Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism5 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Hondurassince 2016dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Empresa Energía Honduras loss-reduction partnership, and its reversal

Honduras's state utility ENEE awarded Empresa Energía Honduras a public-private partnership contract in December 2015, with service starting in 2016, to run national distribution and cut technical and non-technical losses by 17%. Distribution losses fell from 33.38% to 27.11% by February 2018, rose to 35.37% by December 2020 and stood at 30.77% in December 2021. The state intervened the contract and took distribution back when it ended in August 2023.

30.77 % of energy, electricity distribution losses, december 2021 (technical and non-technical), 2021-12. 27.11 % of energy, lowest distribution losses under the partnership (february 2018), the gain that was lost, 2018-02. Secretaría de Energía de Honduras, Dirección General de Electricidad y Mercados, Informe Estadístico Anual del Subsector Eléctrico Nacional 2021 (Tabla 11, from ENEE Subgerencia de Planificación y Gestión Comercial), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

ENEE, through a Congress-approved PPP trust supervised by SAPP and an external supervisor, handed national distribution and loss recovery to a private operator paid from distribution revenue. When losses rose, the state intervened the contract and then let it lapse, moving loss recovery into its own Programa Nacional para la Reducción de Pérdidas.

Preconditions

A loss baseline and metering both parties accept, so the operator can be paid for points recovered rather than for presence
A regulator and supervisor able to enforce loss targets during the term, not only at expiry
Political tolerance for disconnecting non-paying users and prosecuting theft, which is where non-technical losses are recovered

Where else it has been used: Loss-reduction management contracts are a common utility reform. This case shows the first two years of gains disappearing once enforcement weakened, and a government that ended up reabsorbing the function it had contracted out.

Limits: The loss series is ENEE's own commercial accounting, republished by the Energy Secretariat under the government that intervened the contract and campaigned against it, so the source is not neutral. The table stops in December 2021. The 2022 and 2023 values, including the roughly 37 to 38 percent widely reported when the contract ended, appear only in press coverage, and this record does not carry them. The SEN text does not attribute the 2016 to 2018 fall to EEH by name. The 2020 rise coincides with COVID-19 lockdowns and hurricanes Eta and Iota, so not all of the reversal can be laid on the operator. The contract was intervened and then expired at the end of its term in August 2023. It was not cancelled outright, and 'dismantled' here means the partnership model ended and ENEE took distribution back, not that a court annulled it. The SAPP fact sheet has copy errors: a malformed start date, and a repayment source copied from an airport sheet ('COBROS POR SERVICIOS AEROPORTUARIOS'). The 17% target comes from SAPP's project description, not from the contract text. A loss percentage measures the outcome of the partnership and says nothing directly about how deep the collaboration was. It is evidence that a structured government-firm arrangement on a national goal was tried at national scale and failed, not a measure of collaboration.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Hondurassince 1972still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Instituto Nacional de Formación Profesional (INFOP)

Honduras's national vocational training institute INFOP trained or certified 326,161 people in 2024 across six programmes and about 12,552 courses, figures the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas checked against instructors' start and end reports.

326,161 people, people trained or certified by infop across its six programmes (sum of six programme totals), 2024. 135,430 people, people certified in the largest programme, tourism, commerce and services, 2024. Tribunal Superior de Cuentas de Honduras, Informe RC-Nº32-2025-DVGP-INFOP, evaluation of INFOP's 2024 accountability report, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A levy-funded autonomous training institute, financed by employer and worker contributions, runs its own centres and contracts courses through business chambers and unions, and the supreme audit institution checks its delivery figures each year.

Preconditions

A payroll levy that gives the institute its own revenue
Business chambers and unions willing to host company-agreement courses
An audit office that reviews physical delivery, not only spending

Where else it has been used: The levy-funded national training institute is the Latin American model (SENA, INA, INTECAP, INFOTEP); Honduras's version leans heavily on short courses and outsourced company training.

Limits: The total is computed by us: the audit report (pages 9 to 10 of the PDF) gives six programme results, 24,181 (agriculture), 15,834 (industrial), 135,430 (tourism, commerce and services), 65,035 (ICT), 84,665 (company agreements) and 1,016 (labour competency certification), and no single total; the press figure of 325,145 is the first five. The counts are participations per programme product, not unique adults, so a person who took two courses counts twice. Many courses are short, about 20 hours at the low end, and the list includes soft-skills topics such as customer service and motivation; the industrial programme serves ages 15 to 25, so part of the count is youth. The numbers originate in INFOP's own reports; the Tribunal verified them against signed instructor reports and a sample of 68 participants per product, not by a full audit. Over-execution of up to 165 percent against plan says the targets were low, not that demand was met. The 2021 evaluation records that INFOP cancelled its programme for vulnerable groups after the pandemic, so coverage of the poorest is not shown here. The started year is the 1972 decree law creating INFOP, stated in the report.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Hondurassince 2015still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Sistema Nacional de Emergencias 911

Honduras's Sistema Nacional de Emergencias 911 coordinated and attended 762,601 of 788,573 emergency tickets in 2024, reporting 96.71% efficacy through five regional coordination centres.

96.71 % of emergency tickets coordinated and attended, emergency-ticket coordination and attendance efficacy, 2024. 762,601 tickets, emergency tickets coordinated and attended, 2024. Sistema Nacional de Emergencias 911 de Honduras, Memoria Anual 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Honduras put emergency intake, dispatch and inter-agency coordination behind one national 911 service, then operated regional coordination centres to route incidents to the relevant responders. A shared ticket and protocol gives separate agencies a common incident record instead of leaving callers to coordinate them.

Preconditions

A national authority able to route incidents across police, health, fire and other response agencies
Interoperable communications, location data and protocols that work between regional centres
Operating budgets and performance reporting that keep centres staffed and reveal where tickets are lost or delayed

Where else it has been used: Emergency coordination travels when a common intake record is backed by interoperable responders and transparent throughput measures; the number alone cannot substitute for the dispatch network behind it.

Limits: The annual report's ticket counts and efficacy percentage show administrative throughput, not response time, dispatch accuracy, survival, crime reduction or equitable service quality. The figures are the emergency system's own operational accounting, and ticket counts can include calls requiring different agencies or multiple actions; the report does not independently audit the denominator or outcomes.

Hondurassince 2020operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

Conditional cash transfer shock response, and its suspension after 2022

Honduras widened its national conditional cash transfer during COVID-19 and Hurricanes Eta and Iota, from 1,153,069 beneficiaries in 2019 to 1,528,030 in 2020, and paid emergency top-ups to 24,891 households outside the roster in late 2020, but after the 2022 reorganisation of the social protection sector payments paused, rural payments resumed only in December 2022 and urban payments only in August 2025, after a three-year suspension.

3 years, suspension of urban cct payments after the 2022 transition, 2025-08. 1,528,030 beneficiaries, beneficiaries of social safety net programmes at the 2020 peak, 2020. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Honduras Social Protection Integration Project (P152057), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The social protection ministry used an existing conditional cash transfer and its registry to add vulnerable households and pay top-ups after COVID-19 and two hurricanes, financed by an additional World Bank credit; a new administration then moved the programme to a new ministry and new targeting rules, and payments stopped until the new architecture could pay.

Preconditions

A standing transfer programme with a beneficiary registry before the shock
External finance that could be added within a year
Implementing institutions that survive a change of government, which is the precondition that failed here

Where else it has been used: Honduras published a shock-response protocol for the transfer (PROMESA-PSA, Ministerial Agreement 159-SEDESOL-2025, 9 December 2025) built on the 2020 top-up. The lesson the ICR draws is that institutional reform can disrupt delivery more than the external shocks did.

Limits: The publisher financed the project (US$30 million, then a US$70 million additional financing in June 2021) and rates it Substantial on efficacy; the figures are in a PDF (beneficiary counts and the top-up figure on page 19, paragraphs 31 and 33; the payment pause on page 14, paragraph 14; the three-year urban suspension in paragraph 39). The ICR states explicitly that the 1,528,030 peak (cumulative enrollment) and the 922,832 final-year caseload are distinct measures that should not be compared directly, and attributes the lower figure to a compressed implementation window, not a reversal of reach; the Borrower's completion report summarised in the annex gives 961,339 beneficiaries at closing (page 58), 62 percent of target. The record therefore does not use the final-year caseload as its metric: the erosion it documents is the payment pause, which the ICR does state (metric, the three-year urban suspension, paragraph 39, PDF page 21): payments stopped during the 2022 transition to SEDESOL and the Red Solidaria, with rural payments resuming in December 2022 and urban payments after a three-year suspension. The emergency top-up was small (24,891 households) and the source gives no elapsed time for it beyond late 2020. The 2019 to 2020 rise mixes horizontal expansion with routine enrolment. A change of government that redesigns a programme is a political choice, not only a loss of capacity.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Hondurassince 2016still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Aeropuerto Internacional de Palmerola

Honduras's Infrastructure Secretariat concessioned the Palmerola international airport to Palmerola International Airport S.A., with a USD 87.1 million reference investment. Works began on 5 December 2016 and operations on 11 December 2021, about 60 months after works began, against a 61-month contracted works period (start of operation is not necessarily completion of works).

60 months, months from start of works (2016-12-05) to start of operation (2021-12-11), computed, 2021-12. 61 months, contracted works execution period, 2016. Superintendencia de Alianza Público Privada (SAPP), Honduras, Palmerola concession fact sheet, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Honduras's Infrastructure Secretariat let a 34-and-a-half-year concession with a fixed works period, had Congress approve it and a trust carry it, and left SAPP and a supervising consortium to hold the concessionaire to the schedule.

Preconditions

A PPP law and a regulator able to publish and enforce contract milestones
An existing site and runway that removed most land acquisition and airside risk
Private bank financing that reached financial close (August 2018) before the main works

Limits: The schedule figure is ours, computed from two dates on the regulator's fact sheet: about 60 months against a 61-month contracted period. The sheet does not say whether the works period was amended, extended or suspended, or whether 'start of operation' means full completion. The only cost figure is a reference investment set at signature. No final cost, cost overrun or state contribution is published there, so this record shows schedule performance only and is silent on cost, which is half of what the indicator asks. The terminal was built at an existing air base with a runway, which makes it an easier build than a greenfield airport. SAPP is the concession's own regulator. Other SAPP sheets carry copy errors (the EEH sheet cites airport revenues), so treat field values with care. Passenger demand, the concession's financial health and whether the airport displaced Toncontín as intended are not shown.