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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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4 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

El Salvadorsince 1993dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

INSAFORP tripartite training institute, and its dissolution

El Salvador ran its national vocational training system from 1993 through INSAFORP, an institute funded by a 1% employer payroll levy and governed by a tripartite council of four government, four employer and four worker representatives; a 2021 reform gave the President the choice of the employer seats, and Decree 893 of 14 November 2023 dissolved INSAFORP and handed its functions to INCAF, whose council holds only the institute's president and four ministries.

0 seats, employer-sector seats on the governing council of the national training institute under the 2023 incaf law, 2023-11-14. 4 seats (of 12, four per sector), employer-sector seats on the insaforp consejo directivo under the 1993 ley de formaciรณn profesional (peak structure, as read from the recital of the 2021 reform), 2021-06-03. Legislative Assembly of El Salvador, Decreto N.ยฐ 893 (Ley del Instituto Nacional de Capacitaciรณn y Formaciรณn), as published by the Supreme Court's Centro de Documentaciรณn Judicial, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

El Salvador's Legislative Assembly, on the executive's initiative, first moved the choice of INSAFORP's employer representatives to the President (2021) and then dissolved the tripartite institute, replacing it with a ministry-run council while keeping the employer payroll levy (2023). The state kept the money flow from firms and removed the firms' and workers' seats at the table.

Preconditions

  • A training system financed by an employer payroll levy, so the state can keep the revenue while changing who governs it
  • A legislative majority aligned with the executive, able to pass an institutional replacement in a single session
  • Employer and worker organisations whose seats rested on ordinary statute rather than on constitutional or treaty protection

Where else it has been used: Levy-funded tripartite training bodies of the SENAI and INFOTEP family exist across Latin America; the Salvadoran case shows the arrangement is only as durable as the statute that seats the private sector, since the levy alone does not guarantee a voice.

Limits: The metric is a count of seats read off the text of two laws, not a measured outcome: the value 0 is our reading of Art. 11 of Decree 893, which lists only the INCAF president and four ministries, and the peak of four employer seats comes from a recital in the 2021 reform, not from the 1993 law itself, which we did not open. The 1% levy rate in the claim is read from Art. 19 of Decree 893, which carries the levy over, and was not read from the 1993 text. Neither text shows how much the employer and worker seats shaped training decisions in practice, how many people INSAFORP trained, or whether training volume or quality fell under INCAF; no official participant series was retrieved, so this record documents the end of a governance arrangement, not a fall in delivery. Firms still fund the system: Art. 19 keeps the 1% employer payroll levy, although it reserves only 20% of it for INCAF's training and sends the remaining 80% elsewhere, so the levy-funded collaboration was reshaped rather than abolished in money terms. The collaboration was already eroded before dissolution: the 2021 reform let the President pick employer representatives from ternas built by the Labour Ministry, without requiring membership of employer associations. The Supreme Court documentation host returned intermittent HTTP 522 errors on the day of retrieval before serving both documents.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

El Salvadorsince 2021operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

Bitcoin Law, and its 2025 rollback

El Salvador's 2025 reform made private-sector Bitcoin acceptance voluntary, limited the law to private participation and repealed Articles 4, 8 and 9 of the 2021 Bitcoin Law.

3 articles, bitcoin law articles repealed by the 2025 reform, 2025-01-30. 2 sectors (private and public), sectors with mandatory bitcoin acceptance under the original law, 2021-09-07. Legislative Assembly of El Salvador, Reforms to the Bitcoin Law (Decree 57/2025), retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

El Salvador launched a national Bitcoin mandate and later used legislation to narrow it: the 2025 reform removed mandatory acceptance, repealed three core articles and confined the legal framework to voluntary private participation. The case makes institutional responsiveness visible as the ability to unwind a national experiment when its obligations no longer fit.

Preconditions

  • A legislature able to amend the legal basis of a national digital-payment programme
  • Operational monitoring and fiscal or financing feedback that can expose a gap between launch and sustained use
  • A transition plan that removes public obligations while leaving private actors a voluntary route to continue

Where else it has been used: Policy reversals travel when governments design an exit path before a national experiment becomes permanent infrastructure; without legal clarity, a rollback can leave users, merchants and public agencies with stranded obligations.

Limits: The amendment records a legal rollback, not actual Chivo use, fiscal cost, user adoption, merchant behaviour or whether voluntary acceptance changed after the reform. The comparison with the original law describes the statutory sectors affected; it does not measure how widely the 2021 mandate was followed. The legislative text also cannot by itself establish implementation timing or operational outcomes.

El Salvadorsince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

National COVID-19 vaccination campaign

From its first dose on 17 February 2021 to the end of 2023, El Salvador's national COVID-19 vaccination campaign administered 11.5 million doses and completed the primary series for 4.4 million people, 68 per 100 population.

4,397,817 persons, persons with a completed primary series, 2023-12-29. 68 per 100 population, persons with a completed primary series per 100 population, 2023-12-29. World Health Organization, COVID-19 vaccination data (country-reported), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Health vaccinated through mass sites and the public clinic network after securing early supply, and published a running national count.

Preconditions

  • Early vaccine supply contracts or donations
  • A small territory and dense road network that make mass sites reachable
  • An immunization register that counts persons as well as doses

Where else it has been used: The mass-site model travelled across Central America; El Salvador's case shows that a fast start does not by itself carry coverage past two thirds.

Limits: WHO republishes the Ministry of Health's administrative count; the El Salvador row carries DATE_UPDATED 2023-12-29 and no independent coverage survey is cited. A third of the population never completed the primary series and only 29 per 100 received a booster, so the delivery is national in reach but partial; Costa Rica (86) and Peru (87) completed more in the same file. The cumulative count does not show the campaign's early speed, which is its usual selling point, and that speed is not evidenced here. The government's covid19.gob.sv dashboard did not answer a scripted request and the PAHO country profile returned 403 in an earlier pass, so no national publication was read. The issue-47 rejection of this lead was on publisher_metric; the WHO file is the new evidence that fixes it.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

El Salvadorsince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

El Chaparral (3 de Febrero) hydroelectric plant

El Salvador's state hydro commission CEL financed the El Chaparral hydroelectric plant on the Torola River through a BCIE loan arranged in September 2008, with four planned years of construction, and inaugurated it as the 3 de Febrero plant on 19 October 2023 at an approximate cost of US$800 million; CEL gives the initial investment as US$207.8 million, so the final cost is about 3.8 times the initial figure, some 15 years after the 2008 loan.

800 US$ million, approximate final cost of the 3 de febrero (el chaparral) hydroelectric plant, stated at inauguration, 2023-10-19. 207.8 US$ million, initial investment of the el chaparral project, as stated by cel in 2022, 2022. Comisiรณn Ejecutiva Hidroelรฉctrica del Rรญo Lempa (CEL), inauguration notice for the 3 de Febrero hydroelectric plant, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

CEL contracted a 65.8 MW dam, financed by BCIE loans the Assembly guaranteed, and when the original design failed it refinanced a redesign through two further BCIE loans and completed the plant under a later government. Successive administrations kept financing the asset rather than abandoning it, at the price of a cost multiple.

Preconditions

  • A state utility with borrowing capacity and access to a regional development bank willing to extend and enlarge loans
  • Geological and design studies whose adequacy is only tested once excavation begins
  • A legislature that keeps guaranteeing sovereign debt for a stalled project across changes of government

Where else it has been used: The case sits with other hydro and power projects in the corpus whose initial prices did not hold; it shows that an initial contract price transfers little risk when the state must pay for a redesign to finish the asset.

Limits: Both cost figures come from the executing agency reporting on its own project, and both are stated loosely: the final figure is the President's "costo aproximado" quoted in a CEL news item, not an audited account, and CEL's own 2022 notice gave the final cost as "more than $750 million" while the President's speech gave the initial cost as $200 million rather than $207.8 million. The overrun ratio of about 3.8 is our computation from two different documents, and CEL gives the initial figure with no year: it appears to be the price for a design later replaced after technical failures, so part of the gap reflects a changed scope, not only cost escalation; no figure separates the two. The cost statements are politically framed, attributing the overrun to previous governments, and the government that completed the plant is the source. No Court of Accounts final audit was retrieved. The start year rests on the date of the first BCIE loan reported by the Assembly, not on a published construction start date, and the 15-year span is computed from that date to inauguration; the four-year planned duration comes only from the President's quoted speech. The figures say nothing about the plant's output, which is 65.8 MW of installed capacity per the Assembly page.