Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 784 of 784 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism4 of 784 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Cyprussince 1979still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Human Resource Development Authority (HRDA) subsidised training programmes

Cyprus's Human Resource Development Authority subsidised more than 106,000 participations in 11,064 single-company and multi-company training programmes in 2024, at a cost of 35.9 million euros, including 68,064 participations of employed persons in standard single-company programmes against 32,987 in 2023.

106,000 participations, participations in single-company and multi-company training programmes ('more than 106.000'), 2024. 68,064 participations, participations of employed persons subsidised in standard single-company training programmes, 2024. Αρχή Ανάπτυξης Ανθρώπινου Δυναμικού (Human Resource Development Authority of Cyprus), Ετήσια Έκθεση 2024 (Annual Report 2024), bilingual Greek and English, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A levy-funded public authority reimburses employers part of the cost of training their staff, in their own firm or through accredited training centres, against a list of priority themes agreed with the social partners.

Preconditions

A payroll levy that gives the authority its own income
Accredited private training centres able to run courses across sectors
Social partners on the authority's board who agree the training priorities

Where else it has been used: Levy-grant systems of this kind run in Malaysia, South Africa (zaf-seta-wbl) and Latin America (gtm-intecap, dom-infotep); Cyprus's is among the oldest in Europe and shows the usual sensitivity of claims to the subsidy rate.

Limits: The authority reports on its own schemes, in a 185-page PDF: the 106,000 headline is a rounded floor ('more than') in the summary of results on PDF page 16, and the scheme figures are on PDF page 22. The counts are participations, not people: one employee attending three subsidised courses counts three times, many courses last a day or less, and the report gives no count of distinct individuals. The bulk is employer training of people already in work, subsidised from a levy employers pay; the unemployed and adults outside employment are a small part. The doubling of single-company participations from 2023 to 2024 coincides with what the report calls a substantial increase in subsidy amounts and simplified approval, so part of the rise may be employers claiming for training they would have run anyway. The 1979 start is stated in the report's introduction as the year the authority began operating. The URL carries a cache identifier from the authority's portal and may change.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Cyprussince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

COVID-19 public moratorium on loan instalments

Cyprus suspended loan instalments by a Minister of Finance decree of 30 March 2020, and by 19 June 2020 banks and credit acquiring companies had suspended the obligations of 50,586 borrowers on facilities with a gross carrying amount of 11.75 billion euros, with 27,184 borrowers already covered by 24 April 2020.

50,586 borrowers, borrowers whose loan obligations were suspended under the public moratorium, cumulative, 19 June 2020. 11,745,737 thousand euros, gross carrying amount of suspended credit facilities, as at 29 february 2020, 19 June 2020. Central Bank of Cyprus, Aggregate Cyprus banking sector data, publication on suspended facilities, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

Parliament passed an emergency measures law for financial institutions, the Minister of Finance used it to decree a moratorium that banks could not refuse to an eligible applicant, and the Central Bank collected cumulative uptake from every lender every two weeks.

Preconditions

A banking supervisor with an existing reporting channel to every bank and credit acquiring company
Lenders able to process a single standard application by mail, email or fax at volume
An eligibility cut-off date fixed before the shock so that existing arrears did not qualify

Limits: The figures sit in a spreadsheet whose reporting dates are stored as spreadsheet serial numbers (43945 is 24 April 2020, 44001 is 19 June 2020), and the last reporting date published is 19 June 2020, so the series stops before the moratorium ended. Suspension deferred payments and did not cancel them. The count shows uptake of a rule change, not whether it prevented defaults or merely postponed them. Only facilities less than 30 days in arrears at 29 February 2020 were eligible, so borrowers already in arrears are outside the number. The file does not give the share of all loans suspended, and the borrower counts are reported by the lenders to the Central Bank, not audited.

Cyprussince 2025still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Limassol wildfire recovery support scheme

After the July 2025 wildfire in Limassol district, which the Limassol District Administration recorded as damaging 440 homes, 211 of them destroyed, the Council of Ministers adopted a recovery scheme on 30 July 2025 and the Ministry of the Interior had paid its one-off basic-needs grant to 286 beneficiaries, about EUR 2 million in total, by 13 August 2025.

286 beneficiaries, beneficiaries paid the one-off basic-needs grant, 2025-08-13. 440 homes, homes recorded as damaged by the fire (211 totally destroyed), 2025-07-30. Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of the Interior, announcement of 13 August 2025 on gov.cy, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Council of Ministers fixed flat one-off grants per household on 30 July 2025, waived supporting documents to speed payment, routed the money through the Treasury payment system with community councils collecting bank details, and tied reconstruction money to damage estimates by members of the Cyprus Scientific and Technical Chamber (ETEK).

Preconditions

A district administration able to count damaged homes household by household within days
A central payment system that can reach households directly once bank details are collected
A professional body trusted to estimate repair costs at market prices

Limits: The ministry reports on its own scheme, and both numbers are announcements, not audited accounts. The 286 beneficiaries and EUR 2 million cover only the one-off grant for basic needs, the fastest and simplest part of the scheme: on 13 August 2025 the ministry had only begun assessing claims for repair and reconstruction, which pay licensed destroyed homes in three instalments tied to design and to half the building work. The record carries no later official total for reconstruction payments, rent subsidies or completed rebuilds, so the record does not show whether the homes were rebuilt or how long rebuilding took. The 440 and 211 figures come from a separate Ministry of the Interior statement of 30 July 2025 (gov.cy, 'Dilosi tou Ypourgou Esoterikon ... gia apozimiosi ton pyroplikton politon'), and that statement says the final counts could change as further claims arrive. The scheme is a response to one regional fire, not a standing national recovery programme, and the payments say nothing about whether the fire could have been prevented or contained. Both pages are in Greek.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Cyprussince 1986delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Fourth Highway Project, Larnaca-Nicosia and Larnaca-Kophinou roads

Cyprus's Ministry of Communications and Works, with World Bank and Kuwait Fund loans effective from August 1986, upgraded the Larnaca-Nicosia and Larnaca-Kophinou roads and rehabilitated 111 km of rural and secondary roads, finishing a year late (loan closing moved from March 1993 to March 1994) at a final cost estimate of US$98.11 million against an original estimate of US$68.9 million, an overrun of about 42 percent.

98.11 US$ million, final project cost estimate at completion, 1995-04. 68.9 US$ million, original project cost estimate at appraisal, 1985. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Republic of Cyprus Fourth Highway Project (Loan 2684-CY), report 14267, 3 April 1995, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Communications and Works let the scope of a co-financed road programme grow during delivery, rebuilding a whole corridor and adding an interchange, and the government and the Kuwait Fund absorbed the extra cost rather than cutting the works.

Preconditions

Two lenders with parallel financing, so a component could expand under one without renegotiating the other
A central tender board and planning bureau whose approvals took five to six months per contract
Road alignments designed before local and parliamentary consent, which forced redesign after the loans were effective

Limits: The lender wrote the report, and it rates the project a success: it calls the one-year delay not excessive and judges the decisions behind the overrun sound. Most of the 42 percent is scope the government added after appraisal (reconstruction of the whole Larnaca-Kophinou road, the Kophinou interchange and a larger maintenance programme), so it is weak evidence of estimating failure; the report itself says strict comparison between the appraised and completed project cannot be made, and that the Larnaca-Nicosia alignment had to be changed after the loans became effective because it had not been cleared with Parliament or the local population. The US$98.11 million is an estimate made before all final contract payments, and both figures are in US dollars converted from Cyprus pounds at changing rates. US$300,000 was cancelled for misprocurement. The case is 30 years old, predates EU accession and the procurement rules that followed, and says nothing about how Cyprus delivers large projects today.