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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 742 deliveries

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Sudansince 2021dismantledbears on Institutional responsiveness

Sudan Family Support Programme (Thamarat), and its halt after the October 2021 coup

After Sudan cut fuel subsidies and unified its exchange rate in February 2021, the transitional government's Sudan Family Support Programme began paying cash in March 2021 and by 25 October 2021 had registered about 2.7 million families and paid about 30.6 billion Sudanese pounds to 1.4 million families, about 4.7 million people, before all activities, including cash delivery, were halted after the military takeover of that day.

1,395,295 families, families paid by the sfsp/thamarat before the halt (table e4 total, paid families), 2021-10-30. 2,637,632 families, families registered against a planned 6.5 million, 2021-10-30. World Bank, Sudan Transition and Recovery Support Trust Fund (STARS) Annual Report 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour and Social Development built a near-universal cash transfer to offset fuel subsidy removal and exchange-rate unification, registering families through 352 centres linked to the national civil registry and paying through banks, mobile money and cash cards, with donor money held in a designated account; the coup stopped the money and the programme with it.

Preconditions

  • Donor financing large enough to compensate most households for a subsidy cut
  • A national ID registry to validate enrolment against duplicates
  • A government that the financiers continue to recognise, which is the precondition that failed in October 2021

Where else it has been used: The same compensation logic as Iran's 2010 subsidy reform cash transfer and Egypt's Takaful and Karama, but financed almost entirely from outside, which made it end the day the financiers paused.

Limits: The World Bank and the STARS donors financed the programme, decided its pause and wrote this report, so the publisher is grading its own operation and also chose to end it. The numbers are in a PDF: the subsidy and exchange-rate reforms of February 2021 on PDF page 10, the halt of all activities 'including delivery of cash to beneficiaries' on PDF page 16, the 2.7 million families registered and 1.4 million families (about 4.7 million people) paid on PDF page 23, and the per-state table (Table E4, 2,637,632 enrolled and 1,395,295 paid) on PDF page 85, which notes that the first 80,000 families were paid in March 2021 (PDF page 77). The 1.39 million families paid include families in two states where the World Food Programme, not the ministry, implemented payments (PDF page 75), so not every paid family was reached by the government's own delivery. Table E4 has visible inconsistencies (East Darfur shows 391,900 families paid against 4,291 enrolled), so the state rows should not be quoted. The speed claim is about seven months from first payment to 1.4 million families, against a target of 6.5 million; the report says the programme started late because of exchange-rate problems, and paid families reached only 22 percent of the target population. What responded was a transitional government acting inside an IMF and World Bank reform package that conditioned arrears clearance, not on its own timetable. The halt was a decision by the financier after a coup, so the dismantling reflects a political break and donor policy (OP 7.30) as much as institutional capacity; later safety-net payments in Sudan were routed through the World Food Programme rather than the ministry.

Sudansince 2017operating below its peakbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Routine immunization through the 2023 war, and its erosion

WHO and UNICEF estimated that Sudan's national DTP3 coverage among one-year-olds fell from 95 percent in 2017 and 84 percent in 2022 to 51 percent in 2023 and 39 percent in 2024, after war broke out in April 2023, before recovering to 71 percent in 2025.

71 % of one-year-olds, estimated dtp3 coverage among one-year-olds (wuenic), 2025. 95 % of one-year-olds, estimated dtp3 coverage at its recent peak, 2017. World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory OData API, indicator WHS4_100 (DTP3 immunization coverage among 1-year-olds, WHO and UNICEF estimates of national immunization coverage), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Sudan's Expanded Programme on Immunization kept national DTP3 coverage above 90 percent for most of the 2010s through fixed clinics and outreach, then lost more than half of it when war closed facilities, displaced millions and broke the supply chain from Khartoum, and partly rebuilt it with catch-up campaigns.

Preconditions

  • A cold chain and clinic network that depends on the capital for supply and pay
  • Population registers and reporting that survive displacement
  • External partners able to fund and run catch-up campaigns in contested areas

Where else it has been used: Haiti (hti-immunization-erosion) shows a slower erosion under insecurity; Sudan's fall was faster and deeper, and its partial recovery came within two years.

Limits: Routine immunization is a standing health service, not a hazard-specific preparedness delivery, and this record is filed on the precedent of hti-immunization-erosion: it reads the war as the shock and coverage as the capacity to keep a basic service running through it and restore it. The figures are WHO and UNICEF estimates built from administrative reports and surveys, not a census, and estimates for a country at war with displaced populations and collapsed reporting are especially uncertain. The API rows mix revisions: 2000 to 2024 carry a July 2025 timestamp and 2025 a July 2026 one, so the latest revision may have restated earlier years that the API does not show. 95 percent in 2017 is the highest value in the published series, which starts in 2000. The fall is caused mainly by war and displacement, outside the health system's control, and the 2025 recovery may owe much to UNICEF, WHO and Gavi supported catch-up campaigns rather than the national programme alone; the data cannot separate them. The started year is the start of the comparison, following hti-immunization-erosion, not the founding of the national programme.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Sudansince 1973delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Rahad Irrigation Project, and its cost and time overrun

Sudan's government and the Rahad Corporation (RAHCO) built the Rahad irrigation scheme, 300,000 feddans east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile, with a main pumping station, a siphon under the Dinder River and a barrage on the Rahad River, under credits approved in March 1973; the physical works were completed in December 1982 against a planned June 1978, at a final cost of US$395.6 million against an appraisal estimate of US$125.0 million.

395.6 million US dollars, final estimated total project cost at completion, 1983. 125 million US dollars, total project cost estimated at appraisal, 1973. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Project Performance Audit Report, Sudan: Rahad Irrigation Project (Credits 364 and 364-1-SU), Report No. 5130, 13 June 1984, with the Project Completion Report attached, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government let a large pump irrigation scheme go to tender before detailed design was finished, then refinanced a doubling of cost through a second round of Arab and IDA credits and absorbed the remainder in the national budget.

Preconditions

  • Appraisal based on a feasibility study rather than detailed design
  • Several co-financiers willing to raise commitments mid-project
  • A construction market where contractors had better-paying bids elsewhere in the region

Limits: The report is the World Bank auditing a project it financed alongside the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund, the Saudi Fund and others, so the delivery was Sudanese but the money and the judgement were largely external. Much of the threefold overrun came before construction: the project was reappraised in 1975 at US$320.7 million, 156 percent above 1973, because detailed designs had not been done at appraisal and the 1973 oil shock drove inflation, so only a 23 percent overrun is measured against a design-based estimate. The final cost is itself an estimate: the report says local costs such as administration and settlement are approximate and that better information had been requested. Figures are nominal dollars at the exchange rates of the time. The schedule comparison uses the dates for completing physical components in the report's data table (June 1978 appraised, December 1982 actual); the text says the project finished more than four years late. The scheme did develop the full planned area, and the auditors re-estimated its economic return at 20 percent against 14 percent at appraisal, so a cost overrun did not mean a failed asset. The text file is an OCR of a 1984 typescript and some table cells are garbled.