Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism6 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration.

Kazakhstansince 2019delivered and closedbears on University-industry collaboration

Innovation Consortia Matching Grant Program (Fostering Productive Innovation Project)

Kazakhstan's innovation ministry (MDDIAI), through the Innovation Consortia Matching Grant Program of the World Bank financed Fostering Productive Innovation Project, had supported 33 technology consortia of research teams and firms, including 12 competence centres, by September 2024, whose first sales and signed contracts totalled about 17 billion tenge.

33 consortia, technology consortia supported under the innovation consortia matching grant program, September 2024. 17,000,000,000 tenge, first sales and signed contracts of productive sector consortia subprojects, September 2024. World Bank, Kazakhstan: Fostering Productive Innovation Project (P150402), Implementation Support Mission Aide Memoire, September 16 to 24, 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The ministry ran a competitive matching-grant window that paid consortia of research teams and firms to take a technology to first sales, with firms co-financing and a project unit monitoring sales and contracts.

Preconditions

Loan financing from a development bank with a project management unit able to run calls
Research teams with near-market technologies and firms willing to co-finance
A follow-on budget to keep calls running once the loan closes, which was not yet in place

Where else it has been used: The consortia window scaled up the earlier Technology Commercialization Project; its continuation depends on a second loan rather than the state budget.

Limits: The figure is the World Bank's mission account of a programme it financed, not a ministry statistic, and the number is in a PDF (paragraph 6 of the aide memoire). The sentence 'supported 33 technology consortia, including 12 competence centers, and 9 IICs' does not make clear whether the nine inclusive innovation consortia are inside or beside the 33. The aide memoire does not define a consortium's membership; the 2020 restructuring paper describes the window as a tool 'for fostering industry-science linkages' with an average 40 percent private co-financing in the first six grants, and the annex shows competence centres hosted by universities (Astana IT University, the ENU-Lab centre), but not every consortium is shown to include a university. The 17 billion tenge is first sales and contracts as reported by beneficiaries, rounded ('around'), and is not audited. The programme ran on loan money: the 2020 restructuring cut the consortia component from US$35 million to US$25.1 million, and in 2024 the ministry asked to cancel a further US$5.4 million of unused consortia grants because no new round could be run before closing (extended to June 30, 2025), so the status is concluded and a follow-on (FPIP-2) was only in preparation. The 2019 start is the year the first consortia grant agreements were signed according to the 2020 restructuring paper.

Kazakhstansince 2015still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

National and local PPP and concession contracts

By the end of 2025 Kazakhstan's central and local governments had signed 1,257 PPP and concession contracts worth 3.6 trillion tenge, of which 697 were in implementation, 1,240 were local projects mostly in social services, health, education, energy and utilities, and 17 national projects accounted for more than 1.8 trillion tenge.

1,257 contracts, ppp and concession contracts signed, cumulative, 2025. 697 projects, ppp and concession projects in implementation, 2025. Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center (national operator for PPP), briefing on PPP results for 2025, 'From the number of contracts to the quality of projects', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state set up a national PPP operator and let regional akimats sign PPP contracts for local social infrastructure, with the operator appraising projects, ranking regions each year and standardising contract documents.

Preconditions

A PPP law that lets local governments commit future budget payments to private partners
A national operator to appraise projects and publish the portfolio
Budget room for long availability-payment obligations, which is what later pushed policy towards fewer, larger projects

Limits: The figures come from the state-owned PPP Center reporting on the portfolio it promotes, at a briefing of the government's Central Communications Service; the page carries no date beyond 'results for 2025' and no table, and the Center's own homepage gives a different, later count (1,438 contracts and 3.8 trillion tenge as of 1 September 2026) that we could not reconcile with the briefing's 1,257. The gap between 1,257 signed and 697 in implementation is not explained: it mixes completed, not yet started and terminated contracts, so the share of contracts that failed is unknown. Most contracts are small local projects in social sectors, and the Center's PPP White Book describes availability payments from the budget as a standard repayment route, so many contracts may be deferred public procurement rather than shared risk; the briefing gives no split by payment mechanism. The briefing itself says the number of new contracts is falling while average project size rose from about 6 billion tenge before 2022 to 18 billion in 2022 to 2025, a policy shift away from the small local contracts that built the count. The start year is that of the Law on Public-Private Partnership of 31 October 2015, as cited in the Center's PPP White Book; the cumulative count also includes concessions signed under earlier law.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Kazakhstansince 2018still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

AFSA FinTech Lab at the Astana International Financial Centre

The Astana Financial Services Authority granted five FinTech Lab sandbox licences in 2022, saw the first participant graduate to a full licence that year, and had 18 licensed firms in its sandbox at the end of 2022.

5 firms, fintech lab licences granted (firms admitted to the sandbox) in 2022, 2022. 18 firms, licensed companies in the fintech lab at end of year, 2022. Astana Financial Services Authority, 2022 Annual Report, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Astana Financial Services Authority grants individual, time-limited FinTech Lab licences with requirements tailored to each firm, and graduates a firm to full authorisation when its test succeeds.

Preconditions

A financial centre with its own regulator and rulebook separate from the national one
Demand from foreign fintech and crypto firms for a regional base
Supervisory staff able to write firm-specific requirements

Limits: The regulator is reporting on itself in an annual report, and the counts stop at 2022. Admissions plus completions in 2022 come to six firms, which is well under one per million people. AFSA regulates only the Astana International Financial Centre, a special jurisdiction under English-style common law, so the sandbox sits outside Kazakhstan's ordinary financial regulation; the indicator sums every regulator in the country, and the National Bank and the Agency for Regulation and Development of Financial Markets are not counted here. Many participants are crypto exchanges drawn by the AIFC regime, and eight licences were withdrawn in the same year five were granted, so the counts measure churn as much as successful testing. The start year is inferred from 'fifth year' rather than stated.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Kazakhstansince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

KZT 42,500 income-loss payment during the 2020 state of emergency

During the March to May 2020 state of emergency, Kazakhstan's government paid people who lost income because of business closures and lockdown KZT 42,500 per person per month, and about 4 million people received the payment.

4,000,000 people (about), people who received the kzt 42,500 monthly income-loss payment, 2020. World Bank, Kazakhstan Economic Update, Summer 2020: Navigating the Crisis, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government declared a state of emergency and attached to it a flat monthly payment for people who had lost income because of closures and lockdown, paid through the state benefit system for the duration of the emergency.

Preconditions

Fiscal room for an anti-crisis package the World Bank put at 5.7 percent of GDP
Population and tax registers to check applicants against
A state benefit payment system already reaching most households

Limits: The figure is a rounded 'about 4 million people' in Box 1 on printed page 7 (PDF page 8) of a World Bank economic update; the Bank did not finance or evaluate the payment and relays the government's own figure. The government release with the exact count (gov.kz, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection) renders only through JavaScript and could not be opened for verification. The update gives the state of emergency's dates (quarantines from 19 March, lifted on 11 May 2020) but no date of first payment and no count of people paid in each month, so the speed claim rests on the payment having been made during an emergency that lasted under two months. The update publishes no targeting, error or rejection figures, so it cannot show how well the payment reached the people it was meant for. The update puts the whole anti-crisis package at 5.7 percent of GDP, of which this payment was one part. The payment was temporary and ended with the emergency.

Kazakhstansince 2024delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Response and housing recovery after the spring 2024 floods

Kazakhstan's government reported that during the spring 2024 floods, which it called the largest in 80 years, more than 120,000 people were rescued and placed in temporary accommodation centres, and that by December 2024 it had bought 5,767 homes, fully repaired 9,156 and built 2,680 new houses for owners of the 19,359 flooded homes inspected, while 36,455 families received one-off assistance.

120,000 people (more than), people rescued and placed in temporary accommodation during the flood period, 2024-04. 2,680 houses, new individual houses built for flood victims (64 billion tenge), 2024-12-25. Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (primeminister.kz), review '2024 zhylgy su tasqyny: azamattarga aleumettik komek, uyler men infraqurylymdar salu zhane qalpyna keltiru', 25 December 2024 (in Kazakh), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Emergency Situations coordinated a national and regional headquarters that evacuated whole settlements by land and air, and the government then used its reserve to buy housing on the market, repair, and build new houses within the same year.

Preconditions

A civil protection system able to mobilise army, police and National Guard under one command
A government reserve fund large enough to pay for housing within months
A functioning housing market from which homes could be bought quickly in the affected regions

Limits: The government reports on its own response in a press review, with no independent verification, and the page exists only in Kazakh (the English and Russian addresses redirect to the home page); figures were translated by me. 'Rescued and placed in temporary accommodation' counts evacuations, not people saved from death, and the page gives no count of deaths or of people who stayed. The housing figures answer only for homes that were the owner's sole dwelling (19,359 inspected), so second homes and renters are outside them, and the three remedies (purchase, repair, new build) add to 17,603 against 19,359 inspected by my sum, so about 1,750 cases are not accounted for on the page. The page itself says the scale could not have been forecast, which bears on preparation: the response was large but the warning system did not anticipate the event, and the President afterwards created a Committee for the Prevention of Emergencies inside the ministry. Spending figures are nominal tenge. Status 'concluded' rests on a December 2024 account; later complaints about the quality of new houses, if any, were not checked.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Kazakhstansince 2009delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China corridor (CAREC 1b and 6b)

Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads upgraded 1,281 km of the Western Europe-Western China corridor and connecting roads under a US$2.5 billion programme between 2009 and 2024, for an actual cost of US$2,468.6 million against US$2,500 million appraised, but over 15 years against a planned four and a half.

15 years, implementation duration, actual (planned at appraisal: 4.5 years), 2024. 2,468.6 US$ million, actual total project cost (appraised: us$2,500 million), 2024. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00317, South-West Roads Project (P099270), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads borrowed from the World Bank to rebuild its stretch of the Western Europe-Western China corridor to dual carriageway, procured it in large international civil works packages, and used the savings from low bids to extend the scope across three oblasts.

Preconditions

Sovereign borrowing capacity backed by oil revenue
A road agency able to run international competitive bidding under lender rules
A corridor with transit demand that neighbours and lenders also wanted built

Limits: The cost line looks on budget only because the scope was moved to fit the money: bid prices came in low and the tenge depreciated, and the savings bought 219 km of extra road, so the total says nothing about cost per km against plan. The schedule figure is the honest one, and it is poor: the closing date was extended four times, the first three to absorb added scope and the last for COVID-19 and the termination of several civil works contracts, and a 42 km Otar-Uzynagash section was still unfinished at closing after two contractors were terminated for non-performance. The source is the lender's own completion report; the World Bank financed 85 percent of the cost, so this is a borrowed-money build supervised by the lender, though executed and repaid by Kazakhstan. Traffic came in about a third below forecast. It is one corridor programme, not a portfolio, so it cannot stand for Kazakhstan's average project performance.