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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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6 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Tunisiasince 2024still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

ONAS regional sanitation concessions, and their seven-year procurement

Tunisia's national sanitation utility ONAS launched procurement of its first two ten-year regional concessions in September 2017; the south-east concession started in June 2024 and served 797,000 people by July 2026, and the North Tunis concession entered into force only on 9 July 2026 after the original consortium had to be reorganised.

797,000 people, people receiving wastewater collection and treatment from the concessionaire (south-east lot only), 2026-07. 0 agreements, concession agreements signed and effective at the june 2023 status report, against a target of two by december 2020, 2023-06-05. World Bank, Implementation Status and Results Report, Tunisia Sanitation PPP Support Project (P162957), sequence 7, 23 September 2026, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The national sanitation utility bundled the operation, maintenance and rehabilitation of whole regional networks and treatment plants into ten-year performance-based concessions, procured with IFC transaction support and paid from a World Bank loan, replacing short task-based management contracts.

Preconditions

  • An inter-ministerial decision (August 2016) approving a performance-based concession structure for a public utility
  • External finance to guarantee payments to operators while the utility's own tariffs covered only part of its costs
  • A concession unit inside the utility able to supervise operators, which the project had to build

Limits: The 797,000 and the North Tunis entry into force are on pages 2 and 3 of the September 2026 status report, which says the count derives from the south-east lot only and is 92 percent of that lot's end target; the end target for both lots is 2,028,000 people by July 2030. The south-east concession with SCAST was 'scheduled to start on Jun 10, 2024' in the June 2024 status report, and the 783,000 beneficiaries the September 2026 report gives for February 2026 confirm it did. The zero signed agreements against a December 2020 target are in the June 2024 status report (https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099061224041597450/pdf/P162957-61a112cc-f5f3-4ef2-ac1e-0e3c14a54b06.pdf, which also attributes the North Tunis delay to the reorganisation of the ADP-led consortium). The 2017 launch is in the project appraisal document of November 2022, paragraph 13. The World Bank finances the operators' payments through this loan (the status report lists the operation and maintenance component at a cost of 415.30, in US$ millions), so the concessions are public money paying private operators under performance contracts, not private finance, and the lender is reporting on its own project. 'People receiving services' counts the population in the concession area, not households newly connected: only 3,400 people had gained access to improved sanitation through the project by July 2026. The record shows a partnership delivered at national-utility scale but nine years after procurement began, which is as much evidence of slow delivery as of collaboration.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Tunisiasince 2000still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Programme national d'enseignement des adultes (national adult education programme)

Tunisia's Ministry of Social Affairs, through its national adult education centre and regional coordinations, taught 16,560 adult learners in the 2021-2022 school year, 10,320 in the basic cycle and 6,240 in the completion and intensive cycles, 9,799 of them women, against a forecast of 22,710.

16,560 learners, adult learners in the national adult education programme, all governorates and cycles (annex 5), 2021-2022 school year. 22,710 learners, forecast number of learners for 2022 in the same report, 2022 (forecast). Ministere des Affaires sociales, Rapport annuel de performance 2022 (mission Affaires sociales), programme Promotion sociale, indicator 1.3.3 and Annex 5 'Distribution of learners by governorate and cycle, school year 2021/2022', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The social affairs ministry runs a national adult education centre that hires contract teachers to give literacy and post-literacy classes in every governorate, and reports learners by governorate and cycle in its performance budget.

Preconditions

  • A performance-budgeting system that makes ministries report indicators and enrolment annually
  • A pool of contract teachers paid from the ministry budget
  • Local venues and regional coordinators close to rural learners, especially women

Limits: The ministry reports on its own programme in its annual performance report, in Arabic. The numbers sit in a PDF: the narrative on page 43 and the governorate table on page 78; the text layer of this PDF maps digits wrongly (it extracts 16.362 and 22.912), so the figures were read from the rendered pages. The count is learners enrolled in literacy (basic) and post-literacy (completion and intensive) classes, not completions, and literacy classes are only part of adult learning. Against roughly eight million Tunisian adults it is a small reach, about two learners per thousand adults, in a country whose own report puts adult illiteracy at 16.8 percent in 2022. The report attributes the shortfall against forecast to the loss of contract teachers (954 at end 2021 to 943 at end 2022) and to difficulty attracting learners, and the 2024 report still speaks of 'targeting 22 thousand beneficiaries' with 885 contract and 113 tenured teachers, so the programme has not regained its forecast scale; no earlier enrolment peak was verified, so the record is not filed as an erosion. The 2000 start is the commonly reported launch year of the national programme and was not read at the cited source.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Tunisiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Banque Centrale de Tunisie regulatory sandbox, first cohort

The Banque Centrale de Tunisie launched a regulatory sandbox in January 2020, admitted four fintech solutions to its first cohort in September 2020, ran tests with real customers and partner banks for 13 months, notified exit in September 2022, and drafted a circular on digital enrolment and remote bank account opening from the results (BCT Rapport annuel 2022).

4 solutions, fintech solutions admitted to the first cohort of the bct regulatory sandbox, 2020-09. Banque Centrale de Tunisie, Rapport annuel 2020 (June 2021), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank set up a fintech committee, published an access guide, selected four solutions against its own strategic priorities, exempted them from specified rules for a bounded test with partner banks, and then wrote the tested remote-onboarding practice into a banking circular.

Preconditions

  • A central bank with rule-making power over the banks the fintechs had to test through
  • Partner banks willing to embed outside firms in a protected test environment
  • A strategic plan that named innovation as an objective, so staff time was allocated to it

Where else it has been used: The design follows the cohort model of the UK FCA and Bahrain's central bank; what did not travel was the cadence, since Tunisia ran one cohort and stopped.

Limits: The count is the regulator's own report of its own programme. The number does not say how many of the four completed, only that exit plans were validated. Only one regulator is covered; capital markets and insurance regulators are not. Four solutions in one cohort over 2020 to 2022 is about 0.33 admissions per million people (our computation against the World Bank's 2020 population of 11,974,057), and the record shows one cohort only.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Tunisiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

AMEN Social emergency transfers, 2020

After the March 2020 lockdown, Tunisia's government announced in April 2020 a vertical and horizontal expansion of the AMEN Social programme: a TND 50 top-up for two months to all 260,000 poor households, two TND 200 transfers to 450,000 vulnerable households on the subsidised health card, and a one-off TND 200 transfer to 300,000 further vulnerable households enrolled through a new simplified platform.

300,000 households, vulnerable households outside the amen social registry enrolled through a simplified platform and paid a one-off tnd 200, 2020. 450,000 households, vulnerable households on the subsidised health card paid two tnd 200 transfers, 2020. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document, Tunisia COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Support Project (P176352), March 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Social Affairs topped up existing cash-transfer beneficiaries, paid households already listed for subsidised health care, and opened a simplified enrolment platform to reach vulnerable households outside the registry.

Preconditions

  • A social registry with accurate identification for most poor and vulnerable households
  • A legal framework for the AMEN Social programme adopted before the shock
  • Data cross-checks against other administrative registries to vet new applicants quickly

Limits: All three figures are in paragraph 23 of a PDF (printed page 15 of 86, PDF page 21), written a year after the event by the World Bank as it prepared a loan to finance the programme's next phase; it is a lender's description, not an audit, and the counts are round numbers. The document dates the announcement to April 2020 and says the households received the transfers, but it gives no payment dates, so the speed claim rests on the month of the announcement, not on the month money arrived. The 300,000 are households the Ministry of Social Affairs enrolled through a platform it built for the crisis, a horizontal expansion; the other two groups were already known to the state. The amounts were small (TND 200 is about US$73 at the document's rate), and the transfers were one-off or two-month measures. The responsiveness rested on the AMEN Social programme and registry built since 2019 with earlier World Bank support, which the same paragraph credits.

Tunisiasince 1984delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Sfax flood protection (belt canal) after the 1982 flood

After the October 1982 flood in Sfax killed at least 70 people and destroyed about 700 houses, Tunisia's Urban Hydraulics Directorate built an eight-km belt canal and rehabilitated the city's wadi channels and dikes, completing the works in June 1988 as scheduled, and the January 1990 floods that damaged much of central and southern Tunisia did not damage the protected area.

8 km, belt canal built around greater sfax, 1988-06. 70 people, lives lost in the october 1982 sfax flood (at least), 1982-10. World Bank, Project Completion Report, Tunisia Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN), Report No. 9877, 30 August 1991, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

After a flood with an estimated 130-year return period, the urban hydraulics directorate built an intercepting canal around the city to divert runoff from the catchment above it, plus storm drains inside it, and set up a regional maintenance section.

Preconditions

  • A 1978 master plan and long hydrological series that let a feasibility study finish within three months
  • Land expropriation for a canal corridor on the urban edge
  • A maintenance unit with a recurring budget, which the report doubted

Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$25 million (US$22.3 million disbursed), wrote the report. The belt canal length is in the project description and the completion date in the timetable table (Table 2, planned and actual June 1988); 'completed according to the original schedule' is para. 5.01. The evidence that the works protected the city is one sentence noting that the January 1990 floods did not damage the project area, which the report says was acknowledged by the press and local residents; no rainfall or discharge comparison is given, so the 1990 event may have been smaller in Sfax than 1982. The report warns that protection depends on maintenance funding without cost recovery, and recommends an impact evaluation within five years; none was read. This is a 1984 to 1988 build and says nothing about current Tunisian flood preparedness. The text is OCR of a scanned 1991 report.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Tunisiasince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Reseau Ferroviaire Rapide de Tunis, lines D and E, and its overruns

Tunisia's transport ministry and the Societe du RFR built the first two lines of the Tunis rapid rail network, about 18 km plus 28 trains, financed from December 2010; the EIB's approximate total cost for the same scheme rose from EUR 550 million at the 2009 appraisal to EUR 653 million at the 2017 appraisal, Line E opened in March 2023 and Line D on 25 January 2025, against a 2015 project study that scheduled construction of the Line E viaduct for 2014 to 2017.

653 million EUR, approximate total cost of rfr lines d and e (eib appraisal, operation 2015-0288), 2017. 550 million EUR, approximate total cost of rfr lines d and e (eib appraisal, operation 2009-0154), 2009. European Investment Bank, project summary sheet 20150288 (RESEAU FERROVIAIRE RAPIDE II), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Transport created a dedicated project company, the Societe du RFR, assembled a 40 percent state and 60 percent multi-donor financing package, and built the first two lines through civil works contracts while SNCFT took the operating role; when the Bardo municipality stopped the works, the company went to the administrative court and the cabinet chose a design variant in December 2023.

Preconditions

  • Concessional lenders (EIB, AFD, KfW, EU) willing to stay in for more than a decade and to suspend and restart disbursement rather than exit
  • A rail right of way partly owned by SNCFT, so most of the route did not need fresh land
  • An administrative court able to overrule a municipality that blocked works on a national project

Where else it has been used: The same multi-lender package financed Line A in 2013 and is meant to carry the remaining lines of the planned 85 km network; the Tunis case is usually retold as a delay story, and the part that drops out is that the lines did open.

Limits: The cost figures are the EIB's approximate appraisal totals, not an audited out-turn: the 18.7 percent rise from 550 to 653 million EUR is our computation across two appraisals whose scope wording differs slightly (the 2017 sheet names a maintenance facility and 28 trains, the 2010 sheet only rolling stock), and in January 2025 the French Treasury still quoted a total of 550 million EUR including rolling stock, so the publishers do not agree on the out-turn. The cost is in euros and says nothing about dinar costs after the currency's depreciation. The record has no official original line-opening date: the only official schedule is a 2015 impact study placing the Line E viaduct's construction in 2014 to 2017, so the roughly six-year slip to the March 2023 Line E opening is a comparison of one structure's plan against the line's opening, not a published overrun. The EIB suspended disbursements in 2016 over construction companies' failures to implement safeguards (ESDS 18 July 2017), and works at Bardo were halted by the municipality until an administrative court annulled the stop on 29 December 2023 (EIB register 236943929), so part of the delay is litigation rather than delivery. About 60 percent of financing came from foreign lenders and French and Korean firms supplied engineering and trains. This is a city network, not a national programme, and it records poor delivery rather than good: it is evidence of the construct's weak end.