Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Uzbekistan's government signed its first competitively tendered solar PPP in November 2019 at USยข2.679 per kWh, the 100 MW Navoi plant began commercial operation in December 2021, and by January 2024 operational solar PV capacity in the country stood at 1,497 MW, with agreements for a further 5,677 MW of solar and 5,100 MW of wind by 2030.
The government, through the energy ministry and a new PPP agency, ran a World Bank Group Scaling Solar tender with standard contracts and a sovereign support agreement, and used the record low tariff it produced to raise its renewable target and repeat the tender model.
Preconditions
A PPP law and a PPP agency created in 2019 to sign and manage the contracts
Multilateral payment guarantees covering a state offtaker with below-cost-recovery tariffs
An electricity tariff reform commitment that made long-term offtake credible to bidders
Limits: The 1,497 MW is all operational solar, and the ICR's own table of operating projects includes 400 MW from Gezhouba procured non-competitively, so not every megawatt came through the competitive PPP route. One foreign developer, Masdar, holds most of the competitive capacity listed (Navoi, Scaling Solar 2, Sherobod), so the collaboration is concentrated. Most deals carry World Bank Group, ADB or EBRD payment guarantees, so the state and multilateral lenders carry offtake risk and the number cannot separate Uzbek institutional capacity from multilateral de-risking. Capacity is nameplate, not generation, and solar remains a small share of a system of roughly 14 GW of mostly gas-fired plant. The 5,677 MW and 5,100 MW are agreements, not delivery. The source is the World Bank evaluating its own guarantee operation.
Uzbekistan's Ministry of Poverty Reduction and Employment expanded short-term vocational skill training of unemployed people from 20,000 in 2018 to 110,000 in 2022, counting graduates of the regional monocentres and district vocational training centres, according to ministry data reported by the World Bank.
The employment ministry built a network of regional training monocentres and district vocational centres that give registered unemployed people short, free skill courses, and counts graduates centrally.
Preconditions
A labour ministry with a district-level presence and registration of the unemployed
Budget for free short courses and for equipping training centres
Donor co-financing for equipment and curricula in the early years
Limits: The numbers are the ministry's, passed on in a World Bank appraisal document as background, rounded to thousands and without a table; the ministry's own release was not found at an open URL. The footnote says the numbers include graduates of both the regional monocentres and district centres, so the figures are graduates rather than enrolments, and the text calls them 'coverage'. Only two years are given, so the path between 2018 and 2022 and anything after 2022 are unknown; 'operating' rests on the appraisal describing the system as current in 2024 and planning further support to it. The training is for registered unemployed people, not all adults, and courses are short (weeks to a few months). The 2018 start is the base year of the series, not a programme launch date read at the source.
Uzbekistan's government expanded its COVID-19 unemployment support from a one-off to multiple benefits, which the World Bank followed by restructuring its emergency project on 12 August 2020, and with that financing had paid US$50.77 million in low-income family allowances to more than 1,000,000 families and US$0.65 million in unemployment benefits to 19,700 people by 1 January 2021.
The Ministry of Finance channelled an emergency donor credit into the existing low-income family allowance and a temporary unemployment benefit, changing the benefit from one payment to several when the shock outlasted the first plan.
Preconditions
An existing means-tested family allowance with a beneficiary list
Emergency external finance, here an IDA credit approved within weeks
A presidential resolution to authorise spending, which was the slow step
Limits: The figures are in paragraphs 2 and 6 of a World Bank restructuring paper, the lender's account of its own project. The record shows slowness as much as speed: the project was approved on 24 April 2020 but became effective only on 14 July 2020, the paper says it took the government three months to issue the Presidential Resolution enabling implementation, and payments under the component began only in November 2020, more than six months after the project was approved. The 1,000,000 families is 'more than', the families were recipients of an existing allowance financed partly from the project rather than new beneficiaries, and the paper does not say how many were added because of the pandemic. Unemployment benefit reached only 19,700 people, which says how narrow formal unemployment support was. Support the government paid from its own budget outside this project is not covered by this source.
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After the Sardoba reservoir dam broke on 1 May 2020 in Syrdarya region, Uzbekistan's government evacuated about 90,000 people from 24 mahallas of three districts, and by October 2020 had built 37 five-storey blocks with 1,480 flats in Sardoba district's Dustlik mahalla, given free to flood victims, and 86 five-storey buildings in Sardoba and Mirzaabad districts.
The president set up a government commission, assigned each region of the country a mahalla to rebuild with its own construction teams, and the state built free apartment blocks for flood victims within five months.
Preconditions
Central control over regional governments and state construction firms
Budget and donor money (including a private US$10 million donation) available within weeks
Land under destroyed houses left with owners, which eased acceptance of flats
Limits: The shock was itself a failure of preparedness: the president's own site calls it a 'man-made accident on the reservoir', a dam that failed within a few years of filling, so the record shows recovery after a failure the state caused, not readiness. The figures come from presidential news items (the 5 May address for the evacuation, the 13 October item for the flats, and 'Construction projects reported', 26 October 2020, https://president.uz/en/lists/view/3916, for the 86 buildings) with no independent check, and they mix counts of flats and of buildings. The plans of 15 May 2020 (lists/view/3572 to 3574) name about 4,500 affected homeowners and further blocks of 360 flats in Mirzaabad and 800 in Akaltyn plus repairs to hundreds of cottages; whether those were finished was not read, so the 1,480 flats show part of the programme. The evacuation figure is a round number in a presidential address, with no breakdown or timing beyond 'immediately', and the same address reports a separate storm in Bukhara region days earlier. Builders were mobilised from every region, so the speed reflects command mobilisation rather than a standing recovery system.
Uzbekistan's government and its state railway UTY began building the 124 km Pap-Angren line with a 19 km tunnel in mid-2013 and finished the works within nine months of the World Bank loan's 2015 effectiveness, with the main infrastructure costing US$1,475.68 million against an estimate of US$1,438.75 million, about 2.6 percent over, and benefits flowing about 18 months earlier than appraisal assumed.
The Cabinet of Ministers decreed the line and put it on a fast track, with the state railway UTY building the track with its own crews and equipment while design proceeded, and a Chinese contractor driving the tunnel in parallel.
Preconditions
A state railway that had already built 640 km of new line with its own workforce
Central authority able to order design and construction to run at once, and to compel the railway to share data
Concessional tunnel financing from China Exim Bank
Limits: The overrun of 2.6 percent is our computation from two figures in the ICR's cost table. The baseline is weak: construction ran simultaneously with detailed design and cost estimation, and by the Bank's appraisal in late 2014 the works were already very advanced, so the estimate was set when much of the cost was known, which flatters the overrun. The ICR gives no planned and actual completion dates for the line itself, only that works finished within nine months of loan effectiveness and benefits began about 18 months early. The 19 km tunnel was built by China Rail and Tunnel Company with China Exim Bank financing, so not all of the delivery was Uzbek institutional capacity, though the rail line was built by UTY's own workforce. The World Bank's own components went badly: the signaling contract was cancelled for misprocurement, US$72.87 million of the loan was cancelled, resettlement compliance was downgraded to moderately unsatisfactory, and UTY declined a second user survey. Passenger demand came in lower than projected. The source is the World Bank evaluating a project it part-financed (about 12 percent of cost), read from a PDF.