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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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6 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Jordansince 2015operating below its peakbears on Public-private collaboration

Utility-scale renewable power through direct proposals and IPP rounds, and the stop after 2021

Jordan's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources added utility-scale solar and wind plants selling to the grid every year from 2015 to 2021, mostly private projects under direct proposals and competitive rounds, peaking at 345 MWac commissioned in 2020, and then added none: its annual reports put grid-selling renewable capacity at 1,498 MW in 2022 and 2023 and 1,478 MW in 2024.

0 MW (stock 1,498 MW in 2022 and 2023, 1,478 MW in 2024), utility-scale renewable capacity selling to the grid added from 2022 to 2024 (computed from the reported stock), 2024. 345 MWac, utility-scale renewable capacity added in 2020, the peak year, 2020. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Jordan, Annual Report 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The ministry offered sites and long-term power purchase agreements with the state-owned single buyer NEPCO to private developers through direct proposals and competitive rounds, alongside donor-financed public plants, and added no utility-scale plant after 2021.

Preconditions

  • A single buyer, NEPCO, able to sign 20-year take-or-pay contracts with sovereign backing
  • A renewable energy law allowing direct proposals and a regulator able to license IPPs
  • Grid capacity and demand growth to absorb more contracted capacity, which the report does not discuss and which is the most likely limit

Where else it has been used: Egypt's feed-in tariff (egy-renewable-fit) and Uzbekistan's solar tenders (uzb-renewable-ipp) are the same move; Jordan is the case where the additions stopped.

Limits: The 2024 annual report's year-by-year table, 'Renewable Energy Power Generation Projects: Direct Proposals and Grants', runs over PDF pages 13 to 15 with annual totals on page 15 (134.5, 270, 14, 339.1, 235.1, 345 and 135.5 MWac for 2015 to 2021, under a note that the 2015 to 2021 list 'remain[s] as stated'); the 2021 total is a misprint for 153.5, the sum of its three projects and the figure in the 2022 report. The zero is ours, not printed: it rests on the grid-selling capacity the ministry reports, 1,498 MW in the 2022 report (https://www.memr.gov.jo/ebv4.0/root_storage/en/eb_list_page/annual_report_2022.pdf) and the 2023 report (same path, annual_report_2023.pdf) and 1,478 MW on PDF page 12 of the 2024 report, and on the 2022 report's project table also stopping at 2021; the 20 MW fall in 2024 looks like reclassification (a new 10 MW biogas and hydro line) rather than a closure. The 345 MWac peak is a commissioning year for plants contracted in earlier rounds, so it overstates the pace at which new partnerships were being signed in 2020. The table mixes private independent power producers (Masdar's Baynounah 200 MW, ACWA's Mafraq plant, the Tafila wind farms) with plants financed by Gulf, EU and Spanish grants and loans, including an Air Force plant, so not every megawatt is a partnership; we did not separate them. The reports do not say why additions stopped. What kept growing was subscriber-owned capacity under net metering and wheeling, 1,079 MW in 2022 and 1,320.8 MW in 2024, which is private investment without a public counterpart contract. The erosion is in the frequency of new joint deliveries, not in the stock, which still operates. The ministry reports on its own programme, and the stop may be a pause rather than an end.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Jordansince 2024still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

JoRegBox, the Central Bank of Jordan regulatory sandbox

The Central Bank of Jordan approved three companies on 31 October 2024, out of nine applications to the first cohort of its JoRegBox regulatory sandbox launched in February 2024, to begin testing digital financial products with real customers, among them the escrow platforms E-Damana and Watheq.

3 companies, companies approved to enter the sandbox for live testing, 2024-10-31. Central Bank of Jordan, news release 'CBJ approves three Entrepreneurial Companies to Enter the Regulatory Sandbox Environment (JoRegBox)', archived copy of 15 May 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank admits fintech firms in cohorts to test mature products with real customers under its supervision, and links the sandbox to the national financial inclusion strategy and the economic modernisation vision.

Preconditions

  • A central bank sandbox framework with published eligibility and exit rules
  • Partner banks willing to hold escrow and settlement accounts for test firms
  • A government programme that makes fintech a named priority

Limits: The live cbj.gov.jo page refused the connection, so the number was read on a Wayback Machine copy of the central bank's own release. Three is the admission decision for one cohort, the first under the JoRegBox name, and the release gives no count of firms completing the sandbox; the bank's annual report, which would carry later cohorts and exits, was not located today. The central bank had an earlier sandbox framework, which the World Bank's 2020 survey lists as operational from April 2018; the release treats JoRegBox as a new launch on 18 February 2024, and whether firms passed through the earlier framework is not shown here. The governor has been quoted in the press giving a cumulative count of tested products, which this record does not use because no official page carrying it was opened. Three admissions against about 11 million people is about 0.3 per million. The release frames the cohort as part of the government's economic modernisation programme, so the timing is partly political.

Adaptability

3 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Jordansince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

National Aid Fund temporary cash transfers to informal workers, 2020

Jordan's National Aid Fund reused the Takaful cash-transfer platform after the March 2020 curfew, opened online registration for ten days in mid-April and had paid about 150,000 newly identified households by 10 May 2020, and 237,000 households had received three months of temporary cash support by March 2021.

150,000 households, households identified and paid by the temporary cash transfer as of 10 may 2020, 2020-05-10. 237,000 households, households that had received temporary cash transfers (three months of support), 2021-03-31. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document, Jordan Emergency Cash Transfer COVID-19 Response Project (P173974), June 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The National Aid Fund opened the Takaful online registration platform to informal workers who had lost income, selected households with the Takaful targeting formula against linked administrative data, and paid them into e-wallets and bank accounts authorised by the central bank.

Preconditions

  • A cash-transfer registry and online enrolment platform built the year before
  • Central bank rules allowing the Fund to open e-wallets for beneficiaries remotely
  • Domestic charity accounts able to fund the first months before external finance arrived

Where else it has been used: The same reuse of a Takaful-style platform appears in Morocco (mar-tadamon-covid), where a health-assistance register played the role of the cash-transfer registry.

Limits: The 150,000 figure is in paragraph 60 of the appraisal document (printed page 28 of 60), and the curfew dates are in paragraphs 2 and 3 (printed page 9). The 237,000 figure is in a second World Bank document, the Implementation Status and Results Report of 26 April 2021, sequence 2 (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/429691619464662394/pdf/Disclosable-Version-of-the-ISR-Jordan-Emergency-Cash-Transfer-COVID-19-Response-Project-P173974-Sequence-No-02.pdf, page 1), which also says the transfers cost about US$114 million, of which the government paid about US$103 million through national charity accounts and the project financed US$11 million retroactively. Both documents come from the lender to the programme, and the PAD figure is an 'about'. The speed is the delivery system's, not a new law's: the Takaful platform, its registry of almost one million households and digital payments were built from 2019 with World Bank, UNICEF, WFP and other donor support, so the response mostly reused prior investment. The emergency transfer lasted three months per household and the project's own PDO indicator for cash support through the project still read zero in that report because the loan became effective only on 11 November 2020: the fast part was financed domestically. Refugees, about 655,000 registered, were outside this programme and were served by UN agencies.

Jordansince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

COVID-19 vaccination campaign

Jordan's health authorities reported to WHO that 4,821,579 people, 47 per 100 population, had received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose by 21 August 2022, from a first dose given on 13 January 2021, with 4,558,313 (45 per 100) completing the primary series.

4,821,579 people, people vaccinated with at least one covid-19 vaccine dose, 2022-08-21. 45 per 100 population, people who completed the primary series (last dose), 2022-08-21. World Health Organization, COVID-19 dashboard vaccination data (vaccination-data.csv), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Jordan's health ministry ran a national COVID-19 campaign through its primary care network and mass vaccination sites and reported progress to WHO.

Preconditions

  • A routine immunisation programme and cold chain
  • A supply of doses large enough for a national campaign, however obtained
  • Registers good enough to count who received a second dose

Limits: The figures are Jordan's own reports to WHO (DATA_SOURCE 'REPORTING'), with no independent coverage survey behind them. Completion of the primary series reached 45 per 100 and boosters 682,211 people (7 per 100), so the record shows a partial delivery. The row was last updated on 21 August 2022, earlier than most, so later doses are missing; first-dose reach stayed below half of WHO's population estimate. The VACCINES_USED field is empty, so the record cannot show which products were used or where the doses came from, and it evidences distribution only. The per-100 rates divide by WHO's population estimate. Vaccination is a response to one shock, not proof of general preparedness, and it is filed under the precedent of bol-covid-vaccination and ven-covid-vaccination as a judgement call because no hazard-specific delivery with an official figure was found for this country in this batch. The source is a CSV with no prose; the numbers are read from one row. The cited URL is the blob the WHO dashboard serves, the same one bol-covid-vaccination cites.

Jordansince 2016operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

Work permits for Syrian refugees under the Jordan Compact, and the end of the fee waiver

After the February 2016 London conference, Jordan's Ministry of Labour opened formal work permits to Syrian refugees and waived their fees. Annual permits issued rose from 36,788 in 2016 to a peak of 90,152 in 2023. In July 2024 the waiver was not extended for flexible or employer-sponsored permits, and issuance fell to 54,586 in 2024.

54,586 permits per year, work permits issued to syrian refugees in jordan, 2024. 90,152 permits per year, work permits issued to syrian refugees in jordan at the 2023 peak, 2023. UNHCR Jordan, Economic Inclusion of Syrian Refugees factsheet (June 2025), from Ministry of Labour data, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Jordan's Ministry of Labour turned a donor compact into labour-law changes: it waived permit fees, created flexible permits not tied to one employer, and let cooperatives and trade unions act as sponsors. When the donor-funded waiver lapsed in July 2024, it charged Syrians full foreign-worker fees, and issuance fell by about 40 percent.

Preconditions

  • Concessional financing tied to the refugee response that paid for the waived fees
  • A labour ministry able to issue and track permits at volume, with intermediaries such as agricultural cooperatives and unions
  • Domestic tolerance for refugee labour in sectors open to foreigners, which is what came under fiscal and political pressure later

Where else it has been used: Ethiopia's 2019 refugee proclamation and Turkey's 2016 work-permit regulation followed the same compact logic. Both kept permit numbers low relative to their refugee populations.

Limits: The construct is how fast rules and programmes change when conditions change, but a permit count measures uptake. The speed of the 2016 rule change is shown only by the timeline and the 2016 bar. The annual figures are chart labels in a one-page UNHCR factsheet, and the factsheet credits them to the Ministry of Labour. They count permits, not people: renewals, short-term and retroactive permits are all counted, so 340,000 cumulative permits overstates the number of refugees who ever held one. The World Bank and UNHCR copies disagree slightly (45,000 against 47,762 for 2019). The waiver ended in July 2024, so 2024 is only half a post-change year. The 2025 figure (35,702 to July) is partial and is not annualised here. Fall in permits is not fall in work: refugees may have moved back into informal jobs, and the series cannot show that.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Jordansince 2004delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Amman Development Corridor (Amman Ring Road phase 1), and its overrun

Jordan's Ministry of Public Works and Housing built the 40 km first phase of the Amman Ring Road under the Amman Development Corridor Project, whose estimated total cost rose from US$160.6 million at appraisal in 2004 to US$455.97 million in March 2013, with the road works alone rising from US$106.92 million to US$279.87 million, while the loan closing date moved from June 2009 to December 2012 and one of three sections was 65 percent complete at closing.

455.97 million US dollars, actual or latest estimated total project cost (15 march 2013), 2013-03-15. 160.6 million US dollars, total project cost estimated at appraisal, 2004. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Jordan Amman Development Corridor Project (P081505, Loan 7634), report ICR2661, 10 June 2013, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The public works ministry split a 40 km expressway around Amman into three sections financed by three lenders, acquired land late and at rising prices, and absorbed design changes during construction with additional financing rather than rescoping.

Preconditions

  • A land acquisition budget fixed before prices rose along an announced alignment
  • Three lenders with separate procurement and supervision rules on one road
  • A ministry able to fund overruns from the budget, which ran short in the final section

Limits: The World Bank, which financed one of three road sections (with the Arab Fund and the EIB financing the others), wrote the report and rated the outcome, its own performance and the borrower's Moderately Unsatisfactory. The costs are in Annex 1 (printed page 18): land acquisition rose from US$40.9 million to US$158.43 million and is a large part of the overrun, and the latest estimate includes US$42 million of payments due after closing to finish Section 1 and settle bills. Against the 2008 additional-financing estimate of US$343.18 million the overrun is 32 percent, so much of the growth was already recognised mid-project. The 65 percent figure for Section 1 is in the results table; the report says in para. 48 that the road remained uncertain of reaching operation 'when nearly twice the expected construction time has passed', and that the inland port and customs depot were 'gradually dropped'. The text is a scanned 2013 report with OCR errors in the data sheet. When the whole road opened was not read at an official source; 'concluded' means the financed project closed with the road mostly built.