Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Iran's government replaced universal fuel and bread subsidies with a universal cash transfer of 455,000 rials (about US$40) per person per month from late 2010, then left the transfer unindexed, so that by 2019 its purchasing power had fallen to less than US$6 per person before a top-up was added in late 2019.
The Iranian government raised domestic energy and bread prices in one move and paid the savings back as a flat universal cash transfer. It then left the transfer nominal, so inflation dissolved the benefit while energy prices drifted back toward subsidy.
Preconditions
A national population and household register able to pay nearly every resident within months
Large implicit energy subsidies whose removal freed fiscal room for a transfer
A fiscal position, later hit by sanctions and inflation, that made indexing the transfer unaffordable
Where else it has been used: Cited by the World Bank as a model for Angola's 2023 fuel subsidy reform (Policy Research Working Paper 10939). The retellings stress the 2010 compensation and rarely the later erosion.
Limits: The World Bank restates every figure here from secondary sources (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2015, Enami and Lustig 2018, UNICEF 2019). It does not compute them, and no Iranian official series is cited. The two dollar figures are not comparable: US$40 converts at the 2010 rate, the 2019 figure is undated within the year and published only as 'less than US$6', and the rial's collapse after 2018 inflates the fall in dollar terms. The 'nearly in half' real decline from 2012 to 2016 is the cleaner measure, but it is published as prose and not as a number. The reversal is partial. The transfer still reached about 90 percent of households, and the government added a top-up in late 2019 and COVID-19 payments in 2020. The construct asks how fast rules change. This record shows a fast rule change in 2010 followed by about nine years in which the transfer was not changed as inflation rose. It is evidence of the second half, not a measure of speed. The figures are read from a PDF.
๐ฎ๐ทIransince 2002delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery
After the April 2002 earthquake in Kermanshah and the June 2002 earthquake in Qazvin, Zanjan and Hamedan, Iran's Ministry of Interior project unit and the Housing Foundation repaired or rebuilt about 24,000 damaged houses to seismic standards by June 2009, using government funds and a US$180 million World Bank loan, of which US$174.9 million was disbursed.
Iran's Ministry of Interior set up a project unit and handed housing reconstruction to the Housing Foundation, which tied reconstruction materials to compliance with seismic codes and trained local engineers and masons to enforce them.
Preconditions
A standing national housing body (the Housing Foundation) with rural reach and a reconstruction mandate
Government funds already committed before external finance arrived
Access to multilateral lending, which later sanctions closed off
Where else it has been used: The Housing Foundation reused the model of owner-driven rebuilding to code after Bam in 2003, with a World Bank loan approved in 2004.
Limits: The figure is self-reported by the Bank and the borrower's project unit in a completion report, and no independent audit of the houses is cited. The report contradicts itself: the results table gives 24,000 actual against a 24,200 target, the narrative says around 24,200, and a footnote gives an appraisal estimate of 29,232. The project financed materials (steel, cement and equipment) for reconstruction rather than building every house, so the count is of houses it supplied. About 59 percent of the 40,727 damaged houses are covered. The response was regional, in four provinces. It was not national, and it is not the Bam 2003 reconstruction that Iranians would name first. Schedule slipped: the loan closing moved from June 2007 to June 2009, and the indicator was achieved six months after its target date. The disaster insurance component was dropped from Bank financing at the government's request. The evidence of preparedness is limited to seismic-code training for 350 staff against a target of 200 and a public awareness campaign, with no later test against a subsequent earthquake. The figures are read from a PDF.
The Tehran Sewerage Company built interceptors, trunk mains, tunnels and a wastewater treatment plant under the first phase of the Tehran Sewerage Project at a latest estimated cost of US$359.22 million against US$341.45 million at appraisal in 2000, with the treatment works costing 189 percent of their estimate and the loan closing on 30 June 2008, two years late, before the plant and the eastern trunk main were finished.
The capital's sewerage company built the network in parallel with a design-build-operate contract for the treatment plant, letting the network race ahead on cheap domestic pipe while the plant ran late and over budget under inflation and a foreign-currency contract.
Preconditions
A domestic pipe industry able to supply at falling prices
Counterpart funds indexed for inflation, which were short here
A foreign-currency contract hedged against a weakening rial, which it was not
Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$145 million, wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The component costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36); the US$28.7 million funding shortfall, high inflation (12 to 24 percent a year) and a euro-denominated plant contract as the cause of the two-year extension are in para. 50 (PDF page 20). The total stayed near the estimate only because interceptors and laterals came in at 61 percent of estimate while the trunk main (178 percent) and treatment works (189 percent) overran, so the aggregate hides the overrun on the hardest parts. The plant and the eastern trunk main were unfinished at closing, and the report says only that the company had resources to finish them; completion was not read at a current source. The figures are 2000 to 2008 and say little about Iranian delivery under sanctions since.