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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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4 of 742 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Greecesince 2022still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity

Special Secretariat of Foresight (now of Long-term Planning)

Greece's Special Secretariat of Foresight published its Megatrends 2040 report and seven megatrend notes in February and March 2022 and then six further foresight studies to September 2026, including Generative AI Greece 2030 (January 2024), The Future of Work and Skills in Greece (February 2025) and Mediterranean Foresight (September 2026).

6 studies, foresight studies published on the secretariat's studies pages, january 2023 to september 2026, 2026-09-29. 8 publications, megatrends 2040 report and megatrend notes published in february and march 2022, 2022-03. Special Secretariat of Foresight (Eidiki Grammateia Makroprothesmou Schediasmou), Studies pages, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A special secretariat at the centre of government runs foresight studies with universities and research centres, trains a network of public servants in foresight tools, and represents Greece in EU foresight networks.

Preconditions

  • A secretariat placed close to the head of government
  • Research partners to co-produce studies, since the unit is small
  • EU foresight networks that supply method and a reporting rhythm

Limits: Both counts are ours: the two studies list pages show no dates, so each item's date is the datePublished stamp in the metadata of its own page (for example Mediterranean Foresight, 29 September 2026; The Future of Work and Skills, 24 February 2025), and the site states no total. Of the six later items, several were made with partners (the National Centre for Social Research on internet use, the UNESCO Chair on Futures Research on innovation to 2035, and the High Level Advisory Committee on AI for the AI blueprint), so the Secretariat's own output is smaller; reposted EU Strategic Foresight Reports are excluded. Output fell from a launch burst in 2022 to one or two studies a year. The site's footer and its July 2026 press release now name the body the Special Secretariat of Long-term Planning, a renaming whose date and legal basis were not read; the 2022 start is the date of the first study, not the founding act, which was not read. A count of studies says nothing about use in policy.

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Greecesince 2006still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Greece's PPP programme under the 2005 PPP law

Greece's Inter-Ministerial PPP Committee and the finance ministry's PPP Unit have taken 33 public-private partnerships to signed contracts since 2006, from Attica school buildings and fire stations to waste plants, the Kalamata to Rizomylos and Crete northern road sections and ultrafast broadband, with another 34 projects listed in procurement or preparation in 2026.

33 contracts, ppp contracts signed since 2006, 2026-10. 34 projects, projects in the ppp unit's list still in preparation or procurement, 2026-10. Ministry of Economy and Finance, Public Private Partnerships Unit (pppunit.minfin.gov.gr), home page and project list, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A 2005 law set up an inter-ministerial committee that approves which projects may be procured as PPPs and a central unit in the finance ministry that prepares and tenders them for ministries, regions and municipalities, mostly as availability-payment contracts.

Preconditions

  • A central PPP unit with its own procurement expertise, co-financed by EU funds
  • Committee approval at ministerial level, which gives projects political cover
  • EU structural and recovery funds that can co-finance availability payments

Where else it has been used: The same centre-led model as Lithuania's CPVA (ltu-vpsp) at larger scale; Croatia (hrv-jpp-registar) had a similar law but no comparable pipeline after 2008.

Limits: The home page states 33 signed PPP contracts and 34 approved PPP projects since 2006, without a date of update. We read the 67 project pages in the unit's list (https://pppunit.minfin.gov.gr/en/sdit/erga, seven pages) and tallied their status fields ourselves: 33 'Contract signed', 13 in competitive dialogue, 13 at request for proposals, 6 at expression of interest and 2 approved and in preparation, so the 34 in the second metric is our count. The list counts the ultrafast broadband programme as seven lots, each showing the programme's EUR 868 million cost, so a sum of project costs would be wrong and the record gives none. 'Contract signed' is the unit's last populated status; no project is marked completed, so the list does not say how many assets are in operation or whether they came in on time and budget, and several roads and waste plants took three to ten years from committee approval to signature (for example the Peloponnese waste system, approved December 2011, signed June 2018, and the Nafplio marina, approved November 2013, signed April 2023). The unit is part of the ministry that runs the programme, and its home page cites a World Bank ranking as an endorsement; the ranking is not the evidence here. 2006 is the first committee approval in the list (Attica schools, April 2006).

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Greecesince 2023still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

First state aid payments after Storm Daniel (Kratiki Arogi)

Greece's Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection paid almost 65 million euros of first state aid (proti arogi) to about 14,000 people affected by the September 2023 Thessaly floods within the first month after the storm, and by 15 February 2024 had paid 154.94 million euros to 45,292 households, firms, farms and livestock units in the first round.

45,292 recipients, recipients of first state aid (households, businesses, farms and livestock units), first round, cumulative, 2024-02-15. 14,000 people (about), recipients paid within about the first month after the floods, 2023-10-13. Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection, General Secretariat for Natural Disaster Recovery and State Aid, press release '29th payment of First Aid', 15 February 2024, arogi.gov.gr, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A general secretariat for disaster recovery runs a single online platform where victims apply, cross-checks applications against tax and property data held by the revenue authority, and pays first aid in weekly batches within weeks of the event, before full damage assessment.

Preconditions

  • A tax administration with property and bank account data that can be matched to applicants
  • A standing legal framework for state aid after disasters, so no new law is needed per event
  • A ministry unit dedicated to recovery that survives between disasters

Where else it has been used: The same platform paid the Evros fire, Samos earthquake and Chios fire victims; the release pattern is identical across events.

Limits: The ministry reports on its own payments in press releases, and the one-month figure comes from the deputy minister's statement in a separate release of 13 October 2023 (https://arogi.gov.gr/deltia-typou/hr-triantopoylos-8i-katavoli-protis-arogis-65-ekat-eyro-se-14000-polites-mesa-se-peripoy-ena-mina/), worded as 'almost 65 million' to 'about 14,000'. Recipients mix households, businesses, farms and livestock units, so the count is not people or homes; first aid is an advance against later compensation and covers basic needs and household contents, not rebuilding. The release gives no figure for the number of eligible victims, so coverage cannot be computed. Speed of payment is a recovery measure, not preparedness: the record says nothing about warning, evacuation or the flood defences of Thessaly, where Storm Daniel caused deaths and flooded large areas. The 15 February 2024 cumulative covers households and firms hit by the flood 'in Thessaly, but also other areas', so it is not strictly limited to Thessaly.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Greecesince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Second-wave motorway concessions (Central E-65, Olympia Odos, Moreas), and their reset

Greece procured 744 km of motorway as three PPP concessions that commenced in 2008; after works were suspended in 2011 and the contracts were renegotiated in 2013 and 2015, the European Court of Auditors found the three projects delayed by four years on average, their combined cost per km up 36 percent, from 9.1 to 12.4 million euro, and the planned road length cut to 486 km.

36 % overrun (cost per km), increase in total project cost per km across the three audited motorway concessions, initial plan to post-reset, Post-reset position as audited in 2017, published March 2018. 4 years, average construction delay of the three motorways against their initial completion dates, Estimated/actual completion dates as audited, 2016-2017. European Court of Auditors, Special Report 09/2018, Public Private Partnerships in the EU: Widespread shortcomings and limited benefits (paragraphs 34(d), 37-40, Tables 2 and 3), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Greek state bundled several hundred kilometres of motorway into three design-build-finance-operate concessions, transferred traffic risk to the concessionaires, and paid toll-backed private finance plus EU co-financing; when traffic collapsed the state renegotiated, deferred sections and paid about 1.2 billion euro more rather than stop the works.

Preconditions

  • Access to EU cohesion co-financing large enough to fill a renegotiated financing gap
  • A parliament willing to ratify concession contracts in the absence of a general concession law
  • Contracts signed before archaeology, permits and land expropriation were settled, which is what turned the crisis into public liability

Where else it has been used: Spain's A-1 and C-25 concessions, audited in the same report, were renegotiated soon after signature at a public cost of about 300 million euro, a smaller version of the same pattern.

Limits: This is a record of poor cost and schedule performance, not of good delivery, and it is filed because the gap asks for exactly that figure. The 36 percent is a cost per km, and it mixes two movements: the absolute cost of the Central motorway fell (2,375 to 1,594 million euro) while its length was cut by 55 percent, and Olympia's length was cut by 45 percent, so per-km cost rises partly because fixed and financial costs were spread over fewer kilometres. It is not a like-for-like overrun on a fixed scope. Table 3 of the report shows the combined total project cost of the three concessions falling from 6,743 million euro (2,375 + 2,825 + 1,543) to 6,004 million euro (1,594 + 2,619 + 1,791) as length fell from 744 to 486 km, so the 36 percent per-km increase coincides with an absolute cost about 11 percent lower on a 35 percent smaller scope. The ECA computed the figures from information provided by the Greek authorities and audited only three of the five second-wave concessions (Aegean and Nea Odos are not covered). The completion dates in Table 2 are labelled estimated/actual as of the audit, so the four-year average includes forecasts for the Central and Olympia sections due in August 2017. The ECA attributes much of the cost to the 2009 financial crisis, under which traffic fell around 50 percent below the lenders' worst case, and to the public partner's poor preparation (archaeology, environmental permits, expropriation): the record cannot separate those causes. The deferred northern and southern sections of E-65 and the deferred Olympia stretches were taken out of these contracts; whatever was built later under other contracts is not in this number. The report is from 2018. The ECA also records that Greece's PPP route procured 744 km in three tenders where the earlier 82 km of Olympia took up to 20 years and 31 procurements, which is the strongest point in the programme's favour.