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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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2 of 742 deliveries

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Iraqsince 2015still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Emergency Operation for Development, reconstruction of areas affected by terroristic operations

From September 2015 Iraqi ministries, governorates and the Reconstruction Fund for Areas Affected by Terroristic Operations used two World Bank loans totalling US$750 million (IBRD-85200, US$350 million, and IBRD-87930, US$400 million), of which US$610 million was disbursed by 30 November 2024, to rebuild water, power, roads, bridges and railway in five governorates, reaching 5 million direct beneficiaries by March 2024, with the first loan's closing date pushed six years past the original June 2020.

5,000,000 people, direct project beneficiaries, 2024-03. 72 months, extension of the first loan's closing date beyond the original (30 june 2020 to 30 june 2026), computed, 2025-01. World Bank, Implementation Status and Results Report, Emergency Operation for Development (P155732), sequence 19, archived 12 January 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The federal government channelled World Bank loans through line ministries, governorates and a dedicated reconstruction fund, rebuilding basic services in retaken cities sub-project by sub-project rather than through one master plan.

Preconditions

  • Military recovery of the territory before any rebuilding could start
  • Sovereign borrowing capacity and an international lender willing to extend the closing date repeatedly
  • A reconstruction fund and planning ministry able to register and approve hundreds of sub-projects

Limits: The figures come from a World Bank supervision report on its own loan, compiled from implementing agencies' reporting; procurement and M&E are rated Moderately Unsatisfactory in the same report, and the beneficiary count is a 'direct beneficiaries' definition that counts everyone in a served area, so it can overlap across water, power and road indicators. The project is still open, so nothing here is a completion figure, and the 72-month extension is our computation from the table, not a published delay figure. The shock is war, not a natural hazard, and the record evidences recovery, not preparation. The money is World Bank lending the government must repay, implemented by Iraqi agencies under Bank supervision, and the US$68 million repurposed to railway works in 2024 shows the scope moved with time. It covers five governorates, not the country, and the report gives no measure of whether rebuilt services were kept running after handover.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Iraqsince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Hartha power station units 2 and 3 rehabilitation, and its halt

Iraq's Ministry of Electricity set out in 2007 to restore 400 MW at Hartha power station units 2 and 3 by December 2010 under the Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project, but when the project closed on 30 June 2015 no capacity had been restored, the works were about 70 percent complete, the cost estimate had risen from US$150 million to US$187.62 million with a US$98.97 million financing gap, and the contractor withdrew from the site.

0 MW, generating capacity of hartha units 2 and 3 restored at project close (target 400 mw), 2015-06-30. 187.62 million US dollars, latest estimate of total project cost, against us$150 million at appraisal, 2015-06-30. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Iraq Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project (P087734), report ICR3577, 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The ministry tried to finish a rehabilitation begun under sanctions by contracting one turnkey supplier to install equipment bought a decade earlier, and when disputes and budget shortfalls stalled the works, it could neither fund a variation nor terminate.

Preconditions

  • Legacy equipment that tied the contract to bidders familiar with its design
  • A government budget able to fund variations and security costs, which was missing after the 2014 oil price fall
  • A contract with clear termination and dispute rules, which the report says were lacking

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated both itself and the borrower unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory, and it says blame for the delays was shared between the ministry and the contractor (para. 53, PDF page 29). The 0 MW and 70 percent figures are in the results table (PDF page 7); the cost table and the US$98.97 million gap are in Annex 1 (PDF page 43); the halt is para. 46 (PDF page 25: 'works have practically stopped'). The cost estimate excludes about US$19 million the government paid for contractor security and an unsettled price adjustment. Much of the failure came from the design: the project had to reuse equipment bought in 1999 under the Oil for Food Programme, which narrowed bidding and bred disputes, and the security situation from 2014 raised costs. The status is 'concluded' because the financed project closed and its result, no capacity restored, stands; it is a delivery failure, not a reversal, since nothing delivered was later lost and the report does not say the rehabilitation was terminated. Whether the ministry later completed the units with its own money was not read at any Iraqi source. The units are part of one station, a modest project by value; the record evidences delivery failure on a rehabilitation, not on a new build.