Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Papua New Guinea's Department of Works restored or maintained 600 km of national roads against a 640 km target under the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, closing in June 2012 five and a half years after the original December 2006 closing date, with national road works under the original loan costing US$35.62 million, 158 percent of their US$22.52 million appraisal estimate.
The works department ran a lender-financed maintenance and restoration programme on national and provincial roads, absorbed a cost surge on roads by cutting bridges, and extended the programme twice.
Preconditions
Local contractors able to bid for maintenance packages
Provincial governments with budgets to co-fund their share
A lender willing to restructure scope inside a fixed envelope
Limits: The component costs are in Annex 1 (project cost by component, original loan) and the dates and road lengths on the datasheet (sections B and F), read from the plain-text version. The appraisal figure excludes VAT and the actual includes it, so part of the 158 percent is a tax difference the table itself flags. Total project cost was on budget (US$58.21 million against US$58.78 million) because bridge components were cut, so the overrun on roads was paid for by building fewer bridges: provincial bridges spent 11 percent of their estimate. The ICR attributes the road cost rise to the construction boom from the PNG LNG project and to sealing more gravel roads than planned. The World Bank rated the outcome Satisfactory, and the programme is maintenance and rehabilitation rather than one new structure. The cost comparison covers the original IBRD loan only; a 2007 IDA additional financing scaled the programme to two more provinces and extended it, and its national road works also overran, at US$40.86 million against US$28.72 million (142 percent, Annex 1 table b), so the June 2012 closing reflects added scope as well as delay. The government paid US$2.28 million of the US$25.07 million counterpart planned at appraisal, with provinces and other donors covering part of the gap.
Papua New Guinea's Independent Public Business Corporation, using ADB and OPEC Fund loans, built the first phase of the Lae tidal basin, a new berth and container terminal at the port of Lae, between April 2012 and December 2014. It was about four years later than planned and cost $310.4 million, against a $154 million project at the 2007 approval.
The government had its state enterprise holding company, IPBC, borrow concessionally from ADB and the OPEC Fund. IPBC procured a single design-and-build contract for reclamation, berth and terminal, and the Morobe Provincial Administration ran the livelihood programme for displaced settlers and the Labu community.
Preconditions
Multilateral lenders willing to add $89 million of financing in 2011 when geotechnical findings broke the original design
A resettlement plan acceptable to settler households on government land and to the Labu villages
A state port company with tariff revenue to service the debt, which the validation doubted
Limits: The headline 7 percent overrun is against a 2011 revised estimate that had already absorbed $137.4 million of design changes found by later geotechnical work. Against the $154 million package approved in 2007 the increase is about 100 percent. That is our computation and is not like for like, because the scope grew. The validation reports civil works costs up 116 percent and involuntary resettlement costs up 3,590 percent against appraisal. Figures are nominal US dollars. The evaluator is the lender's own evaluation department, validating a completion report the lender wrote. It rated the project less than successful overall, less than effective, less than efficient and less than likely sustainable. The validation attributes the four-year delay to the combination of post-approval design changes and resettlement: 482 settler households on government marshland and a landing site used by three Labu villages, for which a supplementary resettlement plan acceptable to the affected communities had to be prepared. The contractors were foreign: a Korean design-build consultant and China Harbour Engineering. The national institutions' role was procurement, finance and resettlement. A post-completion audit found siltation back to 11 m below chart datum, from the dredged 14 m, at the basin's western entrance. The source says it appeared to have stabilised and does not report lost berth capacity. We have not treated it as an eroded delivery, but a reviewer could. The validation finds handling capacity of 2.0 million revenue tons a year, above the 1.4 million target, so the cost and delay bought a working asset. One project says nothing about PNG's record on other major works.