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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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7 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Nigeriasince 2011still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

NIBSS Instant Payment (NIP)

NIBSS Instant Payment, run since 2011 by the interbank settlement company jointly owned by the Central Bank of Nigeria and the banks, grew from 2 billion transactions in 2020 to 11 billion in 2024, with values rising from US$457 billion to US$1.1 trillion, and had 57.7 million unique users.

11,000,000,000 transactions, nip transactions in the year, 2024. 57,700,000 users, nip unique users (52 percent of adults), 2024. AfricaNenda Foundation, The State of Inclusive Instant Payment Systems in Africa (SIIPS 2025), NIP Nigeria case study, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Bankers' Committee, the forum of the central bank and the deposit-taking banks, created a jointly owned switch in 1992 and used it to launch a 24/7 account-to-account instant payment service in 2011, with the central bank setting rules and fee caps and every bank connected, so a transfer reached any account in seconds.

Preconditions

  • A standing forum where the central bank and banks already took joint decisions and co-owned infrastructure.
  • A cashless-policy push from the central bank that gave banks a reason to route retail payments electronically.
  • A unique bank identity layer (the Bank Verification Number) to reduce fraud on instant transfers.

Where else it has been used: NIP is one of the older African instant payment systems and a reference in AfricaNenda's regional reviews; its joint ownership model differs from rails built by a central bank alone.

Limits: The publisher is a non-profit foundation, not a statistical agency, and the case study does not name the source of its 2020 to 2024 series ('NIP data for 2020 to 2024 shows'); it is presumably NIBSS operator data, but that is an inference. The Central Bank of Nigeria's e-payment statistics page reports channels (internet, mobile app, USSD transfers) without naming NIP, and NIBSS's own pages carry press reprints that mix NIP and all e-payment totals, so no official NIP series was citable. The figures are rounded (2 and 11 billion), the 2024 value is printed as $1.1 trillion in the text and $1,171,642 million in the chart, and the dollar values are converted at unstated rates in a period of steep naira devaluation, so the value growth says little in real terms. Growth was pushed by the 2023 cash scarcity and the pandemic as much as by the rail; the same page reports 69 percent of transaction volumes from men, a large inclusion gap, and the 57.7 million users are not active-user counts. Ownership and governance (jointly owned by the CBN and banks, a board of a CBN deputy governor and bank chief executives) and the 2011 launch are stated in the same document. Figures are in a PDF, on PDF page 8 (printed page 9) and the chart that follows.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Nigeriasince 1990still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Adult literacy education under the National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult and Non-Formal Education

Enrolment in adult literacy education in Nigeria, reported by the National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult and Non-Formal Education, rose from 322,288 in 2020 to 2,152,146 in 2021 and 2,915,453 in 2022, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

2,915,453 enrolments, total enrolment in adult literacy education, 2022. 322,288 enrolments, total enrolment in adult literacy education in 2020, 2020. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Social Statistics Report 2023 (published March 2024), section 1.1.1 and Figure 1.1 (source: National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult and Non-Formal Education), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A federal commission sets adult literacy and non-formal education policy and funds and coordinates state agencies for mass education that run community literacy centres with volunteer and paid facilitators, reporting enrolment upward to the national statistics office.

Preconditions

  • State agencies for mass education in every state to run the centres
  • Facilitators paid little or nothing, which keeps the count high and the quality uncertain
  • An administrative reporting line from centres to the federal commission and on to the statistics office

Limits: The figure is an administrative count supplied by the commission to the statistics office, which republishes it without a definition: it does not say whether enrolment counts people or registrations, whether state-run and donor-funded centres are included, or how many learners completed. A ninefold rise in two years is not explained in the report; 2020 was depressed by pandemic closures, and the jump may also reflect better reporting coverage rather than more learning. The series covers three years only, so no peak or trend before 2020 can be read. The number is in a PDF (Figure 1.1 and its text, PDF page 10), and the newest year is 2022. Even 2.9 million enrolments is small against the large non-literate adult population the commission targets, and literacy classes are basic education, not the training-for-work participation most adult-learning surveys count. The 1990 start is the decree that established the commission, not stated at the source URL.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Nigeriasince 2023still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

SEC Nigeria Regulatory Incubation Program

Nigeria's Securities and Exchange Commission opened a one-year Regulatory Incubation sandbox in September 2023 and had admitted seven firms across cohorts 001/23 and 002/24 to test capital-market products, then cleared seven more entities into its Accelerated Regulatory Incubation Programme in July 2026.

7 firms, firms admitted to the regulatory incubation sandbox across two cohorts, 2024-08-29. 7 entities, entities cleared for the accelerated regulatory incubation programme in one announcement, 2026-07-02. Securities and Exchange Commission, Nigeria, FinPort Registered FinTech Operators directory, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The SEC created a time-limited sandbox with conditional rule waivers and a year-long test period, then added an accelerated track to pull digital-asset firms that were operating informally into supervised testing.

Preconditions

  • A regulator with statutory room to grant conditional waivers, here strengthened by the Investments and Securities Act 2025
  • A pipeline of fintech and digital-asset firms already serving Nigerian users outside the rules
  • Supervisory staff able to review participants and decide graduation or wind-down

Where else it has been used: Built on the FCA sandbox template; Nigeria's variant adds an accelerated track aimed at bringing crypto exchanges and tokenisation platforms already in the market under supervision, rather than only testing new products.

Limits: The count of seven is ours, read off the directory table as retrieved on 2026-10-01, which carries no publication date and may not be current; the SEC publishes no summary statistic, application count, graduation rate or outcome for any participant. Three of the seven RI firms (Trovotech, Wrapped CBDC, Blockvault) reappear among the seven ARIP admissions of July 2026, so the two metrics overlap and must not be added, and an ARIP Approval-in-Principle is by the SEC's own wording not a final licence. This is one regulator's sandbox in one sector: the Central Bank of Nigeria's separate sandbox framework is not counted, and the record says nothing about whether testing changed any rule.

Adaptability

3 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Nigeriasince 2021operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

eNaira, a national rollout with an adoption gap

By June 2024, the Central Bank of Nigeria reported 28.46 million eNaira customers onboarded but only 197,041 active wallets, showing that the national CBDC rollout had not converted broad registration into sustained use.

197,041 wallets, active enaira wallets, 2024-06. 28,460,316 customers, onboarded enaira customers, 2024-06. Central Bank of Nigeria, Financial Stability Report June 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

The CBN responded to digital-payment change by launching a sovereign wallet and connecting it to banks, payment providers and identity checks. The gap between customers onboarded and wallets active shows the second task of institutional change: converting a national launch into a habit that survives competing channels.

Preconditions

  • A central bank with legal authority to issue and regulate a digital form of national currency
  • Interoperability with banks, payment-service providers and identity databases rather than a standalone app
  • A use case such as reliable transfers or public payments that gives households and merchants a reason to return

Where else it has been used: CBDC rollouts travel as an adoption problem: technical issuance can be national on day one, while active use depends on incentives, reliability and integration with the payment ecosystem.

Limits: The Central Bank's administrative counts distinguish onboarding from activity but do not explain why wallets became inactive, measure transaction quality or compare the CBDC with Nigeria's much larger private payment rails. The report is the regulator's own account, and the active-wallet figure is a snapshot rather than a causal evaluation of the rollout.

Nigeriasince 2014delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Nigeria's 2014 Ebola containment

After an infected traveller brought Ebola virus into Lagos on 20 July 2014, Nigeria's government set up an emergency operations centre with WHO country office support, traced contacts in Lagos and Port Harcourt, and held the outbreak to 19 cases and 7 deaths before WHO declared the country free of transmission on 20 October 2014.

19 cases, ebola cases in the nigerian outbreak, 2014-10-20. 7 deaths, ebola deaths in the nigerian outbreak, 2014-10-20. World Health Organization, One year into the Ebola epidemic: Successful Ebola responses in Nigeria, Senegal and Mali (January 2015), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

The Federal Ministry of Health and Lagos State stood up an emergency operations centre within days of confirmation, repurposed the polio programme's staff and GPS tracking for contact tracing, and funded isolation and treatment centres quickly.

Preconditions

  • An existing surveillance and field workforce, here the polio eradication infrastructure, that could be redirected overnight
  • A domestic laboratory able to confirm the virus within days
  • Political authority to release emergency funds and coordinate federal and state agencies under one command

Where else it has been used: Nigeria's emergency operations centre model was formalised in the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and cited by WHO as the preparedness standard for at-risk countries; the transfer depends on having a pre-existing field programme to repurpose.

Limits: This is one outbreak seeded by a single imported chain in two cities, so it shows a response to one shock and not a standing national capacity. The page is a WHO narrative, not a dataset, and WHO and partners supported the response, which also leaned on emergency-operations staff, GPS tools and infrastructure and technologies in place for polio eradication, as the WHO page puts it. Nothing here shows Nigeria's performance in later shocks such as Lassa fever, cholera, floods or COVID-19, and a counterfactual of how far the virus would have spread is not measured.

Nigeriasince 2017still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

National Social Safety Nets Project and the COVID-19 Rapid Response Register

Nigeria's National Social Safety Nets Coordinating Office built a National Social Register of 15,673,296 households and, during COVID-19, a new Rapid Response Register that captured 2.7 million households, while the project paid targeted cash transfers to 9,666,420 direct beneficiaries in 37 states between 2017 and its close in December 2022.

2,700,000 households, households captured by the covid-19 rapid response register, 2022-12. 15,673,296 households, households included in the national social register, 2022-12. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, ICR Review ICRR0023725, National Social Safety Nets Project (P151488), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Nigeria's federal government set up NASSCO and the National Cash Transfer Office to build one national social register and an electronic payment rail, then reused that infrastructure during COVID-19 to stand up a rapid-response register from satellite poverty maps and phone data for urban households outside the original register.

Preconditions

  • A standing social register and payment system already in place before the shock, so a new caseload could be added rather than built from nothing
  • External finance and restitution funds ring-fenced for transfers, which kept payments flowing through federal budget stress
  • An identity layer (NIN or BVN) that later became a hard gate, and whose coverage gaps then slowed payments

Where else it has been used: Shock-responsive registers spread across Africa during COVID-19, Togo's Novissi being the best known. Nigeria's version shows that the register scales faster than the payment and identity-verification rails behind it.

Limits: The gap asks for the speed at which programmes change, and the source gives no elapsed time: it shows that a shock register was built during COVID-19, not how many weeks it took or how quickly payments followed. The figures come from the World Bank's own completion review of a project it financed (IDA credit of about US$491 million, plus about US$335.5 million from the Abacha restitution fund), not from a Nigerian statistical source, and the review prints the original NSR target as 4,000, apparently a unit error that it does not explain. Registration is not payment: only 53 percent of beneficiaries were in the bottom two quintiles against a target of 80, only 6 percent of households received top-up transfers, more than three-quarters of households joined too late for three years of support, and benefit levels were lower than designed. After the review closes, the World Bank's January 2025 status report for the follow-on scale-up (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099012925120031079/pdf/P17693518b066e0ff1b62c194b8b78c78dd.pdf) records that transfers since March 2024 go only to NIN- or BVN-verified beneficiaries, that oversight passed for a period to an inter-ministerial panel, and that about 1.4 million of 5 million supported households had received second and third tranches, so the delivery system's continuity is not secure.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Nigeriasince 2018operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano dual carriageway, and the termination of its 2017 contract

Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Works awarded the rehabilitation of the Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano dual carriageway to Julius Berger on 20 December 2017 at an initial N155.7 billion with a 36-month completion period; after repeated variations and augmentations, the Federal Executive Council cut the contract sum under Section I from N797.3 billion to N740.8 billion on 23 September 2024, and the ministry issued a 14-day termination notice on 4 November 2024 after the contractor rejected the reviewed sum and stopped work.

797.26 billion naira, contract sum (contract no. 6350) before the september 2024 downward review, 2024-09. 155.75 billion naira, initial contract sum at award, 2017-12. Federal Ministry of Works (Nigeria), press release 'Notice of Termination of Contract for the Rehabilitation of the Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano Dual Carriageway, Section I (Abuja-Kaduna)', 4 November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The federal government let one large contract for a 375 km corridor, paid for it through repeated variations and augmentations, and when a new minister demanded a lower fixed price the contractor refused and the ministry terminated, split the work among other contractors and took direct control.

Preconditions

  • Award and variation approvals routed through the Federal Executive Council rather than a fixed-price baseline
  • A naira devaluation and inflation shock that made earlier contract sums unenforceable
  • Political will to terminate a dominant contractor on a flagship route

Limits: The source is the ministry's own statement in a dispute with the contractor, so it carries the government's side. Figures are nominal naira across years of high inflation and a large devaluation, so most of the roughly fivefold growth may be price change rather than poor delivery; the ministry also re-scoped Section I to concrete pavement and gave 38 km of it to Dangote, so the 2024 sum buys a different road from the 2017 one. The termination release frames the N797.3 billion review as concerning 'Section I' while the N155.7 billion award covered all three sections; a ministry release of 7 October 2024 (https://www.fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/3233) describes the same N740 billion as the total contract sum within Julius Berger's scope, with N391 billion already paid, so the two sums may or may not cover identical scope. What ended is the 2017 contract, not the road: Sections II and III were partly completed and handed over before 2023, and a ministry update dated 9 September 2026 (https://www.fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/3425, also shown as a banner on the source page) says the government took over the project, finished 118 km of lot 1, has lot 2 over 60 percent complete and schedules completion for December 2026. Earlier ministry pages (https://fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/2352) give a 36-month completion period from 21 May 2018, so the road is at least five years late; a 2018 ministry release (https://fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/1299) states the award sum as N155.47 billion, slightly different from the N155.75 billion here. No audit or Bureau of Public Procurement document was opened.