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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 742 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Burkina Fasosince 2002operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Adult literacy centres financed through FONAENF, and their erosion

Burkina Faso's adult literacy and non-formal education centres, financed through FONAENF and run by contracted operators under the faire-faire strategy, enrolled 178,021 adult learners in 2015. Enrolment fell to 113,721 in 2018 and 86,405 in 2021, when 1,885 adult centres opened against 3,094 in 2018.

86,405 learners, young people and adults enrolled in non-formal education centres (apprenants jeunes et adultes), 2021. 178,021 learners, adults enrolled in non-formal education centres at the 2015 high point of the 2015 to 2019 series (enf des adultes), 2015. Ministรจre de l'Education nationale, de l'Alphabรฉtisation et de la Promotion des Langues nationales (MENAPLN), Burkina Faso, Rapport de suivi annuel 2021 du Programme de dรฉveloppement stratรฉgique de l'รฉducation de base (PDSEB), version provisoire, May 2022, from DGESS annuaires statistiques de l'ENF, hosted by the Global Partnership for Education, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The ministry created FONAENF in 2002 to pool state and donor money and pay NGOs and associations to run literacy centres under the faire-faire strategy, so the state finances and supervises while operators deliver. Because each year's allocation decides how many centres open, cuts in the budget line and the spread of insecurity reduced the number of centres and learners almost immediately.

Preconditions

  • A pooled fund with donor co-financing and a pipeline of contracted local operators in every region
  • An annual budget allocation large enough to open thousands of centres each campaign
  • Enough security in rural areas for centres to open and learners to attend, which the country lost after 2016

Limits: The figures are counts of people enrolled in literacy and non-formal education centres, not the share of adults that the gap asks for. The ministry publishes no participation rate, and on any plausible adult population the 2021 count is around one percent of adults or less, so even the 2015 level was a small programme against the construct. The 2021 figure comes from a ministry monitoring report marked 'version provisoire' (provisional), and the copy used is hosted by the Global Partnership for Education, a funder of the plan. The 2015 figure comes from a different ministry document, the SNDENF 2021-2025, and the copy used is on a third-party site (mojaafrica.net), not a government domain. The two documents do not fully agree: the SNDENF prints 2016 adult enrolment as 86,001 in one table and 88,770 in the next. 2015 is the high point of the published 2015 to 2019 series and may not be the programme's true peak, and the series is volatile: it dropped by half in 2016 and partly recovered in 2018, which shows enrolment following each year's funding, not a steady decline. The 2021 figure is up from a 2020 low of 81,350, and the ministry credits the rise to a slight increase in budget programme 060. The 2021 level matches 2016 (86,001), so the decline is from the 2015 and 2018 highs, not a steady fall. The centre counts in Tableau V-4 are for 'jeunes et adultes' centres. 'Jeunes et adultes' covers learners aged 15 and over, and the adolescent centres are counted separately and excluded here. The counts are compiled from forms filled in by the operators the fund pays, so the people delivering the programme are reporting their own enrolment. The ministry attributes the fall to reduced budget allocations, and its own reports say the security crisis since 2016 closed many education facilities, but the series cannot separate the two causes. The record has no figure after 2021, so it cannot say whether the decline continued after the 2022 coups.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Institutional responsiveness.

Burkina Fasosince 2020still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Burkin-Naong-Sa Ya adaptive cash transfers for COVID-19 and the lean season

Burkina Faso's national safety net programme (Burkin-Naong-Sa Ya) paid three rounds of FCFA 20,000 adaptive cash transfers to over 42,800 people between May and September 2020 in response to COVID-19, including 21,160 vendors from temporarily closed markets, and later raised the lean-season transfer from FCFA 20,000 to FCFA 45,000 in 2022 to align it with the food security response, paying three extra monthly payments to over 763,700 people in IPC3+ areas over the 2021 to 2023 lean seasons.

42,800 people (over), people who received three rounds of covid-19 adaptive cash transfers, may to september 2020, 2020-09. 45,000 FCFA per household, lean-season adaptive transfer per household after the 2022 increase (from fcfa 20,000), 2022. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Burkina Faso Social Safety Net Project (P124015), January 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The safety net unit kept an 'adaptive' transfer window inside its regular programme and pointed it at whichever shock arrived: market closures and urban poverty in 2020, then IPC3+ lean-season food crises from 2021, raising the transfer amount when food prices rose.

Preconditions

  • A regular cash transfer programme with payment agencies and beneficiary lists already in place
  • A food security classification (Cadre Harmonise) to decide where adaptive payments go
  • Donor financing that allowed components to be reoriented without new approvals for each shock

Where else it has been used: The same adaptive safety net design runs through the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Programme countries (Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Mauritania); compare mli-pgtmu, where the government funded the response itself.

Limits: The World Bank financed the programme and reports on its own project; paragraphs 34 and 35 are on page 10 of the plain-text ICR. The COVID-19 response was small: over 42,800 people, against a regular programme the ICR targeted at 948,100 people and says reached close to 1.05 million, and the ICR mixes units (21,000 of the beneficiaries are described as households in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso). The ICR gives the payment window, May to September 2020, not the date of the first payment, so the most that can be read is that cash started within about two months of the first COVID-19 measures. The 2020 audit was qualified, finding FCFA 27 million of overpayments to COVID-19 beneficiaries by payment agencies and discrepancies in payment lists (page 24). The ICR says the 2022 increase was made to align with the food security response under the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program, not as an indexation rule, and it converts both the 2022 and 2023 amounts to about US$85, so the change kept pace with prices rather than raising real support. All the money is IDA and trust fund money, not the national budget, and the ICR records that the two military coups of 2022 (January and September) led to pauses in disbursements, so the responsiveness shown in 2020 did not hold steady through the period.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Burkina Fasosince 2001delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Ouagadougou Water Supply Project (Ziga)

Between 2001 and 2007, ONEA, Burkina Faso's national water utility, delivered the Ziga project through a dedicated project unit. The project built the Ziga earth dam and its transmission main to Ouagadougou, plus 56,000 subsidised connections and 400 standpipes. Eleven external financiers and the government paid US$269.37 million, 131 percent of the US$205.88 million estimated at appraisal, and the project closed on its original date of 31 December 2007.

269.37 million US$, actual total financing of the ouagadougou water supply project, all financiers, 2007-12-31. 205.88 million US$, total financing estimated at appraisal, 2000-07. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Burkina Faso Ouagadougou Water Supply Project (P000306), ICR705, April 2008, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government gave ONEA a mandate by decree in 1996 to set up a dedicated Ziga project unit. That unit ran one investment programme for eleven external financiers and the government, with joint annual supervision meetings, while the government adjusted tariffs and paid its own water bills so the utility stayed solvent.

Preconditions

  • A national utility already financially sound enough to borrow and to recover costs through tariffs
  • Donor coordination under one project unit and one supervision committee rather than parallel projects
  • Political backing for tariff adjustments and for the state paying its own utility bills

Where else it has been used: The ONEA model, a public utility under a performance contract with its own project units, became a West African reference case for urban water reform. Later Burkina Faso programmes extended it to sanitation and secondary towns.

Limits: The 31 percent overrun is in US dollars, and much of it is exchange rate. The ICR's own note puts the dollar at 640 CFA francs at appraisal and 506 at closing. Converted at those two rates, the appraisal total of about CFAF 132 to 134 billion and the actual total of about CFAF 136 billion are within a few percent of each other. Spending happened between the two dates, so neither conversion is exact, and the ICR prints both 640 and 650 for the appraisal rate. The real cost overrun in local currency is therefore unknown and probably small, and the dollar figure overstates it. The schedule figure only covers the 2001 to 2007 financing window. The project was conceived in the early 1990s and launched in 1994, so on-time closing says nothing about the decade of preparation before it. The ICR is the World Bank grading an operation it financed and supervised, and it relies on the borrower's reporting. The people-served figure is an estimate the ICR computes at 10 people per connection and 120 per standpipe, not a count. Donors provided almost all of the money, and the borrower's share was about US$8.8 million, so the record shows execution by ONEA, not national financing. The data are from 2007 and say nothing about Burkina Faso's delivery of large projects since then.