training window, 2025. Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA), Zambia, TEVET Fund Annual Report 2025, sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.2, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: Parliament created a training fund in the TEVET Act, the revenue authority collects a payroll skills levy for it, and the training authority's board signs competitive contracts with registered public and private institutions to train informal operators and employees in priority sectors.
Limits: The gap asks for a share of adults in education and training, and this is a count of trainees the fund paid for, reported by the authority that runs the fund, read from a PDF. Against an adult population of more than ten million, about 10,000 trainees a year is a fraction of one percent. The report gives no age breakdown, and it names out-of-school youth among the trainees, so an unknown part are young people in their first training rather than adults returning to learn. The report contradicts itself on the employer window: section 4.2.1 gives 1,188 employees trained, and the summary table of annual activities gives 2,557 employees. The 10,270 figure is an enrolment; 8,895 learners sat the assessment, against a different target of 9,674 in the same report. The report does not state the year the informal sector window opened; 1998 is the year of the TEVET Act that created the fund. The 2022 TEVETA annual report, a separate document, gives 8,297 enrolled in the same window that year. A count of trainees says nothing about course length, completion rates or effect on earnings.
Panel median30.0-4.6 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 30.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 30, level with C. Citation impact above world average rests on a small, mostly foreign-partnered output, and the HCI of 0.40 shows weak school-system learning.
- 33.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 33 within a tight panel range. A's point that citation impact rests on foreign-partnered health research is fair, but firm training at 26 percent is a genuine strength; a low HCI of 0.40 holds the score down.
- 30.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 30. Panelist A's point that citation impact at 56 rests on a small number of foreign-partnered articles is plausible and I cannot confirm; B holds at 33. HCI 0.397 (17.9/100) is the weak spot and firm training at 26% is the offsetting strength.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
1.30.37 thin4 of 10
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
Recency 1.00About ExperimentationZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-0.1 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -4 to +0.3, which includes no change. Median change: all countries 0, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest 0.
+0.6 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -3.3 to +0.8, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +0.1, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.1.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 26 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2025. The replay starts in 2002, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-0.1 over 10 years, from 1.1 in 2016 to 1.0 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.PAT.RESD) | 0.84per million peoplefrom 18 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT) | 47.1per million peoplefrom 1,003 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT) | 3.3per million peoplefrom 71 national total | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeGitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv) | 1,276per million peoplefrom 27,966 national total | 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Early-stage entrepreneurial activitydirect capability measureGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate) | no data% aged 18-64 | no data | no data |
| Tolerance of entrepreneurial failureperception proxyGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate) | no data% not deterred | no data | no data |
| Insolvency efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BI.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
No dataset exists for 3 rows, each a gap: Venture deals, Firms through regulatory sandboxes (1 case below), University spinouts.
This project retired one row: Business share of R&D.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2021ZambiaRegulatory Sandbox Framework for Capital Markets, first cohortdelivered and closed
Regulatory Sandbox Framework for Capital Markets, first cohort
Zambia's Securities and Exchange Commission admitted four innovations to the first cohort of its capital markets sandbox, with testing starting on 19 November 2021, and announced on 15 July 2024 that live testing had been completed and directed all four to suspend operations inside the sandbox pending evaluation and exit.
4 innovations, innovations admitted to the first sandbox cohort and completing live testing, 2024-07-15. Securities and Exchange Commission of Zambia, Press Release 'Regulatory Sandbox Framework for Capital Markets' (15 July 2024), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The securities regulator admitted a single cohort of capital markets innovations, let them take real investors under parameters and caps, then froze onboarding at the end of testing so it could evaluate each before deciding on commercial deployment.
Limits: The regulator reports on itself in a one-page press release (PDF). The four are named innovations from four firms (Kukula Capital, Lupiya Circle, Lusaka Securities Exchange and Premier Credit Zambia), one of them the national stock exchange. The release says the framework was issued on 18 December 2022 but that testing began on 'Wednesday, 19th November 2021', which cannot both be right, and neither date matches its weekday (19 November 2021 was a Friday, 18 December 2022 a Sunday); the start year 2021 is the earliest date the release gives and is not confirmed by any other source read. Completion of testing is not a successful exit: the release says each innovator will or will not be permitted to deploy commercially after review, and no outcome statement was found on the SEC site; its list of sandbox participants page is empty. If the 2021 date is right, testing ran over two and a half years for one cohort of four, and no second cohort was found. The Bank of Zambia runs a separate sandbox and reports that 'one financial innovation exited the Sandbox after a successful test' in 2024 (Annual Report 2024, printed page 69, PDF page 86, https://www.boz.zm/sites/default/files/2026-01/Bank_of_Zambia_2024_Annual_Report.pdf); summed, the two regulators show about five firms through a sandbox over three years for 21 million people.
Panel median7.0+5.7 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 7.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Hold 7: panelist B's informal trade and mobile money are not an institutional channel for trial and exit in Zambia.
- 9.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Moved from 12 to 9. C is right that insolvency data is missing and no structured trial is visible; informal trade and mobile money still justify a lift above the 1.3 indicator.
- 4.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Held at 4. Filings are near zero and insolvency is missing; B's informal-trade and mobile-money lift to 12 is adoption, not institutional trial.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
40.30.62 usable4 of 6
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
Recency 1.00About AdaptabilityZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+1 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -1.1 to +3.3, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -0.8, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -0.2.
+8.6 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +3.8 to +13.1. Median change: all countries -1, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.9.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 17 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2016. The replay starts in 2000, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-1.2 over 10 years, from 42.7 in 2016 to 41.5 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS) | 5.9% of labour force | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB) | 63.7% of unemployed | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureUNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices) | 0.67index 0-1, lower = more diversified | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeHarvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ)) | 2.6% of products not exported competitively at the start | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Disaster preparedness and recovery (1 case below), Institutional responsiveness (1 case below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
62.2 % aged 15+, rank 102 of 135. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating. Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
0.79 per 100 people, rank 110 of 135. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2024
19.2 % of output, rank 103 of 122. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT), 2024
82.7 % of employment, rank 77 of 111. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating. Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2024ZambiaDrought Emergency Cash Transfer through the Social Cash Transferdelivered and closed
Drought Emergency Cash Transfer through the Social Cash Transfer
After the President declared the 2024 El Niรฑo drought a national disaster, Zambia's Ministry of Community Development and Social Services enumerated households in all 116 districts within four to eight weeks. From May 2024 to April 2025 it paid a drought emergency cash transfer to 1,631,007 households in 84 districts through the Social Cash Transfer, and paid a nationally funded price-shock transfer to 632,664 households in the other 32 districts.
1,631,007 households, households supported by the drought emergency cash transfer (d-ect) in 84 drought-affected districts, May 2024 to April 2025. 632,664 households, households paid the government-funded indirect price shock emergency cash transfer in the remaining 32 districts, May 2024 to April 2025. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Zambia Scaling-up Shock Responsive Social Protection Project (P179095), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: Once the drought was declared, the Cabinet chose the existing Social Cash Transfer instead of a parallel humanitarian pipeline to deliver emergency aid. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services then used enumerators already on retainer in every district and a simplified proxy-means test to enrol drought-hit households in weeks and pay them through the same digital rails.
Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed, written with the implementing ministry, and the household counts are programme administrative data, not an independent survey. The 1.63 million drought transfers were financed by IDA grants and a donor trust fund. Only the 632,664 price-shock transfers were paid from national funds, so the record shows government delivery capacity more than government financing. Payment timeliness fell to 17 percent in the first half of 2025, at the height of the drought, and averaged 29 percent over the project against a 90 percent target. Households counted as supported were not necessarily paid on time. The consumption and coping effects the report cites come from evaluations it says should be interpreted cautiously. The report's own footnote 51 puts enumeration at about eight weeks, against four weeks in the main text. The report dates the disaster declaration to 28 February 2024 in one place and 29 February in another. The record shows a response after a shock was declared. It does not show forecasting or contingent financing in place before the drought, and the report says the government began strengthening disaster risk financing, with contingent financing instruments, only from 2024, after the drought. The transfer ended in April 2025 and the caseload returned to its pre-drought level, so nothing here shows recovery outcomes.
2020ZambiaCOVID-19 Emergency Cash Transfer through the Social Cash Transferdelivered and closed
COVID-19 Emergency Cash Transfer through the Social Cash Transfer
Zambia's Ministry of Community Development and Social Services answered the COVID-19 pandemic by extending the Social Cash Transfer, paying 400 kwacha a month to about 204,000 households in 25 urban and peri-urban districts from September 2020 to August 2021, and for the first time adding households from outside the programme's caseload.
204,000 households, households paid the covid-19 emergency cash transfer (c-ect), about, September 2020 to August 2021. 194 days, days from the first confirmed coronavirus case to the first c-ect transfer, 2020. UNICEF Zambia, Zambia's Emergency Cash Transfer Programmes D-ECT and C-ECT: Process Evaluation (June 2022), retrieved 2026-10-16.
How it worked: The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services used the Social Cash Transfer's caseload, district staff and payment contracts as the channel for a pandemic transfer, topping up existing beneficiaries and registering new categories of households, such as female-headed households with children, alongside them.
Limits: Both numbers sit in a PDF: the household count on printed page 28 (PDF page 30) and the 194 days in the executive summary (PDF page 13). The evaluation was commissioned and funded by UNICEF Zambia, which also channelled the money, so the programme is partly reporting on itself. The 204,000 is a rounded figure with 116,000 of the households already enrolled in the Social Cash Transfer; the final caseload the evaluation reports for the UNICEF-managed share is 141,579 households in 19 districts, of which 41,581 were newly registered, so most of the response was a top-up to an existing list. The money came from the UN COVID-19 appeal, US$21.6 million from the EU, KfW, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, not from the treasury, and the evaluation says donors had suspended direct funding to the ministry after the Auditor General reported mismanagement of Social Cash Transfer funds. The evaluation rates the speed below the global average for COVID-19 social protection responses: the first transfer came 194 days after the first case and 166 days after the first localised lockdown. It also finds the programme's information system inadequate for emergency processing and records registration delays. The 204,000 is against an estimated more than 1 million households made vulnerable by the pandemic in 43 districts.
Panel median30.0-10.3 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 30.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 30, level with C. Copper concentration, few new export products and a 64 percent long-term unemployment share show a system that does not reallocate; B's 35 grants no specific counterpoint.
- 33.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Trimmed from 35, close to A and C. Copper concentration, 64 percent long-term unemployment and few new export products show slow reallocation; I keep a small lift for farmers shifting crops and households shifting to informal work during the 2024 drought.
- 29.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held near 30, now 29. Panelists A and B agree; copper dominance (diversification 22/100), few new export products and a 64% long-term share show slow reallocation, and the 5.9% unemployment is informality. Recovery from default is incomplete.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
8.70.47 usable3 of 6
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
Recency 1.00About BuildingZambia beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-10.7 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -10.7 to -10.7. Median change: all countries -0.3, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -1.1.
0 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -3.2 to +1.8, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -0.5, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -0.5.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 8 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2007. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-10.7 over 10 years, from 19.4 in 2016 to 8.7 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS) | 8.7% of GDP | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS) | 1.5% of manufactured exports | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Utility connection efficiencydirect capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.US.P3) | no datascore 0-100 | no data | no data |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD) | 0.03index | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Large project delivery (1 case below), Firm scale-up rate.
This project retired 2 rows: Logistics infrastructure quality, Electricity connection speed.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
10,880 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 113 of 133. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2016ZambiaSolar powered milling plants contract, and its erosionoperating below its peak
Solar powered milling plants contract, and its erosion
Zambia's government contracted Shandong Dejian Group for a fixed-price US$200 million national programme of solar powered milling plants, financed in 2016 and due 24 months after the March 2016 deposit. The Auditor General found it still incomplete at 31 March 2022, 38 months after the scheduled completion date, and found 555 of the completed plants non-functional at audit in January 2024.
555 plants, solar powered milling plants found non-functional at audit, January 2024. 1,583 units, units contracted (1,553 solar powered milling plants plus 30 solar powered rice mills), 2016. Office of the Auditor General of Zambia, Special Audit Report of the Auditor General on Public Debt for the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2022, section 7.6.4, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Ministry of Finance borrowed from China Development Bank to buy a turnkey national programme of off-grid milling plants from one Chinese contractor, and appointed the Zambia Co-operative Federation to run them through local co-operatives. No public body was funded to maintain the equipment, so delivery slipped for years and a third of the completed plants stopped working.
Limits: The Auditor General never publishes the peak number of working plants. The secondMetric is the contracted count, not the peak installed or working count. The 555 non-functional plants are counted among the 1,553 milling plants, about 36 percent; that share is our inference. The audit inspected selected sites, so the 555 figure may rest partly on progress reports rather than visits to every plant. The report is internally inconsistent: the loan paragraph describes 1,000 plants for US$200 million, while the finding counts 1,583 contracted units. It also dates the deposit (March 2016) before the China Development Bank loan (July 2016). The section gives no final cost and no completion date, so neither a cost overrun nor a final schedule overrun can be computed. 38 months is the delay at 31 March 2022 against the revised January 2019 date; against the original 6 March 2018 date it is about 49 months. The plants are distributed small units rather than a single structure, which makes the record a weaker fit for major public infrastructure. The Zambia Co-operative Federation, the implementing agent, is a federation and not a ministry. The audit also found K15.5 million in lease fees that were never paid into the Treasury. Nothing here shows how many households used the mills, or whether the non-functional plants were later repaired.
Panel median12.0+3.3 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 12.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Held at 12, the panel's unanimous score. Some roads and the Kenneth Kaunda airport were delivered, but economic fitness and high-tech exports sit near the floor and debt-financed projects overran.
- 12.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Held at 12, which the whole panel shares. Economic fitness near the floor, high-tech exports at 1.5 percent and debt-financed projects that overran outweigh delivered items such as the Kenneth Kaunda airport terminal.
- 10.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Revised down from 12 to 10. All of us sit at 12; economic fitness at 1.1, high-tech exports at 2.3 and manufacturing 22.5 are close to the floor, and the 2024 power crisis showed dependence on one dam system. Debt-financed projects that overran count against it, and delivered roads are a small credit.