Lesotho
Strongest usable evidence: Coordination, at 59.6. Raise Anticipation first, at 18.1. Shared purpose needs more evidence: confidence is 0.22.
A solid dot has usable or good evidence and a hollow dot has thin evidence. The tick is the median of the 10 countries nearest in income. A score is a position among the 135 countries, not a percentage.
Raise, lowest first
- AnticipationPeers 23.40.46 usable+8.6(2)
- BuildingPeers 12.70.63 usable-4.9(3)
- LearningPeers 31.80.54 usable-4.6(2)
- AdaptabilityPeers 48.10.62 usable-3.6(3)
Measure before managing, thinnest first
- Shared purposePeers 46.20.22 very thinno trend
- ExperimentationPeers 1.20.30 thinno trend
- TrustPeers 51.20.33 thin+11.9(2)
- AgencyPeers 35.80.43 thinno trend
Keep watching, highest first
- CoordinationPeers 60.60.45 usable-17.6(2)
These groups are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 22 gaps in the registry.
Read Lesotho beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
Why this country is included: Added in the 9.0.0 completion, which takes every country of a million people or more that is measurable in all nine capabilities.
Download this country as CSVHow to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 135 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
The record behind each score
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
18.10.46 usable2 of 4
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
Recency 0.96About AnticipationLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 2 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+8.6 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +8.6 to +8.6. Median change: all countries +11.2, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +11.6.
+8.7 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -0.1 to +16.4, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +13.4, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +11.7.
The model fills at least one of the 2 indicators in 16 of 27 years, at most 1, last in 2015. The replay starts in 2016, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+8.6 over 10 years, from 9.5 in 2016 to 18.1 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC) | 26articles per million peoplefrom 60.18 national total | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL) | 58.2index 0-100 | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Government foresight capacity, Long-horizon research commitments.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2023
0.1 % of GDP, rank 106 of 123. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well.
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6), 2023
32.2 per million people, rank 107 of 118. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found. Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
86 per million people, rank 105 of 135. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation. Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel median14.0-4.1 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 12.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Held at 12: weak statistics, near-zero science and no national institution looking past the budget year; the panel is within three points.
- 14.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Moved 15 to 14: the panel agrees at 12 to 15; no visible foresight beyond the budget year.
- 14.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
Held. Weak statistics (35.2), near-zero science, and no visible foresight; peers agree at 12-15.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
51.70.43 thin3 of 5
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
Recency 0.75About AgencyLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+1.1 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -3.3 to +6.6, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +1.9, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +1.5.
+4.9 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -1 to +9.6, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +9.3, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +10.9.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2006, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS) | 1.5per 1,000 aged 15-64 | 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BE.P3) | 79.2score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO) | 6count | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Adults doing digital tasks, Perceived control over life.
This project retired one row: Time to start a business.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
51.8 % of population, rank 101 of 135. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting. Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
61.6 % aged 15+, rank 78 of 131. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action. Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2024
24.3 % of GDP, rank 94 of 134. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it. High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Panel median40.0-11.7 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 40.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised up from 36. In round 1 I discounted entry rows because they read better than the economy's capacity, and that mixes endowment with capability, which the frame forbids. Entry efficiency of 79.2 is fresh and 6 procedures is fair, so the One-Stop Business Facility deserves more credit. Density of 1.47 from 2020 and few pathways past registration still hold me well below the derived 51.7. Panelist B's migrant work is exit, so it does not lift me further.
- 42.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Held at 42. Entry efficiency of 79.2 and 6 procedures read well on paper and density of 1.47 dates from 2020. Panelist A's and C's reliance on South African wages and textile exposure describes constraint, while migrant work and wool and mohair sales are themselves action, from my own knowledge. Few openings at home mean paper ease does not earn 51.7.
- 38.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Hold 38. Entry efficiency 72.8 and 6 procedures read well on paper while density 8.5 is 2020 data. Panelists at 36 and 42 agree the economy is thin. Dependence on South African wages and textile exposure to US tariff decisions leave few pathways. Own knowledge.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
59.60.45 usable3 of 5
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
Recency 0.94About CoordinationLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-11.7 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -16.7 to -6.7. Median change: all countries -1.7, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +2.6.
-13.4 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -19 to -7.5. Median change: all countries -2.7, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.7.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-17.6 over 10 years, from 75.7 in 2016 to 58.1 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.IT.P3) | 59.5score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS) | 72.4percentage points from approved budget | 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureV-Dem (v2x_cspart) | 0.74index 0-1 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration (1 case below).
This project retired 4 rows: Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Logistics performance, Border compliance time to export.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2023
13.947 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2011LesothoQueen 'Mamohato Memorial Hospital PPP, and its terminationdismantled
Queen 'Mamohato Memorial Hospital PPP, and its termination
Lesotho's Ministry of Health replaced its national referral hospital through an 18-year partnership with the private Tsepong consortium, which opened the hospital and three filter clinics in 2010 and 2011 and handled 24,796 admissions in 2018; the government terminated the contract in 2021, about five years before its end date, and took over management in mid-2021.
24,796 admissions, admissions at the ppp-run national referral hospital, 2018. 5 years, years of the 18-year contract term cut by the 2021 termination, 2021. McGuire et al., Annals of Global Health (2024), study of the Queen 'Mamohato Memorial Hospital integrated network PPP, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: The Ministry of Health contracted a private consortium to build and run the national referral hospital and its clinics for a fixed fee against quality standards, then ended the contract in 2021 after a nurse strike and the consortium's dismissal of the strikers broke the relationship.
Limits: The source is a peer-reviewed interview study, not a government or World Bank evaluation, and its volume figures come from the hospital itself for one year, 2018. The termination is given only as approximately five years before the contract end, so the second metric is a rounded figure. The record shows one hospital network, the country's single referral facility, so it bears on national delivery only because that facility is the top of the public referral system; it is not a programme of many projects. The source does not give the annual payment to the consortium or its share of the health budget, and that cost is the main reason a reviewer would call the partnership a failure of design before it was a failure of delivery. Admissions after the government takeover are not published at this URL, so the record cannot show whether service fell after the handover.
Panel median43.0-16.6 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 40.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
I hold at 40. Both others agree that a 27.6-point miss on the approved budget is the strongest direct signal; trade compliance at 62 reflects SACU customs arrangements more than domestic coordination.
- 43.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised down from 45: A's point that trade compliance reflects SACU arrangements more than domestic capacity lowers that row's weight. Church and chieftaincy networks still carry local coordination, so I do not follow A down to 40.
- 43.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised 45 to 43. Panelist A is right that trade compliance reflects SACU membership, so the 62 on that row is not domestic coordination; budget outturn missing by 27.6 points remains the weakest direct row and I weigh it most. Civil society at 74 keeps me off 40.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
63.70.33 thin3 of 7
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
Recency 0.97About TrustLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
+7.9 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band +2.8 to +13.2. Median change: all countries +1.9, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +4.7.
+9.9 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band +5 to +15.8. Median change: all countries +2.1, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +6.2.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2009, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
+11.9 over 10 years, from 70.8 in 2016 to 82.7 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.DR.P3) | 41.5score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS) | 7.3% of firms | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeV-Dem (v2jucomp_osp) | 3scale 0-4 (never to always) | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 4 rows, each a gap: Generalised interpersonal trust, Trust in public institutions, Cooperation beyond the in-group, Court case clearance rate.
This project retired 4 rows: Rule of law, Control of corruption, Time to enforce a contract, Intentional homicide rate.
Panel median44.0-19.7 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 44.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised up from 42. Panelist B named burial societies, and from my own knowledge these keep written rules and accounts over many years, so they are organisations with reach past kin, and I did not credit them. Bribery of 7.3% and court compliance of 3.04 read strong and dispute efficiency of 41.5 reads weak, for a derived 63.7. Army killings, the 2014 coup attempt and the suspension of a Chief Justice stay as reasons to remain far below derived.
- 46.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised from 50. Bribery of 7.3% and compliance of 3.04 outweigh dispute efficiency of 41.5 in the 63.7. Panelist A's points on the 2014 coup attempt, army killings and the Chief Justice's suspension, from my own knowledge, make the compliance row look too generous, and C's SADC point adds to it. Burial societies and stokvels remain widespread mutual systems, which keeps me above A's 42.
- 44.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Lower slightly from 45 to 44. Bribery 7.3% (85.6) and compliance 79.7 look strong, dispute efficiency 25.9 is weak. Panelist A (42) cites the 2014 coup attempt, army killings and the Chief Justice's suspension; compliance likely reads too generous. Own knowledge.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
32.10.54 usable3 of 4
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
Recency 0.78About LearningLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 3 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-1.2 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -3.5 to +0.8, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -1.3, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -2.3.
-3 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -10.1 to +4.1, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +0.8, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.6.
The model fills at least one of the 3 indicators in 15 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2014. The replay starts in 2010, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-4.6 over 10 years, from 43.6 in 2016 to 39.0 on 2 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL) | 0.4index 0-1 | 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS) | 33.1% of firms | 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeOpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent) | 0.89ratio to world average | 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for one row, each a gap: Adult learning participation.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2018
9.9 % gross, rank 113 of 134. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned.
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2024
6.6 % of GDP, rank 10 of 135. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about.
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 2017
2.1 % of secondary, rank 116 of 135. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better. It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Panel median28.0-4.1 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 27.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
I revise from 25 to 27. C is right that one third of firms offering training is a direct capability row well above Lesotho's income level, but the Human Capital Index at 0.40 still sets the base.
- 30.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 30: C weights the one-third firm training rate and A the HCI, and I sit between them. HIV mortality and migration drain skills, and I have no data on how herding and farming knowledge passes between generations.
- 28.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 28. Panelist A weights the Human Capital Index at 18.5 and panelist B points to HIV and migration; I read firm training at 33 percent as the capability row sitting above what income predicts, so I do not go as low as 25.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
2.10.30 thin4 of 10
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
Recency 0.81About ExperimentationLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-0.1 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -4.7 to +3.6, which includes no change. Median change: all countries 0, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest 0.
0 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -4.5 to +3.8, which includes no change. Median change: all countries +0.1, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.1.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 26 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2025. The replay starts in 2018, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.PAT.RESD) | 0.45per million peoplefrom 1 national total | 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT) | 30.4per million peoplefrom 68 national total | 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Resident industrial design applicationsdownstream outcomeWorld Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT) | no dataper million people | no data | no data |
| downstream outcomeGitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv) | 4,354per million peoplefrom 10,291 national total | 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| Early-stage entrepreneurial activitydirect capability measureGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate) | no data% aged 18-64 | no data | no data |
| Tolerance of entrepreneurial failureperception proxyGlobal Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate) | no data% not deterred | no data | no data |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.BI.P3) | 0score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 3 rows, each a gap: Venture deals, Firms through regulatory sandboxes, University spinouts.
This project retired one row: Business share of R&D.
Panel median3.0+0.9 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 3.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 3: insolvency efficiency of 0 and stale 2019-2020 IP data; informal trade with South Africa is not an institutional channel.
- 6.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.25
Moved 8 to 6: insolvency at 0 and stale IP data, as the panel says; cross-border trade with South Africa still shows trial, so I stay above 2 to 3.
- 2.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.25
Held. Insolvency efficiency is 0 and IP data is stale (2019-2020); informal trade with South Africa is unmeasured.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
35.90.62 usable4 of 6
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
Recency 1.00About AdaptabilityLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-2.1 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -4.1 to +0.5, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -0.8, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -0.2.
-1.6 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -5.9 to +4.1, which includes no change. Median change: all countries -1, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest +0.9.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 19 of 27 years, at most 2, last in 2018. The replay starts in 2000, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-3.6 over 10 years, from 36.9 in 2016 to 33.3 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS) | 16.3% of labour force | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB) | 57% of unemployed | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureUNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices) | 0.34index 0-1, lower = more diversified | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeHarvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ)) | 1.3% of products not exported competitively at the start | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness (1 case below).
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
59.1 % aged 15+, rank 113 of 135. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating. Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
0.38 per 100 people, rank 117 of 135. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS)
No value for this country. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing. Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT), 2024
89.1 % of employment, rank 87 of 111. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating. Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2020LesothoChild Grants Programme drought top-ups, 2020delivered and closed
Child Grants Programme drought top-ups, 2020
After Lesotho declared a drought emergency in October 2019, the government and the World Bank restructured the Social Assistance Project in January 2020 to reallocate US$7.4 million, and between February and September 2020 the Ministry of Social Development paid more than 40,000 Child Grants Programme households a LSL 500 monthly top-up for six months and added about 10,000 new households, which it kept on the programme at its own cost.
40,000 households, child grants programme households receiving drought top-ups (more than), 2020-09. 10,000 households, new households added in the horizontal expansion and retained on the budget (around), 2020. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lesotho Social Assistance Project, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The social development ministry used its national household registry (NISSA) and the Child Grants Programme to add a temporary top-up for existing recipients and enrol new poor households in drought districts, financed by restructuring an existing World Bank credit instead of waiting for new money.
Limits: The figures are in a PDF (the restructuring in paragraph 39 on PDF page 22; the top-up figures in paragraph 62 on PDF page 31). The World Bank financed the top-ups and rates its own project. The elapsed time is about four months from the October 2019 declaration to the first top-ups in February 2020, which we computed from dates in the report; the report gives no date for the first payment, only the February to September window. The results framework counts 67,000 beneficiaries of emergency top-ups against a target raised to 50,000, a different unit from the 40,000 households in the text, and the extra reach is partly attributed to exchange rate movements during COVID-19. Fewer than 10 percent of payments were digital, so most top-ups went out at cash pay points. The government paid the base benefit and absorbed the 10,000 new households; the top-ups themselves were donor money.
Panel median29.0-6.9 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 28.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
I hold at 28. C reads the 16 percent unemployment and 57 percent long-term share as I do, and B correctly calls migration to South Africa an export of adjustment rather than domestic reallocation.
- 33.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Held at 33: A and C cite the same unemployment and AGOA dependence I did. Labour migration to South Africa is household adaptation, which is why I stay a little above them, but it moves the adjustment abroad.
- 29.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Revised 28 to 29. Panelist B's point that migration to South Africa exports the adjustment is the key one, and I agree 16 percent unemployment with a 57 percent long-term share is a labour market that does not rebuild. A small lift because export mix is moderate rather than concentrated.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
19.50.63 usable4 of 6
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
Recency 1.00About BuildingLesotho beside its income peers
Reconstructed history, 2000 to 2026, provisional
- Reconstruction on today's 4 indicators, band 10th to 90th percentile
- Replay on the values that existed each year
- Darker means more indicators modelled
-3.7 over 10 years (2016 to 2026), band -6.9 to -0.5. Median change: all countries -0.3, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -1.1.
-7.5 over 20 years (2006 to 2026), band -12.9 to -3.5. Median change: all countries -0.5, Income quartile 1 of 4 in 2000, lowest -0.5.
The model fills at least one of the 4 indicators in 25 of 27 years, at most 3, last in 2024. The replay starts in 2007, the first year with two indicators in force. This never enters a score. How it is built, every country and cohort.
-4.9 over 10 years, from 15.9 in 2016 to 11.0 on 3 indicators seen in both years. Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame.
| Indicator | Value | Year | Normalized |
|---|---|---|---|
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS) | 12.1% of GDP | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS) | 0.09% of manufactured exports | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| direct capability measureWorld Bank (IC.BRE.US.P3) | 58.7score 0-100 | 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. | |
| downstream outcomeWorld Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD) | 0.01index | 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026. |
No dataset exists for 2 rows, each a gap: Large project delivery (1 case below), Firm scale-up rate.
This project retired 2 rows: Logistics infrastructure quality, Electricity connection speed.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
8,639 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 118 of 133. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context.
Evidence for missing indicators
Cases the indicators cannot see. They do not affect the score or confidence, because one case is not comparable across countries.
2011LesothoMetolong Dam and Water Supply Programmestill operating
Metolong Dam and Water Supply Programme
Lesotho's Metolong Authority built the Metolong Dam and raw water pump station near Maseru, starting impoundment on 15 February 2014 against a contract date of 31 October 2012 and delivering 93 megalitres a day on 8 October 2014 against a contract date of 1 July 2013, with every component of the programme overrunning its cost.
15.2 months, delay in reaching water delivery of 93 ml/day (contract date 1 july 2013, achieved 8 october 2014), 2014-10-08. 15.5 months, delay in starting impoundment (contract date 31 october 2012, achieved 15 february 2014), 2014-02-15. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lesotho Water Sector Improvement APL Phase II: Metolong Dam and Water Supply (P108143), 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: Lesotho created a dedicated authority to deliver a dam, treatment works and bulk pipelines for the lowlands with many co-financiers, and delivered water about 15 months behind contract after price escalation and procurement delays.
Limits: The contract and revised dates are in Table 9.1 (Annex 9, page 53 of 59) of the World Bank's completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory; both delays in months (15.2 and 15.5) are computed here from the dates in that table. The report states that all components overran their cost, attributing it partly to construction-price inflation from South Africa's 2010 World Cup works (para. 72), but gives no programme-wide baseline and outturn cost, and the World Bank financed only part of a programme co-financed by the Kuwait Fund, Arab and other lenders, the EIB and the government. The project closing date was extended three times for a cumulative 42 months, to 31 December 2018. Impoundment coincided with the 2015 to 2016 drought. Plain-text file of a PDF.
Panel median17.0-2.5 against the indicators
Round 2. How this layer works
- 17.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
I revise from 15 to 17. B and C both credit the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, and the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority is a durable treaty body of the kind I should credit, though Phase II delay and South African co-management limit the raise.
- 20.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised down from 22: A notes Phase II of the Highlands Water Project is delayed and C that the textile base came from preference schemes, which trims my credit. The project is still a delivered system with Lesotho as partner, so I stay above them.
- 16.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Revised 15 to 16. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project is a treaty-backed delivered system, as panelists A and B both say, but it is co-run with South Africa and Phase II is delayed, so I add only one point.