Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Indonesia delivered the three-package Palapa Ring fibre network to connect 57 kabupaten/kota; the communications ministry reported average utilisation of 54.35% in 2024, with the western, central and eastern packages carrying different loads.
The Indonesian state split a national backbone into regional packages and used operating partners to extend public connectivity into places where commercial demand alone was too thin, then tracked capacity and utilisation by package.
Preconditions
A public agency able to aggregate demand across remote districts
Long-term contracts that make operation viable after construction
A backbone design with common technical standards and measurable service levels
Where else it has been used: Public-private infrastructure works best when the public side specifies the underserved geography and measures use after the ribbon-cutting. Palapa Ring shows why a completed fibre route can still have a demand problem.
Limits: Network utilisation and the number of connected districts show a delivered platform and the demand placed on it, not the procurement cost, construction schedule, service reliability or whether local users can afford the resulting bandwidth. The utilisation figure is a ministry planning statistic, and its average hides large differences between the western, central and eastern packages.
๐ฎ๐ฉIndonesiasince 2021still operatingbears on University-industry collaboration
Indonesia's Directorate General of Higher Education, Research and Technology funded 427 university-industry collaboration proposals through the Kedaireka Matching Fund in 2021, its first year, and 1,093 in 2022.
The higher-education directorate built an online matchmaking platform (Kedaireka) where university staff and firms register a partnership, then paid public money to match what the partner commits, so the state funds only collaborations a partner has already put resources into.
Preconditions
A national register of lecturers and higher-education institutions to verify applicants
A ministry budget line for competitive grants that can be paid to universities within the fiscal year
Firms willing to commit cash or in-kind resources before public money is released
Where else it has been used: Matching grants for university-industry projects are common (Uruguay's ANII Alianzas para la Innovaciรณn, ury-anii-alianzas, is one in the corpus); Kedaireka's variation is the platform that requires the partnership to be registered before a proposal can be filed, which let it scale to over a thousand funded projects in its second year.
Limits: The source is the ministry's own news release, and the cited URL is an Internet Archive copy: the original host (dikti.kemdikbud.go.id) no longer answers, and the successor ministry's copy on kemdiktisaintek.go.id sits behind a Cloudflare human-verification check that this protocol does not get past. The release is self-reporting, not an annual report or audit. The counts are funded proposals, not distinct firms or universities, and the release gives no count of partner firms. Partners can be businesses, industry or government bodies ('pihak bisnis, industri, maupun pemerintahan'), so not every funded proposal is a university-firm pairing. The figures show money granted, not research or commercial results. A separate ministry release of 15 September 2022 (same archive) says 5,407 proposals were submitted in 2022 against 1,231 in 2021, so roughly one in five 2022 proposals was funded; it also reports Rp 11.2 trillion of combined ministry and partner 'collaboration funds' for 2022, which mixes partner and possibly in-kind contributions and is not used here. No funded counts for 2023 to 2025 were found at an open official source. The programme was renamed Dana Padanan for 2024 and passed to the new Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology after the October 2024 restructuring; the programme site (backoffice.kedaireka.id) lists a 2025 call and a July 2025 award announcement, which is the basis for 'operating', but not the scale of those rounds, and the 2025 budget cuts to the ministry may have reduced it.
Indonesia's Kartu Prakerja skills programme reached 18.9 million beneficiaries across the country in its first five years, with 347 accredited training providers offering 2,085 online and offline courses in 58 districts and cities in the 2024 report.
Indonesia used an end-to-end digital application, training marketplace and payment rails to move a skills benefit from central government to workers, while accrediting private providers and changing the scheme after the pandemic.
Preconditions
A digital identity and payment channel that can verify applicants at scale
A quality-assurance process for many public and private training providers
Labour-market feedback strong enough to refresh the course catalogue
Where else it has been used: The design has been studied by Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The transferable piece is the operating marketplace and evaluation loop, not the beneficiary total by itself.
Limits: Beneficiary and course counts show the reach of a training marketplace, not whether skills were retained, led to better work or were relevant to each participant. The report is produced by the programme manager, and the 58-district course figure is not the same as equal course availability in every district or a national adult-learning rate.
Indonesia's Financial Services Authority (OJK), running a regulatory sandbox since 2018 and under POJK 3/2024 since February 2024, had received 26 applications and approved 9 sandbox participants by December 2025, four of which had completed testing and been declared passed.
OJK wrote the sandbox into binding regulation, first in 2018 and again in 2024 when it took over crypto and digital-asset supervision, and used graduation from the sandbox to open a registration route for whole business models rather than for one firm.
Preconditions
A financial regulator with a statutory mandate over the new activity, here extended to crypto assets by the 2023 financial-sector law
Staff able to supervise live trials and write graduation decisions that set precedent
A pipeline of firms willing to test under supervision instead of operating offshore
Where else it has been used: Regulatory sandboxes spread from the UK FCA's 2016 model; Indonesia's version shows the sandbox being reused as the entry gate when a regulator inherits a new sector.
Limits: The count of 9 covers only the regime under POJK 3/2024, so it omits every participant tested under the 2018 regulation, and the press release gives no cumulative total since 2018. The regulator reports on its own sandbox. The release's own breakdown names 4 in testing and 4 passed, which sums to 8, so one approved participant is unaccounted for in the text. The cohort is concentrated in digital financial assets and crypto (tokenised gold, tokenised bonds, tokenised property), so breadth across financial activities is narrow. A sandbox count shows that trials run, not that rules changed because of them, although the release does say that business models matching a passed participant may register without a trial. Bank Indonesia runs a separate payments sandbox that is not counted here. The OJK site rejects requests that do not send browser-like headers (a plain curl returned 'Request Rejected'), so automated URL checks may flag it.
Indonesia's Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) health-insurance system had 275,413,133 registered participants, 97.50% of the population, by 31 July 2024; 219,263,970 participants were active.
Indonesia combined a national entitlement with a single administrative pool, subsidised poor households and required employers and local governments to enrol their populations, making portability across the archipelago possible.
Preconditions
A population register and membership identifier that can deduplicate people across schemes
A financing rule that lets the state subsidise households unable to pay
Claims and provider data capable of monitoring both coverage and active status
Where else it has been used: Near-universal insurance travels poorly when enrolment is easier than keeping contributions current. Indonesia's separate registered and active counts make that implementation gap visible.
Limits: Registration is not the same as timely access, quality of treatment or financial protection: the same report shows 56.15 million participants were inactive, including people in arrears or undergoing eligibility verification. The participant totals are compiled by the social-security council from BPJS and civil-registration data and are not an independent audit of claims or health outcomes.
๐ฎ๐ฉIndonesiasince 2014still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery
Indonesia's disaster agency runs InaRISK as an open, integrated risk-management platform; its 2024 national dashboard covered about 7,100 kecamatan and combined BNPB, geospatial, statistical, health and education data for exposure and risk mapping.
BNPB put hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity layers behind one public map, giving national and local planners a shared geography for deciding where preparedness resources should go.
Preconditions
Common administrative geographies and data standards across ministries
A technical agency able to maintain geospatial layers between disasters
Local authorities able to turn a risk map into drills, land-use rules and response plans
Where else it has been used: Risk maps travel when they are treated as operating infrastructure rather than one-off reports. InaRISK is a useful delivery case while leaving the harder questionโwhether the map changes readinessโopen.
Limits: A mapped risk and exposure layer is an input to preparedness, not evidence that warnings arrive, evacuation works or recovery is fast. The dashboard combines modelled hazards and administrative datasets that can change with new boundaries and inputs; it does not provide a comparable outcome measure of lives, assets or services protected.
Indonesia's public-works ministry reported in January 2024 that the Trans-Sumatra toll-road programme had 596 kilometres operating against a 2,749-kilometre planned network, with another 361 kilometres under construction and later phases still in planning.
Indonesia held a long corridor together through a state toll-road regulator, a state-owned lead developer and phased concessions, but the sequence exposed how land acquisition, feeder links and demand assumptions can stretch a national build over decades.
Preconditions
A regulator able to coordinate concessions, land acquisition and provincial interfaces
A credible financing and toll policy for low-demand early sections
Milestones that separate an operating link from a corridor still on a plan
Where else it has been used: Large transport programmes should publish the operating, construction and planned portions separately. Trans-Sumatra is a useful warning against treating an announced corridor as delivered infrastructure.
Limits: The 2,749-kilometre figure is the ministry's planned corridor, not a historical operating peak, so this status records a delivery shortfall rather than physical contraction. Kilometres open say nothing about land-acquisition cost, construction overruns, traffic demand, maintenance or whether the links provide value relative to cheaper roads; the source is a ministry progress account rather than an independent audit.
๐ฎ๐ฉIndonesiasince 2015still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources launched the 35,000 MW generation programme in May 2015 to be completed by 2019; by December 2022, 415 units with 16,596 MW, 47 percent of the programme, had reached commercial operation.
16,596 MW (47 percent of 35,000 MW), capacity at commercial operation, share of the 35,000 mw programme, 2022-12. 35,000 MW, original programme target completed by 2019, 2019 target, restated by the minister on 2018-03-06. Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, press release 040.Pers/04/SJI/2023, retrieved 2026-10-01.
The move, and what it needed
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources set a single national capacity target, signed PPAs and EPC letters of intent with private producers and PLN at launch, and issued pricing and licensing rules to pull IPP finance into it; when demand undershot, the minister rephased the target instead of holding the deadline.
Preconditions
A single-buyer utility (PLN) able to sign long-term power purchase agreements that lenders accept
Land acquisition and one-stop licensing rules that can move dozens of plant sites in parallel
Demand forecasts honest enough that a capacity target does not lock in surplus take-or-pay contracts
Where else it has been used: Headline megawatt targets travel easily between governments; the Indonesian case shows that the target is the cheap part, and that a rephasing announced as on target can hide a schedule miss unless the original deadline stays on the record.
Limits: This is a schedule record, not a cost record: no official source located gives the programme's budgeted against actual cost, so the cost half of the construct is missing. The 47 percent is the ministry reporting on its own flagship. It is a capacity count at commercial operation, not a measure of whether plants run, at what availability, or at what tariff burden on PLN. The target moved: launched as a need for 35,000 MW over 2015 to 2019, it was restated in March 2018 as about 20,000 MW by 2019 with the rest in 2024 to 2025, on the argument that demand grew more slowly than the 7 percent growth assumption. Even the restated 2019 milestone had not been reached by December 2022. The ministry attributes the shortfall partly to over-forecast demand, so part of the slip may be a deliberate deferral rather than a delivery failure, and a reviewer can read the low completion as prudence. Most capacity (about 70 percent of units) is built by private IPPs under PLN purchase agreements, so delivery is joint and not attributable to the state alone. The latest official progress figure found is December 2022; nothing later was verified, and the share may be higher now.