Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism6 of 742 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Pakistansince 2002operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

NCHD Adult Literacy Programme, and its collapse after 2013

Pakistan's National Commission for Human Development opened 19,399 adult literacy centres enrolling 482,295 learners in 2009-10, but its literacy programme 'came to a halt since 2013 due to scarcity of funds', and in 2021 it ran a phase of 1,490 centres, financed by the Pakistan Human Development Fund, that enrolled 36,529 learners, mostly women aged 15 to 45.

36,529 learners, learners enrolled in the 1,490 adult literacy centres of the project 'promoting literacy in rural communities of pakistan', 2021. 482,295 learners, peak: learners enrolled in 19,399 adult literacy centres, nchd annual report 2012, year-wise table, 2009-10. National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, Annual Report 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A federal commission recruited local teachers to run six-month literacy centres in villages, mostly for women, funded from the federal development budget; when that budget line lapsed, delivery fell to small donor-funded rounds.

Preconditions

A federal agency with district offices able to recruit and supervise thousands of local teachers
A recurring development-budget allocation, since each centre runs only one cohort
A political mandate for adult literacy that survives the devolution of education to provinces

Where else it has been used: Bangladesh's Bureau of Non-Formal Education ran the same project-by-project model (bgd-adult-literacy) and shows the same pattern of large reach followed by a gap when funding windows close.

Limits: The commission reports on itself. The 2021 figure is in the foreword of the 2021 annual report (PDF page 10, printed page 8, 'Around 36,529 learners, mostly women benefitted') and in its programme chapter (PDF page 38), which says 1,490 centres were established in 116 districts 'wherein, 36529 learners were enrolled' and 33,377 graduated; 1,500 centres were allocated and ten in North Waziristan could not be opened. The peak comes from a different document at the same host, NCHD Annual Report 2012 (https://www.nchd.org.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/NCHD_Annual_Report_2012.pdf, PDF page 16), whose table gives 19,399 centres and 482,295 learners for 2009-10, 8,317 and 197,907 for 2010-11 and 8,270 and 202,349 for 2011-12; 2009-10 is the highest year in that table, not a demonstrated all-time peak, and the commission's cumulative claim of about 4.07 million people made literate since 2002 implies that earlier years were also large. The statement that the programme halted in 2013 for lack of funds is in NCHD Annual Report 2016 (https://www.nchd.org.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/Annual%20Report-2016.pdf, PDF page 8), which also says the 2017 project approval cut the planned centres from 12,000 to 6,000. Enrolment is not completion or tested literacy. The 2021 centres were financed by the Pakistan Human Development Fund, a support fund set up under the commission's ordinance, rather than the commission's core development budget. Part of the fall may reflect the devolution of education to the provinces after the 2010 constitutional amendment, which moved literacy work to provincial departments that this record does not count. No annual figure after 2021 was found at the commission's site.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Pakistansince 2020still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

SECP Regulatory Sandbox, four cohorts and an open window

Pakistan's Securities and Exchange Commission approved 31 business models for testing in its Regulatory Sandbox across four annual cohorts from 2020 to 2023, out of 125 fintech applicants, with intake rising from six selected in the first cohort to 11 in the fourth.

31 business models, business models approved for testing in the secp regulatory sandbox, four cohorts, cumulative, 2024-06-30. 11 applicants, applicants selected in cohort iv, 2023. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Annual Report 2024 (year ended 30 June 2024), section 'Promoting fintech and encouraging innovation', Regulatory Sandbox, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The securities regulator issued sandbox guidelines under the Companies Act and ran annual cohorts in which fintech, insurtech and capital-market applicants were screened and the selected ones tested for six to nine months under agreed limits, then switched to year-round applications.

Preconditions

A statutory power to issue sandbox guidelines, here section 458A of the Companies Act 2017 as cited in the reissued guidelines
A pipeline of fintech applicants large enough to select from
Regulator staff to evaluate applications and supervise tests

Limits: The regulator reports on its own sandbox. The figures are in a PDF on PDF page 82 (printed page 81), with a cohort chart giving applicants and selections per year (33 and 6, 38 and 6, 28 and 8, 26 and 11); the live secp.gov.pk site returns a Cloudflare challenge to scripts, so the report was read from a Wayback Machine copy of the SECP download link. 'Approved for testing' counts admissions, not completions: the report does not say how many business models finished testing or went to market. The cohort figures sum to 31, matching the stated total. After 2023 the SECP moved to an always-open format, and the same page says it had then received three applications with one testing, a much smaller intake than cohort IV, but over a shorter and unstated period, so it is not read as a decline. The State Bank of Pakistan runs a separate sandbox whose admissions are not counted here, so the figure understates the country total the construct asks for.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Pakistansince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Ehsaas Emergency Cash

Pakistan's government launched Ehsaas Emergency Cash in early April 2020 on BISP's existing payment and registry systems and had paid US$464 million to 6.4 million beneficiaries by 30 April 2020, reaching 15 million beneficiaries in all.

6.4 million beneficiaries, beneficiaries paid emergency cash by 30 april 2020, within about four weeks of launch, 2020-04-30. 15 million beneficiaries, beneficiaries given temporary income support through ehsaas in 2020, 2020. World Bank, COVID-19 G2Px country brief: Pakistan, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The federal government raised the eligibility cutoff on an existing proxy-means-test registry, added an SMS application channel, and pushed one-off payments through BISP's contracted payment providers, so a new caseload was paid without building a new delivery system.

Preconditions

A national socio-economic registry covering most households, with a proxy means score that could be re-cut
A biometric-verified payment network already contracted for a standing cash transfer
National ID and mobile coverage high enough for SMS self-registration

Limits: Both figures are government-reported disbursement counts passed through World Bank documents, not independent verification that the money reached eligible families; the brief does not report inclusion or exclusion errors. The two World Bank documents disagree on the launch month (early April in the brief, March in the PAD) and do not reconcile the 15 million with the 12 million originally targeted. The transfer was one-off and small, about US$71 per family, so it shows speed of reconfiguration, not depth of protection. The speed rested on assets built over a decade (the BISP payment network and the national socio-economic registry), so the record evidences a programme being changed fast, which is the construct, but credits the 2020 government with infrastructure its predecessors built. The 'four weeks' is our reading of the brief's dates, not a published duration.

Pakistansince 2006delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Rural housing reconstruction after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake

Pakistan's Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority inspected all 463,243 houses due for reconstruction in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after the October 2005 earthquake and certified 438,789 of them, 95 percent, as compliant with seismic-resistant standards by the time the World Bank credit closed in May 2011.

438,789 houses, reconstructed houses certified compliant with erra's seismic standards, 2011-05-31. 463,243 houses, houses to be reconstructed (ajk and kp), 2011-05-31. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Pakistan Earthquake Emergency Recovery Credit Project (P099110), 31 December 2011, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A federal authority with army support paid owner-driven housing grants in four tranches, each conditional on an inspection against a seismic-resistant design, and trained masons to build to it.

Preconditions

A damage census done within weeks
Military logistics in mountainous terrain
Bank branches or mobile payment points reaching rural households

Where else it has been used: Nepal (npl-ehrp) copied the tranche and inspection design after 2015; it is Sri Lanka's tsunami ICR (lka-tsunami-housing), not this one, that names Pakistan's programme as having learned from Sri Lanka's homeowner-driven model.

Limits: The table is in Annex 2 (printed page 23) and was read from the plain-text version. The same annex's text gives a different base, 353,931 houses to be reconstructed of which 337,177 were completed, and says 3.8 percent of eligible houses saw no work at all; the record uses the table, and the two figures cannot be reconciled from the document. The data are ERRA's own, compiled from army monitoring teams and partner organisations. Compliance at certification is not occupancy or durability. The programme cost about US$1.5 billion, of which the World Bank credit financed part, and the credit was later enlarged to cover the 2010 floods, which are outside this figure. It is a 2006 to 2011 delivery and says nothing about Pakistan's response to the 2022 floods.

Building

2 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Pakistansince 2008operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project, and its shutdown

WAPDA's subsidiary NJHPC's 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum project, under construction from January 2008 and substantially completed in 2018, had cost Rs 423,446 million by June 2023 against Rs 84,502 million in the 2002 revised PC-I, nine years late; it peaked at 4,940.67 GWh in 2020 and was forced into complete shutdown by a head race tunnel failure on 2 April 2024 (the auditor counts 1,797.704 million units lost in FY2023-24), after an earlier tail race tunnel collapse in July 2022.

338,944 Rs million, cost overrun against the 1st revised pc-i (2002), actual expenditure to june 2023, 2023-06. 4,940.67 GWh, peak annual generation, before the 2022 and 2024 tunnel collapses, 2020. Auditor-General of Pakistan, Performance Audit Report on Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project, audit year 2022-23, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

WAPDA started tunnelling in difficult Himalayan geology before design issues were settled, and the planning ministry re-approved the cost four times rather than stopping or re-scoping the project, so the bill rose with each revision and the tunnels later failed where weak rock had been flagged.

Preconditions

A state utility able to borrow and add a consumer surcharge to keep financing a project as costs rose
A project appraisal system that approves revised PC-Is after the fact instead of gating on final design
A strategic water-rights deadline with India that pushed construction to start before geology and design were resolved

Limits: This is a delivery that ran backwards twice: badly over cost and schedule while it was being built, then lost its output after it was finished. The overrun is measured against the 2002 revision, which is the auditor's choice of baseline; against the 1989 original (Rs 15,012 million) it would be far larger, and against the 2018 fourth revision (Rs 506,808 million) the project came in under. Part of the rupee overrun is exchange-rate depreciation and interest during construction, which a cost-performance reading should not charge entirely to delivery. The plant never reached its design output of 5,150 GWh even at its 2020 peak, partly because India's upstream Kishanganga project and a higher environmental flow reduced water, which management cites and the auditor rejects. The overrun percentage (about 400 percent) is our computation from two published figures, and the Rs 338,944 million is the auditor's own subtraction. The 2024 shutdown is documented in a second AGP report; the expected restart date circulating in the press is not from this source and is not claimed here. Management disputes several findings and never convened the Departmental Accounts Committee, so the report records the auditor's view without a settled reply.

Pakistansince 2012delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Tarbela Fourth Extension Hydropower Project

WAPDA built a 1,410 MW powerhouse on Tarbela Dam's fourth tunnel, effective April 2012 and commissioned in 2018; the World Bank recorded it as completed on time and below its estimated cost, with a capital cost expected at US$749 million.

749 US$ million, expected capital cost of t4hp, physical works and supervision excluding interest during construction, 2019-09. 21,000 GWh, electricity generated since commissioning, 2023-09. World Bank, Tarbela Fourth Extension Hydropower Project (P115893) restructuring paper RES40334, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

WAPDA added generating capacity to an existing dam's spare tunnel under World Bank procurement and supervision, so the geological and resettlement risks that sink greenfield hydropower were mostly absent.

Preconditions

An existing large dam with an unused tunnel and an operator that had run it for decades
Concessional finance with lender-imposed procurement, supervision and an independent panel of experts
A power deficit large enough that the plant was dispatched at once

Where else it has been used: Pakistan and the World Bank repeated the model at the same dam with the fifth extension (T5HP).

Limits: The lender is grading its own project: 'on time and in less than estimated cost' is the World Bank's sentence in a restructuring paper, not an audit, and the paper gives no baseline figure, so the size of the saving cannot be checked from this source. The cost is an expectation in 2019, before every work was closed; the intakes for tunnels 3 and 4 were still being finished, and the loan closing date moved from 2018 to 2024 because the same project was extended to build T5HP. That fifth extension, financed under the same project number, is rated Moderately Satisfactory in the 2023 ISR and was due for completion in 2025; T4's record is not the record of the whole project. The World Bank financed about 90 percent of the civil and electro-mechanical works, so the case shows WAPDA delivering under a lender's procurement and supervision regime, which is a precondition rather than proof of domestic capability. Building a powerhouse on an existing dam and tunnel is much less risky than a greenfield dam, which is part of why it came in on budget.