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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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5 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Dominican Republicsince 2021operating below its peakbears on Public-private collaboration

Plan Nacional de Viviendas Familia Feliz, and its intake freeze

By May 2024 the Dominican government's Familia Feliz plan, in which private developers build low-cost homes and the state pays down-payment, tax and mortgage-rate subsidies, had built 3,979 homes and assigned RD$1,108 million in subsidies.

3,979 housing units, homes built under the plan since launch, 2024-05. 1,108 RD$ million, subsidies assigned (bono inicial, bono itbis and bono tasa 7 aรฑos), 2024-05. Ministerio de la Presidencia de la Repรบblica Dominicana, press note of 13 May 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Presidency, and since Decreto 114-25 the housing ministry, ran a national trust that certifies private housing projects and pays each buyer's down payment, sales tax and seven years of mortgage-rate relief, so private developers and banks build and finance low-cost homes that the state does not build itself.

Preconditions

  • Law 189-11 on mortgage development and trusts, which lets each project sit in a certified autonomous trust that protects buyers
  • A banking sector willing to lend long-term mortgages to lower-income buyers once the state covers the down payment and part of the rate
  • Domestic developers able to build several thousand units across provinces

Where else it has been used: A version of Mexico's and Brazil's developer-led subsidised housing models (Minha Casa Minha Vida), run at much smaller scale and paused after a change of ministry.

Limits: The numbers come from a ministry press note quoting the minister, not from a statistical series, and the government is reporting on its own flagship. 'Built' is not 'handed over': the same note says 704 apartments were delivered in January to May 2024 and 934 were waiting to be inaugurated. It also promised 9,600 deliveries in 2024, and no official page opened today gives a cumulative delivered total to check that against; Diario Libre (12 May 2026) reports the housing ministry putting Familia Feliz deliveries at 5,922 units since 2020, which, if right, means the 2024 promise was badly missed. That figure is press only and is not used. The programme's intake has stopped: FONVIVIENDA's news item of 26 April 2026 (https://fonvivienda.gob.do/2026/04/26/ministro-ito-bisono-reafirma-continuidad-del-programa-familia-feliz-entrega-144-apartamentos-en-laderas-del-este-vf/) says projects approved up to 30 December 2025 continue unchanged, that applications made up to that date are being re-evaluated, and that the focus is on finishing and handing over projects approved up to 2025, and it names no intake after that date; the status is eroded for that reason, although deliveries from the pipeline continue (890 apartments across Familia Feliz and Mi Vivienda in the first half of 2026, per FONVIVIENDA, not split by programme). A few thousand homes is small against the national housing deficit. The private side is paid by subsidy and mortgage, so this is a subsidy-for-supply model; banks still screen buyers through pre-approval, which excludes the informal poor. The start year is taken from Decreto 191-21, which created the FONVIVIENDA trust.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Dominican Republicsince 1980still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

INFOTEP national technical and vocational training

The Dominican Republic's tripartite training institute INFOTEP, created by Law 116-80 in 1980, registered 1,027,791 participants in training actions nationwide in 2025 and 3,613,098 participants between August 2020 and August 2025.

1,027,791 participants, participants in infotep training actions nationwide, 2025. 3,613,098 participants, participants trained by infotep, august 2020 to august 2025, 2020-08 to 2025-08. Presidency of the Dominican Republic, reporting INFOTEP's Memoria Institucional 2025, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The Dominican state, employers and unions run INFOTEP jointly under Law 116-80, financed by an employer payroll contribution, and since 2020 the institute expanded its own centres and virtual offer to push enrolment past one million a year.

Preconditions

  • A compulsory employer training levy that gives the institute a revenue base independent of the annual budget contest
  • Tripartite governance that keeps employers invested in the course offer
  • A dense network of own and partner training centres, plus a virtual platform, to reach provinces outside Santo Domingo

Where else it has been used: INFOTEP belongs to the Latin American levy-funded training family with SENAI and SENA; El Salvador dissolved its counterpart, INSAFORP, in 2023, so the same model travelled and was then unwound next door.

Limits: The figures are INFOTEP's own administrative counts, relayed by the presidency's news service from the institute's annual report; the report itself was not opened, because infotep.gob.do refused scripted requests (HTTP 403). A participant is an enrolment in a training action, not a person: someone taking several short courses counts several times, so the number cannot be read as a share of adults trained and is not comparable with survey participation rates. The two figures are hard to reconcile: 3.6 million over five years averages about 720,000 a year, against more than one million in 2025 alone, and nothing on the pages explains the jump, whether a definition changed, or how much of it is short or virtual courses. The counts include young people who may not be adults in the survey sense, and they say nothing about course length, completion, certification rates, or labour-market outcomes. The pages are promotional and were published by the government that runs the institute.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Dominican Republicsince 2014still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

National 9-1-1 emergency-response system

The Dominican Republic expanded its National 9-1-1 Emergency and Security System to 27 provinces by July 2026, covering 94.64% of the population, or more than 9.6 million people.

94.64 % of population, population covered by the national 9-1-1 system, 2026-07-04. 27 provinces, provinces integrated into the 9-1-1 system, 2026-07-04. Presidency of the Dominican Republic, expansion of the National 9-1-1 System, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

The Dominican Republic joined police, health, fire and public-works responders behind one emergency number and expanded the dispatch network province by province. A common protocol and radio system let separate agencies act on the same incident instead of asking residents to coordinate them themselves.

Preconditions

  • A national dispatch centre with authority to route incidents across police, health, fire and transport agencies
  • Interoperable communications, location data and response protocols that work across provinces
  • A financing and expansion plan that adds ambulances, staff and local coverage as the service footprint grows

Where else it has been used: Emergency systems travel when a single public interface is backed by interoperable responders and a measured expansion path; the phone number alone is not the capability.

Limits: Population coverage and provincial integration show reach, not call-answering speed, dispatch accuracy, survival, crime reduction or equitable service quality. The figures come from the presidency's account of the system, and 5.36% of the population remained outside the stated coverage at the reported date.

Dominican Republicsince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Quรฉdate en Casa emergency cash transfer

Announced on 25 March 2020 and paying from April, the Dominican government's Quรฉdate en Casa transfer was built on the existing SIUBEN registry and PROSOLI payment system and, by the president's report to the Senate of 10 July 2020, reached more than 1.6 million households, 780,000 of them new to social assistance.

1,600,000 households (more than), households benefiting from quรฉdate en casa, as reported by the president to the senate, 2020-07-10. 780,000 households, households new to social assistance among quรฉdate en casa beneficiaries, 2020-07-10. World Bank, Social Protection Response to the COVID-19 Crisis in the Dominican Republic (January 2021), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The social policy cabinet (GCPS) chaired by the Vice-Presidency raised the transfer for 811,003 households already on PROSOLI and added new households classified as poor or vulnerable in SIUBEN, while ADESS partnered with banks and card networks and signed on more than 2,000 new retailers to pay them.

Preconditions

  • A proxy-means social registry (SIUBEN) with recent survey data to target new households without new fieldwork
  • A working electronic payment administrator (ADESS) and a retailer network that could be extended
  • Emergency fiscal room

Where else it has been used: Most Latin American governments scaled transfers through their social registries in 2020; the countries with registries covering a larger share of the population needed fewer on-demand fixes.

Limits: The headline count is the government's own figure, relayed by the World Bank, and the same footnote says different sources and timelines report different figures: the Vice-Presidency announced 899,354 existing PROSOLI households plus 600,646 temporary ones on 2 April 2020. The report was written in 2020 and its spending figures through December are projections. Speed came from infrastructure built long before: SIUBEN identified the households and PROSOLI and ADESS paid them, so the record shows a registry being used under pressure rather than a rule changed from nothing, and SIUBEN covered only about 60 percent of the population, which is why on-demand applications (about one million claims, 70,000 admitted, per the Vice-President) were needed. The programme was temporary by design and was extended by decree to December 2020 and then phased out; nothing here shows the responsiveness carried over to later shocks. Coverage is households paid, not poverty averted.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Dominican Republicsince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Punta Catalina thermoelectric plant, and its cost overrun

The Dominican state electricity holding CDEEE awarded the Punta Catalina coal plant in November 2013 and agreed a final contract price of US$1,945.0 million after the award, including the unloading port; after construction delays and a March 2020 dispute settlement with the contractor, the value carried into the plant's 2022 public trust was US$2,340.54 million, about 20 percent above the contract price.

2,340.54 US$ million, value of punta catalina stated in the 2022 public-trust contract, per the epc contract and the march 2020 dispute settlement, 2020-03-03. 1,945 US$ million, epc contract price finally agreed after award, including the unloading port, 2013. Presidency of the Dominican Republic, statement on the Punta Catalina public trust (15 January 2022), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The government declared a generation emergency by decree, had CDEEE tender a 2-unit coal plant as a single EPC contract with a foreign consortium, and financed milestone payments from the budget and export credit; when payments and works fell behind, it settled the disputes in 2020 at a higher value and later placed the plant in a public trust run by Banreservas' fiduciary.

Preconditions

  • An emergency decree that let one state company run the procurement outside normal planning
  • A single EPC contractor carrying design and construction risk, with milestone pricing open to dispute
  • An external audit body able to publish a final cost, which here came only years after commissioning

Where else it has been used: Large single-contractor energy builds tendered under emergency powers show the same sequence elsewhere in the region: a fixed headline price at award, delays tied to payment disputes, and a settlement that resets the price before any audit.

Limits: The 20 percent overrun is computed here from two documents by different bodies, not published as a figure. The presidency itself calls the US$2,340.54 million a reference number, "no es definitivo, ni como valor del activo ni como monto final de inversiรณn", pending a financial audit, so it is a floor on cost, not the final cost. The US$1,945.0 million comes from a commission appointed by the president who built the plant, hosted by the Consejo Econรณmico y Social, whose chair led it; it was written in 2017 at about 70 percent completion. The same report records that CDEEE was paying milestones against the higher offered price of US$2,040.7 million, so the baseline itself is disputed. No schedule figure with a planned and actual date was found in an opened official source; the commission only puts the cost of delay at about US$25 million a month. The award followed a tender later investigated for Odebrecht bribery, which the overrun figure does not capture.