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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Guineasince 1989dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Urban water lease (affermage) with SEEG, and the return to public management after 2000

Guinea ran its urban water service from 1989 under a ten-year lease in which the public asset company SONEG owned and financed the network and the privately led operator SEEG ran it, but after renegotiation failed the private operator withdrew in December 2000, the government decided in July 2003 to keep the service public, and revenue collected from private customers fell from US$5.8 million in 1998 to US$1.7 million in 2005.

1.7 million US dollars, revenue collection from private customers, urban water services, 2005. 5.8 million US dollars, revenue collection from private customers in the last full years of the lease, 1998. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Guinea Third Water Supply and Sanitation Project, Report No. 36083-GUI, June 2006, section 4.1, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state split the urban water utility into a public asset-holding company that owned and financed the network and a private-led operating company that ran it under a lease and was paid from tariffs; when the lease came up for renewal, tariffs were frozen, the private shareholder saw too much risk and left, and the public company took over operations it was not prepared to run.

Preconditions

  • Tariffs set high enough and indexed so the operator's revenue does not erode in real terms
  • Renegotiation started well before the lease expires, with a deadline
  • A public asset company able to run operations itself if the private partner leaves

Limits: The figures sit in a PDF (page 9, printed page 4; the ten-year lease ending in 1999 is on page 6). The World Bank financed the lease from its first project in 1989 and rated this follow-on project and the borrower unsatisfactory, so it has a view on who was to blame. The revenue figures are in US dollars, and the report says tariffs were frozen until 2005 and fell from US$0.86 to US$0.21 per cubic metre in real dollar terms, so much of the fall in dollar collections is a currency and tariff effect, not only worse collection; the same paragraph says SONEG's net income went from US$2.9 million in 1998 to a loss of US$0.5 million in 2005. 1998 is a year chosen by the report, not a demonstrated peak. The report also says 24 hour service and compliance with water quality standards, achieved under the earlier operation, were lost and service became intermittent, with no figure for when. SEEG's private shareholder is named only as SAUR, in passing, and the share structure is not given. The 1989 start is inferred from the ten-year lease ending in 1999 and the first supporting credit of May 1989; the report gives no signing date. The lease ended at the end of its term after two years of failed renegotiation and contract extensions, so this is a partnership that was not renewed rather than one terminated for breach.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Guineasince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Guinea's 2021 Ebola outbreak response

Guinea's Ministry of Health announced an Ebola outbreak in N'Zรฉrรฉkorรฉ Prefecture on 14 February 2021 and declared it over on 19 June 2021. It activated national and district emergency committees, vaccinated 10,873 people and followed 1,031 of 1,110 contacts daily, and held the outbreak to 23 confirmed and probable cases and 12 deaths, five years after the 2014 to 2016 West African epidemic.

23 cases, ebola cases in the 2021 outbreak, confirmed and probable, 2021-06-19. 10,873 people, people vaccinated against ebola in the response, including 885 contacts and 2,779 frontline workers, 2021-05-27. World Health Organization, Disease Outbreak News, Ebola virus disease - Guinea (DON328), 19 June 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Guinea's Ministry of Health activated national and district emergency management committees within days of the announcement. It deployed case-search, contact-tracing, burial and community-engagement teams, set up PCR testing in N'Zรฉrรฉkorรฉ, and ran ring vaccination of contacts and frontline workers with WHO and partner support. It declared the outbreak over after the 42-day count.

Preconditions

  • Response structures, trained staff and community networks left in place from the 2014 to 2016 epidemic
  • A licensed Ebola vaccine and therapeutics that partners could ship within days
  • A laboratory able to confirm cases near the outbreak, here a PCR capacity stood up in N'Zรฉrรฉkorรฉ

Where else it has been used: The ring-vaccination and emergency-committee model from the 2018 to 2020 eastern DRC response, applied in a country that had lived through the 2014 to 2016 epidemic.

Limits: This is one outbreak in one prefecture, so it shows a response to one shock and not a standing national capacity, and a single outcome cannot separate preparedness from luck. Detection was slow: WHO reports the index case, a health worker, fell ill on 15 January and died on 28 January after visiting two health facilities and a traditional practitioner. She was buried without safe burial practices, and the outbreak was announced only on 14 February. Five cases were health workers, which points to infection-control failures. A second cluster of community deaths surfaced in late March after more than three weeks with no cases. One confirmed case was lost to follow-up from 1 April until 18 June, and 79 of the 1,110 contacts were not followed daily. WHO notes that only nine (39%) of the 23 cases were known contacts at detection, and that the alert system reported a suboptimal number of alerts. The response was not purely national: WHO reports the MoH acted together with WHO and other partners, and their contribution cannot be separated from that of the national institutions. The figures are WHO restating Ministry of Health reports, so the government is reporting on its own response. The page gives no figures for the 2014 to 2016 epidemic, so the record makes no quantitative comparison with it.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Guineasince 1989delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Fourth Highway Project: paving of the Mamou-Kankan and Dubreka-Kolaboui roads

Guinea's Ministry of Transport and Public Works paved the Dubreka-Kolaboui (196.5 km) and Mamou-Kankan (401 km) national roads under the Fourth Highway Project, approved in June 1988, at a latest estimated cost of US$207 million against an appraisal estimate of US$200 million, with the IDA credit closing on 31 December 1996, three years late, and the last 94 km of Mamou-Kankan still under construction in 1997.

207 million US dollars, latest project cost estimate at completion, 1997-06. 200 million US dollars, project cost estimated in the staff appraisal report, 1988. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Republic of Guinea Fourth Highway Project (Credit 1915-GUI), Report No. 16646, 5 June 1997, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The public works ministry packaged two long trunk-road upgrades with spot repairs and labour-based maintenance into one programme, and paid for it by assembling seven donors in parallel, each financing particular sections.

Preconditions

  • Donors willing to finance road sections in parallel under one sector programme
  • A ministry able to procure and supervise several international civil works contracts at once
  • Counterpart funds for local costs, which here arrived at less than half the planned level

Limits: The report is the World Bank's own completion report on a credit it made, and the IDA credit was only US$55 million of the US$207 million: parallel finance of US$143 million came from the AfDB, the French CFD, USAID, Japan's OECF, BADEA and the European Community, so the cost figure covers a multi-donor programme run through the ministry. The cost is a 'latest estimate', not an audited outturn, and the 3.5 percent overrun is small partly because the scope changed: about 500 km of cement-stabilised base and asphalt concrete on 310 km were added, so the money bought a higher standard than appraised. The three-year delay is on the credit's closing date, not on road completion dates; the report says the last 94 km of Mamou-Kankan, financed by the EC, was to be finished by the end of 1999. The government paid about US$8 million of its planned US$19.2 million contribution. The report blames delays on a slow restructuring of the ministry, poor technical studies, cumbersome procurement and late payments to contractors.