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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Laossince 2005still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Nam Theun 2 hydropower concession

The Government of Lao PDR granted a build-operate-transfer concession for the 1,070 MW Nam Theun 2 plant to the Nam Theun Power Company, in which it held 25 percent through Lao Holding State Enterprise; the plant was completed in 2010 in 58.5 months, 4.5 months over plan, at US$1,308 million against a US$1,250 million base estimate (US$1,450 million with contingencies), and paid the government US$180 million in net revenues from 2010 to 2017.

180 million US$, net revenues from nt2 to the government of lao pdr, 2010 to 2017, 2017. 1,070 MW, installed capacity delivered (995 mw for export to thailand, 75 mw for the lao grid), 2010. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Implementation Completion Report Review, Lao PDR Nam Theun 2 Social and Environment Project (2019), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government granted a concession running to 2034 to a special-purpose company, took a minority stake through a new state holding company financed by multilateral loans, and relied on a long-term export power purchase agreement with a Thai buyer that made the debt bankable, with royalties, taxes and dividends earmarked to poverty programmes under a revenue management agreement.

Preconditions

  • A creditworthy foreign buyer for most of the power under a long-term contract
  • Multilateral guarantees covering political and regulatory risk that commercial lenders would not take
  • A government willing to accept an external revenue management and audit regime

Limits: The World Bank financed and guaranteed the project (an IDA grant and a US$50 million partial risk guarantee), so the review is the lender's evaluation unit grading a flagship; it rates the outcome Satisfactory. The figures are in a PDF (cost and financing in the project data section, completion time and capacity and the revenue figures in the efficacy section). The US$180 million is net of nothing the review can confirm: it notes that the US$30 million a year target should be reduced for the government's repayments of the ADB and EIB loans that bought its 25 percent stake, information the Bank team could not provide, so the true net figure is uncertain. Revenue was about US$25 million a year, below the appraisal's US$30 million for the early years, and the much larger US$110 million a year expected after 2020 is a projection, not a result. Equity came from EDF, Italian-Thai Development and EGCO, debt from 14 commercial banks and multilaterals; the delivery is a foreign-led consortium that the state contracted and part-owns, and most of the output is exported to Thailand rather than serving Lao consumers. The resettlement and environmental programme, which the project was also judged on, is not covered by these numbers. The start year, 2005, is our inference from completion in 2010 after 58.5 months. The review also records that by 2014 a significant portion of NT2 revenues were being deposited directly into the Treasury rather than through the agreed special account, which weakened the earmarking of revenue to poverty programmes.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Laossince 2010delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Typhoon Ketsana road recovery under the Road Sector Project

Laos's Ministry of Public Works and Transport repaired about 1,100 km of roads, including small and wooden bridges, damaged by Typhoon Ketsana in September 2009 across five southern provinces, out of about 1,842 km the post-disaster assessment found damaged, through a recovery component budgeted at US$8.8 million, and in 2011 used the contingency fund the project created to spend US$3.63 million repairing 28.6 km of National Road 13 North after Typhoons Haima and Nock Ten.

1,100 km, ketsana-damaged roads repaired and improved as per specifications, 2017-02-22. 1,842 km, roads severely or partially damaged by typhoon ketsana (post-disaster damage, loss and need assessment), 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lao PDR Road Sector Project (P102398), 27 March 2018, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The public works ministry folded post-typhoon road repairs into a running road project and created a standing contingency fund that it could draw on within weeks of the next storm.

Preconditions

  • A damage assessment done soon after the event
  • A road project already under way with procurement in place
  • A contingency line the ministry can trigger without a new loan

Limits: The damaged length is in paragraph 3 (page 5), the component in paragraph 11, the contingency fund use in paragraph 33, and the 1,100 km result in the results annex, all read from the plain-text version. The results table dates the achievement to February 2017 against a revised target date of September 2012; paragraph 32 says 55 percent of the damaged roads, against a target of 60 percent, had been rehabilitated by the end of 2011, about two years after the storm, and that the remaining 45 percent was completed by the government with other funds, at a date the ICR does not give. The 1,100 km is a rounded target reported as met, not a measured count. The repair money came from the IDA Crisis Response Window, and the component spent US$10.6 million against US$8.8 million at approval (Annex 3), so the delivery is the ministry's but the financing was external. The World Bank rated the project Highly Satisfactory.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Laossince 1997delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Road No. 13 South upgrading under the Third Highway Improvement Project

Laos's Ministry of Communication, Transport, Post and Construction upgraded about 200 km of Road No. 13 between Banlak 35 and Pakse to a bituminous standard, completed in March 2002, at US$157,785 per km against an appraisal estimate of US$209,670 per km, and the project closed on its original June 2003 date at US$63.78 million against US$68.92 million appraised.

157,785 US dollars per km, actual unit cost of upgrading road no. 13 south (calendar 2002 dollars), 2002. 209,670 US dollars per km, appraisal unit cost estimate (sar), 1997. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Lao PDR Third Highway Improvement Project, 26 May 2004, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry upgraded a 200 km trunk road under two international contracts and ran a multi-year routine and periodic maintenance programme alongside it.

Preconditions

  • International competitive bidding that attracted capable contractors
  • A maintenance fund to protect the upgraded road
  • Grant finance from a second donor for bridges

Limits: The unit costs are in section 4.3 of the ICR and the totals in Annex 2 (printed page 30), read from the plain-text version; the record states the two published unit costs and does not compute a percentage. The saving is on unit cost, not on the road works line: Annex 2 shows Roads No. 13 and A-1 at US$34.58 million against US$33.45 million appraised even though the A-1 bypass was removed and financed under another project, and the project total came in under appraisal only because physical and price contingencies of US$9.96 million were not needed (actual US$63.78 million against a US$58.96 million baseline before contingencies). The Annex 3 table labels both unit costs 'Calendar 2002 US$ per km' and puts the contract cost at US$153,785, so the actual came in at 103 percent of contract; the 25 percent saving is against the appraisal estimate, which was set before the 1997 Asian crisis and may have been pessimistic. Actual construction took 45 months against 42 contracted, 7 percent longer. Annex 2 prints 88 percent beside the road works line although its own figures give 103 percent, so the table is not internally consistent. JICA separately financed 44 bridges on the road, about six of whose approaches still showed unacceptable settlement. The World Bank wrote and rated the report, and it describes a delivery finished more than 20 years ago.