Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Belarus's Ministry of Transport and Communications widened 154 km of the M6 Minsk to Grodno highway to dual carriageway under a loan approved in December 2014, against 86 km planned, after civil works for the planned sections were awarded for less than half the estimate; the corridor component cost US$242.15 million against US$259.28 million at entry, and the loan closed in June 2022 against an original June 2020.
The transport ministry tendered the corridor in lots to joint ventures of local state-owned contractors, and when bids came in far below estimate it used the savings to add 67 km of the same corridor without new financing.
Preconditions
Complete designs before effectiveness, so works could start as soon as procurement closed
A domestic road construction industry with capacity and equipment
A cost estimate high enough that competitive bids produced savings rather than claims
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan, with costs reported by the borrower. The component costs are in Table 2 (printed page 9), the 154 against 86 km in para. 32 (page 14), the savings in para. 52 (page 21) and the dates on the datasheet (page 2). The low cost was helped by a government decision to exempt the works from VAT, so part of the saving is a transfer within the state, not efficiency. The actual cost excludes design, supervision and land acquisition, which the government paid separately. Works were not contracted until July 2016, more than a year after effectiveness, because of a dispute over whether state-owned Belarusian contractors were eligible, and the road safety centre was incomplete at closing. The report was written in 2022, after which World Bank engagement with Belarus stopped, so later maintenance of the road is unknown.
๐ง๐พBelarussince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Belarus started building its first nuclear power plant at Ostrovets in November 2013, a two-unit WWER-1200 plant totalling 2,400 MW. Its regulator's 2019 report scheduled unit 1 for 2019 and unit 2 for 2020. Unit 1 was commissioned in 2021 and unit 2 in October 2023, three years after the 2019 schedule.
The Belarusian state chose a single foreign state vendor to build a reference design turnkey, and built up a domestic regulator and operator in parallel under a sequence of IAEA review missions, accepting slippage on the vendor's schedule.
Preconditions
A strategic partner state willing to supply design, construction and credit together
A centralised state able to hold a decade-long build through political and diplomatic opposition
A reference plant of the same design already being built abroad (Leningrad NPP-2)
Limits: This is a schedule figure only. The record carries no official budget or final cost for the plant, so cost performance is unknown. The slip is measured against a schedule that the 2019 report itself calls 'updated'. This record uses the 2019 schedule because it is the one stated in an official source. The schedule is given in years, not months, so the three-year slip for unit 2 is approximate. The 2019 schedule speaks of commissioning while the 2023 figure is the start of commercial operation, so the two milestones may not be identical. Both figures come from the Belarusian regulator reporting on its own country's flagship project. The plant was built turnkey on a Russian design, financed from the republican budget and a Russian state export credit, as the 2019 national report states. The delivery is therefore only partly attributable to Belarusian institutions: they decided, licensed, supervised, financed and now operate it. The source does not show capacity factors or outages after commissioning.