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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

6 of 742 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

New Zealandsince 2020still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity

Long-term Insights Briefings under the Public Service Act 2020

New Zealand's Public Service Act 2020 required every departmental chief executive to publish a Long-term Insights Briefing on future trends, risks and opportunities at least once every three years, and nineteen were published in the first round, which concluded in mid-2023, four of them produced jointly by several agencies.

19 briefings, long-term insights briefings published in the first round, 2023 (mid-year). Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, The Policy Project, Long-term Insights Briefings page (last updated 11 December 2025), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A public service statute obliges every department head to consult the public on a topic, write a briefing on medium and long-term trends with policy options, and table it at least once every three years, with the centre of government publishing guidance and reviewing the round.

Preconditions

  • A statutory stewardship duty in public service law
  • A centre-of-government policy team to issue guidance and review rounds
  • Departments with analysts able to do futures work alongside daily business

Limits: The live dpmc.govt.nz page returns 403 to scripts, so it was read from a Wayback Machine copy of 18 June 2026; the page is the coordinating department reporting on a duty it guides. It is a statutory duty spread across departments, not a single foresight unit with its own budget and staff, and the count measures briefings published, not their quality or influence: DPMC's own review of the first round assessed the process only and said so. Started is 2020, the year of the Act that created the duty; the page does not give the year the first briefings were published. The briefings are think pieces independent of ministers and are not government policy. Whether the second round has kept the same number of briefings is not stated on the page.

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

New Zealandsince 2010still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Ultra-Fast Broadband programme

The Crown's infrastructure investment company, now National Infrastructure Funding and Financing, co-funded a fibre network built and owned by Chorus, Northpower, Enable and Tuatahi First Fibre, which was completed in December 2022 covering 87 percent of the population in 412 towns and cities, with NZ$1.75 billion of government funding in a programme costing more than NZ$5.5 billion.

87 % of population, population covered by the ufb fibre network at completion, 2022-12. 1.75 billion NZ$, government funding invested in ufb since 2010, of a total cost exceeding nz$5.5 billion, 2025. National Infrastructure Funding and Financing (formerly Crown Infrastructure Partners), Fibre programme page, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A Crown-owned company invested in regional fibre companies on the condition that they build an open-access, wholesale-only network to a fixed rollout plan, and recovered its investment as the companies sold connections, recycling the repayments into further extensions.

Preconditions

  • Structural separation of the incumbent telecoms firm, so that the main partner sold wholesale only
  • Local lines companies able to bid for regions alongside the incumbent
  • A Crown investment vehicle with commercial terms, not a grant ministry

Where else it has been used: Australia chose a fully public National Broadband Network for the same goal at the same time; Singapore's Next Gen NBN used a similar regulated open-access model.

Limits: The Crown company that ran the programme reports on itself, and the page is promotional ('world leading', 'on time and under budget'); no audit figure for cost against the original budget was checked. The 87 percent is coverage (premises passed), not use: the same page gives uptake as 73 percent of UFB premises passed at 30 June 2025. The total cost above NZ$5.5 billion includes partner co-funding, so the private share is inferred, not stated, and NZ$390 million of the Crown's investment was repaid and recycled into extensions, which the page treats as reinvested rather than spent twice. The page does not describe how partners were chosen or on what terms; the corporate history (Crown Fibre Holdings, then Crown Infrastructure Partners, then National Infrastructure Funding and Financing) and the role of the incumbent's structural separation are background not shown on this page. The page has no date stamp; the uptake figure dates it to after June 2025.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

New Zealandsince 2012operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Adult and community education at tertiary providers, and its halving

New Zealand's adult and community education (ACE) delivered by universities, polytechnics, wฤnanga and private training establishments enrolled 23,610 domestic students in 2021, down from 49,365 in 2012, according to the Ministry of Education's Education Counts tables.

23,610 students, domestic students in adult and community education, all tertiary sub-sectors (table ace.3), 2021. 49,365 students, same count, first year of the published series, 2012. Ministry of Education (Te Tฤhuhu o te Mฤtauranga), Education Counts, tertiary participation, Adult-and-Community-Education.xlsx, Table ACE.3, as archived by the Internet Archive on 25 March 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Tertiary Education Commission funds short, often non-credit community courses for adults through tertiary providers, and the education ministry counts enrolments each year from provider returns.

Preconditions

  • A dedicated ACE funding pool inside the tertiary funding system
  • Providers with community reach willing to run low-margin courses
  • A single student enrolment return that captures non-credit learners

Where else it has been used: Headcount halved while study load held, so the remaining ACE places went to fewer people taking longer courses; whether that was a deliberate shift toward longer, credit-bearing courses is not shown by the table.

Limits: The cited file is an Internet Archive copy: educationcounts.govt.nz answered 403 behind a bot check on 2026-10-02, and the archived September 2026 page that links a newer edition of the same spreadsheet returned 410 for the file, so the series stops at 2021 here although the ministry has published later years. The table counts only ACE delivered by tertiary providers; it leaves out ACE run by schools and community organisations, and 2012 is the first year of the table, not a demonstrated peak. Any funding change before 2012, including the reduction of ACE funding in schools commonly dated to 2009, is outside the series and was not read at a source for this record. Most of the fall is two steps: universities from 13,180 to 3,040 between 2012 and 2013, and polytechnics (now Te Pลซkenga) from 35,235 in 2016 to 27,975 in 2017 and 20,890 in 2020; the 2020 and 2021 counts are also depressed by COVID-19 lockdowns. Equivalent full-time student units held near 3,200 to 4,100 throughout, so fewer people took longer courses, and the fall in headcount is not a fall in hours of learning. Counts are students enrolled at any time in the year, rounded to the nearest 5, and students in two sub-sectors count in each. The started year is the first year of the published table, not the start of ACE funding, which is decades older.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

New Zealandsince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

COVID-19 Wage Subsidy Scheme

Cabinet agreed a 12-week wage subsidy on 16 March 2020, the Government announced it on 17 March, and the Ministry of Social Development paid employers on average within three and a half days of an application, paying more than NZ$13 billion across three stages by the end of December 2020.

3.5 days, average time from application to payment, 2020. 13 billion NZ$, wage subsidy paid, march to december 2020 (more than), 2020-12. Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand, Management of the Wage Subsidy Scheme (performance audit, 2021), Part 3: Making subsidy payments, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Cabinet approved a flat per-employee subsidy paid as a lump sum to employers, and the Ministry of Social Development ran it through its existing benefit payment systems on applicant self-declaration, with Inland Revenue data used for checks after payment.

Preconditions

  • A payment agency with bank details and identity data for most employers and workers already on file
  • A fiscal position that allowed NZ$5.1 billion to be committed within a day and raised to NZ$9.3 billion within a week
  • Political acceptance of overpayment risk, recovered afterwards by audit and voluntary repayment

Where else it has been used: The same flat-rate, employer-paid design was used in Australia's JobKeeper (March 2020); New Zealand reused its own scheme for the August 2020 and 2021 resurgences.

Limits: The live OAG pages answer scripted requests with HTTP 403; the text was read on 2026-10-02 from the Internet Archive copy (https://web.archive.org/web/2026/https://oag.parliament.nz/2021/wage-subsidy/part3.htm), with the dates in Part 1 (paragraphs 1.12 to 1.13) and the 3.5 days in paragraph 3.3. The average is the Ministry of Social Development's figure as reported by the auditor, with no distribution: it does not say how long the slowest payments took. Speed was bought with a high-trust design in which applicants declared their own eligibility; by 5 March 2021 the Ministry had received 20,973 repayments worth NZ$726.2 million, about 5 percent of payments, and nearly NZ$300 million went to public organisations before decisions were made to return money. The NZ$13 billion is a spending figure, not a measure of jobs saved: the Government's estimate that the scheme indirectly supported about 1.8 million employees is not an outcome measure, and the auditor notes it could not determine with certainty how many recipients could have used other support. The audit covers the scheme to early 2021 and not the later 2021 stages.

New Zealandsince 2011delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Earthquake Commission Canterbury Home Repair Programme

New Zealand's Earthquake Commission had practically completed 66,252 home repairs under its Canterbury Home Repair Programme by 30 June 2015, after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes damaged about 180,000 homes, missing the December 2014 completion target it had brought forward from December 2015, with about 8 to 10 percent of repairs needing additional work after completion.

66,252 repairs, repairs practically completed by the canterbury home repair programme, 2015-06-30. 40,000 homes (more than), homes repaired by june 2013, 2013-06. Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand, Earthquake Commission: Follow-up audit on the Canterbury Home Repair Programme (2015), Part 2, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state natural-disaster insurer took on managed repairs itself, contracted one construction firm to project-manage tens of thousands of jobs, and paid for it from a pre-funded disaster fund and reinsurance.

Preconditions

  • A pre-funded public catastrophe fund with reinsurance
  • One contractor able to mobilise a regional workforce
  • Building inspection capacity to check repairs as they are signed off

Limits: The 66,252 figure, the missed December 2014 target and the 8 to 10 percent rework estimate are in Part 2 of the 2015 follow-up audit; the June 2013 figure is from the Auditor-General's 2013 overview (https://ao.parliament.nz/2013/eqc). The Auditor-General's site at oag.parliament.nz refused scripted requests and the same pages were read at ao.parliament.nz. The Auditor-General says it could not reach an overall conclusion on quality: an MBIE review reported in Part 3 of the same audit found 26 of 74 sampled EQC repairs non-compliant with the structural or durability provisions of the Building Code, and the rework rate is EQC's own estimate. Repair counts are Fletcher Construction's and EQC's figures. The programme covered homes with damage under the EQC cap; about 20,000 more expensive claims went to private insurers and are outside it. Later remedial work on repaired homes, which continued for years and generated litigation, is not quantified here.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

New Zealandsince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

City Rail Link, Auckland, and its cost and time overrun

City Rail Link Limited, owned by the Crown and Auckland Council, achieved practical completion of Auckland's 3.45 km underground City Rail Link on 30 June 2026 against a target delivery cost of NZ$5,493 million, up from a NZ$3.4 billion estimate made in 2014, and the line opened to the public on 13 September 2026, after its company had planned completion for late 2024.

5,493 million NZ dollars, target delivery cost in the project delivery agreement, 2026-06-30. 3,400 million NZ dollars, project cost estimate made in 2014, 2014. City Rail Link Limited, Annual Report 2025/26 (accessible Word version), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Crown and Auckland Council set up a jointly owned delivery company, let the main stations and tunnels to an alliance, and re-baselined the budget twice as costs rose rather than cutting scope.

Preconditions

  • A sponsor agreement splitting cost 50:50 between national and local government
  • An alliance contract that shares cost risk with the builders
  • Political tolerance for re-baselining a flagship project

Limits: The NZ$5,493 million and the 30 June 2026 practical completion are in the 2025/26 annual report, a Word document; the 13 September 2026 opening is on the company's home page (https://www.cityraillink.co.nz/). The NZ$3.4 billion 2014 estimate and the 'late 2024' completion plan come from the company's cost page as archived on 26 January 2023 (https://web.archive.org/web/20230126164501/https://www.cityraillink.co.nz/city-rail-link-cost-timeline), which also gives the April 2019 revision to NZ$4.419 billion; the live page no longer carries them. The 62 percent increase over the 2014 estimate is our calculation and mixes price bases: the company attributes the 2019 rise to construction inflation, a larger contingency and a scope change for nine-car trains. Total spend to 30 June 2026 was NZ$5,283 million against approved funding of NZ$5,644 million, and the company reports itself within budget, which is true only against the 2019 and later baselines. The company is reporting on itself; no Auditor-General review of the outturn was opened. 'Started' is the year main works began, which the cited report does not state.