Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism4 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Malisince 2003dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Transrail concession of the Dakar to Bamako railway, and its collapse

Mali and Senegal concessioned the 1,288 km Dakar to Bamako railway to Transrail in 2003 for 25 years, terminated the concession on 5 December 2015 after it failed, and rail traffic, which at its peak had carried about 1.5 million tons of freight a year, stopped completely in 2018.

0 tons (traffic stopped completely), freight and passenger rail traffic on the dakar to bamako line after the concession's termination, 2018. 1.5 million tons, freight carried by the dakar to bamako railway at its peak (about), peak (year not stated). World Bank, Concept Project Information Document, Dakar-Bamako Intermodal Corridor Project (P171122), September 2019, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Two governments handed a run-down binational railway to a private consortium in a single full concession covering track and operations, keeping minority stakes; the operator could not fund maintenance from traffic revenue, service degraded, the states terminated the contract and the line stopped.

Preconditions

A track and rolling stock base good enough for operating revenue to fund maintenance, which was missing
A concession design that separated infrastructure funding from train operations, which was missing
Two governments able to coordinate oversight of one operator across a border

Where else it has been used: The PID places it in a wave of full rail concessions in Sub-Saharan Africa and draws the lesson that infrastructure funding should be separated from train operations, which is the model the follow-on corridor project proposes.

Limits: The facts are in paragraphs 7, 9 and 16 of a concept-stage document (pages 4 to 6 of 14 in the plain-text version); the zero is the document's statement that traffic 'stopped completely in 2018', not a published tonnage, and the 1.5 million ton peak has no year, so it may predate the concession. The World Bank supported the wave of African rail concessions this one belonged to and is preparing the follow-on corridor project, so the publisher is not neutral about why it failed; the PID also says both governments ignored the Bank's advice to restructure the concession as a lease. The concession was binational: Senegal is an equal party and the record is filed under Mali, where Transrail was headquartered, but it describes both states' collaboration. The PID's diagnosis is shared blame: a 'full concession' design that made the operator pay for track and trains from revenue that could not cover both, decades of underinvestment by both governments before 2003, and road competition after the 2002 Cote d'Ivoire crisis sent Mali's trade through Dakar. After termination both governments paid staff salaries through an interim company (Dakar Bamako Ferroviaire) with a heavy fiscal cost.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Malisince 2021delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Programme Gouvernemental de Transferts Monetaires d'Urgence COVID-19 (PGTMU)

Mali's government launched its own emergency COVID-19 cash transfer programme in 2021, paying one-off transfers to 400,000 poor households across the country through the targeting and payment systems built by the Jigisemejiri safety net project, and kept it running in 2022, but only FCFA 42 billion of the FCFA 100 billion budgeted was disbursed because of the political crisis.

400,000 households, households covered by the pgtmu one-off emergency transfers, 2022. 42 billion FCFA, pgtmu funds disbursed against fcfa 100 billion budgeted, 2022. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Mali Emergency Safety Nets Project (Jigisemejiri, P127328), March 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government funded an emergency transfer from its own budget and ran it through the social registry, targeting procedures and payment contracts that a donor project had built over a decade, so it could reach 400,000 households without building new machinery.

Preconditions

A social registry (RSU, over 1.1 million household records) and a government safety net unit (UTGFS) already in place
Budget room for a FCFA 100 billion programme, which in the event only partly materialised
Political stability to sustain disbursement, which the 2020 to 2022 crisis undercut

Where else it has been used: The same reuse of donor-built delivery systems as civ-ptmp-covid; Mali's case shows a government paying with its own money, and the budget gap shows the limit of that.

Limits: The numbers are reported by the World Bank about a programme it did not finance, in paragraph 42 of the ICR of its own project (page 18 of 67 in the plain-text version), with no government source cited and no date of first payment; the 400,000 is a round figure and the ICR does not say whether it counts households paid or households planned. Elsewhere the ICR says 'approximately 400,000 households'. The response was slow: the programme was launched in 2021, a year or more after the first COVID-19 measures, and only 42 percent of its budget was disbursed (computed by us from FCFA 42 billion of 100 billion) because of the political crisis that followed the coups of August 2020 and May 2021. The same paragraph records that the government's regular safety net budget line (PGFS) disbursed FCFA 6.2 billion of 12.5 billion over 2017 to 2022. The ICR also records World Bank disbursement suspensions to Mali in August 2020, May 2021 and January 2022 for a cumulative 18 months (page 27), which slowed the systems the transfer relied on. A one-off transfer does not show a lasting change in the rules.

Malisince 2014delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Mali's 2014 Ebola containment

After Mali confirmed an imported Ebola case on 23 October 2014 and a second, unrecognised imported case started a chain of seven further cases in a Bamako clinic, the government with WHO and partners identified and followed 433 contacts for 21 days, set up a hotline receiving about 6,000 calls a day, built isolation and treatment facilities, and ended monitoring of the last contacts on 15 December 2014.

433 contacts, contacts identified and followed up for the 21-day incubation period, 2014-12-15. 6,000 calls per day, calls per day to the ebola telephone hotline (approximate), 2014-11. World Health Organization, One year into the Ebola epidemic: Successful Ebola responses in Nigeria, Senegal and Mali (January 2015), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Mali's government, on alert since a false alarm in April 2014, traced every contact of two imported cases with medical students trained in epidemiology as extra tracers, isolated them, and used a hotline to find rumours and suspected cases.

Preconditions

A biosafety laboratory in the capital able to confirm the virus within days
Months of preparedness work and a rehearsal before the first case
A pool of trainable people, here medical students, to scale contact tracing quickly

Where else it has been used: Nigeria (nga-ebola-response) ran the same playbook three months earlier, and the WHO page groups the two as models.

Limits: The page is a WHO narrative written to present the response as a success, not a dataset, and it was written before Mali was declared free of transmission (WHO says that would happen on 18 January 2015 if no further cases arose). The second chain shows a detection failure: a patient from Guinea was admitted to a private clinic in Bamako with a diagnosis of kidney failure and died, and seven further cases followed, five of them fatal, including a doctor and a nurse who treated him; the page does not give a single total for cases and deaths. WHO and partner staff already in the country for preparedness shifted to the response, and the Bamako laboratory used was built with US National Institutes of Health support, so the national share cannot be separated. This is one small event seeded by two imported cases, and it says nothing about Mali's capacity for other hazards, including the conflict that has displaced people in the north and centre since 2012.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Malisince 2014delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Urban Water Supply Project (PEMU), part of the Kabala programme for Bamako

Mali's water assets company SOMAPEP-SA built the reservoirs, transmission mains and 1,016 km of distribution networks that brought water services to 803,000 people in Bamako and six other towns, alongside the Kabala treatment plant that came into service in June 2019. Of the US$130 million approved, US$119.6 million was spent, and the project closed in December 2022 against an original closing date of December 2018.

119.57 million US$, actual project cost disbursed at closing, 31 Dec 2022. 130 million US$, approved project cost, original 2013 credit plus 2016 additional financing, 2016. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Mali Urban Water Supply Project (P122826), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Mali's government split urban water into an asset-holding company (SOMAPEP-SA) that builds and a utility (SOMAGEP-SA) that operates, under a regulator (CREE). SOMAPEP-SA then used an IDA credit to build the transmission and distribution side of an eleven-donor Kabala programme, while other donors financed the treatment plant.

Preconditions

A standing asset company and utility able to procure and supervise works through two coups and a pandemic
Donor co-financing coordinated through one programme, so the plant and the networks were built in step
Tariffs set high enough to keep the system running, which Mali did not do

Limits: The source is the World Bank's self-evaluation of its own credit. Spending US$119.6 million of an approved US$130 million is not a cost underrun against a fixed scope. The approved amount grew from US$80 million to US$130 million in 2016, when six towns were added. The report says savings were used to raise targets, and it publishes no unit cost or contract-level overrun. The four-year schedule slip, from a December 2018 to a December 2022 closing, is our reading of the key dates. Three of those years were added with the 2016 scope expansion and one year in 2021 for COVID-19 and the disbursement suspensions that followed the 2020 and 2021 coups, so most of the slip was planned. Targets outside Bamako were not met because distribution networks were finished late. The Kabala treatment plant itself was financed by AFD, the EU and the EIB, and its cost and schedule are not in this record. The project was designed to make the urban water sector financially sustainable, and that objective failed: tariffs were frozen for eight years, and the indicator was removed in 2021. The project was IDA-financed throughout. The national contribution was implementation by SOMAPEP-SA and SOMAGEP-SA, not money.