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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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6 of 742 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Cรดte d'Ivoiresince 1973still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity

Bureau National de la Prospective et de la Veille Stratรฉgique and the national prospective studies

Cรดte d'Ivoire's Ministry of Planning and Development completed its fourth national prospective study, Cรดte d'Ivoire 2040, under the technical responsibility of the Bureau National de la Prospective et de la Veille Stratรฉgique, after earlier national studies in 1973 to 1974, 1983 to 1984 and 1993 to 1995, and built eighteen thematic and three global scenarios to the 2040 horizon.

4 studies, national prospective studies completed (cรดte d'ivoire 2000, 2010, 2025 and 2040), 2017-03. 18 scenarios, thematic scenarios built in the cรดte d'ivoire 2040 study, 2017-03. Ministรจre du Plan et du Dรฉveloppement, Bureau National de la Prospective et de la Veille Stratรฉgique, Etude Nationale Prospective Cรดte d'Ivoire 2040: Rรฉsumรฉ, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The planning ministry keeps a standing foresight bureau with the rank of a directorate general that runs a national prospective study about once a decade, using an expert group drawn from universities and ministries and national and local commissions to debate the results.

Preconditions

  • A planning ministry with a mandate for long-term perspective, not only five-year plans
  • University and ministry staff available for a multi-year expert group
  • Political sponsors willing to adopt the study's vision, which the 2025 study lacked

Where else it has been used: National prospective studies of the same method ran in several West African states, including Mali, whose 1997 to 1999 Mali 2025 study its government evaluated at national prospective days in January 2014.

Limits: Both figures are in a 12-page PDF (page 5 for the four studies, page 6 for the scenarios); the date comes from the file name (final version, 13 March 2017), not from the document. The ministry reports on itself, and the figures count studies and scenarios, not influence: the same summary says the 2025 study did not lead to a plan and that the 1999, 2002 and 2010 to 2011 crises followed scenarios the government had not used. The four studies span four decades with a gap the summary attributes to structural adjustment, so continuity is episodic, and the bureau's own creation date is not given; started records the first national study. The ministry's own site (plan.gouv.ci/structure/5, read 2 October 2026) still lists the BNPVS among its attached directorates and keeps a prospective and strategic watch section, which supports the operating status, but no dated output after 2017 was read at an official source; a national prospective day in May 2024 and a sectoral foresight manual in September 2025 were seen only in press. The study claims a strategic watch mechanism was to follow; no figure for it was read.

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Cรดte d'Ivoiresince 2011still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Henri Konan Bรฉdiรฉ toll bridge

The Ivorian government let a third Abidjan lagoon crossing as a toll-bridge concession to SOCOPRIM, the project company formed in 1997, whose investors include Bouygues Travaux Publics, after a 1996 tender. It funded initial works from October 2011 after the conflict. Private equity and loans, insured by MIGA guarantees of $145 million, built the 1.5 km bridge and 6.7 km road at a cost of about $282 million, and the bridge opened on 16 December 2014.

282 US$ million, approximate construction cost of the bridge, 2014. 145 US$ million, miga guarantees covering the private investment, 2015. World Bank Group (MIGA / IFC), Public-Private Partnerships Briefs: Cรดte d'Ivoire Toll Bridge, April 2015, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government kept a 1990s concession alive through a decade of conflict and then restarted it in 2011, funding the first works itself. A political-risk guarantee from MIGA let a French contractor and development lenders put equity and debt into a toll bridge in a post-conflict country.

Preconditions

  • A concessionaire and sponsor willing to hold a dormant contract through 15 years of instability
  • Multilateral political-risk cover that lenders accept as a substitute for sovereign creditworthiness
  • Urban traffic dense enough to carry tolls, which only Abidjan offers in the country

Limits: The source is a two-page promotional brief from the World Bank Group, whose agency MIGA guaranteed the deal. It is an interested party describing its own transaction. The cost is given as approximate, with no baseline budget, so the record shows no cost or schedule performance against plan. The 100,000 vehicles a day is a forecast ('will use'), not observed traffic. No toll revenue, traffic or state guarantee and payment figures are published here, so the fiscal risk the state kept (minimum revenue guarantees, its own up-front works) is not visible. The brief is from 2015. This is one PPP. It does not show how often or at what scale Cรดte d'Ivoire delivers national objectives jointly with the private sector, which is the construct, and the 18 years from tender to opening were spent mostly in conflict, not in delivery.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Cรดte d'Ivoiresince 1996operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Centres d'alphabรฉtisation, and their erosion

Cรดte d'Ivoire's education ministry ran a national network of literacy centres. It counted 75,275 learners in 2,828 centres in 2015-16 and 53,311 learners in 2,707 centres in 2024-25, a fall of about 29 percent in learners over the decade.

53,311 learners, learners enrolled in literacy centres, all levels, 2024-2025 school year, 2024-2025. 75,275 learners, learners enrolled in literacy centres, all levels, 2015-2016 school year, the highest of the years checked, 2015-2016. Ministรจre de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabรฉtisation, Direction des Stratรฉgies, de la Planification et des Statistiques (DESPS), Statistiques scolaires de poche 2024-2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The education ministry ran adult literacy through a dedicated service and a network of centres staffed by volunteer or low-paid animateurs. That network contracted by about a quarter in the decade after 2015 while primary enrolment expanded.

Preconditions

  • A standing budget line for animateurs and materials, which a volunteer-based network lacks
  • Partner NGOs and donors whose project cycles keep centres open, so closures follow funding cycles
  • Demand from adults who can take time out of informal work, which literacy alone rarely pays for

Limits: The numbers are enrolments in literacy centres, not a participation rate. At about 53,000 learners against an adult population in the millions, the network reaches well under 1 percent of adults. So it shows little about adult learning participation at national scale. The erosion is measured between two of the ministry's pocket yearbooks. The yearbooks give 2015-16 (75,275), 2016-17 (57,299), 2017-18 (59,111), 2022-23 (55,405), 2023-24 (52,554) and 2024-25 (53,311). 2015-16 is the highest of these years, not a confirmed all-time peak. Most of the fall happened in one year, 2015-16 to 2016-17, which could be a change in coverage or method rather than in delivery. The yearbooks do not explain it. The centres include those run by NGOs, religious bodies and communities as well as the state, and the yearbook does not split them by operator. The age chart in 2024-25 shows some learners under 15. The figures are administrative counts collected through the ministry's own IEPP and DRENA offices. The publisher's domain (mena-desps.org) is the DESPS statistics site, not a gouv.ci address. The start year is when the service that runs the network was created, not when the first literacy class was held.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Cรดte d'Ivoiresince 2020still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Programme de transferts monetaires productifs (PTMP), government-funded COVID-19 expansion

In response to COVID-19, the government of Cote d'Ivoire used its own budget to enrol a fourth cohort of 100,000 households (80,000 urban, 20,000 rural) in December 2020 into the World Bank supported productive cash transfer programme, through the programme's existing targeting, enrolment and digital payment systems, taking it to 227,000 households and over 1.3 million people.

100,000 households, households enrolled in cohort 4 with government funding (table 2), 2020-12. 227,000 households, beneficiary households of the cash transfer programme, all cohorts, 2023. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Cote d'Ivoire Productive Social Safety Net Project (P143332), 25 June 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Faced with the pandemic, the government put its own money into an existing donor-built cash transfer instead of creating a new scheme, so the new cohort used the programme's community targeting, enrolment and mobile payment machinery and was enrolled within the year.

Preconditions

  • A cash transfer programme already running with digital payments before the shock
  • Budget room to fund a cohort from domestic resources
  • A delivery unit able to extend targeting from rural to urban households, which the 2019 urban pilot had prepared

Where else it has been used: The same piggybacking on a standing programme as Honduras's 2020 top-ups (hnd-cct-shock-response) and Togo's Novissi, though slower than Novissi, which built a new digital transfer within weeks.

Limits: The World Bank financed the programme, rates its own project Highly Satisfactory, and reports results jointly for its project and the government-funded cohort, so the 100,000 is the financier's account of a government action it supported technically. Table 2 and paragraphs 32 to 34 are on page 13 of 48 in the plain-text version; paragraph 85 (page 21) says the pandemic triggered the expansion with government funding. The speed is modest: the first COVID-19 measures were in March 2020 and the cohort enrolled in December 2020, about nine months later, and the ICR gives no date of first payment to the new cohort. The separate emergency transfer the government announced in April 2020 through the Fonds special de solidarite (reported in the press at about 177,000 households) is not covered by this source and is not counted here. The ICR also says the project was never formally restructured to take in the government money and that the social registry (RSU) was underdeveloped, so the expansion rode on one programme's lists rather than a national registry. Households are counted at enrolment; the source reports payment receipt only through sample surveys.

Cรดte d'Ivoiresince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

COVID-19 vaccination campaign

Cรดte d'Ivoire's health authorities reported to WHO that 13,568,372 people, 51 per 100 population, had received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose by 31 December 2023, from a first dose given on 1 March 2021, with 12,164,304 (46 per 100) completing the primary series.

13,568,372 people, people vaccinated with at least one covid-19 vaccine dose, 2023-12-31. 46 per 100 population, people who completed the primary series (last dose), 2023-12-31. World Health Organization, COVID-19 dashboard vaccination data (vaccination-data.csv), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The health ministry ran a national COVID-19 campaign through its immunisation programme and vaccination sites, and reached about half the population with a first dose within three years.

Preconditions

  • A routine immunisation programme with a cold chain reaching districts
  • Donated or COVAX doses arriving in large enough volume for a national campaign
  • Registers able to count completion of the primary series

Where else it has been used: Bolivia (bol-covid-vaccination) and Venezuela (ven-covid-vaccination) reached similar partial coverage; among this batch's West African countries only Guinea (66 per 100 first dose) reported more.

Limits: COVID-19 vaccination is a response to one shock and a judgement call for this column, which prefers a hazard-specific delivery; no hazard-specific Ivorian case with an official figure was found. The figures are Cรดte d'Ivoire's own reports to WHO (DATA_SOURCE 'REPORTING') with no independent coverage survey. First-dose reach was barely a majority (51 per 100) and fewer than half completed the primary series (46 per 100), with boosters at 12 per 100, so this is a partial delivery on the same terms as ven-covid-vaccination; it is filed because it reached about half the population nationally, which most of its West African neighbours did not. The VACCINES_USED field is empty, so the record cannot show which products were used or where the doses came from, and evidences distribution only. The per-100 rates divide by WHO's population estimate. The file was last updated for this country on 31 December 2023. The WHO dashboard address covid19.who.int/who-data/vaccination-data.csv now returns an HTML page, so the cited URL is the blob the dashboard serves, the same one bol-covid-vaccination cites.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Cรดte d'Ivoiresince 1973delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Yabayo-Gagnoa road under the Fourth Highway Project, and its cost and time overrun

Cรดte d'Ivoire's Ministry of Public Works built the 70 km Yabayo-Gagnoa road and rebuilt the bridge over the N'Zi River under the Fourth Highway Project (Credit 406-IVC, approved June 1973), completing it in September 1978 against a planned June 1976, at a cost of US$24.7 million against an appraisal estimate of US$12.3 million, an overrun of 101 percent.

24.7 million US dollars, actual total project cost (fourth highway project), 1978. 12.3 million US dollars, appraisal estimate of total project cost, 1973. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Project Performance Audit Report, Ivory Coast Second Highway Project (Loan 761-IVC), Third Highway Project (Loan 837-IVC) and Fourth Highway Project (Credit 406-IVC), Report No. 3665, 28 October 1981, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The public works ministry split a new road into separate contracts for earthworks, paving and aggregate, gave the first to an inexperienced state enterprise, and the later contracts stalled waiting for it, doubling cost and tripling the construction time.

Preconditions

  • A government push to upgrade main roads to high standards in the 1970s boom
  • State-owned construction enterprises given work without proven capacity
  • A lender that accepted the borrower's contract split against internal warnings

Limits: This is a modest project by today's standards: a 70 km road and one bridge, US$24.7 million in 1970s dollars, of which the IDA credit was US$7.5 million and the rest the government's, so it is a mid-sized public works delivery rather than a national megaproject; no larger Ivorian project with a published baseline and outturn was found. The source is the World Bank auditing its own lending. The audit attributes the overrun to the road construction and the 27-month delay mainly to the decision, accepted by the Bank, to split the works by function: a government-owned enterprise lacking managers and trained operators did the earthworks late, holding up the French-Ivorian joint venture that was to lay the base and surface. The schedule figures come from the audit's basic data sheet (June 1976 planned, September 1978 actual, a 175 percent time overrun); the text gives completion as 27 months after the project completion date. Despite the overrun, the auditors re-estimated the economic return at 24 percent against 14 percent at appraisal. The text is an OCR of a 1981 typescript.