Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism6 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Ugandasince 2005dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Private electricity distribution concessions, and the 2022 decision to end them

Uganda ran most of its electricity distribution through private concessions, with Umeme selling about 96 percent of grid energy to end users in 2024, but a Cabinet directive of October 2022 approved the non-renewal of all expiring concessions, and in 2024 the state utility UEDCL took over the assets of two private distributors whose licences were not renewed.

2 licences, private distribution licences not renewed and taken over by uedcl in 2024 (kil and krecs), 2024. 96 %, umeme's share of grid energy sold to end users, the private concession at its peak (about), 2024. Electricity Regulatory Authority (Uganda), Electricity Supply Industry Performance Report for the Year 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government concessioned the national distribution network to a private operator for 20 years under ERA regulation, then the Cabinet decided not to renew any expiring concession and folded each private distributor back into the state company as its licence ran out.

Preconditions

A regulator able to set tariffs and verify investment over a long concession
A state utility able to absorb staff, customers and assets at handover
A settled buyout value for the operator's unrecovered investment, which was disputed

Where else it has been used: Uganda also took back Eskom Uganda's 20-year generation concession at its end in 2023 (per an ERA annual report, era.go.ug download wpdmdl=7485); Lesotho's hospital PPP and other African utility concessions show the same pattern of a long PPP ended at expiry rather than renewed.

Limits: The figures are in a PDF (the 96 percent and Table 6 on PDF page 21; the Cabinet directive and the KIL and KRECS takeover on PDF page 24). The report covers 2024, when Umeme still operated; it does not record the end of Umeme's own concession, which ran to 2025. That the state utility took over Umeme's area is documented by UEDCL itself: its '100 Days in the Driving Seat' report (https://www.uedcl.co.ug/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/100DaysInTheDriving-Seat-.pdf, page 1) says that on 1 April 2025 UEDCL began its national mandate of electricity distribution; ERA's tariff schedules for Umeme on its site also stop after January to March 2025. The started year is the start of the Umeme concession as commonly dated, not stated in this report. The concession's record is contested: ERA reports Umeme's losses at 16.0 percent in 2024 against a 13.24 percent target, and the decision to end private distribution was a policy choice by the Cabinet, so 'dismantled' records a decision, not a collapse. The report gives no buyout amount; an ERA annual report on the same site (wpdmdl=7485) lists 'no clear asset registers to determine buyout amount for UMEME' as a risk of the concession's expiry.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Ugandasince 1992operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Functional Adult Literacy programme, and its decline

Uganda's Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development enrolled 434,664 adult learners in its government-funded Functional Adult Literacy programme in 2004, and enrolment fell to 88,533 by 2007.

88,533 learners, learners enrolled in government-funded functional adult literacy (fal), 2007. 434,664 learners, learners enrolled in government-funded fal in 2004, the high of the 1997-2007 table, 2004. Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, national report on adult learning and education for CONFINTEA VI, hosted by the UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development ran adult literacy classes through district community development officers and volunteer instructors. Enrolment fell after 2004 while government releases fell only from Shs 3.61bn to 3.08bn a year, so the source does not explain the fall.

Preconditions

District community development staff in every local government
Volunteer instructors willing to teach for little or no pay
A protected budget line that outlasts donor and poverty-fund cycles

Limits: The series stops in 2007. The report is a 2008 ministry submission to UNESCO, and no later official FAL enrolment series was found or checked. Whether it recovered later, under this or another name, is not shown, so the eroded status describes 2004 to 2007 and nothing after. 2004 is the high of one eleven-year table, and the jump from about 149,000 in 2001 to 358,000 in 2002 suggests a one-off funding push rather than a stable peak. The table's printed total (2,090,340) does not match the 2,091,340 in the text above it. The figures are the ministry's own administrative counts, taken from a PDF, with no independent check. A count of literacy learners is much narrower than the indicator's construct, the share of all adults in any education or training. The report's national figures show 43% of adults had some primary schooling, so not every enrolee was starting from zero. It also says FAL relied on UNICEF, UNESCO and DVV funding that stopped around 1999, so part of the swing may come from donor funding rather than from state delivery. The same report's release table shows government FAL releases of Shs 3.61bn a year in 2002/03-2004/05 and 3.08bn in 2005/06-2006/07, a cut of about 15% against a fall in enrolment of about 80%, so the cause of the decline is not shown. Elsewhere the report dates the government's re-launch budget to 1991. The start year is a re-launch: there was adult literacy work before 1992, and FAL began as a pilot in eight districts.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Ugandasince 2021still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Bank of Uganda regulatory sandbox

The Bank of Uganda reviewed five applications to its regulatory sandbox in the year to June 2025, issued deficiency letters to all of them, and reported one firm, Rexial Payment Systems Limited, exiting the sandbox after testing and applying for a payment systems operator licence.

1 firms, firms exiting the regulatory sandbox in the financial year, FY2024/25 (July 2024 to June 2025). 5 applications, applications to the regulatory sandbox reviewed in the financial year, FY2024/25. Bank of Uganda, Integrated Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2025, 'FinTech innovation and emerging technology exploration', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank screens sandbox applications against its framework, sends deficiency letters rather than admitting weak proposals, supervises the experiments it has admitted, and steers firms that finish testing into its licensing regime.

Preconditions

A sandbox framework issued under the central bank's payment systems law
A licence category (payment systems operator) that a graduate can move into
Supervisory staff to monitor experiments for scalability and market suitability

Limits: The bank reports on itself, in a 188-page PDF (PDF page 59). The report gives no count of firms admitted in the year: that none of the five applicants was admitted is our reading of 'Deficiency letters were issued to all applicants', so the year's admissions may be zero, and the count of firms still testing is not given. One exit is the whole completion figure, and the report does not say whether the licence was granted. The 2021 start is the year the sandbox framework launched, not stated in this report. The same report lists 'review the regulatory sandbox framework' among next-year priorities. The Capital Markets Authority launched separate Regulatory Sandbox Rules in October 2025 (cmauganda.co.ug news, 8 October 2025) with no participant count, so the record covers only the central bank's sandbox. Against about 48 million people, one completion is a rate near zero per million.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Ugandasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Bank of Uganda COVID-19 credit relief and loan restructuring

The Bank of Uganda gave supervised financial institutions exceptional permission to restructure the loans of borrowers hit by COVID-19 from 1 April 2020, and banks restructured UGX 2.3 trillion of loans in April 2020 alone and UGX 5.9 trillion by July 2020, approving 893,018 of 895,241 applications.

5.9 UGX trillion, loans restructured under bou credit relief, april to july 2020, 2020-07. 893,018 applications, credit relief applications approved, april to july 2020, 2020-07. Bank of Uganda, Financial Stability Report June 2020 (archived copy), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank suspended the usual classification and provisioning rules for restructured loans for 12 months, so banks could reschedule borrowers' repayments without eating their capital, and paired it with a liquidity facility for distressed lenders.

Preconditions

A banking system well capitalised enough to carry deferred repayments
A supervisor with power to waive its own prudential rules by circular
Credit reference and reporting systems to track restructured loans

Where else it has been used: The same forbearance was used across East Africa in 2020: the report itself notes that Rwanda had the highest restructured-loan ratio in the region at 39.0 percent at end June 2020.

Limits: The live Bank of Uganda site is now a JavaScript application and the original PDF path returns a web page, so the source is the Internet Archive copy of the central bank's own report, fetched today. The figures are in Box A on PDF pages 27 to 29 (printed pages 19 to 20) and in the policy summary. The central bank is the rule-maker and the reporter. Restructuring is forbearance, not new money: it postponed repayments and recognition of bad loans, and the same report warns that NPLs could materialise when the relief matured; the 5.9 trillion is a flow of restructurings, while the stock under relief at end June was UGX 4.9 trillion, 31.2 percent of loans. Granting relief was at each bank's discretion, so the approval rate reflects applications banks chose to process. The report dates the relief window from 1 April 2020 but not the decision itself, so the time from shock to rule is not shown here.

Ugandasince 2022delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Response to the 2022 Sudan ebolavirus outbreak

Uganda's Ministry of Health contained the Sudan ebolavirus outbreak declared on 20 September 2022, for which no licensed vaccine existed, through national and district emergency committees, listing 4,793 contacts, and declared it over on 11 January 2023 after 142 confirmed and 22 probable cases and 77 deaths.

113 days, days from outbreak declaration (20 september 2022) to declared end (11 january 2023), 2023-01-11. 4,793 contacts, contacts listed during the outbreak, 2023-01-11. World Health Organization, Disease Outbreak News, Ebola disease caused by Sudan ebolavirus, Uganda, 2023-DON433, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The health ministry activated standing national and district emergency committees, traced and followed contacts, and isolated and treated cases in dedicated treatment centres.

Preconditions

Standing outbreak response structures from earlier Ebola and Marburg outbreaks
A national reference laboratory able to confirm cases fast
District health teams able to trace thousands of contacts

Limits: The 113 days are computed here from the two dates in the WHO notice; the case, death and contact counts are WHO's summary of Ministry of Health data. Containment within four months with no vaccine is the claim, but the outbreak reached nine districts including Kampala, the case fatality was 47 percent, and the record cannot separate the government's response from luck in transmission chains or from the over US$27 million of international support WHO mentions. An epidemic is a different shock from the climate hazards the construct names first, filed on the same terms as the COVID-19 vaccination precedents, and a single 2022 outbreak says little about cyclone or flood preparedness. Uganda's earlier Ebola and Marburg experience is part of why the system existed.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Ugandasince 2013delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Karuma Hydropower Project

Uganda began building the 600 MW Karuma hydropower station in August 2013 against a 60-month plan. By the end of June 2023 the Auditor General reported it 54 months late at 99.9 percent physical progress, and UEGCL records commercial operation from 12 June 2024.

54 months, schedule overrun of karuma hpp at the end of fy2022/23 (actual duration 114 months against a 60-month plan), 2023-06. 60 months, planned construction duration of karuma hpp, 2013. Office of the Auditor General of Uganda, Report of the Auditor General to Parliament for the Financial Year ended 30th June 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and UEGCL let the dam as a single turnkey EPC contract to a foreign state contractor, financed mostly by an export-credit loan. That handed design and construction to the contractor, and land, resettlement and transmission stayed with Ugandan agencies, where much of the delay arose.

Preconditions

An export-credit lender willing to finance most of the cost against a sovereign guarantee
A state land acquisition and resettlement process able to keep pace with an EPC contractor, which it did not
Transmission lines built in step to evacuate the power

Limits: The record carries schedule performance only. No official baseline-against-outturn cost figure was found: UEGCL's page states a project cost of US$1.398 billion with no original budget beside it, so cost overrun is unknown. The Auditor General names USD 30 million of interest claims on delayed payments, which is one cost of the delay and not the overrun. The 54-month figure is measured at June 2023, when the plant was not yet in commercial operation. Commercial operation on 12 June 2024 implies a total overrun near 66 months, more than double the plan, but that figure is our computation from two sources. The 60-month plan is the Auditor General's statement of the plan, and the contract itself was not checked. The same report finds that the community development projects promised with the dam were largely unfunded (UGX 3 billion of 38.3 billion received) and that resettlement lagged, so the delivery is incomplete beyond the powerhouse. The record says nothing about how the plant has performed since commissioning.