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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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4 of 742 deliveries

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Kyrgyzstansince 2020still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Special regulatory regimes (spetsialnye regulyativnye rezhimy) of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic

The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic approved six special regulatory regimes between October 2020 and August 2026, letting a microcredit company, three payment and e-money firms and two banks test operations outside its standing rules, judged testing successful and closed for four of them between April 2022 and February 2025, and ended one early with the licence revoked in March 2022.

6 regimes, special regulatory regimes approved and listed in the register, 2026-08-07. 4 regimes, regimes completed with testing judged successful, 2025-02-27. National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, Register of special regulatory regimes (Reestr spetsialnykh regulyativnykh rezhimov), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank grants a firm a time-limited special regime, licensed and entered in a public register with start and end dates, to test a named banking or payment operation, then records whether testing succeeded and amends its rules where it did.

Preconditions

  • A banking law provision allowing the national bank to set special regulatory regimes
  • A public register kept up to date row by row
  • Payment and e-money firms with products that standing rules did not allow

Where else it has been used: After the regime run by Regional Payment Systems, the board amended its regulations in May 2024 to remove obstacles to card acquiring by payment system operators, which is the route from test to rule.

Limits: Both counts are ours, made by reading the rows of the register page (dated 2 September 2026): it lists six regimes with approval, start and end dates, the words 'testing judged successful (regime completed)' against four, 'ended early, licence revoked' against the Bakai Bank regime (September 2021 to March 2022), and a sixth, Eldik Bank, approved on 7 August 2026 and testing until August 2027; the page itself states no total. Some regimes list partner institutions (the Interbank Processing Centre) as co-participants, so the count is of regimes, not of every firm involved. Six regimes in six years, about one a year in a country of about seven million people, is a thin flow, and the regime appears only once a firm asks for it rather than through open cohorts. The register says the national bank amended its regulations in May 2024 after the Regional Payment Systems regime, but it does not show whether the other completions led to rule changes. The register is a central bank page only; other Kyrgyz regulators were not checked.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Kyrgyzstansince 1999delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Flood Emergency Project after the 1998 southern floods

After record floods in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1998 damaged about 1,000 houses, the Department of Water Resources rebuilt or built 27.4 km of river protection embankments against 8.8 km planned, directly protecting about 40,000 people, and in 2003 a flood greater than that of 1998 passed the new embankments without significant damage or overtopping.

27.4 km, river protection embankments rehabilitated or constructed, 2004-03-31. 40,000 people (about), people living in flood zones protected directly, 2004-03-31. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Kyrgyz Republic Flood Emergency Project, Report No. 29944, 2004, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

After a record flood the water department rebuilt the failed river defences to a 1-in-200-year standard with more durable rock and gabion-mattress linings instead of patching them, and created a dedicated agency to maintain embankments.

Preconditions

  • Emergency credit available within months of the flood
  • Hydrological records long enough (from 1927) to set a design flood
  • A maintenance budget for the new agency, which the report flags as limited

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report on an IDA credit of about US$10 million and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The figures are in the outputs section and the summary of achievements; the 2003 test is described with a reference to Table 11.3 of the report, which is OCR text of a 2004 PDF. The 40,000 people protected is the report's estimate, not a count, and 'no significant damage' is the report's judgement; it also says sections downstream of the rebuilt embankments were weakened by the same 2003 floods and needed emergency repairs. The works took until March 2004 against a planned closing of September 2001, in part because floods in 2002 and 2003 swept away half-finished works and Uzbekistan closed its border to rock supplies. The record evidences preparation for the next flood at a few sites in three raions, not national flood preparedness, though the project set up a Flood and Mudflow Protection Agency responsible for some 460 km of embankments nationwide; whether that agency is still funded was not checked.

Building

2 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Kyrgyzstansince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

National Road Rehabilitation (Osh-Batken-Isfana) Project

The Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications rehabilitated 50 km of the Osh-Batken-Isfana road corridor, against about 30 km planned at approval in 2009, for a total project cost of US$52.46 million against US$30.72 million estimated, over four years and ten months instead of three, closing on 31 December 2014 instead of 30 June 2013.

52.46 million US dollars, total project cost, actual, with scope increased through two additional financings, 2014-12-31. 30.72 million US dollars, total project cost at appraisal, for about 30 km, 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Kyrgyz Republic National Road Rehabilitation (Osh-Batken-Isfana) Project (P107608), report ICR3239, 2015, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry's implementation group rehabilitated a corridor section on a World Bank credit and, delivering on budget, was given two additional financings to extend the works along the same road.

Preconditions

  • An implementation unit with a track record on other donors' road projects
  • A lender that rewards delivery with additional financing on the same corridor
  • A corridor whose remaining sections were already designed

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36), the 30 km plan in para. 1.5.2, the 50 km outturn in para. 3.2.2, and the schedule in para. 1.7.2. Most of the cost rise followed added scope: two additional financings added road length and the repair of about 350 km of Osh urban roads, both paid from the road component (US$27.29 million estimated, US$50.27 million actual), so no cost per kilometre of the corridor can be computed from the report and the record cannot separate overrun from added scope. The 18-month extension also followed the added scope. This is a 50 km rehabilitation, small against the country's network, and it says nothing about larger state-financed builds; no Kyrgyz audit was read.

Kyrgyzstansince 2002delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Bishkek-Osh road rehabilitation, third phase

The Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications completed the third and final phase of the Bishkek-Osh road rehabilitation in July 2007, bringing the rehabilitated length of the only internal surface connection between Bishkek and Osh to 463 km, with a 31.7 percent cost overrun on base cost items and civil works finished 33 months after the October 2004 appraisal schedule.

31.7 % overrun, cost overrun on base cost items, third road rehabilitation project, 2007. 33 months, civil works completion delay (appraisal schedule october 2004, actual july 2007), 2007-07. Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation Department, Validation Report PCV: KGZ 2009-40, Third Road Rehabilitation Project (Loan 1853), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Kyrgyz government, through the Ministry of Transport and Communications and a project implementation unit staffed by local consultants experienced on the earlier phases, rehabilitated its only north-south trunk road in phases over a decade, financing each phase with an ADB concessional loan and a counterpart share.

Preconditions

  • A concessional lender willing to finance the same corridor three times in succession
  • An implementation unit staffed by local consultants experienced on the earlier phases
  • Counterpart and maintenance funding from a small budget, which arrived late and only after the works ended

Limits: The record covers phase three only: 120 km of the Bishkek-Osh road and 125 km of secondary roads, not the two earlier phases. The 31.7 percent is on base cost items and is driven by the secondary roads and an added bridge ($7.6 million of the $13.6 million); main-road civil works ran 11.6 percent over per km, and total project cost rose from $50.0 million to $57.1 million, about 14 percent, because contingencies and currency gains absorbed part of the overrun. The 33 months is computed from two dates in the text, and 22 of the delay months came before construction, in loan effectiveness and bidding against a 7-month plan; one civil works contract was terminated and the supervision consultant was sanctioned. The road was 80 percent financed by an ADB concessional loan, and the validation is ADB's evaluation office reviewing ADB's own completion report; it rated the project 'less effective' pending a later performance evaluation that this record does not carry. Traffic grew about 4 percent a year against a forecast of 6 to 7, accidents rose in number and severity after the works, and the road maintenance funding covenants were not met until 2007, so nothing here shows the condition of the road today.