Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism4 of 742 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Haitisince 2010delivered and closedbears on Adult learning participation

National literacy campaigns, 2010-2015

Haiti's national literacy campaigns trained about 250,000 adults between 2010 and 2015, about 10 percent of the illiterate population, according to the education ministry's ten-year plan.

250,000 adults (approximate), adults trained in literacy campaigns, 2010-2015. Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (MENFP), Plan décennal d'éducation et de formation 2020-2030 (December 2020), republished by the MIT-Haiti Initiative, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state ran adult literacy campaigns through the education ministry's literacy apparatus, reaching an estimated tenth of the illiterate adult population over five years.

Preconditions

Volunteer or low-cost literacy facilitators
Foreign cooperation to fund materials and training
Enough stability for community classes to meet

Limits: The only figure is a rounded approximation on printed page 25 (PDF page 28) of the ministry's plan, which cites an unpublished 2017 MENFP review of the 2010-2015 operational plan; no annual series, completion or literacy test results are given. 'Trained' is not 'made literate'. The copy that opens is hosted by the MIT-Haiti Initiative, not by the ministry, whose own site does not carry the PDF. The plan places the adult literacy campaigns, itinerant courses of at most six months, under a Secretariat of State (the Secrétairerie d'État à l'Alphabétisation; printed page 21, PDF page 24), but it does not say who paid for them; Haiti's literacy work in this period drew on foreign cooperation, so the domestic share of the funding is unknown. The same page says non-formal education suffers from inadequate infrastructure, budgets and staff, and the record does not show the campaigns continuing after 2015. 2010 is the start of the reporting period, not the start of literacy campaigns in Haiti.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Haitisince 2011operating below its peakbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Routine immunization coverage, and its erosion

WHO and UNICEF estimated Haiti's national DTP3 routine-immunization coverage at 51% in 2022, down from 68% in 2011, while documenting vaccine and syringe stockouts and weak administrative reporting in the national programme.

51 % of children receiving three DTP doses, estimated dtp3 coverage, 2022. 68 % of children receiving three DTP doses, estimated dtp3 coverage at the start of the comparison, 2011. World Health Organization and UNICEF, Estimates of National Immunization Coverage: Haiti 2022 revision, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Haiti's Expanded Programme on Immunization lost routine coverage as stockouts, insecurity and weak reporting interrupted the chain from national procurement to local clinics. The decline shows how a public-health capability can erode when replenishment, supervision and data feedback fail together, even while the programme remains formally in place.

Preconditions

Reliable vaccine and syringe procurement with buffer stocks that can reach every department
A functioning cold chain and clinic network able to offer repeated doses rather than one campaign visit
Accurate child registers and district reporting that expose missed cohorts quickly enough for outreach and corrective supply

Where else it has been used: Immunization systems can recover through catch-up campaigns and community outreach, but the Haiti case warns that a formal national programme is not durable without stock management, trusted local access and data that decision-makers believe.

Limits: The 51% figure is a WHO/UNICEF estimate with low confidence and is not a direct census of vaccinated children: the profile records poor administrative reporting, national stockouts and disagreement from Haiti's Ministry of Health. The estimate does not show which districts lost coverage, whether children completed doses later, or the causal contribution of insecurity, financing, supply or clinic access; it is evidence of a reported national delivery failure, not a clean impact estimate.

Haitisince 2013operating below its peakbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

National cholera elimination drive, and the return of cholera

After Haiti's Ministry of Public Health (MSPP) and water directorate DINEPA launched the National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in 2013, the country reported no confirmed cholera case from January 2019 to January 2022, but transmission returned in October 2022 and the MSPP epidemiology directorate had reported 76,675 suspected cases in all 10 departments by 18 December 2023.

76,675 suspected cases (cumulative), suspected cholera cases reported since the october 2022 re-emergence, 2023-12-18. 3 years, consecutive years with no confirmed cholera case before re-emergence, 2019-01 to 2022-01. Pan American Health Organization / WHO, Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Situation Report #20 (27 December 2023), citing MSPP/DELR, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Haiti's MSPP and DINEPA pursued elimination through case surveillance, case-area rapid response teams and targeted vaccination, with partner financing, and drove confirmed transmission to zero. When insecurity, displacement and water-system collapse returned in 2022, the response chain broke and cholera spread back to every department.

Preconditions

Laboratory-confirmed surveillance with field teams able to reach every reported case within days
Safe water and sanitation coverage that removes the transmission route, not only emergency treatment
Enough security and sustained financing to keep response teams and supplies moving after donor attention fades

Where else it has been used: Case-area targeted response has been copied in other cholera-endemic settings, and Haiti shows it can push transmission to zero without fixing the water system, which leaves the result reversible.

Limits: The two numbers are in different units: a three-year run with zero confirmed cases is set against a cumulative count of suspected cases, so the record shows a loss of the elimination outcome, not a measured fall in a capability. Part of the apparent elimination may be under-detection; WHO reports national figures and does not audit them. Suspected-case counts depend on clinical definitions and reporting under gang violence that cut access to clinics and labs, so the 76,675 figure is likely an undercount and not comparable with the 2010 to 2019 series. The re-emergence was driven mainly by insecurity, displacement and the collapse of water supply, which the elimination plan's water and sanitation targets never fixed; it is weak evidence about the surveillance and rapid-response capacity itself. Much of the response (rapid response teams, oral vaccine, water investments) was financed and technically run with PAHO, UNICEF, CDC and NGOs, so attribution to Haitian institutions alone is partial. The started year, 2013, is the year the plan was announced and funding requested, since the PAHO page is a funding call, and not a dated start of delivery; control activities had run since the October 2010 outbreak. The secondMetric comes from a separate WHO page.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Haitisince 2008dismantledbears on Large project delivery

PetroCaribe-financed public investment programme, and its audited failure

From September 2008 to September 2016, Haiti's Council of Ministers allocated PetroCaribe oil-credit revenue to 409 public projects, and the state fuel monetisation bureau BMPAD disbursed US$1,605,905,287.84 (92.4% of the revised budget), but the Superior Court of Auditors (CSCCA) found cost and schedule overruns across the audited works, including a Cap-Haïtien street rehabilitation that ran 18% over budget and took 21 months against an eight-month contract term.

1,605,905,287.84 US dollars (cumulative, 92.4% of revised budget of US$1,738,691,909.70), petrocaribe project funds disbursed by bmpad across 409 council-of-ministers projects, 2008-09 to 2016-09. 18 % over contract amount, budget overrun on the audited cap-haïtien street rehabilitation, phase 1 (mtptc), 2010-03-18 start, completed in 21 months. Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (CSCCA), Audit spécifique de gestion du fonds PetroCaribe, rapport 3 (August 2020), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Successive Haitian governments turned Venezuelan oil credit into a parallel capital budget, approving projects by Council-of-Ministers resolution under emergency law and having ministries such as MTPTC and MPCE award contracts directly. Spending reached US$1.6 billion, but without needs analysis, cost estimates or contract supervision, many works overran, stalled or could not be verified, and the money stopped when the oil credit ended.

Preconditions

A budget channel that runs through normal appropriation and procurement rather than ministerial resolutions under emergency powers
Project preparation, costing and supervision capacity in line ministries before money is committed
An independent audit body able to follow disbursements to physical completion while projects are live, not years later

Where else it has been used: Resource-backed off-budget investment funds in other oil-credit recipients show the same pattern: rapid disbursement, weak preparation and audits that arrive after the financing has gone.

Limits: The headline number is money disbursed, not works delivered: the CSCCA itself says missing reception certificates often stop it concluding whether a contract was finished or abandoned, and it documents abandoned works such as the Miragoâne market and bus station, stopped at 35.27% progress, a figure from report 1 (31 January 2019). The court publishes no aggregate cost or schedule overrun for the 409 projects. The 18% overrun is one audited road project picked as the cost figure, with no claim that it is typical; other audited projects show overruns of 9%, 10%, 33% and 54% against contract (reports 1 and 3), and some came in under budget. Report 1 gives the Cap-Haïtien contract an 8-month term but a contractual end date of 14 May 2011 (start 18 March 2010), so the schedule overrun is 21 months against 8 or against about 14 depending on which line of the court's own sheet is read. The audit covers a sample of projects across three reports of roughly 1,000 pages each, every figure has to be read out of a PDF, and contractors contested several findings in report 3's annex. The 'dismantled' status rests on the audit ledger: the last resolution is dated 28 September 2016 and Venezuelan PetroCaribe supply then collapsed; no single Haitian text formally closing the programme was located. Projects were executed in a post-earthquake state of emergency that suspended normal procurement rules, which the court says enabled direct awards.