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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 742 deliveries

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Gambiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Nafa Quick, the COVID-19 cash transfer carved out of the Nafa programme

The Gambia's government had its new social safety net project restructured within three months of the pandemic (restructuring dated 9 June 2020) to create Nafa Quick, which between July and October 2020 paid two transfers of GMD 3,000 to 78,359 rural households in 30 districts, against a target of 60,000, with all payments made before the end of the lean season.

78,359 households, households benefiting from the temporary nafa quick intervention (oi 2.1), 2020-10. 100 %, share of nafa quick payments made before the end of the lean season (ir 2.1), 2020-10. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, The Gambia Social Safety Net Project (P167260), June 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government asked the World Bank to repurpose its freshly started safety net project, and the project unit ran a separate, simple rural cash transfer, two payments timed to the lean season, through community targeting in 30 districts while the social registry and the regular programme were still being built.

Preconditions

  • An externally financed safety net project already effective, with money that could be reallocated
  • A project unit and community structures able to list households without a registry
  • Willingness to sacrifice the duration of the long-term programme to pay for the emergency one

Where else it has been used: Like hnd-cct-shock-response and cog-lisungi-covid, a donor project became the shock-response channel; The Gambia's case shows the cost explicitly, because the regular programme was cut to fund it.

Limits: The World Bank financed the project and rates its own efficacy High; the figures are in the plain-text ICR: the June 2020 restructuring on page 9 (paragraph 17), the 78,359 households and the 100 percent lean-season indicator in Table 2 on page 14 (paragraph 34), and 'restructured in three months' with the July to October 2020 payment window on page 24 (paragraph 70). The ICR says Nafa Quick ran before the delivery system existed, so no socio-economic data were collected on its beneficiaries and its targeting of the poor cannot be assessed. The speed was bought by cutting the longer-term programme: the extreme-poor Nafa transfer was halved from 36 to 18 months to pay for Nafa Quick, and the additional financing meant to restore it was not approved because a COVID-19 waiver expired first, so the remaining 18 months were deferred until a new project, The Gambia RISE (approved February 2024), began paying them from July 2024 (page 24, paragraph 69). Two payments of GMD 3,000 is a small, temporary transfer. The money came from an existing IDA project, not from the national budget.

Gambiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

COVID-19 emergency food support distributed by the National Disaster Management Agency

The Gambia's government bought 264,500 bags of rice, 279,500 bags of sugar and 185,200 drums of oil for vulnerable households with about GMD909.9 million redirected in 2020, and the National Disaster Management Agency distributed them between May and 28 September 2020, with 228,367 bags of rice recorded as delivered to households, 36,133 fewer than procured.

228,367 bags, bags of rice (50 kg) delivered to households as recorded in the kobo-collect system, 2020-09-28. 264,500 bags, bags of rice (50 kg) procured for distribution, 2020-05. National Audit Office of The Gambia, Audit Report on the Government COVID-19 Response: Procurement and Distribution of Medical and Food Items (Phase 1), September 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government redirected debt-relief money to buy staple food in bulk and used the disaster management agency and local authorities to hand it out through distribution points with coupons to households identified as vulnerable.

Preconditions

  • A disaster agency with a field network able to run distribution points nationwide
  • Household lists from local authorities, here incomplete and drawn up without criteria
  • Stock records and storage that let food be tracked from purchase to household, which here were missing

Limits: The audit office judged the distribution untimely, unequal and poorly recorded, so this is a record of a national relief delivery with large leaks, not a model. Procurement deliveries ran from 1 to 12 May 2020 but the last household distribution was on 28 September 2020, nearly five months later. The delivered counts come from the Kobo-Collect tool, which the audit says recorded what a household should receive rather than what it received, some households recorded as served could not be reached, and coordinators' reports disagree with it, so 228,367 is an upper bound on what reached people. The same delivered figure appears for rice and sugar in the audit table. Households were selected without a needs assessment, some vulnerable households in two Kanifing wards were never registered, and food stored in the open was damaged without records. The audit examined Banjul, Kanifing and West Coast Region in detail and left the other regions to a later audit. The number of households reached is not reported. The figures are in a 156-page PDF (executive summary, pages 18 to 24).

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Gambiasince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Banjul Rehabilitation Project (roads, drainage and sewage), and its delay

The Gambia's Ministry of Transport, Works and Infrastructure contracted the US$35.7 million (D1.8 billion) Banjul roads, drainage and sewage rehabilitation in May 2019 without tender, for completion by November 2021; by August 2021 12,953 m of the 15,216 m of roads, 85 percent, were built and 63 percent of the contract price paid, the pumping and lifting stations were outstanding, and the completion date had been extended to November 2022.

12,953 metres, road length completed as at august 2021 (85 percent of 15,216 m), 2021-08. 35.7 million US dollars, contract sum of the epc contract, 2019-05. National Audit Office of The Gambia, Banjul Rehabilitation Project, Final Management Letter for the period 1 January 2019 to 31 August 2021, April 2022, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The works ministry accepted a contractor's unsolicited offer to pre-finance the reconstruction of the capital's roads and drains, signed a single-source design-and-build contract, then switched to paying it from the budget in interim instalments ahead of the hardest components.

Preconditions

  • A procurement authority that can be bypassed by single sourcing for a presidential priority
  • A contractor willing to start work before a signed contract
  • Budget room to pay interim certificates once the pre-financing was dropped

Limits: The audit is a compliance management letter, not a completion audit: it stops at 31 August 2021, three months before the original deadline, so it shows progress and a one-year extension of the deadline to November 2022, not an outturn. Whether the project was finished, at what final cost and on what date is not shown here, and the status 'operating' rests only on the audit's finding that most roads were built and in use. The 85 percent is of a road length that an addendum had raised from 14,614 m to 15,216 m, and the audit does not report a cost increase from that addendum. The figures are in a 24-page PDF (site verification on page 23). The audit's main findings are about process, not schedule: the contract was single sourced and gazetted only in February 2021, works began on 18 March 2019 before the contract was signed on 11 May 2019, no performance security was provided, withholding tax was not deducted, and 63 percent had been paid while critical components worth US$2.47 million, 6.9 percent of the sum, were outstanding. A contractor-initiated, pre-financed offer is how the project began, so the institutional delivery is partly the contractor's proposal.