Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism5 of 742 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Moroccosince 2007still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity

Institut Royal des Etudes Stratégiques (IRES)

Morocco's Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, announced in the 2003 Throne Speech to strengthen the country's capacities for analysis, adaptation and anticipation and created by Dahir No 1-07-183 of 30 November 2007, published the twelfth edition of its strategic dashboard on Morocco's international positioning on 28 November 2024 and was still issuing general reports in 2025.

12 editions, editions of the strategic dashboard 'tableau de bord stratégique: évolution du positionnement international du maroc', 2024-11-28. Institut Royal des Etudes Stratégiques, Publications: Rapports généraux (list page) and Présentation de l'IRES, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The head of state created by decree a strategic studies institute with a small project-based staff and associated researchers, which runs recurring monitoring products, national surveys and studies on questions he refers to it.

Preconditions

A head of state who commissions long-range studies directly
A decree giving the institute a standing mandate and a guidance committee appointed from the top
Associated academics to staff time-limited study projects

Limits: The institute reports on itself, and the figure is an edition number in the title of a listed report, not a count of output the institute publishes. The dashboard tracks Morocco's position in international indicators, which is strategic monitoring (veille) rather than scenario-based foresight, and the institute describes itself as a think tank, a watch function and a forum, working on questions referred by the King; the mandate and the Dahir are on the presentation page (https://www.ires.ma/fr/ires/presentation), where the 2003 Throne Speech that announced it names anticipation as its purpose. It sits outside the elected government, attached to the monarchy, so it is a centre-of-state body rather than a cabinet unit, and nothing read today shows its work entering a government decision. The page gives no budget, staff count or total of reports. Started is 2007, the year of the founding Dahir; the publication list begins in 2009.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Moroccosince 2015still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Agence Nationale de Lutte contre l'Analphabetisme literacy and post-literacy programmes

Morocco's national literacy agency (ANLCA) and its partners registered 763,744 adults in literacy programmes in 2023-2024, 570,507 at level 1 literacy and 193,237 in post-literacy, with about 81 percent of level 1 registrants women and 62 percent rural.

763,744 registrants, registrants in literacy programmes (level 1 literacy plus level 2 post-literacy), 2023-2024 programme year. 570,507 registrants, registrants in level 1 literacy programme (alpha) only, 2023-2024 programme year. Agence Nationale de Lutte contre l'Analphabetisme (ANLCA), Alphabetisation, Indicateurs page, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A national agency funds and certifies literacy classes that associations, the religious affairs ministry and other departments run in villages, mosques and neighbourhoods, and counts registrants each programme year.

Preconditions

A dense civil-society network able to host classes close to where adults live
State subsidy that pays associations per class, with EU budget support at the margin
A registration system that collects counts by programme, region, sex and residence

Limits: The agency reports on its own programmes and the page carries no publication date. The counts are registrations, not completions or people who became literate: the Cour des comptes (annual report 2023-2024, principal axes, pages 49 to 52) found an average attendance index of about 40 percent and an assiduity index of 43 percent in 14,263 inspected classes over 2019 to 2022, so attendance is far below registration. Delivery runs mostly through civil-society associations under agency contracts (385,442 of the 570,710 level 1 registrants in the page's partner table) and through the Ministry of Habous mosque programme (165,290), so the agency finances and certifies rather than teaches; the partner table total (570,710) differs by 203 from the headline level 1 figure (570,507), and the page does not explain the gap. Literacy courses are basic education, which is only part of the adult learning construct. Press reports, citing the agency and the Cour des comptes, put registrations at over one million in 2023; that figure was not found at an official URL this protocol could open, so no peak is claimed, but if it holds for 2022-2023 the 2023-2024 count is about a quarter lower. The 2015 start is the year the Cour des comptes gives for the launch of the agency's programmes, not a date on the cited page.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Moroccosince 2020still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Catastrophe insurance regime and the Solidarity Fund against Catastrophic Events (FSEC)

Morocco's dual catastrophe insurance regime under Law 110-14 took effect in January 2020. It offered private cover to close to 9 million insured people and set up the FSEC, financed by a parafiscal levy, for the uninsured. After the September 2023 Al Haouz earthquake, the government deployed the FSEC for the first time, and it mobilised US$300 million to compensate uninsured victims.

300 US$ million, compensation funding mobilised by the fsec for uninsured victims of the al haouz earthquake (us$25 million from reserves plus us$275 million from sovereign reinsurance), 2023. 9 million people, people insured against bodily injury in catastrophic events under the private scheme, 2022. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00006503, Morocco Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Loan with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (P168580), June 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Economy and Finance legislated a two-tier regime. Private insurers carry catastrophe cover for people who already hold policies. A public fund, paid for by a parafiscal levy and backed by sovereign reinsurance, gives basic compensation to the uninsured once the government declares an event a catastrophe.

Preconditions

An insurance market with a policy base wide enough to carry catastrophe cover, and a levy base to fund the public tier
An Interior ministry able to declare a catastrophe and register uninsured victims through local agents and an online portal
International reinsurance capacity and World Bank technical and financial backing for the design

Limits: Both sources are the World Bank reporting on reforms it financed: an FSEC programme-for-results loan and a Cat DDO whose prior actions were these reforms. The US$300 million is money mobilised, not money paid to households. The ICR says the compensation process was still under way in June 2024 and gives no count of victims compensated. Nothing here shows what share of the earthquake's losses the regime covered. The 9 million and 6 million figures are coverage estimates from a 2022 results brief, not counts of policies or payouts. The regime's one real test is a single earthquake. One of the Cat DDO's own result indicators was missed by a wide margin: Interior ministry officials trained on victim registration stood at 7.4 percent against a 90 percent target. The audit of the FSEC's internal controls had not been completed. The two World Bank documents disagree on the law's date: the ICR says Law 110-14 was promulgated in 2016, while the brief says it was adopted in 2018. Started is therefore the year the regime took effect. The headline figures are read from a 45-page PDF and a web page.

Moroccosince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Tadamon emergency cash transfers to informal workers, 2020

Morocco created a Special Pandemic Fund in March 2020 and, through its Tadamon budget line, paid emergency cash transfers of MAD 800 to 1,200 to households of informal workers, reaching 4.2 million households in the first wave in April 2020 and 5.45 million across the first and second waves, for a total of MAD 16.15 billion by October 2020.

5,450,000 households, households reached by the first and second waves of tadamon emergency cash transfers, 2020. 4,200,000 households, households reached by the first wave, paid in april 2020, 2020-04. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document, Morocco COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Project (P172809), November 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Economy and Finance opened a dedicated budget line in a pandemic fund, used the RAMED health-assistance register to pay listed informal-worker households by mobile phone without a new application, and opened a one-week web platform for informal households outside the register.

Preconditions

A large existing register (RAMED, about 30 percent of the population) with household composition and phone contacts
A payment channel that could reach unbanked households through mobile cash withdrawal
A fund able to pool budget and private contributions within days

Where else it has been used: The emergency transfers fed directly into the 2020 royal social protection reform and the unified social register; RAMED was replaced by AMO-Tadamon in December 2022.

Limits: The figures are in paragraphs 13 and 14 of a PDF (printed pages 12 and 13 of 103, PDF page 18): 4.2 million households in the April 2020 first wave, 1.25 million added later through the grievance mechanism, 5.45 million across the first two waves (2.8 million RAMED and 2.65 million non-RAMED), a third wave in July 2020, and MAD 16.150 billion paid by October 2020. The World Bank wrote this appraisal to finance the programme retroactively (US$160 million for the Tadamon transfers), so it is a lender describing a programme it was about to fund, not an independent evaluation, and the document gives no exact payment dates beyond the month. Speed is shown only in months: the fund was set up in March 2020, enrolment for non-RAMED households was open on 10 to 16 April, and the first wave was paid in April. The 5.45 million counts households paid at least once, not households kept whole: transfers were flat amounts by household size and stopped after three waves. The 1.25 million added through grievances means the first list missed about a fifth of the households it finally paid, so targeting was fast but rough. The fund was financed in large part by contributions from public enterprises, banks, firms and individuals, not only the budget.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Moroccosince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Noor-Ouarzazate solar complex

Morocco's solar agency MASEN had the Noor-Ouarzazate I, II and III concentrated solar plants (510 MW) built, grid-connected and fully operational by October 2018, at a completed capital cost of US$1,962 million, about 7 percent below the appraisal estimate of US$2,093 million. Noor II and III then generated an average of 739 GWh a year in 2019 to 2023, against the 1,144 GWh expected at appraisal.

1,962 US$ million, completed capital cost of the noor-ouarzazate complex (appraisal estimate us$2,093 million), 2024. 739 GWh per year, average annual generation of noor-ouarzazate ii and iii, against 1,144 gwh expected at appraisal, 2019-2023. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00043, Morocco Noor Solar Power Project (P131256, P164288), March 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

MASEN, the state agency set up for the Moroccan Solar Plan, tendered the plants to private developers under power purchase agreements and sat between them and the national utility ONEE. A World Bank-financed cost mitigation mechanism covered the gap between the solar tariff and what the utility paid.

Preconditions

Concessional finance pooled from the World Bank, KfW, AfDB, EIB, the EU and AFD, coordinated by one national agency
A state buyer willing to absorb a tariff above the cost of grid power for the life of the contracts
A site with high direct irradiation where the state delivered land, access, water and grid evacuation before the developers arrived

Where else it has been used: Morocco tried the same structure at Noor-Midelt. Construction had not started by June 2024, and Noor-Midelt II was redesigned as photovoltaic plus battery storage, because PV and battery costs fell while CSP costs did not.

Limits: The lender graded its own project here. The World Bank financed it, and the report rates the outcome 'Moderately Unsatisfactory', with efficacy and efficiency both 'Modest'. The cost figure is the Bank's economic-analysis number for the Ouarzazate plants. A footnote says it nets a 14 percent saving at Noor I against an overrun at Noor III. On schedule the report gives no figure, only that Noor II and III were built 'with a delay of just a few months'. Cost was on budget, but output was not. Generation ran about 35 percent below the appraisal expectation. Noor II missed its peak-hour share, at 32 percent against a 41 percent target. The Noor III tower plant had two prolonged outages caused by cracks in its molten salt tank: September 2021 to December 2022, and April 2024 to at least October 2024, when the report says it was still offline. The second phase financed under the same operation, Noor-Midelt, had not started construction by the June 2024 closing date. The project therefore delivered 510 MW against a 1,310 MW target. The economic rate of return was negative without carbon benefits. Generation-mix forecasts did not materialise either: coal's share rose to almost 70 percent by 2020. The capital came largely from concessional international lenders, with about US$4.1 billion disbursed from all financiers. A copy of this design would need that finance. All figures are read from a 40-page PDF.