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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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5 of 742 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Cubasince 1961delivered and closedbears on Adult learning participation

Campaña Nacional de Alfabetización

In 1961 Cuba's national literacy campaign mobilized volunteer teachers, student brigades and worker brigades to teach adults to read across the country. By 30 August 1961, 593,651 people were learning and 64,253 had already been made literate, and the government reported illiteracy reduced to 3.92 percent of the population when the campaign closed.

593,651 people, people enrolled and learning in the literacy campaign, reported at the iv national literacy meeting, 1961-08-30. 3.92 % of population, illiteracy rate reported after the campaign, share of total population, 1961. Ministerio de Educación de la República de Cuba, '¿Cómo surgieron las Brigadas de Alfabetización Patria o Muerte?', retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The revolutionary government closed secondary schools for part of 1961 and sent students, teachers and worker brigades to live with illiterate households, after a door-to-door census of illiterates run through mass organizations. It then built follow-on worker-peasant education so the new readers kept studying.

Preconditions

  • A census of who could not read, collected house by house through neighborhood and mass organizations
  • A state able to suspend schooling and mobilize about a quarter of a million volunteers under one command
  • A single primer and teacher manual that untrained volunteers could deliver

Where else it has been used: Cuba exported the method as 'Yo, sí puedo', a radio and video version used in about 30 countries; the exported form replaced the volunteer army with recorded lessons and local facilitators, because the mass mobilization did not travel.

Limits: Both numbers come from commemorative articles on Cuban ministry websites, not from a statistical release. The MINED article says it was taken from the Communist Party's website, and both rest on the campaign's own 1961 records, which nobody independently audited. The 593,651 is a mid-campaign count from August 1961, not the final number taught, and the source gives no denominator of adults. A participation share therefore cannot be computed, and the literacy standard reached was basic, a letter written at the end of the course. The 3.92 percent is a government figure against the total population of the time, while the 23.5 percent baseline the MINED article cites is from the 1953 census, eight years earlier, so the two are not a like-for-like comparison. The campaign was a one-year mobilization, not a standing system, and the follow-on adult schooling it created (Superación Obrera y Campesina) is not measured here. The case is 65 years old and says nothing about adult learning participation in Cuba today.

Adaptability

3 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Cubasince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

National COVID-19 vaccination campaign

Cuba's national COVID-19 vaccination campaign had given at least one vaccine dose to 94% of the country's population by 31 December 2021, according to the Pan American Health Organization.

94 % of population, population receiving at least one covid-19 vaccine dose, 2021-12-31. Pan American Health Organization, Health in the Americas country profile: Cuba, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Cuba treated COVID vaccination as a national public-health delivery operation, using its existing primary-care and community health network to move doses from central procurement and production into local clinics. The campaign's reach depended on routine registration and trusted local health workers rather than a stand-alone emergency site.

Preconditions

  • A nationwide primary-care network with local staff and population registers
  • Domestic or secured vaccine supply plus cold-chain and scheduling capacity
  • Public-health surveillance and communication that can identify priority groups and monitor uptake

Where else it has been used: High-coverage emergency vaccination travels when routine primary care, a population register and a dependable supply chain already exist; a campaign launch without those delivery rails cannot reach most households quickly.

Limits: The PAHO coverage figure shows reach of at least one dose, not completion of a primary series, booster uptake, protection against infection, mortality avoided, equity across provinces or the campaign's logistical cost. It is based on reported national data, and the profile does not independently audit Cuba's dose records or distinguish domestically produced vaccines from other supplies.

Cubasince 1997still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Civil Defence hurricane evacuation system

Cuba's Civil Defence system and the provincial and municipal Defence Councils it activates evacuated and protected more than 735,000 people across eastern Cuba ahead of Hurricane Melissa, which struck as a Category 3 storm on 29 October 2025, according to UN OCHA.

735,000 people (more than), people evacuated and protected before hurricane melissa's landfall, 2025-10-29. 53,000 people, people still evacuated about two weeks after landfall, 2025-11-14. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Six things to know about Hurricane Melissa's impact on Cuba, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Cuba's Civil Defence, under the armed forces ministry, activates provincial and municipal Defence Councils on a meteorological alert, and they move residents of low-lying and fragile housing to shelters or relatives' homes and secure crops and assets before landfall. The phased alert system set in law lets local authorities order evacuation without waiting for national instruction.

Preconditions

  • A trusted national meteorological service whose forecasts trigger pre-agreed alert phases
  • Local government and mass organisations that know every household and can order and organise movement block by block
  • Annual drills and a population that expects to evacuate, so compliance is routine rather than negotiated

Where else it has been used: Caribbean and Central American governments have studied the model through UNDP and regional disaster agencies; the early-warning and phased-alert parts travel, while the compulsory, block-level mobilisation depends on Cuba's political organisation.

Limits: The 735,000 figure is the Cuban authorities' count relayed by OCHA, not independently verified, and it counts people moved, not lives saved: no official source located today states the death toll avoided, and the claim does not assert one.The system is military-led and rests on compulsory mobilisation through a one-party state's local structures, which may not transfer. Preparation is the strong half; recovery is weak: two weeks after landfall 53,000 people remained evacuated, nearly 150,000 homes were affected and nearly 60 per cent of Santiago de Cuba province had no electricity. The started year is the decree that set the current system of measures; the Civil Defence itself dates from the 1960s, which no official page opened today states with a year. The page is a UN news story, not a dataset, and a single event is one observation.

Cubasince 2021operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

Tarea Ordenamiento's single exchange rate, and its fragmentation

On 1 January 2021 Cuba's government replaced its dual-currency system with a single exchange rate of 24 pesos per dollar for the whole economy. By 1 October 2026 the Central Bank of Cuba published three official dollar rates, of 24, 120 and 689 pesos.

689 CUP per USD, central bank of cuba floating-segment (segment iii) usd rate, 2026-10-01. 24 CUP per USD, single exchange rate set at monetary unification, 2021-01-01. Banco Central de Cuba, exchange-rate API (tasas de cambio activas), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The Council of State unified the currency by decree on a fixed date at a fixed rate. When reserves and supply did not support 24 pesos per dollar, the Central Bank layered new official segments, a 120 rate for individuals and then a daily floating rate for exporters, on top of the old rate rather than moving it.

Preconditions

  • Hard-currency reserves able to defend a fixed rate, which Cuba lacked
  • A state wholesale sector whose prices and contracts were written at 24 and would be repriced by any move
  • A tolerated informal currency market that kept setting the price the official rate ignored

Where else it has been used: Venezuela and Argentina have run the same layered-rate sequence after a unification; in each, the new segments were added as exceptions before the old rate was abandoned.

Limits: The API fields are named tasaOficial, tasaPublica and tasaEspecial. We map them to Segments I, II and III because the bank's rate page shows the same 689.00 figure under its three-segment tabs. The API does not state that mapping, so it is our reading. The API history starts in December 2025, at 410 for the floating segment, so the official series does not document when the single rate first split. A 120-peso rate for individuals existed by 2025, but this record cannot date it from an official source. The unification's other half, withdrawing the convertible peso (CUC), stands and is not counted as lost. A hostile reviewer would say the record shows a monetary outcome, not the speed of rule-making. The case for filing it here is that the state held a fixed rate while the informal market moved away from it, then added segments instead of adjusting the one rate. The record does not show the informal rate, inflation or shortages. The Gaceta's website lists Decreto-Ley 17/2020 as 'Derogada' without saying what replaced it. The MEP page reprints a state-media article and sometimes fails to load.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Cubasince 2019operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Programa Nacional de la Vivienda, and its collapse

Cuba's national housing programme, run by the Ministry of Construction under the housing policy presented in 2018 to close a deficit of 929,695 homes in ten years, completed 20,232 homes in 2022 and 5,493 in 2025, of which the state built 1,791.

5,493 homes, homes completed in the year, state and self-build, 2025. 20,232 homes, homes completed in 2022, 2022. Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI), Construcción en Cuba. Indicadores seleccionados, enero-diciembre 2025, tables 5 and 6 (source SIEC, Ministerio de la Construcción), archived copy, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Construction sets an annual national housing plan, builds part of it through state enterprises and counts the rest through subsidised self-build by households, with municipal governments responsible for local materials.

Preconditions

  • A domestic supply of cement, steel and blocks that the state controls and can allocate
  • Budget room for state construction and household subsidies
  • Municipal materials production able to supply self-builders when national supply fails

Limits: The count is of homes finished, not of the housing deficit, quality, cost or who received them. Two thirds of the 2025 total (3,702 of 5,493) is self-build by households ('población', 'esfuerzo propio'), which the programme subsidises and counts toward its plan but does not build, and the state-built part fell from 2,756 in 2024 to 1,791. The 2022 figure is from the 2024 edition of the same ONEI publication (https://web.archive.org/web/20260621201114/https://www.onei.gob.cu/sites/default/files/publicaciones/2025-05/construccion-en-cuba-indicadores-seleccionados-2024_0.pdf, table 5), which gives 32,874 for 2020, 18,645 for 2021, 20,232 for 2022, 16,065 for 2023 and 7,427 for 2024. In the 2025 edition's table 5, headed 2021 to 2025, the province rows sum to 18,645, 20,232, 16,065, 7,427 and 5,493, but the national total row is shifted one year back in its first three columns (32,874, 18,645, 20,232) and drops 16,065, so the national row is wrong there and the provinces are right; Granma (27 February 2024) independently reports 16,065 homes for 2023, 65 percent of the plan, from the ministry's annual review. 2022 is not the peak: 2020 was higher, and the series before 2020 is not in these editions. The 2018 policy and the 929,695 deficit are from Cubadebate's report of the policy's presentation (21 November 2018), state media rather than a statistical release, and the started year is the first full year under that policy. The collapse coincides with the 2021 to 2025 economic crisis, the loss of construction materials (ONEI reports corrugated steel bar output down 80 percent in 2025) and 40,191 stalled self-build homes, so the record documents a delivery capacity that ran backwards without separating the programme's management from the economy around it. onei.gob.cu refused connections on 2 October 2026, so both editions are Internet Archive copies; the PDF text layer uses a shifted font encoding and the tables were read after decoding it.