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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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8 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration.

Australiasince 1991still operatingbears on University-industry collaboration

Cooperative Research Centres programme

Australia's Department of Industry reported that its Cooperative Research Centres portfolio facilitated 304 businesses establishing research-focused collaborations in 2023โ€“24, across 114 CRC and 190 CRC Projects partners, above the year's target of 248.

304 businesses, businesses establishing research-focused collaborations, 2024. 248 businesses, portfolio target, 2024. Australian Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Annual Report 2023โ€“24, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Australia funds industry-led research centres for three to ten years and shorter CRC Projects for up to three years, giving firms and researchers a shared programme, matching resources and a governance structure for applied work. The long and short formats let a mature collaboration and a focused translation project coexist.

Preconditions

  • Universities, research organisations and firms able to define a problem together and commit staff or cash
  • A competitive public grant process with independent assessment and enough duration for trust and technical work to accumulate
  • A centre-level governance and intellectual-property framework that can turn joint research into adoption or further investment

Where else it has been used: Universityโ€“industry centres travel when public grants buy durable shared capacity and firms own a consequential problem; short networking schemes without governance, matching effort or a path to adoption produce thinner ties.

Limits: The partner count measures collaborations facilitated through grant agreements, not completed research, commercialisation, additionality or university-only links. It is an administrative portfolio measure whose reporting and retrospective calculations can change, and partners include research organisations and community bodies alongside universities and businesses.

Australiasince 2018still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

New Payments Platform, the shared fast-payment rail

The New Payments Platform, whose payments the Reserve Bank of Australia settles one by one in central bank money through the Fast Settlement Service of its RITS system, settled a daily average of 3.6 million transactions in 2024/25, almost 19 percent more than in 2023/24, worth A$4.7 billion a day.

3,600,000 transactions per day, fast settlement service (npp) daily average transactions settled, 2024/25. 4,700,000,000 Australian dollars per day, fast settlement service (npp) daily average value settled, 2024/25. Reserve Bank of Australia, Annual Report 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Reserve Bank set real-time payment objectives after its 2012 strategic review and built the Fast Settlement Service, while banks jointly financed, built and governed the switching platform and overlay services, so that every participating account could send and receive in seconds around the clock.

Preconditions

  • A central bank willing to set outcome targets and build settlement infrastructure but leave the customer-facing rail to industry.
  • A concentrated banking sector able to agree a shared build and its governance.
  • Exchange settlement accounts for participants so each payment can settle individually in central bank money.

Where else it has been used: Fast-payment rails built by industry under central bank objectives are common; Australia's case shows the slow part is migrating legacy bulk payments, not launching the rail.

Limits: The figure counts settlements in the Reserve Bank's Fast Settlement Service, which exists to settle NPP payments; it is a volume measure, not evidence of reach, outage resilience, fraud losses or how much activity is additional to existing direct entry. The annual report shows the Reserve Bank's half of the arrangement (settlement in RITS, fifteen institutions settling NPP payments directly) but does not say who built, owns or governs the NPP itself; it names NPP Australia Limited only in its glossary, so the industry side of the partnership rests on sources outside this document. The NPP is still the smaller rail for account-to-account payments: the report's Graph 2.3.4 shows bulk electronic clearing (BECS) still carrying more daily volume, and the industry's proposed decommissioning of BECS, which the report discusses, is not yet done. The 2018 launch year is not stated in the annual report. The number is on page 99 of the PDF. The rba.gov.au host refuses scripted requests (Akamai 'Access Denied'); the PDF was read through WebFetch at the same URL. The Reserve Bank reports on a service it owns and operates.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Australiasince 2008dismantledbears on Adult learning participation

VET FEE-HELP, and its abolition

Australia's VET FEE-HELP loan scheme, introduced in 2008 to fund higher-level vocational courses, grew from fewer than 3,500 loans in 2009 to 196,108 in 2015, and was abolished and replaced from 1 January 2017 by VET Student Loans, which reached 53,892 students in 2019.

196,108 loans, vet fee-help loans at the scheme's peak, 2015. 53,892 students, vet student loans recipients under the replacement scheme, 2019. Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, The Higher Education Loan Program (HELP) and related loans: a chronology (Carol Ey, 23 March 2021), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The Commonwealth extended income-contingent loans to vocational diplomas and opened them to private providers with light entry controls; providers and brokers enrolled students at scale, Parliament then legislated the scheme's closure and replaced it with capped loans for approved courses and providers.

Preconditions

  • An income-contingent loan system administered through the tax office, so the state could finance study with no upfront fee
  • A contestable training market in which private providers drew public money per enrolment
  • Regulators (ASQA, ACCC, the department) whose powers and data lagged the growth of enrolments by several years

Where else it has been used: The same demand-driven, provider-paid design produced comparable mis-selling in the United States for-profit college sector and in England's Individual Learning Accounts, which were closed in 2001; each time the fix was to cap the loans and vet the providers, which shrinks reach along with fraud.

Limits: Loans are not learners: the count is loans issued, not adults who studied or completed, and the Library's own note says the 2017 onward figures count students while earlier years count loans or places, so the peak and the successor figure are not on the same unit and the fall cannot be read as a precise percentage. Much of the 2013 to 2015 growth was not learning at all: the Senate Education and Employment Committee's report on the replacement bills (https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Education_and_Employment/VETStudentLoans/Report/c02) records loan value rising from $26 million in 2009 to $2.9 billion in 2015 alongside 'unscrupulous behaviour by a small number of providers and poor student outcomes', so the peak overstates real adult participation and the reversal is partly a correction of fraud rather than a loss of capability. The loans cover only diploma-level and above vocational courses, a small slice of adult learning; the record says nothing about the national share of adults in training, which the ABS measures separately. The Auditor-General's audit of the scheme (ANAO report 31 of 2016-17) is the primary account of the failure, but the ANAO site did not open from here, so its figures are not used. The source is a secondary compilation by the Parliamentary Library from departmental annual reports, and 2016 figures are missing from it.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Australiasince 2020still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

ASIC enhanced regulatory sandbox

Australia's government introduced the enhanced regulatory sandbox on 1 September 2020, letting firms test financial services and credit activities for up to 24 months without a licence, and ASIC's register lists 23 users, four current and 19 past.

23 entities, entities listed as current or past users of the enhanced regulatory sandbox exemption, 2026-10-02. Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced regulatory sandbox (ERS), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Parliament and Treasury put a licensing exemption into regulation, so an eligible firm can notify ASIC and start testing within set client and exposure limits, rather than applying for case-by-case relief.

Preconditions

  • A statutory power to exempt from the licensing regime by regulation
  • Hard caps on clients and exposure so a notification regime stays safe without vetting
  • A public register so customers can check that a firm is a sandbox user

Where else it has been used: Australia moved from a regulator-run sandbox to a legislated notification exemption; low take-up suggests automatic entry does not by itself create demand.

Limits: The 23 is ours, counted from the two expandable lists ('Current users' 4, 'Past users' 19) on the day of retrieval; the page carries no headline total or reference date, and the lists change as exemptions start and lapse. Users notify ASIC rather than being selected, so the count measures take-up of an exemption, not supervised trials, and the page does not say how many past users went on to obtain a licence or simply stopped. Twenty-three users in six years is small for Australia's financial sector. ASIC's earlier sandbox, which the ERS superseded, is not counted.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Australiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

JobKeeper Payment

Australia's Treasury designed, Parliament legislated and the tax office began paying the JobKeeper wage subsidy just over five weeks after its announcement on 30 March 2020, and in its first phase it supported on average around 925,000 businesses and 3.6 million individuals each month before ending on 28 March 2021.

5 weeks (just over), time from announcement to first jobkeeper payments, 2020-05. 3,600,000 individuals, individuals supported each month, first phase average, 2020-09. Australian Government, The Treasury, Insights from the first six months of JobKeeper, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Treasury designed a flat-rate wage subsidy and the Australian Taxation Office paid it through the single-touch payroll and business registration systems it already ran, so Parliament could legislate eligibility and money reached employers within about five weeks.

Preconditions

  • A tax office already holding near-real-time payroll and turnover data for most employers
  • A Parliament able to pass emergency legislation within days with bipartisan support
  • Fiscal room to accept large deadweight in exchange for speed

Where else it has been used: Germany's Kurzarbeit, the UK furlough scheme and New Zealand's wage subsidy did the same job in the same months; the schemes that already existed in law, like Kurzarbeit, paid sooner, and the new ones depended on how much payroll data the tax authority already held.

Limits: Treasury is evaluating its own programme, and the five-week figure is a statement in prose, not a timestamped series. Speed was bought by routing payment through existing tax-office systems and a flat $1,500 fortnightly rate, which shipped known errors: the same report finds around $8.9 billion went to businesses whose turnover rose, and the 2023 Independent Evaluation of the JobKeeper Payment (https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-10/p2023-455038.pdf) records that around 2 million short-term casual and temporary-visa employees were excluded, that the first-phase cost estimate of $130 billion, which a reporting error had inflated, was revised down to $70 billion, and that JobKeeper was announced 'later than job retention schemes in comparable countries'. The total cost was $88.8 billion. One emergency response shows the state can change programmes quickly under extreme pressure; it does not show routine responsiveness of rules in normal times, which is what the indicator's construct mostly asks about. Coverage counts are monthly averages from tax-office payment data, not unique people.

Australiasince 2018still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements

The Australian Government paid $3.1 billion to state and territory governments through the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements between 1 June 2018 and 30 June 2022, and the arrangements were activated for 49 disaster events that occurred in 2021โ€“22.

3.1 AUD billion, drfa payments to states and territories, 2018-06-01 to 2022-06-30. 49 events, disaster events that occurred in 2021โ€“22 with drfa activations, 2021โ€“22. Australian National Audit Office, Auditor-General Report No. 23 of 2022โ€“23, Administration of the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Commonwealth pre-commits by ministerial determination to reimburse a set share of state and territory relief and recovery spending in defined categories once an event is activated, so states can spend first and claim afterwards under an agreed assurance process.

Preconditions

  • A federal fiscal capacity large enough to absorb a bad disaster year
  • State governments able to design, run and acquit relief programmes
  • An assurance process both levels of government accept, which the audit found still lacked performance monitoring

Where else it has been used: Canada's DFAA is the older version of the same cost-sharing move. Both reached modernisation reviews that pushed toward funding mitigation, because a reimbursement scheme alone pays to rebuild what the next event can destroy again.

Limits: Dollars paid measure the federal share of state recovery spending, which tracks how much damage the hazards did as much as how well recovery was run: a bad flood year raises the number. The audit is an independent assurance review of administration, not an evaluation of recovery outcomes, and it found the agencies did not monitor or report DRFA performance, so no figure on speed or quality of recovery exists to set beside the spending. The 49 events is the ANAO's own headline count of disasters that occurred in 2021โ€“22 and activated the arrangements; it counts activations, not their size or how well each was handled. Delivery is by the states; the Commonwealth reimburses. The ANAO site sits behind a Cloudflare check that blocks scripted requests, and its headline counter renders as 0 without JavaScript; the numbers were read in a browser at the same URL, and 49 also appears in paragraph 2.16. DRFA replaced the earlier Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements in 2018, so the start year is that of the current determination, not of federal recovery cost sharing.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Australiasince 2018operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Inland Rail, and its consolidation at Parkes

The Australian Government began building Inland Rail, a Melbourne to Brisbane freight railway, in 2018 through the Australian Rail Track Corporation, which passed delivery to its subsidiary Inland Rail Pty Ltd in May 2024; a verification report delivered to the infrastructure department in November 2025 reported the company's estimate at completion of A$45.6 billion (P90, Target scenario, estimate current as of December 2024) with completions finalised in May 2036, and the 2026-27 Budget then consolidated the project at Parkes and returned $4.4 billion in equity.

45.6 billion Australian dollars, estimate at completion of the full inland rail programme, target scenario (p90), 2024-12. 2,036 year (May 2036), month in which completions are finalised under the target scenario schedule, 2024-12. ACIL Allen for the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, Verification and assurance of Inland Rail scope, design, delivery and cost, final report of 20 November 2025, tabled at Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Budget Estimates 2026-27, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Commonwealth committed to a 1,700 km freight line through a government-owned track company and started construction before the route ends, approvals and designs were settled; when successive reviews put the cost far above the budget, it moved delivery into a dedicated subsidiary, commissioned independent cost assurance and then cut the line back to the sections already under way.

Preconditions

  • A government-owned rail company able to take Commonwealth equity and build without a separate procurement for each section
  • Construction started on sections whose environmental approvals and designs were immature
  • A budget process willing to recognise a reversal and return equity rather than keep funding the full scope

Where else it has been used: The pattern matches gbr-hs2 in this corpus: a national line cut back to its first sections after its cost estimate tripled, with the corridor preserved for later.

Limits: Both numbers are forecasts, not outturn: they are Inland Rail Pty Ltd's own December 2024 estimate as reviewed by a consultancy (ACIL Allen) for the department, and the report itself says IRPL's core assumptions have not been met and the cost is likely to increase with further delay. The faster Stretch scenario is A$44.7 billion with completions by June 2035. Both figures are in Table 1.1 on PDF page 12; the 2018 start and the 2015 business case are on page 8. The truncation is not in this report: it comes from Budget Paper No. 2, 2026-27 (https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2026-27.pdf, PDF page 139, printed page 124), which says the government will 'consolidate the Inland Rail project at Parkes and preserve the remaining rail corridor and intermodal sites for future investment, with $4.4 billion in equity to be returned to the Budget'. The 2015 business case cost and the estimates in the 2023 Schott review are published on infrastructure.gov.au, which did not answer from the machine used for this record, so no original baseline is given here and the overrun against it is not stated. The erosion is to planned scope: Beveridge to Parkes is still being built and nothing in service was lost, and no section of the full line has opened to double-stacked through traffic.

Shared Purpose

1 delivery linked to Civic participation.

Australiasince 1924still operatingbears on Civic participation

Compulsory voting

Australia has required citizens to vote since 1924 and turnout at the 2025 federal election was 90.7 percent of enrolled voters, a level no large voluntary-voting democracy reaches.

90.7 % of enrolled voters, house of representatives turnout, 2025 federal election, 2025. Australian Electoral Commission, participation in the 2025 federal election, retrieved 2026-08-27.

The move, and what it needed

Parliament made voting a legal duty with a token fine, paired it with automatic-style enrolment, Saturday voting and easy postal and early options, so the state removed every excuse at the same time as it imposed the duty.

Preconditions

  • Cross-party agreement to keep the duty, since either side could repeal it
  • An electoral commission trusted to run painless voting
  • A fine large enough to state the norm and small enough not to embitter

Where else it has been used: Around twenty countries mandate voting and fewer enforce it; Belgium and Luxembourg are the closest working siblings. Where compulsion was dropped, as in Chile in 2012, turnout fell by tens of points within two elections.

Limits: Turnout under compulsion measures compliance, not civic desire, which is exactly the objection to filing it under civic participation; the record is here because the indicator's construct is participation behaviour, and ninety percent of a country voting for a century is behaviour, whatever its cause. The denominator is enrolled voters, and enrolment itself is near-complete only because it is also compulsory. The fine is small and enforcement light, so the mechanism is closer to a maintained norm than to coercion.