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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

8 of 742 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

South Koreasince 2018still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity

National Assembly Futures Institute

Korea's National Assembly enacted the National Assembly Future Institute Act on 12 December 2017 and opened the institute on 28 May 2018 with a statutory duty to predict and analyse changes in the future environment and derive mid to long term national development strategies; its English-language research report archive listed 203 reports in 2026.

203 reports, research reports listed in the institute's english-language report archive, 2026-10-02. National Assembly Futures Institute, Archive, Research Reports, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The National Assembly legislated a futures research institute attached to the National Assembly and gave it a statutory mandate for long-range national strategy, so parliament holds its own foresight capacity independent of the government of the day.

Preconditions

  • Cross-party support for a statute rather than a Speaker's initiative that could lapse
  • A parliamentary research ecosystem (budget office, research service, library) to house it beside
  • A domestic research community the institute can recruit from

Limits: The institute reports on itself. The count is a running total shown on an archive board ("Total 203"), not a dated annual figure, so asOf is the retrieval date, and it covers the English-language listing only; the Korean site organises reports differently and may hold more. The newest report in the English listing is dated 30 December 2024, so the count shows nothing published in English since then. A report count measures output, not whether any law or budget changed. The institute serves the National Assembly, not the executive, so it says nothing about foresight inside ministries. The founding dates and the Article 1 purpose come from the institute's own History and Vision pages (https://nafi.re.kr/home/eng/contents.do?menuPos=10 and menuPos=11), not from the statute text itself.

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

South Koreasince 1961delivered and closedbears on Public-private collaboration

Economic Planning Board, long-run industrial coordination

South Korea's Economic Planning Board operated from 1961 to 1994 as the government body responsible for economic development planning and budget planning before its functions moved through later finance ministries.

1961 year, year the economic planning board was established, 1961. Ministry of Strategy and Finance, ministry history, retrieved 2026-08-30.

The move, and what it needed

Planning, budgeting and economic coordination were placed in one central institution, giving government a durable route to align public investment with industrial priorities and private-sector expansion.

Preconditions

  • A centre of government with authority over development priorities and budgets
  • Administrative capacity to turn plans into financing and implementation
  • Firms able to respond to coordinated infrastructure, credit and export policy

Limits: The board's mandate and lifespan show a coordination architecture, not the independent contribution of planning to industrial outcomes or the distribution of its gains. A ministry history is an official account and is not a comparative evaluation.

Trust

1 delivery linked to Trust in public institutions.

South Koreasince 2023still operatingbears on Trust in public institutions

MyData, citizen-directed data portability

South Korea's MyData policy gives people a route to request and direct the transfer of personal data between services, with the Personal Information Protection Commission describing the scheme as a way to give people control over data portability after the March 2023 legal amendment.

2023 year, year of the legal amendment establishing the data portability right, 2023. Personal Information Protection Commission, MyData policy notice, retrieved 2026-08-30.

The move, and what it needed

The state gives people a legal route to move their own data between providers, shifting data access from a private platform choice toward a user-directed right.

Preconditions

  • A privacy authority able to define consent and portability rules
  • Interoperable data formats and secure transfer channels
  • Providers willing and able to respond to a person's authorised request

Limits: A portability right shows a legal design for user control, not whether people understand it, use it safely or receive better services. The policy notice describes the legal framework and is not an independent assessment of outcomes.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

South Koreasince 1999operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Employer and in-work training under Employment Insurance, and its erosion

Korea's Employment Insurance-funded employer and in-work training reached 4,916 thousand training participations in 2018, then fell to 2,410 thousand in 2025 after the Ministry of Employment and Labor withdrew support for statutory common training in 2019, COVID closed classrooms in 2020 and a cap on outsourced remote training took effect in late 2023.

2,410 thousand participations, employer and in-work training participations (์‚ฌ์—…์ฃผ ๋ฐ ์žฌ์ง์žํ›ˆ๋ จ), 2025. 4,916 thousand participations, employer and in-work training participations at the 2018 peak, 2018. Ministry of Employment and Labor, e-๋‚˜๋ผ์ง€ํ‘œ indicator 1500 (์ง์—…๋Šฅ๋ ฅ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ›ˆ๋ จ ์‹ค์‹œํ˜„ํ™ฉ), updated 2026-05-18, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Employment and Labor refunded employers from the Employment Insurance fund for training their staff, which drove volume up to a 2018 peak, then cut support for statutory and oversupplied courses and capped remote training to contain cost and quality problems, and participations halved.

Preconditions

  • An employment insurance fund with a levy earmarked for vocational development
  • A large market of accredited private training providers, including remote courses cheap enough to scale fast
  • A ministry willing to trade headline volume for tighter subsidy rules

Where else it has been used: Levy-refund training schemes in many OECD countries show the same arc: volume grows on cheap compliance and remote courses, then falls when the funder tightens eligibility; the volume series alone cannot tell lost capability from removed waste.

Limits: The count is person-courses (์—ฐ์ธ์›), and the page itself warns that in-work training double-counts heavily, so a halving of participations is not a halving of adults trained. The counting basis changed in 2020 from fund payment date to course start date, so 2018 and 2025 are not measured identically. The aggregate bundles several programmes (employer training subsidy, the in-work Naeil Baeum card, national HRD consortia, work-study), so it is a programme family, not one delivery. Much of the fall is deliberate: the ministry stopped subsidising statutory compulsory courses in 2019 and capped low-quality outsourced remote training in 2023, so a hostile reviewer would read the decline as pruning of low-value box-ticking courses, and the same page shows unemployed and vulnerable-group training growing from 355 thousand in 2020 to 467 thousand in 2024. The series is administrative, not a survey of adult participation, and says nothing about training firms fund without the subsidy.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

South Koreasince 2019still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Korean regulatory-sandbox system across eight sectors

South Korea expanded its regulatory-sandbox system from ICT and industrial-convergence fields in January 2019 to eight sectoral regimes by 2024, adding finance, regulatory-free zones, smart cities, R&D zones, mobility and circular economy testing.

8 regimes, sectoral regulatory-sandbox regimes operating, 2024-01. Government of the Republic of Korea, Regulatory Sandbox portal, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

South Korea created a common regulatory-sandbox architecture with temporary permits, demonstration exemptions and rapid regulatory confirmation, then added sector-specific tracks and dedicated support bodies so smaller firms could test products without negotiating every rule from scratch.

Preconditions

  • A legal framework that allows time-, place- and scale-limited exemptions while retaining safety controls
  • Specialist ministries and intake bodies able to assess experiments across finance, mobility, ICT and industrial sectors
  • A route from a successful test to regulatory revision, licensing or procurement rather than leaving pilots stranded

Where else it has been used: Sandbox systems travel when experimentation, safeguards and rule-change pathways are designed together; multiplying sector labels without review capacity creates a catalogue rather than a learning system.

Limits: The regime count shows institutional breadth, not the number of firms approved, experiments completed, commercial products launched, safety outcomes or permanent rule changes. The government portal describes the system's design and expansion but does not independently evaluate whether each sectoral track is active at the same intensity or produces net social benefit.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

South Koreasince 2009still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Korea Internet and Security Agency, a consolidated digital authority

Korea established the Korea Internet and Security Agency in July 2009 by integrating three predecessor organisations, giving the country one public body for internet development, security and international information technology cooperation.

2009 year, year the korea internet and security agency was established, 2009. Korea Internet and Security Agency, history, retrieved 2026-08-30.

The move, and what it needed

Three specialised organisations were combined into one agency so that internet development, security and international cooperation could be handled through a shared public capability.

Preconditions

  • A government willing to merge overlapping specialist bodies
  • Technical staff and institutional knowledge that can survive the merger
  • A mandate broad enough to connect infrastructure, security and cooperation

Limits: The integration date and mandate show a public response to a changing digital environment, not the agency's effectiveness against cyber threats or its performance across every programme. The agency is the source for its own institutional history.

South Koreasince 2015still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

KMA earthquake early warning service

The Korea Meteorological Administration expanded the national seismic network from 195 stations when its earthquake early warning service started in January 2015 to 550 stations, and by May 2026 issued early warnings within 5 to 10 seconds of first detection.

550 stations, seismic observation stations in the national network, 2026-05. 195 stations, seismic observation stations when the early warning service started, 2015-01. Korea Meteorological Administration, via Korea Policy Briefing (korea.kr), 15 May 2026, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The national weather agency densified the seismic network roughly threefold and tied automatic magnitude estimates to the national cell-broadcast emergency text system, so a warning reaches every phone in the affected area without a human approval step.

Preconditions

  • A national cell-broadcast channel already carried by all mobile operators
  • Budget for a decade of station build-out and telemetry
  • An agency trusted to issue automatic alerts that will sometimes be wrong

Where else it has been used: Japan's JMA system is the model; Taiwan, Mexico (SASMEX) and the United States (ShakeAlert) run variants. The Korean retelling stresses network density, because a small, densely populated peninsula has little lead time between fault and city.

Limits: This is the agency describing its own service in a government press item, in Korean. A station count is an input, and the 5 to 10 second issuance time is a stated operating standard, not a measured average over real events; the page gives no record of how warnings performed in actual earthquakes, how many were false or missed, or what share of people received the cell-broadcast text. The agency itself names the weakness: close to the epicentre, strong shaking arrives before the warning, which is why it added an on-site alert stage from 28 May 2026. Korea has had few damaging earthquakes since 2016, so the system has been tested rarely. Earlier reporting puts the 2015 issuance time at about 50 seconds, but that figure is not on this page and is not used here.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

South Koreasince 1992delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Gyeongbu high-speed railway (KTX), and its cost and schedule overrun

Korea built the Seoul to Busan high-speed line planned in 1990 at 5,846.2 billion won for opening in early 1999; by 1993 the Ministry of Transportation re-estimated the cost at 12,174.3 billion won, the first phase opened in April 2004 and the whole line opened in 2010.

12,174.3 billion won, 1993 re-estimated project cost of the gyeongbu high-speed railway, 1993. 5,846.2 billion won, original project cost in the 1990 basic plan (1989 prices), 1990. National Archives of Korea, ์ฃผ์š” ์ •์ฑ…๊ธฐ๋ก ํ•ด์„ค์ง‘ โ…ฃ ๊ตํ†ต ํŽธ, Chapter III railways (commentary on Ministry of Transportation record DA0762778), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The government committed to a TGV-based Seoul to Busan line on a rough estimate derived from conventional rail costs, discovered within a year of breaking ground that the cost had doubled, then cut scope, created a dedicated construction authority and passed a 1996 promotion act to keep the build going until it opened in stages.

Preconditions

  • A state able to keep financing a megaproject through a doubling of cost and the 1997 financial crisis
  • A dedicated construction authority and imported core technology (TGV) with a transfer agreement
  • A corridor dense enough that demand justified finishing the line despite the overrun

Where else it has been used: Later Korean lines (Honam, Suseo to Pyeongtaek) were built by the same authority with domestic rolling stock; the Gyeongbu record is the standard example of optimism bias in a first-of-a-kind national project.

Limits: The 108% increase is computed from two published figures, and it compares a 1993 re-estimate with the 1990 plan, not the final outturn with the plan; the price basis of the re-estimate is not stated, so part of the gap may be inflation. The final outturn cost was not taken from an opened source. The 1993 plan cut scope (underground Seoul, Daejeon and Daegu sections replaced with upgraded existing alignments) to save 1.43 trillion won, so the delivered line is not the planned one, and phase one ran on electrified conventional track south of Daegu. The archive commentary is written by an outside researcher; the figures are read from a scanned-document PDF. The record documents overrun on one megaproject, not Korea's general project delivery performance.