Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Nepal's Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, through the EVENT II project secretariat, put 111,062 people aged 16 to 40 through market-relevant short-term vocational training between 2018 and 2023, delivered by 142 private and public training providers in 68 of the 77 districts and paid partly on trainees' employment six months after completion.
The education ministry bought short courses from accredited private and public providers and paid them per trainee, with part of the payment withheld until the trainee was verified as employed six months later, and paid more for women, disadvantaged youth and the poorest districts.
Preconditions
A pool of private training providers able to open courses in rural districts at short notice
A joint monitoring team to check enrolment, completion and employment before payment
A skills testing body (NSTB) to certify trades nationally
Where else it has been used: The model came from the Swiss-funded Employment Fund and ran through EVENT I before EVENT II; each version was a time-bound donor project, which is the weakness the pattern carries.
Limits: The figure is in a PDF completion report written by the World Bank about its own project, from data supplied by the ministry's project secretariat and checked by a joint monitoring team of local education officers, CTEVT, the ministry and SDC-Helvetas, which is not fully independent of the delivery; the Bank rated its own outcome. It counts trainees over a five-year project, not participation in the last 12 months, and amounts to roughly 22,000 a year against a labour force in the millions. The project defined youth as 16 to 40, so the count mixes recent school leavers with older adults and gives no age split. The total was 96.5 percent of a 115,000 target and training stopped for about 18 months during the pandemic. The training was financed by IDA credit, not the national budget, and the report does not say whether the government continued the results-based short-term training after the July 2023 closing, so 'concluded' describes the project window, not a measured end of the model. Employment rates of 70 to 83 percent six months after training are from the project's own tracer verification.
After the April 2015 Gorkha earthquake, Nepal's National Reconstruction Authority ran an owner-driven housing grant programme that, by 23 September 2021, had paid the third and final tranche of the reconstruction grant to 704,341 of 866,207 eligible households across 32 districts, with the World Bank-financed share revised to 309,335 houses.
Parliament created a time-limited National Reconstruction Authority that enrolled every damaged household, paid a flat grant in three tranches, and released each tranche only after engineers verified that the house met a seismic building code, so the payment schedule enforced the standard.
Preconditions
A damage census that enumerated eligible households district by district before money flowed
Concessional and pooled donor finance large enough to fund a uniform grant for most of the caseload
Enough trained masons and inspecting engineers in remote districts to verify construction stage by stage
Where else it has been used: The tranche-on-verification model is the owner-driven reconstruction approach also used after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake; Nepal's version is distinguished by its scale and by tying each tranche to a code-compliance inspection.
Limits: A grant tranche is a payment, not a finished house: in the programme's rules the third tranche is released on completion of construction up to the roof band, so 704,341 counts households verified to that stage, not occupied, completed homes. The figures are reported by the government agencies to the lender and published by the lender, which financed about $700 million of the programme and rates its own operation; the 309,335 count was itself revised in 2023 after the project clarified that its reported total had included 3,766 houses financed by a trust fund grant (TF0A4783). About 162,000 eligible households had not received the final tranche at the reporting date, and the World Bank's ICR for the MDTF Funding for Earthquake Housing Reconstruction project (P162067, TF0A4783) notes the average rebuilding cost was about three times the NPR 300,000 grant, and one third of households used loans to close the gap. The number shows recovery after one shock; it says nothing about preparedness before the next one, and the NRA was a temporary body dissolved in December 2021, with its residual work passed to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority. The record documents the national programme's scale through a single donor's monitoring report; there is no independent national statistical series behind it.
๐ณ๐ตNepalsince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness
Nepal Rastra Bank's monetary policy of 17 July 2020 expanded its subsidised refinance facility to five times the available fund for COVID-19 affected businesses, and by mid-July 2021 Rs 148.75 billion had been approved to 48,890 borrowers, against Rs 7.49 billion of refinance outstanding a year earlier.
The central bank turned an existing subsidised refinance window into a pandemic credit programme by multiplying its size, setting sector rates (1 percent special, 2 percent small business, 3 percent general) and letting commercial banks, development banks, finance companies and microfinance institutions on-lend it.
Preconditions
A standing refinance facility with procedures banks already used
A banking system with liquidity and branch reach to on-lend quickly
A central bank willing to take credit-allocation decisions by sector
Limits: The URL serves a PDF, which NRB labels an unofficial translation; the 7.49 billion baseline is in the Monetary Policy for 2020/21 (https://www.nrb.org.np/ofg/monetary-policy-2020-21-full-text-english-version/, paragraph 48) and the expansion in paragraphs 100 to 103 of the same document. The central bank reports on its own scheme. 'Approved' is not disbursed, and the two figures are different measures (an annual stock against a cumulative approval), so the comparison shows scale, not a like-for-like increase. The rule changed about four months after the March 2020 lockdown, at the regular annual monetary policy rather than in an emergency statement, so the speed is moderate. Uptake was uneven: under the same document the business continuity loan for tourism and small firms to pay wages reached only Rs 956.7 million, and 30 percent of refinance could go through customer evaluation or microfinance lump sums that the source does not break down. Refinance at 1 to 3 percent with borrowers paying 3 to 5 percent went to borrowers banks chose, and the document gives no count of first-time or small borrowers. Other relief in the same section (repayment extensions for Rs 93.63 billion of loans, restructuring of Rs 129.21 billion) is not added here.
Nepal's government built the Melamchi River diversion tunnel and headworks to pipe an additional 170 million litres a day into the Kathmandu Valley, closing the project in June 2021, more than 14 years after its original March 2007 closing date; the 2021 flood then damaged the headworks, and water has since been diverted for about eight months a year.
The Ministry of Physical Planning and Works and later the Ministry of Water Supply, with ADB as lead financier, tied a trans-basin water diversion to a reform of Kathmandu's water utility in a single loan. The infrastructure was delivered and the institutional reforms largely were not.
Preconditions
Concessional finance from several lenders willing to stay through repeated contractor failure and the exit of three co-financiers
An executing agency able to cancel and re-tender a failed tunnel contract in mountainous, flood-prone terrain
A utility (KUKL) whose tariff and water-levy reforms the project assumed but could not compel
Where else it has been used: ADB's own lesson is that bundling a major physical build with a governance overhaul in one operation was over-ambitious; the remaining reforms were moved into separate pipeline programmes.
Limits: The 14 years is the gap between two loan closing dates, which is a lender's administrative milestone, not a measured completion date for the tunnel; the source gives no physical completion schedule against a baseline. The cost figure is not usable as an overrun: appraisal was $464 million and completion $345.3 million, but the 2008 scope change and the exit of the World Bank, NORAD and Sida mean the two totals price different projects, and ADB says separately that a 2014 additional loan covered tunnel cost overruns without stating the overrun in percent. The erosion is stated in words and one current number: the source publishes no figure for the year-round flow before the 2021 flood, so the secondMetric holds the post-flood level, not a measured peak. The flood is an exogenous shock, though ADB attributes the vulnerability to design that did not fit the terrain. The validation rests on the project completion report written by the lender and the executing agency, and ADB was itself a party to the project's design. The delay mixes national causes (slow decisions, leadership turnover, poor contractor management) with contractor failure, the cancelled and re-bid contracts of nonperforming contractors.