Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Lithuania's Government Strategic Analysis Center (STRATA) followed six thematic public discussions on the country's future in May and June 2022 with nine foresight studies on megatrends and scenarios by policy area, which fed the vision and strategic ambitions of the draft state progress strategy Lietuva 2050.
The government's strategic analysis centre ran public thematic discussions, commissioned studies that turned their megatrends into sector scenarios and SWOT analyses, and used them in workshops that drafted the long-term state strategy.
Preconditions
A government-owned analysis centre with a mandate in strategic planning
A strategy cycle that asks for a long-term vision
Experts and citizens willing to take part in discussions
Limits: The live site (https://strata.gov.lt/) returned 403 to scripts, so an archived copy was read. The counts are stated by the centre about its own work and measure output, not influence; the page does not date each study, and 2022 is the year of the discussions. The exercise was tied to one strategy, so it shows a foresight delivery and not, by itself, a standing foresight function; STRATA's wider role (research, impact assessment, training) continues but was not counted. Whether the final Lietuva 2050 strategy adopted the scenarios was not read.
Lithuania's Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology (MITA) funded 815 innovation-voucher projects in three calls from 2012 to 2014, in which small firms bought applied research, experimental development or feasibility services from universities and research institutes, and 776 of them were completed successfully.
The innovation agency gave small firms a fast, small grant that could only be spent on research services from accredited universities and research institutes, to make a first contact between the two cheap and quick.
Preconditions
A list of research services that universities and institutes are able and allowed to sell
A simplified application procedure so very small firms can apply
Structural fund money willing to finance many small grants despite the administrative cost
Where else it has been used: Innovation vouchers began in the Netherlands (Limburg, 1998) and spread across Europe; the Lithuanian evaluation found the EU-funded version carried higher administrative costs than the earlier nationally funded pilot of 2010 to 2012.
Limits: The report was commissioned and paid for by the ministry and written by a consultancy, and the copy that opens is held by SIPER, an academic repository of innovation policy evaluations, not by the ministry; the counts themselves come from MITA's activity reports for 2012 to 2015, which the evaluation cites. The figures are on printed page 19 (PDF page 19) of a 112-page PDF, with the call-by-call table (Table 6: 185, 174 and 456 funded applications). Each voucher was small, up to 5,792.4 euros at up to 80 percent public funding, so a project is a short service purchase rather than joint research, and 104 firms were funded in two calls, so 815 projects are fewer distinct firms. The third call relaxed the private contribution and favoured firms with no prior research contact, which raised volume. The vouchers were EU structural fund money and the measure ended with the 2007 to 2013 period; a successor, 'Inovaciniai ฤekiai', was being prepared for 2014 to 2020 and is not covered here.
๐ฑ๐นLithuaniasince 2009still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration
Lithuania's state and municipal institutions had concluded 76 public-private partnership contracts by 31 December 2025, 49 of them in force at the end of 2025 across culture and sport, waste, energy, law enforcement, education, transport and defence, with only one new contract signed in 2025.
A central agency advises and monitors, and individual ministries and municipalities procure PPP contracts for buildings, lighting, waste and defence facilities, reporting each year so the agency can publish a national portfolio.
Preconditions
A PPP law with a central agency that collects data from every contracting authority
Municipal borrowing limits that make off-budget delivery attractive
Eurostat treatment of the contracts, which decides whether they count against the deficit
Where else it has been used: Latvia's single large road deal (lva-kekava-ppp) is the alternative model; Lithuania now plans larger transport PPPs (a regional road and bypasses worth EUR 20 to 250 million) on top of its many small municipal ones.
Limits: CPVA compiled the figures from data submitted by state and municipal institutions; it is the national PPP centre, not an auditor, and the underlying annual report is linked from the page but was not opened. Most contracts are municipal (24 municipalities in 2025), so the count mixes national objectives such as defence and law enforcement, where the public sector made its largest payments in 2025 (EUR 32.5 million and EUR 10.3 million), with local sports halls and street lighting. A contract count says nothing about value for money; the National Audit Office has published a critical audit of PPP project management (valstybeskontrole.lt), which this record has not read. The gap between 76 concluded and 49 in force is not explained on the page (expiry, termination or both). The pace is slow: one contract in 2025, and 18 projects planned for 2026 that are still in preparation. The start year 2009 is the year of the finance minister's reporting rules (order 1K-489 of 24 December 2009) cited on CPVA's statistics page, not a documented first contract.
The Bank of Lithuania opened its regulatory sandbox to applications on 15 October 2018 and, by the page's last update on 27 June 2025, listed one innovation ever tested in it: UAB Workpower's peer-to-peer insurance platform, authorised on 13 June 2019 and tested from 24 October 2019 to 23 October 2020, which led the bank to draft proportionate rules for P2P insurance.
The central bank offered live testing under supervision for financial innovations new to the Lithuanian market and used its one completed test to write proportionate guidelines for peer-to-peer insurance.
Preconditions
A regulator with authority to set test conditions under existing licences
Firms whose model does not fit existing licences, which in Lithuania were few because licensing was already fast
A route from test results to guidelines
Where else it has been used: The single test did travel into rules: the bank's 2021 news says it would issue P2P insurance guidelines, the sandbox-to-rule step that most sandboxes lack.
Limits: The live page (https://www.lb.lt/en/regulatory-sandbox) returned a bot challenge and 403 to scripts, so the archived copy was read; it carries the bank's own 'last update' date of 27 June 2025. The count is one firm in about seven years, so the regime exists but barely delivers; the page's heading 'Financial innovations currently tested' still shows a test that ended in 2020. The bank's better-known LBChain blockchain platform, which 11 fintechs from 8 countries used during development to May 2020 (https://www.lb.lt/en/lbchain, archived), was a technical test environment without regulatory relief and is not counted. The bank also runs a newer sustainability-report test under the GFIN initiative (news of 16 July 2021) that is not listed as a firm test on the page. Lithuania's high fintech licensing volume runs through ordinary licensing, not this sandbox.
The European Court of Auditors found in 2016 that Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant decommissioning had pushed its end date back by a further nine years since 2011 to 2038, that the interim spent fuel storage facility was ten years behind the 2005 decommissioning plan, and that the estimated decommissioning cost had risen 15 percent from 2,930 million euros in 2011 to 3,376 million in 2015, and 67 percent since the 2010 estimate.
A state enterprise decommissions a large Soviet-designed plant under EU accession commitments, building fuel and waste storage through international contracts paid by an EU fund, and its end date moves each time a key facility is delayed.
Preconditions
EU accession-linked funding that covers most of the cost
Reliable design records of the plant being dismantled, which were missing here
Contract management capacity strong enough to resolve disputes with foreign suppliers quickly
Where else it has been used: Slovakia's Bohunice V1, funded under the same arrangement, held its end date until 2025 and then slipped to 2029 (svk-bohunice-v1).
Limits: The figures are in a PDF: the 2038 end date and the nine-year postponement in paragraph 60 (PDF page 38), the ten-year delay of the interim spent fuel storage facility in Table 6, the 67 percent rise in paragraph 73 (PDF page 44) and the 2011 and 2015 estimates in Table 8 (PDF page 46). The report is ten years old and the current end date and cost estimate were not checked at a Lithuanian source; the Lithuanian audit office's site (valstybeskontrole.lt) returned a Cloudflare challenge. The ECA audits EU spending, and the EU funds most of the programme, so the figures describe a jointly financed delivery carried out by the state enterprise Ignalina NPP. Decommissioning is a stretch for 'major public infrastructure projects': it builds waste and fuel storage facilities and dismantles a plant, and the report says delays came partly from contractual disputes with a foreign contractor and from poor information on how the Soviet-built plant was constructed. The started year is approximate: 2010 is the base year of the ECA's cost comparison, and the report does not give a start date for decommissioning itself.