downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 13844.24articles per million people
- Year
- 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC)
- History
Israel
Strongest usable evidence: Adaptability, at 80.6. Raise Building first, at 42.5. Coordination needs more evidence: confidence is 0.23.
Raise, lowest first
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Building | 0.57 | 42.5 |
Measure before managing
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Coordination | 0.23 | 83.5 |
| Shared Purpose | 0.29 | 62.0 |
| Trust | 0.29 | 56.8 |
| Experimentation | 0.33 | 46.0 |
| Agency | 0.41 | 63.3 |
These lists are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 18 gaps in the registry.
Why this country is included: Small state with the highest venture density in the world and deep civil divisions.
Anticipation72.8Confidence0.46usableHow capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
Israel
Read Israel beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
| Coordination | 0.23 | 2 of 5 | 0.79 | no trend | 70.0 | -13.5 | |
| Adaptability | 0.62 | 4 of 6 | 1.00 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 2 of 4 | 0.96 | +10.1(2) | 68.0 | -4.8 | |
| Agency | 0.41 | 3 of 5 | 0.72 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Shared Purpose | 0.29 | 2 of 6 | 0.92 | +1.2(2) | 44.0 | -18.0 | |
| Trust | 0.29 | 3 of 7 | 0.86 | no trend | 50.0 | -6.8 | |
| Learning | 0.55 | 3 of 4 | 0.81 | no trend | no data | no estimate | |
| Experimentation | 0.33 | 4 of 9 | 0.81 | -9.6(3) | no data | no estimate | |
| Building | 0.57 | 4 of 6 | 0.90 | +7.2(3) | no data | no estimate |
How to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 125 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
+10.1 over 10 years, from 62.7 in 2016 to 72.8 on 2 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 90.294index 0-100
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL)
- History
Government foresight capacity
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable international dataset. OECD and UN work is descriptive, not scored. Envisioning would have to build this.
Long-horizon research commitments
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of new grants
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the share of R&D spending classed as basic research, which is the make-up of a spending stock, the construct D142 retired business R&D share for. OECD MSTI publishes that share for its members only, and UNESCO UIS no longer serves R&D by type of research (construct audit, 2026-10-02). The behaviour behind it is a funder committing to a horizon: a grant awarded for five years or more is a decision to wait for a result. Untried: no memo has triaged a grant register. National funders publish award lists one by one with their own durations, and commercial grant aggregators fail the inspectability rule. Wireable on a grant-level register with award and end dates, on one definition of a competitive public grant, for half the frame or more.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2023
6.3 % of GDP, rank 1 of 118. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well (D122).
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6)
No value for this country. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found (D122). Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
12,319 per million people, rank 40 of 125. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation (D122). Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 68.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Hold: the statistics bureau, the Innovation Authority and the defence research establishment are strong anticipatory institutions, but the October 2023 failure shows warnings that existed did not travel through the institutions that should have acted on them. The panel agrees closely.
- 68.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Strong statistics, research and technology scanning, offset by the October 2023 failure to act on available warnings. The panel is tight and I hold.
- 69.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Excellent statistics and research, but all three of us name the October 2023 warning failure as a miss in the one place anticipation mattered most. I settle at the panel midpoint.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 2.917per 1,000 aged 15-64
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 11days
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.DURS.MA.DY)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 3count
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO)
- History
Adults doing digital tasks
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- ITU / UNESCO UIS (SDG 4.4.1, ICT skills by type)
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked whether adults can perform standard digital tasks, which reads a skill level, the kind of stock D122 moved out of the scores with internet users. It now counts the act: a person who did the task. It is not the internet users condition beside it, which counts access. Candidate: ITU ICT skills by type (SDG 4.4.1) through the UNESCO UIS API, probed 2026-10-02. Sent a message with an attached file reaches 33 of the 53 countries then in the frame, 25 at 2018 or later, with no United States, India or China and most of Africa and Central America missing; two other task items reach 31 and 16. The items are self-reported and the task list has changed between rounds. Wireable on one task observed for half the frame or more at 2018 or later.
Perceived control over life
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no datamean 1-10
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A173)
- History
- no data
Note: A perception: the publisher-weighted mean, on a 1 to 10 scale, of how much freedom of choice and control respondents feel they have over the way their life turns out, from the official Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 results table, release 5.0.0. It observes the felt capacity to act, not action. The table prints the mean to one decimal and no top-box share, so the row stores the mean and ties are common. Fieldwork years differ by up to six years: the 37 countries emitted were surveyed between 2017 (eight, the US among them) and 2023 (India), and every value is stamped with the release year 2022. Response style on 10-point scales differs across cultures, and a closed autocracy can read high: Vietnam and Nicaragua sit near the top of the frame. Countries with separate EVS and WVS samples (Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands) are held, as for interpersonal trust. See D127 and A15.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
88.2 % of population, rank 50 of 125. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting (D122). Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
89.3 % aged 15+, rank 36 of 122. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action (D122). Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2025
72.5 % of GDP, rank 32 of 124. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it (D122). High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Government effectiveness
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_GE.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The WGI aggregate the opinions of experts and firms, and in this set the four WGI series correlate with each other between 0.93 and 0.98 while correlating with log GDP per capita at 0.91. That is one perception of national wealth counted in three dimensions. Cross-agency delivery records are the replacement and they are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Regulatory quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RQ.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. Same measurement as government effectiveness, filed under a different name, correlating with it above 0.93. See D23 and A4.
Logistics performance
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The LPI is a survey of international freight forwarders, so it records how a country looks to global logistics firms. A small country with a small port scores low whatever its state can organise, which is artefact A9. Container throughput and border time are observable and stay. See D23.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 36hours
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (TRD.ACRS.BRDR.EXPT.BRDR.COMP.HR.DB1619)
- History
Budget execution fidelity
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no datapercentage points from approved budget
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS)
- History
- no data
Note: Observable alignment between an approved public plan and what government spent. The API covers 113 of 125 countries, with a latest year between 2016 and 2024. Values above and below 100 both indicate deviation, so the transform measures absolute distance from the approved budget rather than rewarding overspending. See D55.
University-industry collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Innovation Index
- History
- no data
Note: GII carries it, but the underlying item is a WEF executive opinion survey whose microdata is not inspectable. Excluded on principle 4.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 0.803index 0-1
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2x_cspart)
- History
- one year
Public-private collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable dataset. PPP investment databases measure infrastructure finance, not collaboration capacity.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2024
10.064 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Seawater desalination under private concessions
Israel's Water Authority contracted private operators to build and run large seawater desalination plants under long-term concessions, and by 2022 the five largest held concessions for about 596 million cubic metres a year and supplied 33 percent of the country's fresh water, with the state buying 540 million cubic metres from them that year for about NIS 1.5 billion.
33 % of fresh water, share of fresh water supplied from desalination, 2022. 596.4 million cubic metres a year, production capacity in the concessions of the five largest plants, 2022. State Comptroller of Israel, Regulation and Oversight of Seawater Desalination Facilities, November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-01.
How it worked: The state kept the planning, the water purchase and the regulation, and let private consortia finance, build and operate each plant on a long-term concession with a guaranteed buyer, so capacity arrived on a tender schedule without the capital sitting on the budget.
Limits: The source is an audit, and most of it is criticism: it finds that the Water Authority never completed the national desalination master plan a 2010 government resolution required, that the agreed penalties for poor water quality are too low to enforce anything, that 14 seawater contamination incidents halted production between 2007 and 2023, that three of the largest plants sit near one river mouth, and that no serious preparation had begun for the Palmachim concession expiring in 2029. A third of fresh water is the 2022 national share; desalination's share of drinking water is higher, but the audit does not state it. The started year is the first year the audit reports plants in operation; the first plant opened earlier. Capacity is a contractual figure, not output.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 70.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Slightly lower: civil society is dense and border processing is fast, but the state's own cross-ministry coordination broke down after 2023 and volunteers filled gaps ministries left. Volunteer mobilisation shows societal capacity, not the durable inter-agency coordination I weight.
- 71.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Civilian volunteer networks mobilised within hours in October 2023 and filled gaps the ministries left, which is the distributed coordination this dimension asks about; state fragmentation and coalition paralysis keep me below the indicator score.
- 70.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Civil society and border time are real behaviours, and volunteer mobilisation is distributed coordination, but volunteers filling gaps ministries left is also a state failure. I move up two.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Rule of law
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RL.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite correlating with control of corruption above 0.95 and with log GDP per capita at 0.83. Court throughput and case clearance rates are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Control of corruption
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_CC.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite. It measures reputation for corruption, which is not the same thing as corruption, and it tracks income closely. Prosecution and audit records are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 975days
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (ENF.CONT.DURS.DY)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 28.501% of firms
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 3.036scale 0-4 (never to always)
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2jucomp_osp)
- History
- one year
Intentional homicide rate
downstream outcomeretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataper 100,000 people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (VC.IHR.PSRC.P5)
- History
- no data
Note: Added 2026-08-26 by D23 as the observable replacement for two retired WGI perception composites, and retired 2026-08-27 by D44 when the diagnostic built in D42 measured what it was doing. It raised this dimension's correlation with log GDP per capita by 0.288, from 0.096 to 0.385, the largest single wealth contribution anywhere in the model. It was added to fix wealth contamination and it was the wealth contamination. The dataset is sound and the objection is to what it measures here: homicide is driven heavily by organised crime, a society can be physically safe while trusting very little, and across this country set the variation it carries is mostly income. Behavioural trust measures remain a gap.
Generalised interpersonal trust
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no data% agreeing
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A165)
- History
- no data
Note: Share answering that most people can be trusted in the official Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 results table, release 5.0.0. The adapter uses the publisher-weighted country results, emits only countries with one survey row, and holds countries with separate EVS and WVS samples until the respondent-level weights can be pooled reproducibly. See D57 and D64.
Trust in public institutions
perception proxyno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% expressing confidence
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD Trust Survey / WVS
- History
- no data
Note: The OECD survey covers members only. Mixing it with WVS items for India and South Africa would break comparability. The Joint EVS/WVS confidence battery (E069) reaches 37 countries from one release, and confidence in the courts (E069_17) is published beside Trust as a check under this id rather than scored: every item of the battery tested (courts, civil service, police, parliament and government) reads higher in the closed and electoral autocracies of the frame than in its democracies, which is deference as much as confidence (A13). The gap stays open for a measure that does not reward a court that cannot rule against the state. See D132.
Cooperation beyond the in-group
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no data% expressing trust
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (G007_34_B)
- History
- no data
Note: The distinction that makes this dimension worth measuring: whether trust reaches a person with no tie to the respondent. Generalised trust asks about "most people", which a respondent can fill with their own circle; this item names the stranger. China is the clearest case, high on most people and low on a person met for the first time. The value is the publisher-weighted share answering trust completely plus the share answering trust somewhat, the one sum of two printed columns the adapter stores, exact to about 0.1, over all respondents including don't know and no answer. EVS and WVS ask the same question on the same four-point scale; where one country has both samples, the WVS share is a median 2.2 points higher. Trust in people of another nationality (G007_36_B), which the row once also named, is left out because it reads attitudes to foreigners as much as trust. Fieldwork runs from 2017 to 2023 and every value carries the release year 2022. Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are held, as for interpersonal trust. See D140.
Court case clearance rate
downstream outcomeno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of incoming cases
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- CEPEJ / OECD / national court statistics
- History
- no data
Note: Whether a court finishes what it starts, counted from case records rather than asked in a survey. D23 named it as the observable replacement for the two retired WGI composites and it has stayed unfilled since. CEPEJ publishes it for Council of Europe members and OECD for its own members, so no single publisher reaches this country set, and a harmonised series needs the project second source adapter. See D57.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 51.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Hold: courts are generally obeyed and the judiciary has been strong, but contract enforcement is slow, reported firm bribery is notable, and the 2023 confrontation over judicial independence put the core institution of impersonal cooperation in contest. Trust across Jewish, Arab and Haredi communities is low.
- 50.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Strong in-group cooperation, but deep divides across Jewish, Arab and Haredi communities, contested judicial authority and surprisingly high reported firm bribery limit cooperation beyond networks. The panel agrees; I hold.
- 50.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Courts are complied with, but slow enforcement, firm bribery at 28.5 percent and low cross-community trust hold it near the middle; all three of us agree at 50 to 52.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 0.734index 0-1
- Year
- 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL)
- History
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 5.924% of firms
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS)
- History
Adult learning participation
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Eurostat / OECD PIAAC
- History
- no data
Note: The best available measure of continuous learning capacity, and it exists only for European and OECD members.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 1.524ratio to world average
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- OpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2024
56.3 % gross, rank 56 of 124. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned (D122).
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2022
5.9 % of GDP, rank 17 of 125. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about (D122).
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 2018
19.9 % of secondary, rank 36 of 125. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better (D141). It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Ministry of Labour Vocational Training Division adult courses
Israel's Vocational Training Division, in the labour ministry, trained about 61,000 people in 2022, against about 55,000 in 2019 and 59,000 in 2021, according to the Knesset Research and Information Center.
61,000 people (rounded), people trained through the vocational training division, 2022. 55,000 people (rounded), people trained through the vocational training division, pre-pandemic year, 2019. Knesset Research and Information Center, Review of poverty data in Israel and government policy (26 September 2023), citing labour ministry data, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The labour ministry's training division licenses and supervises a large market of paid vocational courses, sets curricula and state certification exams for more than 350 occupations, and funds a smaller set of courses through referrals from the employment service.
Limits: The figures are rounded and reach us through the Knesset's research centre, which republishes labour ministry data; the sentence is on PDF page 11 (printed page 9), in Hebrew. Most of the volume is not state-funded training: the Center's December 2021 paper on the training system says that in 2019, 49,192 of the participants, 88.5 percent, were in non-budgeted courses that learners pay for at private institutions the Division supervises and certifies, and 5,621 were in state-funded courses. The same paper records a fall to 36,522 participants in 2020, which the ministry attributed to the absence of a state budget and the pandemic; the 2022 figure shows recovery, so the record is not filed as a reversal. About 61,000 a year is a small share of Israel's adult population, and the count says nothing about completion or employment outcomes. The started year is not given in either source: 2003 is the year a 2006 European Training Foundation report gives for the Division's predecessor bureau moving to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour, and the bureau ran adult courses before that.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
-9.6 over 10 years, from 51.7 in 2016 to 42.1 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
-18.6 over 20 years, from 60.7 in 2006 to 42.1 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
-37.8 over 30 years, from 96.8 in 1996 to 59.0 on 2 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 1592per million people
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.PAT.RESD)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 5080per million people
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 626per million people
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 331373per million people
- Year
- 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- GitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv)
- History
- no data
Venture deals
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD / national VC associations
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The id keeps its first name so evidence records, links and published files still resolve. The row asked for venture capital deployed as a share of GDP, a level of financial depth of the kind private credit is (D122). A count of first rounds counts attempts started with outside risk money, which is what this capability asks about, and a large round counts once. Candidates, none wireable: the OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Financing scoreboard carried venture capital for 6 of the 16 countries the frame held on 2026-08-26, as amounts in national currency, latest year 2022, with Brazil, India, South Africa and Singapore absent (D21); national venture capital associations publish counts on their own definitions; commercial deal databases cover the world and are not inspectable (D10). Wireable on an inspectable deal count with one definition of a first round for half the frame or more. Read A1 before treating this dimension as measured.
Early-stage entrepreneurial activity
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no data% aged 18-64
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate)
- History
- no data
Note: From the GEM Adult Population Survey, entered by hand because GEM has no open API. TEA counts every new business, so necessity self-employment scores the same as a funded startup, which is why Chile and Argentina sit above the United States here. Read it as how many people are trying, not as how much value the attempts create. GEM does not run every economy every year: Singapore last took part in 2014 and the recency term marks that value down hard.
Tolerance of entrepreneurial failure
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no data% not deterred
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate)
- History
- no data
Note: Stored as 100 minus the published GEM fear of failure rate, so the direction matches the rest of the registry. GEM measures that rate among adults who already see good opportunities, not among all adults, so the denominator differs from the label. Attitudinal: bankruptcy law and time to discharge would be the observable substitute and are still worth wiring beside it.
Firms through regulatory sandboxes
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no datafirms per million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national regulators
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the number and breadth of live sandboxes, which is a policy stock: a regime can exist with nobody in it. It now counts what passes through: firms a regulator let test under relaxed rules, and firms that came out, authorised, withdrawn or failed. Regulators publish cohort lists and exit reports one by one. The evidence corpus holds 22 records against this row, most of them counts of firms admitted or exited, each on the definition and window of its own regulator, and no register assembles them on one definition (O1 triage sweep, 2026-10-01). A realistic candidate for Envisioning to build from those lists. Wireable on a register that counts admissions and completions on one definition for half the frame or more.
University spinouts
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national TTO associations
- History
- no data
Note: Reported nationally with incompatible definitions of what counts as a spinout.
Business share of R&D
capability inputretired, see notes- Raw value
- no data% of R&D
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD MSTI / RICYT
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-02. The only working source, OECD MSTI joined with RICYT for Latin America, covers 34 of the 53 countries then in the frame, but the row reads the make-up of a spending stock: who performs the R&D a country pays for. R&D spending itself is a condition since D122, and the share is high both where business research is large (Israel) and where total research is tiny and one firm dominates it (Thailand). State enterprises count as business, so China and Vietnam read their ownership model. UIS stopped publishing the series in 2023. Firms trying new things are read through patents, trademarks, designs and entrepreneurship instead. See D142.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Yozma, the venture capital catalyst
Israel put 100 million dollars of public money into ten hybrid venture funds from 1993, with foreign partners and a buy-out option, and by 2002 the country had 131 venture funds with around 10 billion dollars under management.
10,000,000,000 US dollars, capital under management by israeli venture funds, 2002. 100,000,000 US dollars, government capital that started yozma, 1993. OECD, Venture Capital Policies in Israel, STI working paper 2003/3, retrieved 2026-08-27.
How it worked: The state capitalised new private funds rather than picking companies, required each fund to bring a foreign venture firm as partner, and sold the government's stake cheaply to the private partners once a fund worked, so the subsidy was the upside, and it expired by design.
Limits: Attribution is the weak joint: the ten funds were one cause among several, alongside a million-person skilled immigration wave, military technology spillovers and a US stock market that wanted Israeli listings, and the OECD paper credits Yozma as catalyst rather than cause. The 10 billion figure is capital under management, not investment made or returns earned, and roughly 70 percent of it was foreign money. The programme was deliberately closed once private capital led, which is why the status is concluded.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 3.489% of labour force
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 8.7% of unemployed
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- ILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB)
- History
- one year
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 0.141index 0-1, lower = more diversified
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- UNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices)
- History
- one year
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 4.33% of products not exported competitively at the start
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Harvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ))
- History
- one year
Disaster preparedness and recovery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- INFORM / UNDRR
- History
- no data
Note: No source observes a country preparing for or recovering from a real shock. INFORM publishes its lack of coping capacity apart from hazard and exposure, but that dimension averages government self-assessments and governance perception indices with stocks such as roads, phones and physicians, which is the perception layer D23 retired plus conditions money buys (D122). Sendai and WHO reporting are governments grading themselves. A warning-reach survey item is a check candidate. See the disaster preparedness memo.
Institutional responsiveness
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No dataset exists. Measurable in principle from legislative and regulatory timestamps, which no one has assembled comparably.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
74.4 % aged 15+, rank 44 of 125. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating (D141). Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
29.2 per 100 people, rank 42 of 125. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D122). Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2024
3.9 % of output, rank 9 of 117. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D141). Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT)
No value for this country. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating (D150). Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
National COVID-19 vaccination campaign
Israel started COVID-19 vaccination in December 2020 through its four health funds and had fully vaccinated about 70 percent of adults by April 2021; at the end of April 2021, 55 percent of its population was vaccinated, when coverage in most OECD countries was between 11 percent and less than one percent.
70 % of adults (about), adult population fully vaccinated (two doses), 2021-04. 55 % of population, population vaccinated at the end of april 2021, 2021-04-30. OECD, Economic Surveys: Israel 2023, retrieved 2026-10-01.
How it worked: The government bought early supply with a data-sharing agreement. It then delivered the campaign through the four health funds, which used their electronic records to call people in by risk group and their employed nurses to vaccinate, and it paid the funds premiums for reaching coverage targets.
Limits: The 70 percent is an approximate figure that the OECD takes from the Bank of Israel, not an OECD count. The speed was bought in part by an early Pfizer/BioNTech supply deal paid for with weekly anonymised aggregate epidemiological data, and Israel has a young population, so the case says little about what a slower procurement position would have achieved. An OECD working paper says Israel later fell into the lower half of OECD vaccine coverage, and it puts ultra-Orthodox vaccination at about half the rate of the rest of the population. The 2023 survey also records that excess mortality was around the OECD average, so fast vaccination did not by itself produce better mortality outcomes. This is response to one shock, not evidence of preparation before it. Both figures are in PDFs.
Bank of Israel COVID-19 small-business credit programme
After the Monetary Committee decided on 6 April 2020 to lend banks three-year fixed-rate money for credit to small and micro businesses, the Bank of Israel had NIS 1.2 billion outstanding under the programme by 30 April 2020 and NIS 28.1 billion by 31 March 2021.
28.1 NIS billion, long-term loans to the banking system for credit to small businesses, balance outstanding, 2021-03-31. 1.2 NIS billion, same programme, balance outstanding 24 days after the decision, 2020-04-30. Bank of Israel, monthly report on programmes operated in the financial markets in view of the coronavirus crisis (press release, 7 April 2021), retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Monetary Committee created a dedicated funding line for banks, conditioned on lending to small and micro businesses, within weeks of the first lockdown, and reopened and extended it with cheaper terms as the crisis continued.
Limits: The site answers scripted requests with a Radware bot-verification page; the table was read in a normal browser at the same URL, so a reviewer needs a browser to check it. The figures are the Bank reporting on its own programme. They are balances of central-bank loans to banks, not credit that reached firms and not a count of businesses: how much of the money became new small-business lending, rather than refinancing, is not shown. The programme was not continuous: the footnote says it ran first until the end of May 2020 and was renewed in August, and the balance sits at NIS 4.6 billion from May to July. Part of the March 2021 balance comes from a second pillar of four-year loans at minus 0.1 percent decided on 22 October 2020. The cited page's last row is 31 March 2021; the status rests on a later report in the same series (7 July 2021, boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/monthly-report-on-programs-the-bank-of-israel-is-operating-in-the-financial-markets-in-view-of-the-coronavirus-crisis-12/), which records a Monetary Committee decision of 5 July 2021 to end the programme on 1 October 2021 or once NIS 40 billion had been extended, and a balance of NIS 37.2 billion on 30 June 2021. The same table shows the Bank's other rapid moves (repo from 15 March, dollar-shekel swaps from 18 March, government bond purchases from 23 March 2020, NIS 8.5 billion outstanding by 31 March), which are monetary operations rather than programme changes and are not the claim. The State Comptroller's 2021 COVID-19 special report found that financial regulators prepared rapidly but that timeframes for handling loan requests were not set, which concerns the separate state-guaranteed loan funds.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
+7.2 over 10 years, from 28.4 in 2016 to 35.6 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 11.242% of GDP
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 37.234% of manufactured exports
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS)
- History
Logistics infrastructure quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.INFR.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. An LPI sub-index, so the same freight-forwarder survey as logistics performance and the same problem. Electricity connection speed stays as the observable infrastructure measure in this dimension. See D23.
direct capability measureobserved
- Raw value
- 63.478score 0-100
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.ELC.TIME.DFRN)
- History
downstream outcomeobserved
- Raw value
- 0.548index
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD)
- History
Large project delivery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 2 records- Raw value
- no data% overrun
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: The single best measure of execution capability and there is no comparable international dataset. Assembling one is a defensible Envisioning project. Building mixes industrial output with state delivery capacity, and this indicator carries the delivery side: the other six indicators cannot see a national programme that was delivered. Documented deliveries are recorded in data/evidence and never scored, see D20.
Firm scale-up rate
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of firms
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD DynEmp
- History
- no data
Note: OECD business dynamics work covers members irregularly. Nothing comparable for India, Brazil or South Africa.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
104,695 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 20 of 123. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context (D122).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Israel's government approved the Red Line in December 2010 at an estimated NIS 10.7 billion, and NTA, the state-owned company delivering it, began the main construction works in 2015. By October 2021 the cost estimate had reached NIS 18.71 billion, about 75% above the original, and the completion date had been postponed six times, by about five years in total. The 24 km line opened in August 2023, and in December 2025 the State Comptroller put its construction cost at NIS 18.8 billion.
75 % overrun, increase in the red line cost estimate over the december 2010 government estimate of nis 10.7 billion, 2021-10. 5 years, cumulative postponement of the red line completion date across six postponements, 2021-10. State Comptroller of Israel, The Progress of the Light Rail Project in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area, November 2022, retrieved 2026-10-01.
How it worked: The government set the budget and target date by resolution in 2010 and handed delivery to NTA, a state-owned company. NTA revised the cost estimate at least eight times and moved the opening date six times, most of them before main construction began, and still brought the line into service in 2023.
Limits: The 75% overrun is the audit's figure for the October 2021 estimate and includes indexation. Net of price-index linkage and a VAT cut, the audit puts the real increase at about NIS 7.46 billion, or 69.7%. The audit was finished before the line opened, so the overrun is measured on an estimate rather than a final account. The December 2025 audit's NIS 18.8 billion construction cost comes from a security audit and is not a reconciled final cost. The five-year delay counts slippage to the then target of 2022. The line actually opened in August 2023, about six years after the original 2017 date, so the figure understates the final schedule slip. Most postponements came before main construction began in 2015, so a hostile reader would call them planning slippage rather than construction delay. The project is national in its funding, its government resolution and its state-owned delivery company, but it serves one metropolitan area, and one line is a single case and not a national delivery record. The audit's per-kilometre comparisons with other cities are not used here. Ridership is not established: the 300,000 passengers a day in the 2025 audit is NTA's forecast. The audit also found the framework agreement between NTA and the finance and transport ministries still unsigned more than 20 years after the company was founded.
Israel Railways electrification and the Jerusalem express line, and their delays
Israel Railways began electrifying the national network in 2000 and opened the electric express line to Jerusalem in September 2018, but by May 2020 only about 64 of 480 planned route kilometres were electrified, and the forecast completion date had moved from 2019, set in 2013, to the end of 2025, on an estimated cost of ILS 12.1 billion.
2025 year, forecast completion year of the electrification project, as updated in march 2020, 2020-03. 2019 year, forecast completion year defined in 2013, 2013. State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, Annual Report 71A (2020), Execution of the Railway Lines Electrification Project and Opening of the Express Line to Jerusalem, follow-up audit, retrieved 2026-10-01.
How it worked: A state-owned rail company ran a network-wide electrification programme alongside a new flagship line and opened the line first, diverting cars from other lines to do it. Completion dates were reset repeatedly while the State Comptroller ran follow-up audits.
Limits: This is a delivery still in progress, not a finished one. At the audit date it had reached 13.3 percent of the planned route, and no official source that opened on the retrieval date gave a later figure, so whether the 2025 date held is not shown. The audit gives an estimated cost (ILS 12.1 billion) but no original budget, so the cost overrun cannot be computed from this source; the schedule slip from 2019 to 2025 is the only performance figure. The completion dates are Israel Railways' own forecasts, which the Comptroller reports. The audit also found that the Jerusalem line opened without its own rolling stock and ran with passengers in test mode for about a year, cancelling 2.6 percent of trips against 0.5 percent on other lines. A hostile reviewer would say the record shows a slipping project, not a delivered one.