Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Egypt's Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy took private sector-owned renewable generation from 0 MW in October 2015 to 1,500 MW at financial closure by the end of FY2017/18 under its feed-in tariff programme, with about US$2 billion of private investment, much of it in the Benban solar park.
The Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy legislated a renewable energy law in 2014, set a feed-in tariff by cabinet decree, licensed private developers through the regulator and allocated land in one desert park, Benban, so many small IPPs could share grid connection and permitting.
Preconditions
A power deficit (5,540 MW in FY15) that made new private capacity politically urgent
A state offtaker whose payment risk international guarantors were willing to cover
Desert land under state control with high irradiation, allocated as one park
Limits: The indicator was softened mid-programme: DPF1 asked for 1,500 MW commissioned, and DPF2 redefined it as 1,500 MW at financial closure, so the number shows contracts financed, not plants generating, and the ICR's statement that Benban was then the world's fourth-largest solar plant sits in a footnote that says it 'promises' capacity. Most developers and lenders were foreign, and the deal flow leaned on IFC debt (US$653 million) and MIGA risk insurance (US$210 million), so how much of the collaboration was the Egyptian state's own capacity and how much was World Bank Group de-risking cannot be separated. The figure does not show the tariff cost carried by the state offtaker, or that the feed-in tariff was later replaced by other procurement. The source is the World Bank's own evaluation of operations whose results framework included this indicator, and the number is read from a PDF results table.
Egypt's Ministry of Social Solidarity launched the Takaful and Karama cash transfers in early 2015 and expanded coverage from an initial 1.5 million to 4.675 million households (about 17 million people) by project close in 2024, revising the eligibility threshold and adding top-ups in response to COVID-19 and later inflation, while the cash transfer budget rose from EGP 3.5 billion in 2015 to EGP 41 billion in 2024.
The Ministry of Social Solidarity built a proxy-means-tested registry and a cash transfer programme with World Bank financing, then used the registry's threshold and benefit levels as the levers it moved when COVID-19, inflation and devaluation hit.
Preconditions
A national social registry, which reached 11.3 million registered households, to retarget against
A payment rail through post offices and later Meeza cards that could absorb more beneficiaries without a new system
Fiscal room created by the 2014 energy subsidy reform, which the programme was launched to offset
Limits: The construct is the speed of rule and programme change, and the headline number is coverage, which is scale rather than speed. The ICR describes the COVID-19 response (a revised proxy-means-test threshold, wider coverage, Meeza cards, top-ups) in prose without dates or a count of households added by the revision, so how fast the rules moved is not measured here. The 4.675 million includes legacy Daman social pension beneficiaries absorbed into the programme by consolidation, so part of the growth is relabelling rather than new reach. The budget figure is nominal Egyptian pounds across years of high inflation and two large devaluations, so the 12-fold rise overstates the real increase. Coverage still reaches only about 28 percent of the poorest quintile. The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed with US$900 million, read from a PDF, and the counts are administrative figures reported by the ministry.
๐ช๐ฌEgyptsince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery
Egypt's health authorities reported to WHO that 56,907,319 people, 56 per 100 population, had received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose by 31 December 2023, from a first dose given on 24 January 2021, with 42,337,175 (41 per 100) completing the primary series.
Egypt's health ministry ran a national COVID-19 campaign through its primary care network and mass vaccination sites and reported progress to WHO.
Preconditions
A routine immunisation programme and cold chain
A supply of doses large enough for a national campaign, however obtained
Registers good enough to count who received a second dose
Limits: The figures are Egypt's own reports to WHO (DATA_SOURCE 'REPORTING'), with no independent coverage survey behind them. Completion of the primary series reached 41 per 100 and boosters 15,217,352 people (15 per 100), so the record shows a partial delivery. The row reports 102,191,677 doses in total, 100 per 100 population. The VACCINES_USED field is empty, so the record cannot show which products were used or where the doses came from, and it evidences distribution only. The per-100 rates divide by WHO's population estimate. Vaccination is a response to one shock, not proof of general preparedness, and it is filed under the precedent of bol-covid-vaccination and ven-covid-vaccination as a judgement call because no hazard-specific delivery with an official figure was found for this country in this batch. The source is a CSV with no prose; the numbers are read from one row. The cited URL is the blob the WHO dashboard serves, the same one bol-covid-vaccination cites.
The Egyptian Electricity Holding Company built the 1,300 MW Ain Sokhna supercritical thermal power plant, with its first unit entering commercial operation on 3 March 2015 and the second on 4 June 2015, at a final cost of US$1,159.4 million against a base cost of US$2,139.6 million estimated at appraisal in 2009.
The state power holding company procured a large thermal plant in a few big packages co-financed by four lenders, priced the appraisal estimate conservatively, and redeployed the savings into grid works.
Preconditions
A state utility with an engineering department experienced in large thermal plants
Co-financing from several development lenders committed before bidding
A market for supercritical boilers and turbines competitive enough to bid below estimate
Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$600 million of the cost, wrote the report. The costs are in Table 1 and para. 23 (ICR pages 8 to 9), the commercial operation dates in para. 20 of the annex on design and implementation; the report says construction was 'initially delayed' but finished 'about when expected' and gives no original target date for commercial operation, so schedule performance rests on that judgement and on the 2015 dates. The ICR does not explain why the plant cost 46 percent less than estimated; a 2013 restructuring had already cut the estimate to US$1,655.3 million, which suggests the 2009 estimate was high rather than that delivery was unusually efficient, and the savings went into a transmission component. That transmission component ran late: it was not finished at the extended loan closing of 31 December 2018 (original closing 31 December 2015), and its final cost was not known. The plant was designed to burn heavy fuel oil as well as gas, which the report says raised its cost and lowered its efficiency against a combined-cycle plant. The status rests on the report's account of operation in 2015 to 2018, not on a current source.