Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Brazil's central bank specified, built and ran a mandatory instant payment rail that settled 7.98 billion transactions in July 2026, for 152 million people and 14 million firms transacting in that month.
The central bank wrote the standard, mandated participation for every institution above a size threshold, ran the settlement infrastructure itself and set the price to zero for individuals.
Preconditions
A central bank with regulatory authority over the institutions it needs to compel
Near-universal account ownership to build on
A national identity number to key accounts to
Where else it has been used: The instant rail is not novel and India built one first. What Brazil added was compulsory participation and a zero price, and those are the parts most copies drop.
Limits: Transaction volume shows adoption of one payment rail. It says nothing about cost or schedule performance on a capital project, which is what this indicator asks for. Pix was specified and enforced by a single institution with regulatory power over the participants, so it is weak evidence about delivery that needs several agencies to hold position.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil consolidated federal public services behind one identity platform, reporting 175 million active accounts and 5,179 digital services in May 2026.
One identity provider for every federal service, with assurance levels tied to records the state already held, and a rule that services migrate to it rather than build their own login.
Preconditions
Existing federal databases good enough to verify identity against
Authority to force agencies off their own systems
Limits: An account count measures registration and a service count measures listing. Neither shows whether a service completes, how long it takes, or what it costs to run. Both numbers are published by the programme about itself, with no external audit attached.
๐ช๐ชEstoniasince 2001still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Estonia has run one data exchange layer for the whole state since 2001, and in July 2026 it carried 374.9 million queries between 1,000 connected organizations, 251 of them government bodies, across 3,785 services.
A distributed exchange layer between agency systems, with a legal once-only rule: an agency may not ask a citizen for data another agency already holds.
Preconditions
A legal mandate strong enough to bind every agency
A national identity system
Small enough administration to move together
Where else it has been used: Finland, Iceland and others run the same software. The once-only law is the part that does the work and the part that is hardest to pass.
Limits: Query volume measures use of a layer that grew over 25 years. That is evidence of sustained operation and not of bringing one large project in on cost and on schedule, which is what this indicator asks for. The factsheet is published by the authority that operates the system.
๐ฎ๐ณIndiasince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Existing banks were given a national target and a stripped-down account product, and the identity system removed the documentation barrier that had excluded people.
Preconditions
A bank branch and agent network with national reach
A digital identity covering the population
Political priority high enough to hold banks to a target
Limits: An account count measures opening. Part of the stock is dormant or holds very little, and the release carries no external audit. Reaching 590 million people through banks that already existed is a different problem from delivering a physical project on a schedule.
๐บ๐พUruguaysince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Uruguay rebuilt its electricity supply between 2010 and 2017 through public tenders and long-term contracts, and in 2025 fossil fuels produced 293 GWh of the 15,855 GWh generated, so 98.2 percent came from hydro, wind, biomass and solar.
Long-term power purchase agreements at fixed prices, awarded by competitive auction, with the state utility as a single creditworthy buyer carrying the offtake risk.
Preconditions
A solvent state utility that private investors will contract with
A wind or solar resource worth bidding for
Cross-party agreement to hold the policy across governments
Where else it has been used: The auction plus single-buyer design is the most transferable piece and has been used across Latin America. The decade of political continuity behind it is not a design choice.
Limits: The share is computed from the published generation series by source and is not itself a published headline figure. A generation mix is an outcome, and it hides the cost and schedule record of the projects behind it. A wet or dry year moves the hydro share by several points, so one year is not the programme.
๐บ๐พUruguaysince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Uruguay gave a connected laptop to every child in public primary school from 2007, the first country to do it nationally, and the household survey found a Ceibal computer in the homes of 35.8 percent of the population in 2018.
A dedicated agency outside the education ministry procured devices and connectivity at national scale and used schools as the distribution channel.
Preconditions
A small enough country to reach every school
Budget held outside the ministry it serves
Electricity and connectivity to the schools
Limits: Household reach peaked at 40.1 percent in 2014 and the series stops in 2018, so this number says nothing about the programme now. A device in the home measures distribution and says nothing about learning. The record is here because the delivery is documented and the measure of it is weak.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 1988still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil wrote a right to health into the 1988 constitution and built a single public system that covers everybody in the country, and the WHO service coverage index for Brazil rose from 71 in 2000 to 84 in 2023.
A right to health written into the constitution, funded by earmarked federal transfers and delivered by municipalities under national rules.
Preconditions
A constitutional moment able to carry the commitment
A municipal layer capable of delivering services
Earmarked funding that survives annual budget fights
Limits: A service coverage index counts whether services reach people. It says nothing about waiting times, quality, or the difference between a capital city and the interior, and it credits private provision alongside the public system. Brazil spends less per head on public health than most countries with a comparable index, which this number cannot show.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 1973operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Brazil's national immunisation programme reached 99 percent DPT coverage in 2003 and held above 95 percent for a decade, then fell to 68 percent by 2021 and had recovered to 91 percent by 2024.
91 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage, children aged 12-23 months, 2024. 99 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage at its 2003 peak, 2003. World Bank, from WHO and UNICEF estimates, retrieved 2026-08-26.
The move, and what it needed
Free universal vaccination delivered through the primary care network, with national campaign days that made coverage a visible public event.
Preconditions
A primary care network with national reach
A cold chain
Public trust in the health system, which is what later eroded
Limits: This record is here because it runs both ways. A delivery capability that reached the whole country lost a third of its coverage in five years and has not fully recovered, which is evidence about durability rather than about peak performance. Coverage is administratively reported, DPT is one antigen among many, and the fall has several causes that the series cannot separate.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 2003delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Brazil connected the last rural households to electricity through a national programme run with the state and private distributors, taking access from 94.4 percent of the population in 2000 to 99.8 percent in 2024.
The federal government paid the connection cost and delivered through the existing distribution concessionaires, with connection targets written into their contracts.
Preconditions
Concessionaires already operating in the territory
A grid close enough to extend
Subsidy large enough that the last connections are not loss-making
Limits: Access counts a connection. It says nothing about how often the power fails, what it costs, or the isolated Amazon communities that make up most of the remaining gap. Access was already rising before 2003, so the programme accelerated a trend rather than starting one.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 2003still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil built one national registry of low-income households and paid conditional transfers through it, going from 6.6 million benefits in December 2004 to a peak of 21.0 million in 2022 and 18.6 million in December 2025.
One registry of low-income households shared across every social programme, with payments made directly to a card held by the mother, conditional on school attendance and health checks.
Preconditions
A payments network reaching poor municipalities
Civil registration good enough to identify households
Municipal staff to maintain the registry
Where else it has been used: The conditional transfer plus single registry has been adopted across Latin America, Africa and Asia. The registry, not the transfer, is the reusable asset.
Limits: A benefit count is administrative and says nothing about whether the transfers reduced poverty. The programme was renamed and restructured twice between 2021 and 2023, so the series covers more than one design. The capability worth copying is the registry and the targeting, and neither has a number in this record.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 1996still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil has run every election on electronic voting machines since 2000, across an electorate that reached 155.9 million voters in 2024, with results published the same evening.
One election authority owns the machines, the software and the count, with public audit ceremonies and results published the same evening.
Preconditions
A single national election authority with its own budget
Enough institutional standing to be trusted with the count
Logistics able to reach every polling place
Limits: The electorate measures the scale of the operation and not the speed or the integrity of the count. The Superior Electoral Court publishes result timing and audit results separately and neither is in this number. Electronic voting has been contested politically in Brazil despite repeated public audits, which is a fact about trust rather than about delivery.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 1997still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil developed deepwater extraction, found the pre-salt fields in 2006 and produced them at depths of more than 5,000 metres, with national oil production rising from 71,844 thousand cubic metres in 2000 to 219,032 in 2025.
A state oil company sustained deepwater research for decades, and licensing rules concentrated the learning from each field in one operator.
Preconditions
A state company with a real research budget
Reserves worth the exploration risk
Capital markets willing to fund very long payback
Limits: Production is an outcome shared between Petrobras and foreign operators, and several individual platforms ran years late and over budget, which is exactly the cost and schedule record this indicator asks for and which this number hides. Expanding oil output also sits against Brazil's climate commitments, and a production figure cannot weigh that.
๐ฒ๐ฝMexicosince 2003dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Mexico built public health insurance for people outside social security from 2003 and abolished it in 2020, and CONEVAL measured the share of the population without access to health services rising from 16.2 percent in 2018 to 39.1 percent in 2022.
The abolition is the mechanism recorded here: a new government replaced a funded, enrolment-based entitlement with a budget-line service that required no affiliation, and affiliation-based coverage disappeared faster than the replacement could deliver care.
Preconditions
A programme identified with the previous political coalition, which made it removable
Centralised budget authority able to redirect earmarked health funds
No statutory or constitutional floor under the entitlement
Where else it has been used: The replacement, INSABI, was itself dissolved in 2023 and replaced by IMSS-Bienestar, the second replacement in four years. The case travels as a warning: an entitlement without a legal floor is one election from removal.
Limits: The metric measures the dismantling, not the programme: CONEVAL's deprivation number is self-reported affiliation, not care received, and Seguro Popular at its peak was itself criticised for shallow coverage and uneven state-level spending. The 2018-2022 change spans the pandemic, which stressed every health system, so not all of the 23-point rise is the reform. CONEVAL itself lost autonomy in a later reorganisation, so the continuity of this series is not assured.
England built a national network of early-childhood centres reaching 3,632 sites by August 2009, then closed or hollowed out a large part of it after funding was cut, with the official count at 3,123 by October 2017 and independent estimates near 1,000 closures.
3,123 centres, children's centres open, official count, 2017-10. 3,632 centres, children's centres open at the peak, 2009-08. The Sutton Trust, Stop Start report summary, retrieved 2026-08-27.
The move, and what it needed
Central government funded local one-stop centres for under-fives, ring-fenced the money, and targeted the most deprived areas first; when the ring-fence was removed in 2010, local authorities under cuts converted, merged or closed centres faster than any national decision was ever taken.
Preconditions
Local authorities able to deliver a nationally specified service
A ring-fenced grant, whose removal was also what let the network erode
Cross-departmental agreement that early childhood was infrastructure
Where else it has been used: The 2025 Best Start family hubs programme is the same state rebuilding a version of what it closed, fifteen years later, which is the strongest available evidence that the erosion was a loss.
Limits: A site count is the crudest measure of the service: many surviving centres kept the building and lost the staff, which is why the Sutton Trust's estimate of real closures is roughly double the official fall shown here. The count stops in 2017 and later parliamentary answers show further decline. The record shows the erosion of delivered infrastructure under budget cuts, not the effect on children; the IFS separately measured lasting health benefits from the programme at its peak, which is what makes the erosion a loss rather than housekeeping.
๐ฟ๐ฆSouth Africasince 1994operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
South Africa ran one of the world's cheapest reliable grids and extended it to most of the population after 1994, then under-invested and lost the surplus, reaching 335 days of load shedding in 2023 before recovering to 83 days in 2024.
The erosion is the mechanism recorded here: a state monopoly was told to electrify without being allowed to charge for or build ahead of demand, new-build decisions were delayed for a decade, and the two giant plants finally ordered were too large for the delivery capability that remained.
Preconditions
A single vertically integrated utility, so one balance sheet carried every deferral
Tariffs held below cost for political reasons, which financed under-maintenance
Procurement institutions too weakened to deliver a mega-project on schedule
Where else it has been used: The failure pattern, defer, then order two of the largest coal plants ever attempted, is a caution for any state that skips a build cycle and tries to catch up in one leap.
Limits: The day counts are read from the annual chart in the CSIR report rather than a stated table, and a day with any load shedding counts the same as a day of stage six, so the unit understates severity differences. The 2024 recovery also leans on private rooftop solar that households bought in self-defence, which the report itself notes, so the improvement is not all Eskom's. What the record shows is a delivered capability, generation adequacy, lost over roughly fifteen years of deferred maintenance and failed new build, with Medupi and Kusile late and over budget.
๐บ๐ธUnited Statessince 2000operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
The United States eliminated endemic measles transmission by 2000 through school-entry vaccination requirements, and falling coverage brought 2,777 confirmed cases by August 2026, the most since 1991, against 285 in all of 2024.
The erosion is the mechanism recorded here: vaccination requirements are enforced at school entry by states, so a delivery that took federal purchasing and decades of practice is being undone state by state through widening exemption rules and falling trust, with no single decision anywhere.
Preconditions
Enforcement located at fifty state legislatures rather than one national rule
A generation of parents with no memory of the disease
An information environment that carries vaccine doubt faster than health agencies answer it
Where else it has been used: The same coverage decline is visible across several high-income countries; the American case is the cleanest because elimination was formally certified in 2000, which fixes the baseline the erosion is measured against.
Limits: A case count is the lagging end of the erosion; the leading end is kindergarten vaccination coverage, which CDC reports separately as falling from about 95 percent before the pandemic to under 93 percent, below the outbreak-prevention threshold. The 2026 number is a year in progress and will rise. Elimination status is a WHO-defined property of transmission chains, not of case counts, and had not been formally revoked at retrieval; what the record documents is a maintained public-health achievement being lost while the infrastructure that delivered it still exists.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 1952still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Founded in 1952, Brazil's federal development bank provides long-term financing and investment across the national economy, and it disbursed R$169.7 billion in 2025.
The federal development bank converts public capital and long-term finance into patient support for firms and infrastructure projects that commercial lenders may not carry through their formation period.
Preconditions
A public balance sheet able to lend beyond ordinary commercial horizons
A pipeline of firms and projects able to turn finance into productive capacity
A mandate that can survive changes of government
Where else it has been used: Development banks exist across emerging economies, but the Brazilian case shows the value and the risk of keeping one institution large enough to shape an industrial system: patient capital can build capability, while political allocation can weaken it.
Limits: Disbursement volume measures the bank's activity, not whether the projects it finances arrive on time, within budget or with durable public value. The source is the institution reporting on itself, and the number mixes market-rate lending with policy-directed finance.
๐ง๐ทBrazilsince 1694still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Founded in 1694, Brazil's national mint has remained a public institution through colonial, imperial and republican regimes and now produces currency, identity documents and passports after more than 330 years of operation.
A permanent public production institution carries the state's credential infrastructure across political and monetary transitions, preserving practical capability while its outputs change with the regime around it.
Preconditions
A public mandate for products whose authenticity the state must guarantee
Security and production capabilities that can be renewed across technology shifts
Administrative continuity strong enough to outlast constitutional change
Limits: Institutional survival and the ability to produce state credentials show continuity, not the cost, quality or strategic value of every product made by the mint. The institution also changed its technologies and functions over time, so continuity does not mean an unchanged organisation.
๐ธ๐ฌSingaporesince 1960still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Singapore set up the Housing and Development Board in 1960 to address a severe housing shortage, and it built more than 21,000 flats within its first three years.
A public housing authority combined land, planning, finance and construction into one delivery system, allowing a severe national shortage to be treated as a programme rather than as separate private projects.
Preconditions
Public authority over enough land for coordinated development
Finance and construction capacity that can be directed to a common programme
A long-term administrative mandate that survives individual projects
Limits: The early construction count shows delivery at scale, not housing quality, affordability or equal access over the full history of the programme. The account is published by the agency responsible for the programme.
๐บ๐พUruguaysince 1952operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Uruguay's state railway suspended passenger service in January 1988 to focus on freight; by 1990 about half of the national network had been declared non-operational, leaving 1,484 kilometres active from a 2,998-kilometre network, before passenger services returned only partially in 1993.
The state railway concentrated scarce operating capacity on freight, suspended passenger service and then allowed half the network to fall outside the active system; the later partial restart could not simply recreate the connections and maintenance routines that had been dropped.
Preconditions
A state railway carrying both public-service and commercial obligations
Budget and management pressure strong enough to prioritise freight over access
Alternative road transport available to absorb passengers when rail service stopped
Where else it has been used: Rail contractions are common where a network is asked to behave like a freight business while serving as public infrastructure. Uruguay's current Central Railway rebuild is a second attempt to restore a network after the operating base was allowed to thin.
Limits: Track kilometres are an infrastructure count, not a measure of trains, reliability, passengers or freight capacity, and the source does not establish that every kilometre declared non-operational was physically removed. Passenger service returned on selected routes in 1993, so this is a contraction and partial recovery rather than a permanently closed railway. The network statement is a government description and does not evaluate the decision's social or economic effects.
๐ซ๐ทFrancesince 2007operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
France's Flamanville 3 EPR took about 16.5 years from construction beginning in September 2007 to completion in early 2024, and its commissioning was the country's first new nuclear reactor since Civaux 2 in 1999, a 25-year gap.
A state-backed utility attempted a first-of-kind reactor after a long pause in domestic nuclear construction, while the regulator accumulated inspections and prescriptions as construction, manufacturing and testing problems appeared; the project delivered, but the decade-plus gap exposed how much build-and-supply-chain capability had gone unused.
Preconditions
A utility and regulator able to retain nuclear engineering knowledge through a long construction pause
A supply chain capable of qualifying safety-critical components to current standards
Political and financial capacity to carry a first-of-kind project through repeated redesigns
Where else it has been used: The EPR experience is now being used in France, Finland, China and the United Kingdom as a common warning about first-of-kind nuclear delivery. The lesson that travels is to rebuild the industrial base before promising a fleet, not to copy the reactor design alone.
Limits: The durations are calculated from the start and completion dates and from the previous commissioning date stated by the regulator; they do not isolate the causes of delay, the project's cost or the reactor's long-run availability. Flamanville eventually entered service and the regulator reports nearly 600 construction inspections, so the case documents a thin and difficult delivery capability rather than a project that never completed. The regulator describes its own oversight and is not an independent cost auditor.
๐จ๐ฆCanadasince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Canada rolled out the Phoenix federal pay system in 2016, then spent more than C$2.6 billion by April 2022 to support and stabilise it and correct pay-file errors, with a further roughly C$1 billion allocated through the 2024-25 fiscal year.
A central agency replaced a complex government-wide payroll system through a schedule-driven rollout with insufficient independent oversight; once errors spread across departments, the state converted the project into a permanent stabilisation operation while designing a successor.
Preconditions
A payroll system serving many departments with different rules and legacy data
Central oversight strong enough to challenge a schedule and budget that look achievable on paper
A fallback payroll process that protects workers while the digital system is repaired
Where else it has been used: Phoenix is now used inside Canada's digital-government controls as a failure case. The transferable lesson is governance: independent review has to see the whole operating complexity before a government-wide launch, not after the backlog appears.
Limits: Spending on stabilisation and correction measures shows the scale of a delivery failure, not the total social cost of late or incorrect pay, nor whether a replacement will perform better. The Auditor General notes that the total implementation cost was still not known, and the figures combine technical support, error correction and later stabilisation rather than one clean project budget. The system continued to operate while the government explored its replacement.
The Netherlands ended roughly sixty years of Groningen gas extraction with the permanent closure of all production locations on 19 April 2024; by the end of 2024 the response system had handled more than 500,000 damage reports and paid over โฌ2.5 billion in compensation.
The state and a private operator ran a national energy system for decades, then progressively restricted and finally closed the field as evidence of induced earthquakes and resident harm made the old production objective untenable; the institutional challenge shifted from extraction to repair and trust.
Preconditions
A public-private operating structure able to produce and distribute gas nationally
Seismic monitoring and a legal route for government to reduce production and close the field
Administrative capacity to process large-scale damage claims after the revenue stream ended
Where else it has been used: The case travels as a warning about lock-in: a system that reliably delivers an economic objective can still require an equally large exit and repair capability when its external costs accumulate.
Limits: Damage reports and compensation measure the burden of the extraction system and the state's response, not the engineering reliability or economic value of the gas infrastructure. The figures include cases handled by successor agencies and do not show how many homes are safe or how long recovery will take. Closure was a deliberate response to induced earthquakes, so the case is evidence of a capability being withdrawn after its harms became politically unavoidable, not a verdict on every use of natural gas.
The Netherlands has run DigiD as a shared login for public services since 2005; in 2024 it recorded 550,153,271 successful authentications across 16,829,696 accounts and reported 99.94 percent availability against a 99.5 percent norm.
The state provided one identity rail that agencies could reuse instead of each building a separate login, then raised assurance levels through SMS, an app and an identity-document check while publishing service-level figures for the shared platform.
Preconditions
A population register and national identifier that public services can use consistently
A central operator able to set security, availability and integration standards for many agencies
A support and authorisation route for people who need another person to act for them
Where else it has been used: Shared government identity rails have spread across Europe, but the difficult part is not the login screen: it is agreeing one trust model, keeping the service available and providing assisted access when digital identity is not enough.
Limits: Authentication volume, account stock and uptime show a durable shared service, not whether online procedures finish, whether users can access it equally or what it cost to build and operate. Logius reports its own service figures, and account counts include people who may use DigiD rarely or not at all. The case is evidence of sustained digital delivery rather than proof that every public service is easy to use.
๐ณ๐ฑNetherlandssince 1954delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
After the 1953 flood, the Netherlands built 13 Delta Works between the first project in 1954 and the completion of the Maeslant Barrier in 1997, creating a long-lived national defence system of dams, sluices and storm-surge barriers.
13 major flood-defence works, delta works delivered, 1997. 43 years, programme duration to final delivery, 1997. Rijkswaterstaat, institutional history, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
A national authority turned a catastrophic shock into a sequenced portfolio: it set common safety standards, built dams and movable barriers one after another, retained specialist engineering knowledge and kept the programme alive across governments until the final barrier closed the original build cycle.
Preconditions
A widely shared national threat that can sustain investment after the disaster fades from daily politics
A public engineering authority able to carry designs, standards and procurement knowledge across decades
Stable funding and coordination with ports, fisheries, municipalities, businesses and environmental interests
Where else it has been used: The Delta Works became a reference point for coastal-defence programmes elsewhere. The transferable move is a durable portfolio and standard-setting institution; copying a barrier without the maintenance, modelling and governance around it copies only the visible object.
Limits: Counting structures and years shows continuity of a national programme, not the cost, construction productivity, maintenance burden or actual reduction in flood probability. Rijkswaterstaat reports the programme's own history and says the works protect the area behind them, but this record does not independently test performance or distributional effects.
๐ณ๐ฑNetherlandssince 1995operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
The Netherlands opened the Betuweroute freight railway in 2007, but the Auditor General found that state operating support in 2006โ2013 reached โฌ170 million against a โฌ76 million maximum subsidy and required another โฌ152 million through 2015; the line was not cost-covering and its promised environmental gain was never measured.
The state built a specialised freight corridor on the expectation that private operators and a road-to-rail shift would make it commercially self-sustaining; when those assumptions did not hold, public money filled the operating gap while the promised environmental test remained undone.
Preconditions
A public sponsor able to separate construction approval from a credible long-term operating plan
Freight operators and port users with enough demand to shift traffic onto one corridor
An independent appraisal that tests both revenue assumptions and environmental counterfactuals before opening
Where else it has been used: The case is a warning for infrastructure justified by a future market: a completed asset can still erode national capability if operating incentives, demand and evaluation are left to catch up after the ribbon-cutting.
Limits: The support figures show that the operating model missed its financial promise, not the railway's current freight volume, safety or strategic value. The Court of Audit says the environmental modal-shift benefit was never measured, so this is not evidence that the line failed every objective. The 2006โ2013 support period also excludes construction costs and later operating decisions.
The Netherlands runs MijnOverheid as one portal for government mail and personal data; in 2024 it carried 103,429,342 messages through 11,015,895 accounts with reported availability of 99.99 percent against a 99 percent norm.
103,429,342 messages, messages delivered through mijnoverheid, 2024. 11,015,895 accounts, mijnoverheid accounts, 2024. Logius, 2024 service figures, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
The state made one citizen-facing mailbox and data view that agencies could feed through common services, letting residents find notices and records in one place instead of learning a separate portal for every authority.
Preconditions
A national identity rail such as DigiD that can authenticate residents across agencies
Authoritative registers and interoperability standards so agencies can publish consistent messages and data
Paper, phone and assisted-digital routes for residents who cannot or do not want to use the portal
Where else it has been used: Many countries have built citizen portals, but a single front door only works when agencies agree to standards, notifications and support obligations; a website alone does not create a joined-up government.
Limits: Message volume, account stock and uptime show a durable shared service, not whether a notice is understood, whether a public procedure finishes or whether people can use the portal equally. Logius reports its own service figures, and an account can be inactive. The case is evidence of sustained digital delivery rather than proof that every government interaction is simple or inclusive.
The V250 trains for the NetherlandsโBelgium Fyra service entered operation six years late and the service was cancelled after only 40 days, leaving the intended passenger service on the HSL-Zuid unrealised and triggering a parliamentary inquiry.
The state, rail operators and an international supplier committed to a technically ambitious service without a credible fallback, and the timetable moved ahead before the trains had demonstrated reliable operation; once the fleet was withdrawn, the promised network could not be delivered as contracted.
Preconditions
An independent acceptance regime that tests a complex system in real operating conditions before commercial launch
A contract and concession design with a usable fallback when a supplier misses reliability and certification milestones
Clear accountability across the state as sponsor, the operator as concession holder and the cross-border partner
Where else it has been used: The case travels as a warning about megaproject coupling: a finished track, a concession and new rolling stock can each look plausible while the combined system lacks a tested path to service.
Limits: The 40-day service and six-year delay show a failed launch and delivery process, not that the HSL-Zuid railway has no later passenger value or that every actor shared the same responsibility. The metric does not capture the eventual alternative services, the line's wider benefits or the full financial loss. The parliamentary inquiry was convened to examine the interacting procurement, oversight and governance failures rather than a single technical defect.
Translink and the Dutch public-transport operators rolled out OVpay nationwide in 2023, embedding bank-card and mobile check-in across the country; in 2024 the system processed 390 million travel transactions, 15 percent of all transit transactions.
390,000,000 transactions, ovpay travel transactions processed, 2024. 15 % of transit transactions, ovpay share of all travel transactions, 2024. Translink, 2024 annual report, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
Translink gave all operators a common back office and reader software while banks and card networks supplied the payment credentials; a pilot was expanded in stages until passengers could use a familiar bank card or phone on every Dutch operator without buying a separate transit card.
Preconditions
One national transaction processor and technical standards that competing operators will share
Banks, card schemes and transport authorities willing to align liability, settlement and fare rules
A phased migration that keeps the legacy card and assisted support available while the new rail proves itself
Where else it has been used: Open-loop transit payments are spreading internationally. The Dutch case shows that the visible tap is the easy part: nationwide acceptance depends on a common back office, operator coordination and a migration path for concessions, refunds and passengers who are not well served by bank cards.
Limits: Transaction volume and share show that a national payment rail is being used, not its construction cost, reliability, fare equity, privacy effects or the quality of the migration for people who still need an OV-chipkaart. Translink reports the figures and says the rollout and functions such as capping and product sales were still being extended in 2024. Adoption therefore measures delivery and network reach, not a completed replacement of every legacy process.
On 1 January 2024 the Netherlands put the Omgevingswet and its Digital Environment System into operation, joining municipalities, provinces, water boards and the national government behind one Omgevingsloket for rules, maps and permit applications.
4 government tiers, government tiers represented in the shared environment portal, 2024. 1 portal, national environment portal, 2024. Rijksoverheid, Omgevingsloket description, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
The government consolidated the legal framework and gave four administrative tiers a shared data and application front door, backed by common digital standards and staged chain testing so a resident can check rules and apply without choosing the responsible authority first.
Preconditions
A legal framework that can align national, provincial, municipal and water-board powers without removing local rule-making
Common location, rule and application data standards that every authority can publish and maintain
A transition programme with testing, support and fallback arrangements for authorities moving from separate legacy portals
Where else it has been used: One-stop planning portals are being attempted in many jurisdictions. The Dutch case makes the hard dependency visible: one interface works only when each authority keeps its underlying rules current and agrees to shared standards, governance and testing.
Limits: The four-tier and one-portal counts show a national institutional and digital launch, not whether local rules are complete, applications are faster, the interface is accessible or the legal simplification has delivered better environmental outcomes. The government describes the portal as under continuous improvement and the transition includes significant local implementation work. This is evidence of coordinated delivery at the point of launch, not a completed evaluation of the new system.
๐จ๐ฑChilesince 2007operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Chile launched the integrated Transantiago busโmetro system in 2007; an independent 2016โ19 evaluation found the state subsidy per passenger fare rose from CLP 640 per CLP 1,000 paid in 2016 to CLP 790 in 2019 even as passenger production rose 7%.
790 CLP subsidy per CLP 1,000 passenger fare, state subsidy per clp 1,000 passenger fare, 2019. 640 CLP subsidy per CLP 1,000 passenger fare, state subsidy per clp 1,000 passenger fare, 2016. DIPRES, independent evaluation of the National Public Transport Subsidy, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
The state integrated bus routes and metro under concessions and used subsidies to stabilise fares, but the evaluation exposed weak outcome baselines and growing fiscal dependence. The case shows why a complex service reform needs a measurable fallback plan as well as a unified operating design.
Preconditions
A unified transport authority able to coordinate routes, metro, fares and concession contracts
Reliable passenger, coverage, cost and service-quality baselines before the reform begins
Contract and contingency mechanisms that can be revised when demand, operations or fiscal exposure diverge from plan
Where else it has been used: Integrated transport reforms are common worldwide. Transantiago travels as a caution that coordination and physical integration do not substitute for outcome measurement, realistic demand assumptions and contracts that preserve room to correct course.
Limits: The subsidy ratio is not the system's total cost, a schedule overrun or a direct measure of service quality. The evaluation reported missing coverage baselines and global outcome indicators, and the transport network continued operating under later reforms and branding. Rising subsidy dependence is a warning about delivery and contract design, not proof that one institutional choice caused every passenger or fiscal problem.
๐จ๐ดColombiasince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery
By September 2024, Colombia's 4G road programme comprised 30 concessions at 86.99% aggregate progress, with 14 in operation, 13 under construction, two in pre-construction and one in early termination.
Colombia bundled road building and rehabilitation into a portfolio of public-private concessions, using a national infrastructure agency to standardise contracts, sequence projects and track construction while private concessionaires supplied capital and delivery capacity.
Preconditions
A central agency with authority to structure, procure and renegotiate long-term road concessions
A pipeline of bankable projects and a legal framework for public-private partnerships
Transparent progress reporting and a route to terminate or restructure concessions that cannot meet their obligations
Where else it has been used: Large concession portfolios travel well as a financing and delivery pattern, but the Colombian case shows why a headline completion percentage must sit beside stage, termination, cost and service measures rather than stand in for them.
Limits: ANI's aggregate progress and stage counts are agency-reported and combine projects with different scopes, concession structures and baselines. They do not establish on-time or on-budget delivery, road quality, travel-time gains or equitable regional benefits; one project had already entered early termination. The portfolio is evidence of sustained delivery capacity and correction inside a large programme, not proof that every concession met its original promise.
๐จ๐ดColombiasince 2007operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
A 2021 Contralorรญa fiscal-responsibility ruling on Colombia's Reficar modernization held COP2.945 trillion in damage after finding USD997 million in additional investments that added no value to the project.
The state-owned refinery modernization expanded through weak cost, contracting and supervision controls; after the project entered service, Colombia's supreme audit institution traced losses, assigned fiscal responsibility and used the finding to make a failed delivery visible rather than treating the asset's operation as proof of success.
Preconditions
A public audit institution with access to contracts, transactions and project records after delivery
Baseline scope, cost and schedule data that allow later investigators to distinguish justified change from value-destroying additions
Legal recovery and accountability mechanisms that can impose responsibility on officials and contractors
Where else it has been used: Reficar travels as a warning for state-led megaprojects: an operating asset can still represent poor delivery if governance cannot control scope, productivity and contract changes, and if the state lacks an independent route to learn from the loss.
Limits: A fiscal-responsibility ruling is an oversight finding about quantified damage, not a complete account of every cost increase, engineering decision or criminal question; the refinery itself continues operating. The two figures come from a later accountability summary and mix a peso liability with a dollar project finding, so they should not be added. The case demonstrates failed governance and correction through audit, not that large state-led industrial projects are impossible.
๐ฏ๐ตJapansince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Japan's MEXT GIGA School programme reached a one-device-per-student environment in 1,810 of 1,812 local school authorities (99.9%) by the end of fiscal 2022, with the remaining two scheduled to finish during fiscal 2023.
The national ministry set a clear one-device standard and channelled grants, procurement guidance and network support through local school authorities, while vendors supplied hardware and software and schools adapted use to their own classrooms.
Preconditions
Central funding and a simple, measurable service standard that local authorities can procure against
Procurement, connectivity and technical-support capacity in every school authority
Teacher training, maintenance and replacement plans that continue after the initial hardware push
Where else it has been used: Rapid school-device rollouts travel during crises, but Japan's experience shows that physical coverage is only the first gate; sustained capability depends on support, content and renewal budgets after the delivery headline fades.
Limits: The completion count means a device was in a student's hands and a school network was usable; it does not measure learning, teacher workload, device quality, replacement costs or equal use at home. MEXT reports the authority survey and the last two authorities were still finishing after the reference year. Delivery of hardware is therefore a national implementation milestone, not proof of better education.
๐ฏ๐ตJapansince 1994dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Japan decided in December 2016 not to restart the Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor and moved to decommissioning after a 1995 sodium leak, a 2010 restart followed by equipment trouble and 2012 inspection failures; the approved plan targets roughly 30 years of decommissioning.
After repeated technical and inspection failures, Japan stopped trying to restart a strategically important prototype, created a government-led decommissioning team and converted the remaining work into a staged thirty-year plan with external oversight and local coordination.
Preconditions
A regulator and review process able to expose inspection and management failures
Political authority to end a sunk-cost programme despite regional and industrial commitments
A technical decommissioning institution with funding, specialist staff and a safe plan for fuel, sodium and waste
Where else it has been used: Monju travels as a lesson in stopping: adaptive capacity includes an orderly exit from a prestige technology when safety and management evidence no longer support restart, plus a plan that preserves knowledge while removing the hazard.
Limits: The decision to end the programme and its planned duration do not quantify total cost, opportunity cost, safety performance or the amount of equipment actually removed. The government account describes the policy and management failures and the successor decommissioning plan; it is not an independent assessment of the nuclear programme's full social effects.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2016still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Peru's Invierte.pe system tracks public investment across national, regional and local governments; by 25 July 2024 the three levels had executed S/25.939 billion of a S/67.797 billion investment budget, a reported 38.3% advance.
Peru replaced a project-by-project approval model with a multi-year investment cycle that registers, prioritises and follows projects across government levels, giving the finance ministry a common pipeline and a basis for tracking execution rather than seeing only annual spending requests.
Preconditions
A central investment registry and rules that bind national, regional and local project units
Budget and procurement data that can be reconciled to physical project progress
Political and managerial capacity to re-prioritise stalled projects instead of carrying them forward invisibly
Where else it has been used: Multi-year investment-management systems travel as a response to fragmented project pipelines. Peru's case shows their limit: a dashboard and prioritisation rule improve visibility, but delivery still depends on local preparation, procurement and maintenance capacity.
Limits: Budget execution is an administrative flow, not evidence that projects were selected well, completed on schedule, delivered value or reached underserved regions. The daily report aggregates three government levels and counts expenditure against a budget that can change during the year. A planning-and-monitoring system can make bottlenecks visible without guaranteeing that agencies resolve them.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2017operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
A 2023 Contralorรญa control report found the education portfolio of Peru's Reconstrucciรณn con Cambios programme at 36.6% implementation by July 2023 against a 78% milestone expected in the earlier baseline, with the corresponding target date already expired.
Peru created a dedicated reconstruction authority and hired government-to-government technical assistance, then used concurrent audit to expose procurement and schedule risks while projects were still moving. The 36.6% result shows that a new delivery wrapper did not automatically clear local preparation and contracting bottlenecks.
Preconditions
A reconstruction authority with a cross-sector mandate after a major climate disaster
Technical and procurement support that can work across many local implementing agencies
Concurrent oversight with enough access to identify delays early and a management response that can correct them
Where else it has been used: Government-to-government reconstruction models travel as a way to import programme-management capacity, but Peru's audit is the caution: external expertise can improve visibility while unresolved local land, design and procurement constraints still determine the calendar.
Limits: The comparison is for one education portfolio and one control milestone, not the whole reconstruction programme or every project type. The Contralorรญa measures implementation against a management baseline; it does not by itself explain land, procurement or design causes, nor the quality and resilience of completed works. The gap shows a delayed delivery path, not that every intervention failed.
๐จ๐ทCosta Ricasince 1949still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Costa Rica's integrated electricity system generated 89.4% of its electricity from renewable sources in 2024, while ICE reported electrical coverage reaching 98.7% of households despite one of the country's driest years on record.
A state utility planned generation and controlled the transmission backbone, combining public hydro and geothermal investment with regulated contracts for private and cooperative wind, solar and biomass while extending the distribution grid to remote households.
Preconditions
A technically capable utility with authority to plan generation and operate the national grid
Long-horizon finance and resource mapping for projects whose benefits arrive over decades
A regulatory framework that lets private and cooperative generators sell into a coordinated system
Where else it has been used: Renewable-grid programmes travel as portfolios rather than single projects. Costa Rica's experience makes the enabling bundle visible: a transmission spine, credible offtake and a utility that can coordinate public, private and cooperative assets.
Limits: The renewable share and household coverage are outcomes, not a project-by-project cost or schedule record. Hydrology, imports and thermal backup move the annual mix, and the utility report does not independently audit the full lifetime cost, reliability or distributional effects of the generation portfolio.
๐จ๐ทCosta Ricasince 1941still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Costa Rica's Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social reported health-insurance coverage of 92.92% of the national population in 2024, using household-survey and administrative records to include contributors, dependents, pensioners and state-covered households.
Costa Rica expanded a contributory social-insurance institution into a near-universal insurer-provider by covering dependents, pensioners and state-financed households through a common pool and an integrated primary-care network.
Preconditions
A statutory social-insurance body with authority to collect contributions and contract or operate care
A broad payroll base and public subsidy for households outside formal employment
A nationwide clinic and referral network that turns insurance status into a service
Where else it has been used: Universal-insurance models travel only when the financing and delivery institutions travel together. Costa Rica's coverage figure is a reminder that the hard capability is not declaring a right but maintaining the pool, clinics and cross-subsidy that make it real.
Limits: Insurance coverage is not the same as timely access, quality, financial protection or equal outcomes, and the estimate comes from a combination of survey and administrative data. It also does not show the operating cost or schedule of the facilities and workforce that make a legal entitlement usable.
๐ช๐จEcuadorsince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Quito opened the first line of its metro in December 2023 after a multi-administration build, and the operator reported more than 54 million passenger trips during 2024 with uninterrupted service.
Quito combined four multilateral lenders, a metropolitan delivery company and an external operator, then renegotiated the operating contract after a suspended launch to clarify responsibilities and restart service across 15 stations.
Preconditions
A metropolitan authority able to hold a long project across several mayoral administrations
Multilateral finance and procurement rules that can support a technically complex rail system
A contract-management team able to diagnose interface failures and renegotiate before the asset is abandoned
Where else it has been used: Urban rail travels as a governance problem as much as an engineering one. Quito shows that commissioning, operator interfaces and a credible restart plan can decide whether a nearly finished asset becomes a service.
Limits: Passenger trips and uninterrupted operation show use after opening, not whether construction met its original cost and schedule or whether the line changes access fairly across Quito. The operator's accountability report is self-reported, and a first-year demand figure cannot establish long-term maintenance or financial sustainability.
๐ต๐ฆPanamasince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery
After the third set of locks opened in 2016, the Panama Canal Authority handled 9,944 deep-draft transits and 423 million tonnes of cargo in fiscal year 2024, reporting B/.4.986 billion in total revenue despite climate constraints.
Panama put a strategic infrastructure asset under an autonomous public authority with its own revenue, long-term capital programme and technical workforce, then expanded locks and service rules around the needs of global shipping customers.
Preconditions
A legally protected authority able to retain revenue and plan beyond annual budget cycles
Stable access to multilateral and bond finance for a megaproject with a long construction period
Hydrological, engineering and maritime expertise that can coordinate a global customer base with local water and land constraints
Where else it has been used: A self-financing infrastructure authority travels where one asset has national strategic value, but Panama's canal shows the governance bargain: autonomy brings delivery capacity only when public accountability and water constraints remain visible.
Limits: Traffic and revenue show an operating logistics asset, not the expansion's full cost and schedule record, its distributional effects or the counterfactual value of alternative routes. The canal's own results report is not an independent audit of construction performance, and tonnage varies with world trade and vessel mix.
๐ต๐ฆPanamasince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Panama's public metro network, inaugurated in 2014 and expanded with Line 2, transported 118,351,007 passengers in the twelve-month operating period reported in its 2024 institutional memory.
118,351,007 passengers, passengers transported in the reported year, 2023-11 to 2024-10. 321,519 passengers in one day, peak daily passengers on line 1, 2024-04-30. Metro de Panamรก, Institutional Memory 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
Panama built a dedicated metro company, sequenced lines around the capital's commuting corridors and combined central financing, concession contracts and an operating workforce so a new line could be integrated into a growing network rather than run as a one-off project.
Preconditions
A metropolitan transport authority able to reserve corridors and integrate fares and buses
Multi-year financing and procurement capacity for civil works, rolling stock and systems
An operator and maintenance regime that can turn an opened line into a dependable daily service
Where else it has been used: Metro systems travel as network institutions, not just tunnels. Panama's ridership makes the operational layer visible: integration, maintenance and staffing determine whether construction becomes reliable mobility.
Limits: Ridership demonstrates use and operating scale, not whether each line met its original cost or schedule, how much subsidy it requires or whether travel-time gains are shared across the metropolitan area. The operator reports the figures, and a peak day is not a reliability or maintenance measure.
๐ง๐ดBoliviasince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Bolivia's Mi Telefรฉrico network carried 78,715,401 passenger trips in 2024; its management report compared that result with a 97.7 million annual volume required for budget balance, or roughly 80% of the target while the system remained in service.
78,715,401 trips, passenger trips on the mi telefรฉrico network, 2024. 97,700,000 trips, annual passenger volume required for budget balance, 2024 target. Mi Telefรฉrico, 2024 management report, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
Bolivia treated steep urban mobility as a network problem: a state company linked multiple cable-car lines, integrated fares and stations and expanded service incrementally rather than waiting for a single road corridor to solve access across La Paz and El Alto.
Preconditions
A public authority able to coordinate land, stations, safety regulation and municipal transport connections
Capital financing and specialist operations staff for a high-altitude cable system
A fare and subsidy policy that can keep the network usable while it builds ridership and covers maintenance
Where else it has been used: Cable transit travels where topography makes roads expensive, but Mi Telefรฉrico makes the operating bargain visible: network scale can be delivered, yet financial break-even still depends on ridership, fares and continuing public support.
Limits: Passenger trips show use of the network, not whether construction stayed on schedule, whether fares cover operating and renewal costs or whether travel time and access improved for low-income residents. The budget-balance target is a management benchmark, not an independent estimate of the system's full social value or lifecycle cost.
๐ง๐ดBoliviasince 2013operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Bolivia's state lithium company doubled lithium-carbonate output to 2,064 tonnes in 2024 after its industrial plant began operating, but the Ministry of Economy reported that technical problems with evaporation ponds and the water-treatment plant kept production below the project's projected capacity of 15,000 tonnes a year.
Bolivia pursued a state-led value chain from brine extraction to industrial lithium carbonate, retaining control of the resource and plant while learning that evaporation chemistry, water treatment and process reliabilityโnot only mine ownershipโset the usable production ceiling.
Preconditions
Long-horizon public finance and technical institutions able to carry a complex chemical process from pilot to industrial scale
Reliable water, evaporation and quality-control systems in a fragile salt-flat environment
Independent engineering feedback and contracting discipline strong enough to surface underperformance before capacity claims harden into policy
Where else it has been used: Resource-processing projects travel poorly when geological ownership is mistaken for industrial capability. Bolivia's shortfall is useful benchmark evidence because it separates strategic ambition from demonstrated, repeatable throughput.
Limits: Output and design capacity establish a large production gap, but they do not by themselves show the plant's full economics, product quality, environmental effects, downstream contracts or whether the technical bottlenecks were later resolved. The ministry's bulletin is an official macroeconomic account, not an independent engineering or audit report.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 1984still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Itaipรบ supplied Paraguay's grid with 20,383 GWh in 2024, 4.5% more than in 2023, while the binational plant generated 67,089 GWh in total and continued operating after four decades of service.
Paraguay sustained a technically complex binational asset through a permanent operating institution, shared dispatch and long-horizon maintenance rather than treating the dam as finished when construction ended; the national grid could then convert a cross-border project into domestic energy security.
Preconditions
A durable treaty and governance structure able to resolve operating and revenue disputes across two states
Engineering, maintenance and safety institutions that preserve performance over decades
Transmission and utility capacity able to absorb a large, hydrology-dependent supply stream
Where else it has been used: Large infrastructure lasts when the operating institution is designed as carefully as the concrete. Itaipรบ is a useful benchmark case because its delivery story is four decades of binational maintenance, not only its original construction.
Limits: Annual generation and supply show output from an operating asset, not the original cost and schedule, transmission reliability, environmental effects or the distributional consequences of the binational tariff and power-allocation rules. Hydrology strongly affects the yearly number, and the plant's own report is not an independent project audit.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 2015dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Paraguay's planned Asunciรณn Metrobรบs corridor ended with an incomplete and unviable works package: in April 2024 the Public Prosecutor's Office said the state had paid certificates for works that did not meet the programme's purpose and alleged a G.180.03 billion patrimonial loss.
Paraguay attempted a multi-municipality bus rapid transit corridor through a public works contract, but weak design integration, contract management and escalation left paid works disconnected from a functioning service and triggered an ex-post prosecution rather than an operating system.
Preconditions
A corridor design agreed with the municipalities, operators and affected communities before civil works are certified
Contract-management capability able to test whether each payment creates a usable part of the service
A credible stop-and-correct process that can surface an unviable design before sunk infrastructure and litigation dominate the response
Where else it has been used: Failed transport projects are useful capability evidence when the failure is written as a delivery problem rather than a scandal alone. Metrobรบs shows why integration, certification and the ability to stop matter as much as the initial capital commitment.
Limits: The loss figure is an allegation in an ongoing criminal case, not a final judicial finding or a complete cost-benefit account. The notice establishes that the works were incomplete and did not serve the stated programme, but it does not measure the corridor's intended passenger benefits, the full financing cost or the later value of infrastructure retained by the state.
๐ฆ๐ทArgentinasince 2015dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Argentina's government review found that the ARSAT-3 construction programme, approved in 2015 with a 2019 launch plan, was suspended in 2016โ17; the unbuilt satellite forced two later orbital-protection operations and left the original nationwide broadband objective undelivered.
Argentina stopped an already contracted satellite mission when financing and programme continuity broke, then had to buy temporary orbital-protection services while a successor design was reconsidered; the episode exposes how a strategic project depends on continuity beyond one administration.
Preconditions
A multi-year financing and procurement plan protected from abrupt political and management turnover
Technical programme governance that can distinguish a redesign from an indefinite suspension
An orbital and service-continuity plan that prices the cost of delay before a launch slot is at risk
Where else it has been used: Strategic technology programmes travel with continuity mechanisms, not only engineering talent. ARSAT-3 is a useful reversal because it records the cost of stopping a national capability before the replacement is ready.
Limits: The review documents a suspension and its operational consequences, not the complete engineering, procurement or commercial case for a third satellite. ARSAT later reformulated the mission as SG-1, so the record describes the original ARSAT-3 programme's failure to deliver rather than claiming that Argentina abandoned satellite capability altogether.
The Philippine Department of Public Works and Highways' live transparency portal records 209,419 completed contracts and 997 terminated contracts out of 258,645 contracts from 2016 to 2026, against โฑ6.4 trillion of listed investment.
DPWH exposed a national project portfolio with contract, cost, accomplishment and completion fields, making delivery status inspectable across regions instead of leaving infrastructure performance inside agency spreadsheets and press releases.
Preconditions
A common project and contract identifier shared by national and district engineering offices
Field reporting and audit practices strong enough to keep accomplishment and termination statuses current
A public interface that lets citizens, contractors and oversight bodies compare commitments with delivered works
Where else it has been used: Project transparency travels when it is attached to contract data and corrections, not only a dashboard of completed works. The Philippines provides a useful portfolio-scale example while leaving cost and quality verification open.
Limits: Contract status and listed investment reveal portfolio scale and a public reporting mechanism, not whether projects met their original cost, schedule, quality or maintenance promises. The portal's totals are live and can change as records are uploaded or corrected; they are not an independent value-for-money audit.
The Philippine Department of Energy's 2017 annual report describes the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant as mothballed and records its reassessment as part of a proposed national nuclear programme, after the original plant failed to become an operating power asset.
The Philippines carried a completed but mothballed nuclear asset into later policy reviews instead of treating construction as equivalent to usable capability; the plant became a long-lived governance and maintenance obligation while the country reconsidered nuclear power.
Preconditions
Independent safety and technical institutions able to reassess a politically sensitive sunk asset
A transparent process for comparing rehabilitation with closure and alternative generation
Long-term funding and site stewardship for a facility that does not produce electricity
Where else it has been used: Megaprojects can fail at the conversion from physical completion to operating capability. Bataan is a useful negative case because it keeps construction, commissioning and usable service as separate tests.
Limits: The report establishes the plant's mothballed status and later reassessment, but not the full historical cost, safety case, debt burden or counterfactual electricity supply. The record concerns the original plant as a delivery outcome; later feasibility studies and nuclear-policy discussions are separate decisions, not evidence that the original project operated.
๐ฎ๐ฉIndonesiasince 2015operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Indonesia's public-works ministry reported in January 2024 that the Trans-Sumatra toll-road programme had 596 kilometres operating against a 2,749-kilometre planned network, with another 361 kilometres under construction and later phases still in planning.
Indonesia held a long corridor together through a state toll-road regulator, a state-owned lead developer and phased concessions, but the sequence exposed how land acquisition, feeder links and demand assumptions can stretch a national build over decades.
Preconditions
A regulator able to coordinate concessions, land acquisition and provincial interfaces
A credible financing and toll policy for low-demand early sections
Milestones that separate an operating link from a corridor still on a plan
Where else it has been used: Large transport programmes should publish the operating, construction and planned portions separately. Trans-Sumatra is a useful warning against treating an announced corridor as delivered infrastructure.
Limits: The 2,749-kilometre figure is the ministry's planned corridor, not a historical operating peak, so this status records a delivery shortfall rather than physical contraction. Kilometres open say nothing about land-acquisition cost, construction overruns, traffic demand, maintenance or whether the links provide value relative to cheaper roads; the source is a ministry progress account rather than an independent audit.
๐ป๐ณVietnamsince 2024still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Vietnam's Ministry of Transport reported that seven road projects were completed and opened in 2024, bringing the national expressway network to more than 2,021 kilometres.
The transport ministry set a national completion pipeline, combined central investment with local site and land coordination, and reported completed links as an expanding network rather than isolated provincial projects.
Preconditions
A central project pipeline that can sequence links across provinces
Local authorities able to clear land and connect feeder roads
A stable road standard and funding mechanism that keeps partial links usable
Where else it has been used: Network delivery travels when each opening is useful on its own but designed for later connection. The Vietnamese total shows reach; it does not substitute for a cost-and-schedule dataset.
Limits: The network total and projects opened are an annual ministry progress account, not a project-by-project cost or schedule audit. Kilometres aggregate roads begun in different years and do not show construction quality, traffic demand, land-acquisition cost or the distribution of benefits between regions.
๐ป๐ณVietnamsince 2010operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Vietnam's State Audit reported in 2019 that the Cat LinhโHa Dong metro's approved investment had risen from VND8,700 billion to VND18,000 billion and that a line originally due in November 2013 was still unfinished after repeated schedule changes.
The first urban-rail project was allowed to proceed with changing designs, slow site handover and a directly appointed foreign EPC contractor, while operating costs were omitted from the initial economic appraisal; late fixes converted a construction delay into a major cost revision.
Preconditions
An independent technical and cost review before design is split into buildable packages
Land and interface responsibilities settled before an EPC contract starts
A transparent appraisal that includes operations, maintenance and safety certification
Where else it has been used: Urban rail is a system contract, not just an elevated structure. Cat LinhโHa Dong is a negative case for copying a financing and contractor model without the institutions that can hold design, land and commissioning together.
Limits: The audit snapshot predates the line's eventual opening, so it records the delivery failure at the decision and construction stage rather than current ridership or service quality. The figures do not provide a full life-cycle cost, safety record or counterfactual transport benefit; the government news report is a summary of the State Audit findings rather than the complete audit file.
๐ฒ๐พMalaysiasince 2015still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Malaysia completed and opened the 57.7-kilometre MRT Putrajaya Line in two phases, with 36 operational stations serving a corridor of about two million people; full operations began on 16 March 2023.
Malaysia created a dedicated state delivery corporation, divided a technically complex urban railway into phases and used interchange stations and park-and-ride facilities to make the new line part of a larger metropolitan network.
Preconditions
A transport authority able to acquire land and coordinate metropolitan utilities
A dedicated project owner with authority over design, procurement and commissioning
A network plan that protects interchanges and feeder access beyond the line itself
Where else it has been used: Urban rail delivery travels through institutional ownership and integration. A line can be physically complete while its usefulness still depends on fares, feeders and interchange quality.
Limits: Length and station counts show the physical delivery, not the line's final cost, construction schedule, reliability, ridership or operating subsidy. The project page is maintained by the state-owned delivery corporation and describes the corridor's intended population and ridership rather than independently audited outcomes.
๐ฒ๐พMalaysiasince 2016dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Malaysia allowed the bilateral Kuala LumpurโSingapore high-speed rail agreement to terminate on 31 December 2020 and paid Singapore SGD102,815,576 in March 2021 for verified costs incurred on the project and for extending its suspension.
Malaysia used a treaty-level bilateral project to coordinate a cross-border railway, but a change of government, proposed scope changes and successive suspensions exhausted the agreement's final deadline; termination then converted planning work into a compensable sunk cost.
Preconditions
A bilateral governance structure with a clear change-control and termination rule
Independent cost and demand reviews before scope changes become political commitments
A way to preserve useful land and design work when a megaproject is stopped
Where else it has been used: Stopping a project can be a rational decision, but the capability test is whether the state exposes the sunk cost and preserves options. The HSR case keeps cancellation visible instead of counting an announced line as delivery.
Limits: The compensation figure records a bilateral settlement, not the full public cost of years of planning, land work or foregone connectivity. No rail construction was delivered; later proposals to revive or redesign a Malaysian line are separate projects, not evidence that this one operated. The 2016 start year (the bilateral agreement) and the earlier suspensions are not stated in the cited compensation statement; MyHSR's FAQ documents the suspension to 31 May 2020.
๐น๐ญThailandsince 1991dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Thailand approved Hopewell's 60-kilometre Bangkok Elevated Road and Train System concession in 1991, but work stalled at 14 percent completion for more than nine months during the 1997 property-market collapse and the government terminated the concession in spring 1998.
The concession bundled transport delivery with property-development revenue and depended on continuous site handover and a rising Bangkok property market. When the boom collapsed, construction stopped, the state and concessionaire lacked a credible re-scoping path, and the government terminated the agreement rather than deliver the promised integrated system.
Preconditions
A concession contract that separates transport obligations from speculative land-value revenue
Independent feasibility, demand and financial-stress tests before a bundled megaproject is signed
A termination and salvage plan that protects the public right-of-way and explains sunk costs
Where else it has been used: Hopewell is now used internationally as a warning against financing core transport with optimistic property capture. The transferable capability is disciplined project preparation and an honest fallback, not a particular rail technology.
Limits: The 14-percent figure is a contemporaneous project-progress estimate in a World Bank case box, not an audited final account of every structure built or every baht spent. Termination records a failed concession and its loss of optionality, not the performance of Bangkok's later rail network. The project combined an elevated road, MRT, railway grade separation and property-development rights, so the failure cannot be assigned to one technical component.
๐ช๐ธSpainsince 1992still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Spain expanded high-speed rail from the first MadridโSeville line in 1992 to more than 4,000 kilometres of high-speed track by 2024; the Transport Ministry reported that the service reached 70 percent of the population.
Spain treated high-speed rail as a long-horizon territorial network, retained a national infrastructure manager and sequenced corridors over multiple administrations. European funding, domestic engineering capacity and a common technical standard let each new line add value to a growing national system.
Preconditions
A stable national investment pipeline that survives electoral cycles
An infrastructure manager able to plan track, signalling, stations and maintenance as one network
Demand, finance and environmental appraisal strong enough to choose where extension is justified
Where else it has been used: Spain's network is a reference case for countries weighing high-speed rail, but the transferable capability is continuity of planning and network integration, not the kilometre target alone.
Limits: Track length and population reach show a sustained national build-out, not whether each corridor earns its operating cost, how much construction exceeded initial budgets or whether travel shifted from cars and planes. The ministry's statement uses a rounded lower bound for the network and a population denominator rather than land-area coverage. Lines and services opened over three decades under different governments, so the record is not a single-project causal test.
๐ช๐ธSpainsince 2008dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Spain extinguished the Castor underground gas-storage concession in October 2014 after seismic events halted operation; the state transferred administration to Enagรกs and the decree recognised โฌ1.350729 billion in compensation for the former concessionaire, with recovery structured over 30 years.
The state granted a private concession for strategic gas storage, then halted injection when induced seismicity made operation unacceptable and transferred administration to the system operator. The exit preserved the physical asset and safety responsibility but socialised a large compensation claim, showing how a rapid stop can still leave a long fiscal tail.
Preconditions
Independent seismic monitoring and a regulator able to suspend operation on safety grounds
A concession contract that defines compensation, decommissioning and liability before construction
A system operator capable of securing and maintaining a closed facility while its final fate is decided
Where else it has been used: Castor travels as a caution about subsurface megaprojects and asymmetric risk: stopping unsafe operation is necessary, but the public needs an honest liability and decommissioning plan before approving the investment.
Limits: The compensation and recovery period show the fiscal and legal consequences of closing the facility, not the full construction cost, the number of earthquakes caused or the eventual cost of sealing the wells. The concession was extinguished and the facility placed in hibernation, with later court decisions changing parts of the payment mechanism. This is evidence of a project that could not be operated safely, not a claim that every underground storage project has the same risk.
๐ต๐ฑPolandsince 2018dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Poland began the 1,000-MW Ostroลฤka C coal-block project in 2018 without full financing, suspended construction in 2020 and demolished the built elements in 2021; the Supreme Audit Office later found that the unfinished investment consumed more than PLN1.5 billion.
Poland committed to a large coal unit before its financing, fuel assumptions and climate-policy fit were fully re-tested. When the economics and policy context changed, the state-owned investors suspended the build and converted the site toward gas, but only after construction and contractual obligations had made the exit costly.
Preconditions
Independent feasibility and financing checks refreshed when a project is materially delayed
Board and shareholder oversight able to stop a state-owned project before sunk costs compound
A site-reuse and worker-transition plan that preserves options after cancellation
Where else it has been used: Ostroลฤka travels as a warning about energy megaproject lock-in: changing course is rational when assumptions fail, but review gates must come before construction and contract settlement, not after.
Limits: The audit's cost figure covers the investment and its close-out as assessed by NIK, not every wider system cost or the value of the later gas-fired replacement. The project was a state-owned-company investment rather than a conventional central-government budget line, and the audit is a retrospective accountability finding. Abandonment can prevent further losses, but it does not recover the sunk expenditure or prove that every original energy-security objective was mistaken.
๐ธ๐ชSwedensince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Stockholm delivered Nya Karolinska Solna through a 30-year publicโprivate partnership: the official inquiry reports SEK 22.8 billion for construction and equipment, a projected SEK 57 billion total through 2040 including operation and maintenance, and an external comparison that found construction 53% more expensive per square metre than Scandinavian hospitals.
Stockholm bundled design, construction, financing, operations and maintenance into a long PPP contract, transferring construction risk and locking in a lifecycle payment model. The inquiry shows the trade-off: a complex hospital was delivered and remains in use, but the long contract and specification changes made the full cost harder to compare and challenge.
Preconditions
A public buyer able to specify a complex clinical programme before contracting
Independent financial, clinical and risk scrutiny that can test a PPP against conventional procurement
Governance that keeps service requirements and change control aligned over a multi-decade contract
Where else it has been used: Nya Karolinska travels as a cautionary PPP pattern: lifecycle contracts can bundle accountability, but benchmarkers need to separate build cost, financing, maintenance and service outcomes before calling a project efficient.
Limits: The inquiry distinguishes the 22.8 billion construction-and-equipment investment from the 57 billion projection through 2040, which includes operations, maintenance, financing and additions; those figures are not a like-for-like cash budget. The 53% comparison is an external estimate with explanations including higher standards, site conditions, schedule and PPP risk transfer, so it does not isolate one causal failure or measure clinical performance.
๐ธ๐ชSwedensince 1970dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Sweden permanently shut Barsebรคck 1 in 1999 and Barsebรคck 2 in 2005; the national nuclear-safety report lists each reactor at 615 MWe and records the site as undergoing decommissioning, a 1,230-MWe asset retirement completed by political decision rather than construction failure.
Sweden converted a political decision into a regulated, staged retirement: operators removed fuel, kept the site under care and maintenance, and moved toward dismantling under the nuclear-safety authority's oversight. The capability is visible in the exit path and accountability after closure, not only in the original build.
Preconditions
A regulator with authority to supervise shutdown, fuel removal and decommissioning
Long-lived financing and liability arrangements for an asset that no longer produces revenue
A replacement-power and local-transition plan that makes a politically chosen closure workable
Where else it has been used: Barsebรคck travels as a durable-exit pattern: a benchmark should count the institutional work of retiring infrastructure, while keeping the energy trade-offs separate from the fact of closure.
Limits: Retiring a nuclear asset is evidence about a state's ability to close and decommission a major system, not about whether the original plant was safe, economical or replaceable without wider grid effects. Capacity is nameplate output rather than annual generation, and the record does not quantify replacement power, compensation or the final decommissioning cost.
๐ฎ๐ชIrelandsince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Ireland's New Children's Hospital project saw its approved budget rise from โฌ1.73 billion to โฌ2.24 billion by February 2024 after an independent review recorded โฌ450 million of earlier escalation and weaknesses in set-up, planning, execution and governance.
Ireland kept a politically necessary hospital project moving after cost escalation, but the state had to reset the budget and strengthen assurance rather than re-tender. The case makes the value of early challenge visible: once design, contracts and site work are locked, correcting an underestimated scope becomes more expensive than revising the approval.
Preconditions
An independent gateway review that tests scope, budget, risk and delivery capability before construction
A sponsor with enough clinical and commercial expertise to challenge designers and contractors
Change-control rules that expose scope growth and schedule slippage to ministers and the public
Where else it has been used: The hospital travels as a megaproject caution: a reset can preserve a needed public asset, but only an early assurance function can prevent a politically protected project from consuming its contingency before the building opens.
Limits: The approved budget includes the main hospital, satellite centres, commissioning, information systems and service integration, so it is not a pure construction-cost comparison. The 2019 review attributes escalation to several interacting factors, and the project was still being delivered when the 2024 budget was approved; the record therefore shows an eroded cost and governance promise, not a completed outcome evaluation.
๐ณ๐ฎNicaraguasince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Nicaragua's Ministry of Energy and Mines reported national electricity coverage of 99.575% in December 2024 after public electrification projects brought power to 732,427 homes and 3,853,005 people.
Nicaragua combined public transmission and distribution investment with rural electrification projects, tracking household coverage as a national delivery target. Extending the grid into remote departments and reporting the remaining gap made a dispersed infrastructure task legible as one programme.
Preconditions
A utility and ministry able to plan transmission, distribution and last-mile connections across departments
Capital budgets and procurement arrangements that can reach remote and low-density settlements
A household-level coverage register and maintenance capacity so new connections remain usable after construction
Where else it has been used: Near-universal connection targets travel only with last-mile finance and a maintenance system; a high connection percentage without reliable service can overstate the capability delivered.
Limits: The ministry's coverage and home counts show connection reach, not continuity, affordability, voltage quality, reliability, losses, maintenance or regional inequality. They are government administrative estimates, and the long-run change from the 2006 baseline does not isolate which projects, utilities or financing streams produced the increase.
๐ป๐ชVenezuelasince 2011still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Venezuela's Gran Misiรณn Vivienda Venezuela reported delivery of its five-millionth home on 7 June 2024, with the programme saying that community self-construction supplied 75% of its construction in the preceding four years.
Venezuela used a central housing mission to aggregate land, materials and public construction while shifting more of the build into community self-construction. A national target and local delivery groups linked a large capital programme to household-level participation.
Preconditions
A central land, finance and materials pipeline that can allocate housing projects across regions
Local organisations able to manage community construction and verify beneficiaries
A housing registry and inspection process that can track units from allocation through occupancy and maintenance
Where else it has been used: Community self-build can extend a state housing programme when it is backed by material supply, technical supervision and a beneficiary registry; without those controls, a headline unit count can conceal unfinished or unoccupied stock.
Limits: The cumulative total is reported by Venezuela's state broadcaster and does not establish independent verification, construction quality, occupancy, maintenance, location, tenure security, cost or whether every unit was newly built rather than rehabilitated. The 75% self-construction figure is a programme claim, and the source supplies no audited project-level cost or schedule data.
๐ต๐นPortugalsince 2021still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Portugal's PRR barometer recorded โฌ21.9 billion across 121 investments and 43 reforms, with โฌ14.43 billion paid to beneficiaries by 27 August 2026.
Portugal bound a large cross-government investment programme to a reform-and-milestone schedule, central monitoring and payment requests, while leaving implementation to ministries, public bodies, firms and local beneficiaries. The financing contract creates a common delivery clock across otherwise separate projects.
Preconditions
A central authority able to consolidate milestones and submit evidence for payment
Project owners with procurement, co-financing and reporting capacity
A transparent public dashboard that exposes slippage and reallocations before the deadline
Where else it has been used: Milestone-funded national plans travel when the payment gate is credible and project owners can report comparable evidence; a large envelope without a delivery spine becomes a catalogue of announcements.
Limits: Funds paid, investment counts and reform counts are programme inputs and milestones, not completed infrastructure, cost and schedule performance or long-run outcomes. The plan is EU-funded and centrally coordinated but executed through many ministries and beneficiaries; the barometer's aggregate totals cannot attribute results to one delivery unit or show which projects will remain useful after the funding window closes.
๐ต๐นPortugalsince 2010dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Portugal's 2011 Council of Ministers formally abandoned the previous LisbonโMadrid high-speed rail project, replacing its passenger priority with a freight connection through Sines, Lisbon, Setรบbal, Poceirรฃo and Madrid.
Under fiscal pressure, the government stopped a politically committed passenger megaproject by resolution and redirected the corridor toward freight interoperability, changing the objective before further construction commitments accumulated.
Preconditions
A cabinet with authority to revoke or redirect a concession-backed transport priority
A planning and appraisal process capable of naming the financial risk of the existing pipeline
An alternative corridor objective that can preserve part of the strategic value while dropping the original scope
Where else it has been used: Project reversals travel when governments can expose sunk costs and change scope openly; abandoning a line without a credible replacement only defers the delivery problem.
Limits: The number is categorical: one formally abandoned national project. The resolution records a policy reversal, not the project's final cost, the amount already spent or a completed line; the replacement freight priority and a later revival of high-speed planning mean this is evidence of stop-and-reframe capacity, not proof that Portugal solved rail delivery.
๐ฎ๐ณIndiasince 2003operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
India and Delhi hosted the Commonwealth Games in October 2010, but the Comptroller and Auditor General recorded the total estimate rising from โน1,200 crore in the May 2003 bid to โน18,532.31 crore by October 2010.
A multi-agency event was delivered against an immovable deadline, but scope changes, late procurement and fragmented governance allowed the budget estimate to expand more than fifteen-fold between the bid and the event.
Preconditions
A host agreement that bound the Union and Delhi governments to the event and its liabilities
A portfolio of venues and city works dependent on many implementing agencies
Independent audit access to plans, estimates, procurement files and delivery evidence
Where else it has been used: Large-event delivery travels badly when an immovable deadline rewards late scope acceptance; an early integrated budget and clear decision rights matter more than the event brand.
Limits: The Games were delivered, so this is not a failed event; it documents erosion of the original cost promise. The CAG compares estimates assembled at different stages and scopes, and the October 2010 figure is not a single audited final-cost total. The audit identifies fragmented planning, late decisions and weak controls but does not attribute every rupee of the increase to one cause.
South Africa's National Research Foundation and SARAO completed the 64-dish MeerKAT radio telescope in March 2018 on schedule and on budget, then began science operations as a precursor to the Square Kilometre Array.
A national research agency led a staged telescope build, using prototype arrays, local engineering and university and industry partners to test components before integrating the full 64-dish facility in the Karoo.
Preconditions
A long-lived public research institution able to hold a technically demanding project across administrations
Prototype infrastructure and specialist engineering capacity before full-scale construction
A remote site, fibre and power systems, and a scientific user community ready to operate the facility
Where else it has been used: Research infrastructure travels when prototypes, procurement and user operations are designed as one delivery chain; a completed instrument without a funded operating model becomes a monument rather than capability.
Limits: SARAO's institutional account states that the array was on schedule and on budget but does not publish an audited cost or baseline schedule in this record. Sixty-four dishes prove physical completion, not scientific productivity, local industrial spillovers or the performance of the larger SKA programme into which MeerKAT is being integrated.
๐ฒ๐ฝMexicosince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Mexico's state telecom operator CFE Telecomunicaciones e Internet para Todos installed 113,683 free public internet sites by September 2024, reaching 81.2 percent of its stated 140,000-site 2025 goal.
A state-owned carrier combined satellite, fibre, copper and mobile contracts with public access points, using a federal operator to reach places commercial networks had not served.
Preconditions
A public operator able to aggregate several access technologies under one programme
Procurement and spectrum arrangements that reach isolated localities
Public facilities where a connection can be installed and maintained
Where else it has been used: Universal-access builds travel when a state carrier can fill commercial gaps, but the last fifth of a numerical rollout target is often the hardest and most expensive part.
Limits: The management report is self-reported and counts installed sites, not uptime, geographic service quality, affordability after the free offer or actual use. The 81.2 percent figure is calculated from the report's installed count and stated goal, and the programme was still short of that goal at the reference date.
๐ฒ๐ฝMexicosince 2014dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Mexico cancelled the partially built Texcoco airport after construction and contracts had begun; the government's 2019 cancellation paper estimated a 100 billion peso cancellation cost, including 60 billion pesos already spent and 40 billion in non-recoverable commitments.
100,000,000,000 Mexican pesos, government estimate of cancellation cost, 2019-04-26. 60,000,000,000 Mexican pesos, construction expenditure already incurred at cancellation, 2019-04-26. Grupo Aeroportuario de la Ciudad de Mรฉxico, Government of Mexico, retrieved 2026-09-02.
The move, and what it needed
A new administration stopped a politically contested megaproject, terminated contracts and redirected the airport strategy to a different site, accepting sunk costs in exchange for a different delivery path.
Preconditions
Executive authority over the state airport holding company and the federal investment plan
A contracting and bond framework that permits negotiated termination
An alternative site and delivery institution available before the old project was abandoned
Where else it has been used: Stopping a megaproject travels as a governance option only when the government can disclose the sunk-cost trade-off and still offer a credible replacement; otherwise cancellation becomes delay with a bill attached.
Limits: The 100 billion peso figure is the government's own estimate and excludes or treats differently the financing and legal costs that later audits and congressional analyses debated. Cancellation is evidence of a project running backwards and of a political decision to change course, not evidence that the replacement airport delivered better value or schedule performance.
๐น๐ทTurkeysince 2004still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Tรผrkiye opened the Marmaray rail tunnel between Europe and Asia in October 2013 and the transport ministry reported 196 million passenger journeys in 2024, with 1.226 billion cumulative journeys since opening.
The state assembled a cross-Bosphorus rail link, integrated it with existing suburban lines and then built ridership through frequent service rather than treating the tunnel as a stand-alone monument.
Preconditions
A metropolitan rail network on both sides of the crossing
Engineering and procurement capacity for a deep immersed-tube tunnel
An operating authority able to integrate timetables, fares and maintenance
Where else it has been used: A megaproject becomes capability when the operating system is funded and connected to everyday routes; a tunnel that opens without network integration will not produce this usage.
Limits: Passenger journeys show that the completed line is used at scale, not whether construction met its original budget or schedule. The ministry's cumulative figure is a programme-reported total, and ridership also reflects Istanbul's population, fares and the network of connecting lines rather than the tunnel alone.
๐น๐ทTurkeysince 2011still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Tรผrkiye's Ministry of National Education reported that the FATฤฐH project had installed 620,000 interactive classroom boards by 2023 and signed a five-year TรRKSAT service contract covering about 2,000 schools.
620,000 boards, interactive boards installed under fatiฬh, 2023. 2,000 schools, schools covered by the continuing service contract, 2023. Ministry of National Education, Government of Tรผrkiye, retrieved 2026-09-03.
The move, and what it needed
The education ministry treated classroom hardware, connectivity and content as one procurement programme, then used a national telecom operator for continuing access rather than ending delivery at installation.
Preconditions
A central school inventory and procurement authority
Electricity and connectivity in ordinary classrooms
A service provider able to maintain equipment across thousands of schools
Where else it has been used: Education technology projects travel when maintenance and teacher practice are funded alongside hardware; a board installed without a service contract quickly becomes furniture.
Limits: Equipment counts show installation, not whether teachers use the boards or whether learning improved. The ministry reports the hardware and contract itself, and the article does not give a national uptime, maintenance-cost or student-outcome series; the 2,000-school contract is a subset of the wider rollout.
๐น๐ทTurkeysince 2017dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Tรผrkiye signed the 1,000 MWe YEKA RES-1 wind contract in February 2018 and completed its factory and R&D centre in 2019, but the Energy Ministry records that the contract was cancelled under a 2024 law.
The state tied a renewable auction to domestic manufacturing and research obligations, then later used a statutory change to cancel the contract despite preparatory industrial facilities having been completed.
Preconditions
A ministry able to bundle generation rights with local-content obligations
Private consortia willing to build manufacturing and R&D capacity ahead of generation
Legislative authority able to reopen or cancel a signed concession
Where else it has been used: Industrial-policy tenders travel only when contract stability is part of the bargain; a local factory does not rescue a project whose legal foundation can be rewritten midstream.
Limits: The ministry page establishes the contract, capacity, factory and R&D milestones and the later cancellation, but it does not publish the cancellation cost, foregone generation or the reasons for the legislative change. Counting two completed facilities is a direct count of the page's milestones, not an independent audit of their operation; cancellation is evidence about delivery durability rather than renewable output.
๐จ๐ญSwitzerlandsince 1998delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Switzerland built the 57 km Gotthard Base Tunnel under the voter-approved NEAT programme and opened it to commercial traffic on 11 December 2016, on the date set, at a final cost forecast of CHF 9.541 billion against a 1998 cost basis of CHF 6.323 billion, both in 1998 prices.
Voters approved the programme and a ring-fenced rail fund, parliament set a total credit and a standing supervisory delegation that reports every year, and a single-purpose federal subsidiary, AlpTransit Gotthard, built it under that oversight.
Preconditions
Direct democracy that ties a ring-fenced fund to one programme
A standing parliamentary delegation that publishes cost forecasts every year
Tunnelling and rail engineering capacity already in the country
Where else it has been used: The Brenner and Mont Cenis base tunnels copy the engineering but run across two states with EU co-financing, and both have moved their opening dates repeatedly.
Limits: The 51 percent is computed from the NAD's Table 2 (6,323 to 9,541 million francs, 1998 prices) and is not a headline the publisher states. That column mixes true overrun with scope added after 1998, including extra safety works and the Sedrun geology, so a like-for-like overrun would be lower. The cost basis is in real 1998 francs; the nominal bill, about CHF 12.2 billion with inflation, VAT and interest according to the Federal Office of Transport, is larger. On schedule means against the timetable fixed late in the project, which the NAD calls on time, not against the opening years implied by the 1992 vote. The started year is the 1998 financing vote; main construction contracts followed. The source is a PDF and the figures sit in Table 2 and section 1.8.
๐ฐ๐ชKenyasince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Kenya Railways began building the Standard Gauge Railway in financial year 2014/15, completed the 472 km Mombasa to Nairobi Phase I in 2017, and opened the 120 km Phase 2A to Naivasha in September 2019 against a September 2017 start and an 18-month plan, about six months late; the line hauled 7.33 million tonnes of freight in 2025.
18 months, planned construction period of sgr phase 2a (sept 2017 start, ksh 155.5 billion), against which the line opened in september 2019, about six months (a third) late, 2017. 7,332 thousand tonnes, freight hauled on the sgr, 2025. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2018, retrieved 2026-10-01.
The move, and what it needed
The Treasury and Kenya Railways contracted a Chinese state contractor on a design-build-supply basis with Exim Bank finance, which put construction risk and speed on the contractor and left financing, land acquisition and traffic risk with the state.
Preconditions
A bilateral lender willing to finance most of the cost against sovereign guarantees
A state able to acquire a 472 km corridor of land quickly
A port whose cargo the state could steer onto rail to fill the line
Limits: No official source found publishes the outturn cost of either phase against its budget, so the record carries a cost plan (KSh 155.5 billion for Phase 2A) and no cost performance. That is the half of the construct that matters most for a Chinese-financed turnkey contract. The schedule overrun of about six months on Phase 2A, or a third of the 18-month plan, is computed: the plan is from KNBS, and the opening is from the Ministry of Roads and Transport Strategic Plan 2023-2027 draft ('completed Phase 2A ... and was launched for operation in September 2019', https://www.transport.go.ke/sites/default/files/DRAFT%20FINAL%20MINISTERIAL%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN%202023-27%20FEB%202024%20.pdf). Phase I's schedule against its plan cannot be checked from an official copy. The National Assembly's 2014 Public Investments Committee report giving a December 2016 completion date and a USD 3.804 billion contract price was found only on an NGO mirror. The parliamentary repository timed out, so neither figure is used. The railway was meant to run to Malaba and into Uganda, and the Naivasha to Malaba section remained unbuilt for years. The same ministry plan reports rail carrying 19 percent of port throughput in 2021 against a 50 percent target for 2030. Freight tonnage is published by KNBS from Kenya Railways returns. Debt service and fiscal cost are not shown at all.
๐จ๐ฆCanadasince 1998dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Canada began registering all firearms under the 1995 Firearms Act from December 1998. The registry's first information system, CFIS I, had an initial estimate of $13 to 20 million and had cost $190 million by March 2005. Its successor CFIS II rose from $32 million to at least $87 million and was halted. In 2012 Parliament ended long-gun registration and ordered the destruction of about 7.5 million non-restricted registration records, which the RCMP deleted from CFIS in October 2012.
The Department of Justice, and later the Canada Firearms Centre, built a universal national registry through contracted IT development while the regulations it had to implement were still changing, and reported the rising cost to ministers before Parliament. In 2012 Parliament ended the long-gun part by statute and had the RCMP destroy its records.
Preconditions
Legislation and regulations settled before the system is specified, so requirements do not move during the build
Cost reporting to Parliament that covers the full programme, not only what is appropriated each year
A political settlement on registration durable enough to survive a change of government, or a design that does not depend on one
Limits: The cost figure is a Commons committee's summary of the Auditor General's 2006 follow-up. The Auditor General's own 2002 and 2006 chapters no longer open at their published OAG URLs, so the record rests on Parliament's restatement of them. The $190 million covers CFIS I, the information system, and is not the cost of the whole programme. The often quoted figure of roughly $1 billion for the programme could not be verified at an official URL today and is not used. The baseline is a range of $13 to 20 million given at an early stage, so any overrun ratio, roughly ten times, depends on which end is chosen and on how far the scope of that early estimate matched the system that was built. The committee itself attributes part of the growth to things outside the project team's control: requirements kept changing, and Bill C-10 and its regulations were delayed by more than two years. The dismantling in 2012 was a political decision by a new parliamentary majority. It was not a collapse caused by the delivery, so the status records a policy reversal rather than a technical failure. Licensing and the registry of restricted and prohibited firearms kept running, Quebec residents' records were held back pending litigation, and public agencies still register. The 7.5 million records show the scale the registry reached and say nothing about their accuracy, which the 2006 audit questioned. Like can-phoenix, this is a public IT system rather than physical infrastructure.
๐ฎ๐ฑIsraelsince 2015still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Israel's government approved the Red Line in December 2010 at an estimated NIS 10.7 billion, and NTA, the state-owned company delivering it, began the main construction works in 2015. By October 2021 the cost estimate had reached NIS 18.71 billion, about 75% above the original, and the completion date had been postponed six times, by about five years in total. The 24 km line opened in August 2023, and in December 2025 the State Comptroller put its construction cost at NIS 18.8 billion.
The government set the budget and target date by resolution in 2010 and handed delivery to NTA, a state-owned company. NTA revised the cost estimate at least eight times and moved the opening date six times, most of them before main construction began, and still brought the line into service in 2023.
Preconditions
A dedicated state delivery company with a signed framework agreement setting its accountability to the transport and finance ministries, which the audit found missing
Contingency budgets set by the transport projects procedure from the first estimate, rather than costs left out of early estimates
Land clearance and right of way secured before the main contracts are tendered
Limits: The 75% overrun is the audit's figure for the October 2021 estimate and includes indexation. Net of price-index linkage and a VAT cut, the audit puts the real increase at about NIS 7.46 billion, or 69.7%. The audit was finished before the line opened, so the overrun is measured on an estimate rather than a final account. The December 2025 audit's NIS 18.8 billion construction cost comes from a security audit and is not a reconciled final cost. The five-year delay counts slippage to the then target of 2022. The line actually opened in August 2023, about six years after the original 2017 date, so the figure understates the final schedule slip. Most postponements came before main construction began in 2015, so a hostile reader would call them planning slippage rather than construction delay. The project is national in its funding, its government resolution and its state-owned delivery company, but it serves one metropolitan area, and one line is a single case and not a national delivery record. The audit's per-kilometre comparisons with other cities are not used here. Ridership is not established: the 300,000 passengers a day in the 2025 audit is NTA's forecast. The audit also found the framework agreement between NTA and the finance and transport ministries still unsigned more than 20 years after the company was founded.
๐จ๐ณChinasince 2003still operatingbears on Large project delivery
China's railway authorities built a high-speed rail network that the National Railway Administration put at about 47,000 km in operation in December 2024, from a programme that began in 2003; a World Bank review of the 27 lines in operation at the end of 2013 found a weighted average approved unit cost of RMB 129m per km for 350 km/h lines, which it put at no more than two-thirds of costs elsewhere.
The former Ministry of Railways and its successors standardised designs, viaduct and station types and procurement across a national programme, then built continuously for two decades, so each line reused the previous line's templates, supply chain and crews.
Preconditions
A single national rail authority with power to plan corridors, acquire land and finance lines through state-owned debt
A continuous build pipeline long enough for standard designs and a domestic supply chain to pay off
Tolerance for debt and for low-traffic lines whose cost is carried off the general budget
Where else it has been used: Standardisation and a continuous pipeline are what the World Bank note offers as transferable; other countries that build one line at a time keep the high unit costs the note compares against.
Limits: Neither number is the overrun this gap asks for. The World Bank unit cost is built from estimated cost at project approval, not out-turn cost, so it cannot show whether lines came in over or under budget; the note itself warns that the data exist only in aggregate, that expenditures fall in different years and may not be comparable, and that its inputs come from China Railway and former Ministry of Railways publications. It is a 2014 staff note in a working series, covering about 10,000 km built by 2013, not the 47,000 km now operating, and the World Bank lends to Chinese railway projects. The 47,000 km figure is a rounded administrative statement by the regulator, relayed by Xinhua on the State Council portal, not a statistical table. Neither source shows the financing side: the debt carried by China State Railway Group and its predecessor, the low traffic density on many later lines, or the 2011 Wenzhou collision and the corruption cases at the former Ministry of Railways. Low unit cost also reflects cheap labour and land acquisition terms that are not institutional choices other countries can copy. No schedule-performance figure was found at an official URL.
The UAE, through the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and under licences from the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation issued from 2010, built four APR-1400 reactors at Barakah that ENEC reported in September 2024 were all in commercial operation and providing up to 25 percent of the UAE's electricity; Unit 1 entered commercial operation on 6 April 2021, about four years after the 2017 date the regulator recorded in its 2012 construction licence review.
The UAE federal government set a nuclear policy in 2008, created an independent regulator (FANR) and a single owner-developer (ENEC), and bought a proven reactor design with a turnkey contract, so the state managed one prime contractor against one reference plant rather than a first-of-a-kind design.
Preconditions
A sovereign balance sheet able to finance a multi-unit plant over a decade of construction and delay
A regulator built from scratch with foreign technical support, credible enough to hold the schedule back when licensing required it
A vendor with a recent reference plant and an intact domestic supply chain willing to export it
Where else it has been used: The turnkey, reference-plant model is what newcomer states such as Saudi Arabia and Poland cite; the four-year first-unit slip shows the regulator and operator readiness, not the construction, set the pace.
Limits: The 25 percent is the operator reporting on itself, relayed by the Abu Dhabi government's media office, and it is phrased as "up to": it is a capacity claim, not a measured share of national generation in a given year, and no statistical series was opened to confirm it. The schedule figure is computed by us from two documents, a 2012 regulator statement that the first unit was planned for 2017 and the 2021 commercial-operation release; it is a slip of roughly four years for Unit 1 only, and the later units' original dates were not found at an official URL. The plant's construction cost, and any cost overrun, are not published in any source opened, so the cost half of the construct is missing. The reactors were designed and built by a KEPCO-led Korean consortium on the Shin-Kori 3 and 4 reference design, so the UAE's institutional contribution is commissioning, licensing, financing and operating, not engineering. ENEC is an Abu Dhabi entity and the plant sits in one emirate, though it supplies the national grid under federal regulation. The operator's own boast of "a 40 per cent improvement in schedule" from Unit 1 to Unit 4 measures operational readiness to commercial operation, not construction, and is not used here.
๐ญ๐ณHondurassince 2016still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Honduras's Infrastructure Secretariat concessioned the Palmerola international airport to Palmerola International Airport S.A., with a USD 87.1 million reference investment. Works began on 5 December 2016 and operations on 11 December 2021, about 60 months after works began, against a 61-month contracted works period (start of operation is not necessarily completion of works).
Honduras's Infrastructure Secretariat let a 34-and-a-half-year concession with a fixed works period, had Congress approve it and a trust carry it, and left SAPP and a supervising consortium to hold the concessionaire to the schedule.
Preconditions
A PPP law and a regulator able to publish and enforce contract milestones
An existing site and runway that removed most land acquisition and airside risk
Private bank financing that reached financial close (August 2018) before the main works
Limits: The schedule figure is ours, computed from two dates on the regulator's fact sheet: about 60 months against a 61-month contracted period. The sheet does not say whether the works period was amended, extended or suspended, or whether 'start of operation' means full completion. The only cost figure is a reference investment set at signature. No final cost, cost overrun or state contribution is published there, so this record shows schedule performance only and is silent on cost, which is half of what the indicator asks. The terminal was built at an existing air base with a runway, which makes it an easier build than a greenfield airport. SAPP is the concession's own regulator. Other SAPP sheets carry copy errors (the EEH sheet cites airport revenues), so treat field values with care. Passenger demand, the concession's financial health and whether the airport displaced Toncontรญn as intended are not shown.
๐ธ๐ปEl Salvadorsince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
El Salvador's state hydro commission CEL financed the El Chaparral hydroelectric plant on the Torola River through a BCIE loan arranged in September 2008, with four planned years of construction, and inaugurated it as the 3 de Febrero plant on 19 October 2023 at an approximate cost of US$800 million; CEL gives the initial investment as US$207.8 million, so the final cost is about 3.8 times the initial figure, some 15 years after the 2008 loan.
CEL contracted a 65.8 MW dam, financed by BCIE loans the Assembly guaranteed, and when the original design failed it refinanced a redesign through two further BCIE loans and completed the plant under a later government. Successive administrations kept financing the asset rather than abandoning it, at the price of a cost multiple.
Preconditions
A state utility with borrowing capacity and access to a regional development bank willing to extend and enlarge loans
Geological and design studies whose adequacy is only tested once excavation begins
A legislature that keeps guaranteeing sovereign debt for a stalled project across changes of government
Where else it has been used: The case sits with other hydro and power projects in the corpus whose initial prices did not hold; it shows that an initial contract price transfers little risk when the state must pay for a redesign to finish the asset.
Limits: Both cost figures come from the executing agency reporting on its own project, and both are stated loosely: the final figure is the President's "costo aproximado" quoted in a CEL news item, not an audited account, and CEL's own 2022 notice gave the final cost as "more than $750 million" while the President's speech gave the initial cost as $200 million rather than $207.8 million. The overrun ratio of about 3.8 is our computation from two different documents, and CEL gives the initial figure with no year: it appears to be the price for a design later replaced after technical failures, so part of the gap reflects a changed scope, not only cost escalation; no figure separates the two. The cost statements are politically framed, attributing the overrun to previous governments, and the government that completed the plant is the source. No Court of Accounts final audit was retrieved. The start year rests on the date of the first BCIE loan reported by the Assembly, not on a published construction start date, and the 15-year span is computed from that date to inauguration; the four-year planned duration comes only from the President's quoted speech. The figures say nothing about the plant's output, which is 65.8 MW of installed capacity per the Assembly page.
๐ป๐ชVenezuelasince 1980operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
WHO and UNICEF estimated Venezuela's national DTP3 coverage among one-year-olds at 50 percent in 2025, down from 87 percent in 2015, and coverage has not returned above 66 percent in any year since 2017.
Venezuela's health ministry ran a free national schedule through public clinics and held DTP3 near or above 80 percent for most of 2009 to 2016; when national procurement of vaccines and syringes failed during the economic collapse, the ministry kept the programme formally in place while coverage fell to around half of infants.
Preconditions
Hard-currency budgets and procurement able to keep vaccines and syringes in national stock
A clinic network staffed by vaccinators who stay through a crisis
Population denominators accurate enough that a fall in coverage is seen before an outbreak reveals it
Where else it has been used: Haiti shows the same erosion from stockouts and weak reporting; Venezuela adds that a fall can sit inside a denominator change for two years before an outbreak (measles in 2017 to 2019) makes it visible.
Limits: Construct fit is borrowed, not literal: DTP3 coverage is not the cost or schedule performance of an infrastructure project. It is filed here only on the bra-pni precedent, which EVIDENCE.md names as the reversal template (hti-immunization-erosion files the same kind of series under disaster_preparedness instead); a reviewer holding to the literal construct should reject it. The 87 percent peak is a single good year in a volatile series (50 in 2008, 87 in 2005 and 2015), and the WHO/UNICEF 2022-revision country profile (https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/country-profiles/immunization/2023-country-profiles/immunization_ven_2023.pdf) says the 2015 rise was 'due in part to a change in the population source', so part of the drop is a denominator artefact. Estimates rest on Venezuelan administrative reports with no nationally representative survey in the last five years; WHO/UNICEF graded recent years as having no accepted empirical data, and values are revised between rounds (2022 was 56 in the 2022 revision and 43 now). The same profile records national vaccine and syringe stockouts from 2016 to 2020, which locates the failure in supply rather than in the programme's design, but the series cannot separate economic collapse, emigration of health workers, sanctions-era procurement limits and denominator error. DTP3 is one antigen. PAHO separately documented that endemic measles transmission was re-established in Venezuela in 2018 and interrupted again in 2019 (https://journal.paho.org/en/articles/comprehensive-approach-achieving-reverification-measles-elimination-venezuela-2019-2023), which supports the erosion but is not part of this metric.
๐ญ๐นHaitisince 2008dismantledbears on Large project delivery
From September 2008 to September 2016, Haiti's Council of Ministers allocated PetroCaribe oil-credit revenue to 409 public projects, and the state fuel monetisation bureau BMPAD disbursed US$1,605,905,287.84 (92.4% of the revised budget), but the Superior Court of Auditors (CSCCA) found cost and schedule overruns across the audited works, including a Cap-Haรฏtien street rehabilitation that ran 18% over budget and took 21 months against an eight-month contract term.
Successive Haitian governments turned Venezuelan oil credit into a parallel capital budget, approving projects by Council-of-Ministers resolution under emergency law and having ministries such as MTPTC and MPCE award contracts directly. Spending reached US$1.6 billion, but without needs analysis, cost estimates or contract supervision, many works overran, stalled or could not be verified, and the money stopped when the oil credit ended.
Preconditions
A budget channel that runs through normal appropriation and procurement rather than ministerial resolutions under emergency powers
Project preparation, costing and supervision capacity in line ministries before money is committed
An independent audit body able to follow disbursements to physical completion while projects are live, not years later
Where else it has been used: Resource-backed off-budget investment funds in other oil-credit recipients show the same pattern: rapid disbursement, weak preparation and audits that arrive after the financing has gone.
Limits: The headline number is money disbursed, not works delivered: the CSCCA itself says missing reception certificates often stop it concluding whether a contract was finished or abandoned, and it documents abandoned works such as the Miragoรขne market and bus station, stopped at 35.27% progress, a figure from report 1 (31 January 2019). The court publishes no aggregate cost or schedule overrun for the 409 projects. The 18% overrun is one audited road project picked as the cost figure, with no claim that it is typical; other audited projects show overruns of 9%, 10%, 33% and 54% against contract (reports 1 and 3), and some came in under budget. Report 1 gives the Cap-Haรฏtien contract an 8-month term but a contractual end date of 14 May 2011 (start 18 March 2010), so the schedule overrun is 21 months against 8 or against about 14 depending on which line of the court's own sheet is read. The audit covers a sample of projects across three reports of roughly 1,000 pages each, every figure has to be read out of a PDF, and contractors contested several findings in report 3's annex. The 'dismantled' status rests on the audit ledger: the last resolution is dated 28 September 2016 and Venezuelan PetroCaribe supply then collapsed; no single Haitian text formally closing the programme was located. Projects were executed in a post-earthquake state of emergency that suspended normal procurement rules, which the court says enabled direct awards.
Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the federal government and the states built the Interstate System. In nominal dollars, the estimated federal cost to complete it rose from $34 billion in the 1958 Interstate Cost Estimate to $114 billion in the final estimate of 1991.
114 USD billion, estimated federal cost to complete the interstate system, final (1991) interstate cost estimate, nominal, 1991. 34 USD billion, estimated federal cost to complete the interstate system, first (1958) interstate cost estimate, nominal, 1958. US Federal Highway Administration, Highway History: How many Interstate programs were there?, retrieved 2026-10-01.
The move, and what it needed
Congress set a 90 percent federal match paid from a dedicated Highway Trust Fund fed by fuel taxes, and the Bureau of Public Roads (later FHWA) apportioned it to state highway departments by repeated cost-to-complete estimates, which let the states build to one national standard on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Preconditions
A dedicated user-tax revenue stream that kept construction off the general budget
State highway departments with existing engineering capacity to design and let contracts
A legislated national network map and design standard fixed before money flowed
Where else it has been used: The trust-fund-plus-match model was copied in transit and airport programs; it travels less well where fuel-tax revenue is small or where no subnational agencies can deliver.
Limits: Both figures are in dollars not adjusted for inflation, so the 235 percent rise we compute from them, (114-34)/34, is not a real cost overrun. FHWA itself attributes the growth to inflation, mileage added by Congress in 1968 and later, 'more safety and more attention to the environment' in later programs and 'changes in the definition of completion', as well as to the Interstate Program 'evolving'. The page gives no real-terms figure, no schedule baseline and no per-mile comparison, so it cannot separate execution failure from scope change. The 1958 ICE was a cost-to-complete estimate used to apportion funds, not a contract budget. The source gives no schedule baseline; the final estimate came 35 years after the Act. The source says later Interstate Programs have not ended, so 'concluded' refers to the end of Interstate Construction apportionments under ISTEA. The figures are federal share only.
๐จ๐บCubasince 2019operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Cuba's national housing programme, run by the Ministry of Construction under the housing policy presented in 2018 to close a deficit of 929,695 homes in ten years, completed 20,232 homes in 2022 and 5,493 in 2025, of which the state built 1,791.
The Ministry of Construction sets an annual national housing plan, builds part of it through state enterprises and counts the rest through subsidised self-build by households, with municipal governments responsible for local materials.
Preconditions
A domestic supply of cement, steel and blocks that the state controls and can allocate
Budget room for state construction and household subsidies
Municipal materials production able to supply self-builders when national supply fails
Limits: The count is of homes finished, not of the housing deficit, quality, cost or who received them. Two thirds of the 2025 total (3,702 of 5,493) is self-build by households ('poblaciรณn', 'esfuerzo propio'), which the programme subsidises and counts toward its plan but does not build, and the state-built part fell from 2,756 in 2024 to 1,791. The 2022 figure is from the 2024 edition of the same ONEI publication (https://web.archive.org/web/20260621201114/https://www.onei.gob.cu/sites/default/files/publicaciones/2025-05/construccion-en-cuba-indicadores-seleccionados-2024_0.pdf, table 5), which gives 32,874 for 2020, 18,645 for 2021, 20,232 for 2022, 16,065 for 2023 and 7,427 for 2024. In the 2025 edition's table 5, headed 2021 to 2025, the province rows sum to 18,645, 20,232, 16,065, 7,427 and 5,493, but the national total row is shifted one year back in its first three columns (32,874, 18,645, 20,232) and drops 16,065, so the national row is wrong there and the provinces are right; Granma (27 February 2024) independently reports 16,065 homes for 2023, 65 percent of the plan, from the ministry's annual review. 2022 is not the peak: 2020 was higher, and the series before 2020 is not in these editions. The 2018 policy and the 929,695 deficit are from Cubadebate's report of the policy's presentation (21 November 2018), state media rather than a statistical release, and the started year is the first full year under that policy. The collapse coincides with the 2021 to 2025 economic crisis, the loss of construction materials (ONEI reports corrugated steel bar output down 80 percent in 2025) and 40,191 stalled self-build homes, so the record documents a delivery capacity that ran backwards without separating the programme's management from the economy around it. onei.gob.cu refused connections on 2 October 2026, so both editions are Internet Archive copies; the PDF text layer uses a shifted font encoding and the tables were read after decoding it.
The Dominican state electricity holding CDEEE awarded the Punta Catalina coal plant in November 2013 and agreed a final contract price of US$1,945.0 million after the award, including the unloading port; after construction delays and a March 2020 dispute settlement with the contractor, the value carried into the plant's 2022 public trust was US$2,340.54 million, about 20 percent above the contract price.
The government declared a generation emergency by decree, had CDEEE tender a 2-unit coal plant as a single EPC contract with a foreign consortium, and financed milestone payments from the budget and export credit; when payments and works fell behind, it settled the disputes in 2020 at a higher value and later placed the plant in a public trust run by Banreservas' fiduciary.
Preconditions
An emergency decree that let one state company run the procurement outside normal planning
A single EPC contractor carrying design and construction risk, with milestone pricing open to dispute
An external audit body able to publish a final cost, which here came only years after commissioning
Where else it has been used: Large single-contractor energy builds tendered under emergency powers show the same sequence elsewhere in the region: a fixed headline price at award, delays tied to payment disputes, and a settlement that resets the price before any audit.
Limits: The 20 percent overrun is computed here from two documents by different bodies, not published as a figure. The presidency itself calls the US$2,340.54 million a reference number, "no es definitivo, ni como valor del activo ni como monto final de inversiรณn", pending a financial audit, so it is a floor on cost, not the final cost. The US$1,945.0 million comes from a commission appointed by the president who built the plant, hosted by the Consejo Econรณmico y Social, whose chair led it; it was written in 2017 at about 70 percent completion. The same report records that CDEEE was paying milestones against the higher offered price of US$2,040.7 million, so the baseline itself is disputed. No schedule figure with a planned and actual date was found in an opened official source; the commission only puts the cost of delay at about US$25 million a month. The award followed a tender later investigated for Odebrecht bribery, which the overrun figure does not capture.
๐ซ๐ทFrancesince 2016still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The Sociรฉtรฉ du Grand Paris, the state's public builder, renamed Sociรฉtรฉ des grands projets by the law of 27 December 2023, has been building the Grand Paris Express automatic metro since works began in June 2016. The project's estimated total cost rose from 22.6 billion euros in March 2013 to 36.1 billion euros from October 2021, about 60 percent above the 2013 estimate.
The state created a dedicated public builder with its own earmarked taxes and the right to borrow on bond markets, so that a 200 km metro could be built in parallel rather than paid for line by line. The Senate notes this borrowing moved full delivery from 2075 to 2030, at the price of cost estimates that were revised upward as studies deepened and the Olympic deadline compressed the schedule.
Preconditions
A legal vehicle with earmarked revenue and borrowing power, kept off the annual budget
Enough in-house engineering staff to supervise thousands of contractors, which the Senate says was missing until after 2018
A political commitment to the whole network that survives changes of government, here confirmed in 2013 and again in 2018
Where else it has been used: The builder is now preparing France's regional express rail networks (SERM) using the same model. Those projects have no Olympic deadline and no Paris land values to borrow against.
Limits: The 60 percent overrun is our calculation from two Senate figures. The 2013 baseline is stated in 2012 euros. The 2026 page does not state the price basis of the 36.1 billion figure, but the 2020 Senate report (r20-044) gives the preceding estimate as '35,6 milliards d'euros aux conditions รฉconomiques de 2012', which points to constant 2012 euros, so the overrun is mostly real rather than inflation. Both figures are estimates to completion and not an audited outturn, and the network is still unfinished. The Senate reports that in February 2025 the builder announced new delays to line 15 south and the first sections of lines 16 and 17, so the cost figure, unchanged since 2021, may rise again. The 36.1 billion excludes the further 3.5 billion euros, and 700 million more in 2024, that the builder pays toward other รle-de-France transport projects. The source does not quantify schedule slippage against the 2013 or 2018 timetables. The Cour des comptes reports on the project, the primary audit source, did not open from this machine, so the figures come from parliament's reading of the builder's answers to its questionnaires.
๐ช๐นEthiopiasince 2015delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
The Ethiopian Roads Administration built the 57.4 km Batu/Zeway-Arsi Negele section (Lot 3) of the 202 km Modjo-Hawassa expressway under a project that became effective in 2015. The civil works were substantially complete by mid-2026, but only after cumulative extensions of 57 months to the project's closing date.
The Ethiopian Roads Administration split a 202 km toll expressway into lots with different financiers: Bank-financed, government-financed and Chinese EXIM-financed. It carried the World Bank lot through material shortages, contract suspensions and repeated restructurings until the civil works were done.
Preconditions
A roads authority able to manage several international contracts and financiers on one corridor
Foreign-exchange and fiscal headroom to absorb price escalation
Land acquisition and compensation processes that do not stall works, which here still leave grievances before the courts
Limits: This is one 57 km road section, not a national programme, and the schedule figure is a slip in the World Bank financing's closing date, not a construction schedule measured against a contractual completion date. The 57 months run from the original 31 December 2021 closing to 30 September 2026, and part of that time came before Lot 3 works began: the paper says phase 2 started about two years after phase 1. The World Bank documents name cost overruns from material price inflation but give no figure, and the financing was partly cancelled (about 105 million dollars cumulatively by June 2026, including 9.31 million on the additional-financing credit) and topped up with 37 million in additional financing, so no cost-performance number can be drawn from them. The status 'concluded' is provisional. The road had been provisionally taken over by the roads authority, but the documents tie public opening to installing tolling and transport systems, which were moved to another project, and no source seen here confirms the section is open to traffic. Lots 1 and 2 have been open since September 2021, while Lot 4 is financed by China EXIM Bank and is not covered. All figures are the World Bank's own supervision reporting on a project it finances.
๐บ๐พUruguaysince 2013operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Uruguay's transport ministry signed a FOCEM-funded contract in November 2013 to rehabilitate 422 km of the Pintado to Rivera line within 36 months, cut the scope to the 310 km between Paso de los Toros and Rivera in January 2017, took the last provisional handover in May 2019, and by June 2025 reported the line in a degraded state with freight limited to 10 to 25 km/h against its set maximum of 40 km/h and no freight carried in recent years.
The transport ministry used a regional cohesion fund to finance a capital rehabilitation, contracted a state-owned rail company to deliver it, and then let the maintenance contract lapse in 2021 without a successor, so the rebuilt track degraded within four years.
Preconditions
Grant capital for construction that carried no matching budget line for upkeep
A railway operator without freight demand on the corridor to justify ongoing maintenance
A competing national rail priority, the Ferrocarril Central, that pulled scope and attention away mid-contract
Where else it has been used: Donor-funded rehabilitations that lose their maintenance regime are a familiar pattern in regional infrastructure funds. Here the cut in scope to make way for the Ferrocarril Central shows a smaller project giving way to a larger one built on the same corridor.
Limits: The source is a scanned ministerial reply to a parliamentary information request, so the quoted text comes from the PDF's OCR layer (it names the contractor "CEU" where the contracting firm was CFU), and checking it means reading the scan. The two speeds measure the asset's condition, not cost or schedule, which is what the construct asks for. The schedule slip is our computation: 36 months from a November 2013 signature against a last provisional handover in May 2019, about two and a half years late, and on a scope that had been cut from 422 to 310 km in January 2017, so a like-for-like slip cannot be stated. The final cost of the works was not found at an official URL: only the 2013 budget of US$75 million and a CND contract figure of 1,462 million pesos, which cannot be compared without exchange-rate and indexation assumptions, so no cost overrun is claimed. The 10 km/h figure is the bottom of a range of speed restrictions and does not apply along the whole line. The absence of freight reflects demand and operator choices as well as track condition, since the pulp traffic that justified the Ferrocarril Central runs south of Paso de los Toros. This is a different delivery from the 1988 to 1990 contraction recorded in ury-rail-network, but both concern AFE's network, and the record leans on the same ministry describing its own asset.
๐ฐ๐ทSouth Koreasince 1992delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Korea built the Seoul to Busan high-speed line planned in 1990 at 5,846.2 billion won for opening in early 1999; by 1993 the Ministry of Transportation re-estimated the cost at 12,174.3 billion won, the first phase opened in April 2004 and the whole line opened in 2010.
The government committed to a TGV-based Seoul to Busan line on a rough estimate derived from conventional rail costs, discovered within a year of breaking ground that the cost had doubled, then cut scope, created a dedicated construction authority and passed a 1996 promotion act to keep the build going until it opened in stages.
Preconditions
A state able to keep financing a megaproject through a doubling of cost and the 1997 financial crisis
A dedicated construction authority and imported core technology (TGV) with a transfer agreement
A corridor dense enough that demand justified finishing the line despite the overrun
Where else it has been used: Later Korean lines (Honam, Suseo to Pyeongtaek) were built by the same authority with domestic rolling stock; the Gyeongbu record is the standard example of optimism bias in a first-of-a-kind national project.
Limits: The 108% increase is computed from two published figures, and it compares a 1993 re-estimate with the 1990 plan, not the final outturn with the plan; the price basis of the re-estimate is not stated, so part of the gap may be inflation. The final outturn cost was not taken from an opened source. The 1993 plan cut scope (underground Seoul, Daejeon and Daegu sections replaced with upgraded existing alignments) to save 1.43 trillion won, so the delivered line is not the planned one, and phase one ran on electrified conventional track south of Daegu. The archive commentary is written by an outside researcher; the figures are read from a scanned-document PDF. The record documents overrun on one megaproject, not Korea's general project delivery performance.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2015dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Peru's Gasoducto Sur Peruano concession, signed in July 2014 for a US$7.328 billion gas pipeline due in commercial operation by March 2019, stood at 37.32% overall progress against 76.49% scheduled in December 2016, according to the energy regulator Osinergmin, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines terminated the concession in January 2017 after the consortium failed to reach financial close.
Peru's energy ministry awarded a single private consortium a design-build-finance-operate concession for a strategic southern gas pipeline, backed by a guaranteed-revenue charge on electricity bills, and then terminated it when the consortium could not close financing; the regulator was left administering the half-built assets.
Preconditions
A concession framework that ties construction milestones to financial close and lets the grantor terminate cleanly
Bidders whose financing does not collapse when a sponsor is caught in a corruption case
A fallback plan, with budget, for custody and re-tendering of stranded assets
Where else it has been used: Large energy concessions with guaranteed revenue travel across Latin America; the GSP case is the cautionary version, where a single sponsor's legal collapse took the financing and the schedule with it.
Limits: Both progress figures are the concessionaire's own report as relayed by the regulator (the table cites 'Fuente: Reporte de Concesionario Gasoducto Sur Peruano SA'); Osinergmin supervised but did not independently measure overall progress. The figure is a weighted composite of permits, engineering, logistics and construction, so 37% overstates what was built: construction and assembly stood at 10.37% against 63.78% planned. The record does not show the final cost to the state, the arbitration outcome, the value of stranded assets, or how far the collapse stemmed from the Odebrecht corruption case and lost bank financing rather than from Peruvian institutions' project management. It is a concession (design, finance, build, operate), so the schedule failure is shared between the grantor and a private consortium. The numbers sit inside PDFs, not a statistical API. Later governments have repeatedly proposed reviving the pipeline under new names; this record concerns the 2014 concession, which ended by decision.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Petroperรบ's Talara Refinery Modernisation Project, begun with the May 2014 EPC contract, reached full operation in 2023 after Peru's Contralorรญa found its estimated investment had risen from US$1.3 billion to more than US$5 billion by October 2020, about 400%, and a cumulative schedule slippage of more than three years in the project's execution schedule, traced to the auxiliary-units contracting.
Peru legislated a state-owned refiner's modernisation, let the company contract a single EPC builder and then improvise the auxiliary works, and the Contralorรญa's audit traced repeated procurement reversals to a schedule slip of over three years and a several-fold cost rise before the plant reached full operation.
Preconditions
A state enterprise with procurement rules and project-management capacity matched to a multi-billion dollar build
A cost baseline updated before the investment decision, so scope changes are not read as overrun after the fact
An audit office able to review a megaproject while it is still under construction
Where else it has been used: National-oil-company refinery megaprojects (Dos Bocas in Mexico, Abreu e Lima in Brazil) show the same pattern of baseline estimates that bear little relation to final cost; Talara is the Peruvian instance with an audit trail.
Limits: The 400% figure is a conditional statement ('estarรญa significando') attributed to the Comptroller General in a press release, comparing a feasibility-study estimate with an October 2020 cost, not an audited final cost; part of the rise reflects scope changes (Flexicoking, auxiliary units) rather than pure overrun, and the press release does not separate them. The press release's own figures (US$1.3bn to over US$5bn) imply an increase of about 285%, or roughly 3.85 times the estimate, so the stated 400% is the Comptroller's rounding and not the arithmetic; the metric keeps 400 because it is the published figure. The three-year slippage is the audit's figure for the auxiliary-units component over its 2014 to 2018 review window, not a measured end-to-end delay. Petroperรบ is a state-owned company, not a ministry: the record judges the state as project owner, and Petroperรบ's subsequent financial distress and government bailouts are not shown here. 'Operating' rests on a ministry press release declaring 100% operability in September 2023, not on independent utilisation data. The evidence is of a delivery that was completed late and far over cost, not a success.
๐ฎ๐ฉIndonesiasince 2015still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources launched the 35,000 MW generation programme in May 2015 to be completed by 2019; by December 2022, 415 units with 16,596 MW, 47 percent of the programme, had reached commercial operation.
16,596 MW (47 percent of 35,000 MW), capacity at commercial operation, share of the 35,000 mw programme, 2022-12. 35,000 MW, original programme target completed by 2019, 2019 target, restated by the minister on 2018-03-06. Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, press release 040.Pers/04/SJI/2023, retrieved 2026-10-01.
The move, and what it needed
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources set a single national capacity target, signed PPAs and EPC letters of intent with private producers and PLN at launch, and issued pricing and licensing rules to pull IPP finance into it; when demand undershot, the minister rephased the target instead of holding the deadline.
Preconditions
A single-buyer utility (PLN) able to sign long-term power purchase agreements that lenders accept
Land acquisition and one-stop licensing rules that can move dozens of plant sites in parallel
Demand forecasts honest enough that a capacity target does not lock in surplus take-or-pay contracts
Where else it has been used: Headline megawatt targets travel easily between governments; the Indonesian case shows that the target is the cheap part, and that a rephasing announced as on target can hide a schedule miss unless the original deadline stays on the record.
Limits: This is a schedule record, not a cost record: no official source located gives the programme's budgeted against actual cost, so the cost half of the construct is missing. The 47 percent is the ministry reporting on its own flagship. It is a capacity count at commercial operation, not a measure of whether plants run, at what availability, or at what tariff burden on PLN. The target moved: launched as a need for 35,000 MW over 2015 to 2019, it was restated in March 2018 as about 20,000 MW by 2019 with the rest in 2024 to 2025, on the argument that demand grew more slowly than the 7 percent growth assumption. Even the restated 2019 milestone had not been reached by December 2022. The ministry attributes the shortfall partly to over-forecast demand, so part of the slip may be a deliberate deferral rather than a delivery failure, and a reviewer can read the low completion as prudence. Most capacity (about 70 percent of units) is built by private IPPs under PLN purchase agreements, so delivery is joint and not attributable to the state alone. The latest official progress figure found is December 2022; nothing later was verified, and the share may be higher now.
๐ง๐ดBoliviasince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Bolivia's Empresa Siderรบrgica del Mutรบn, whose turnkey contract with Sinosteel was awarded in 2016 and whose complex the President inaugurated in February 2025, reported in its 2026 initial accountability review that the project stood at 92% physical progress against 100% accumulated financial execution, that its own supervision found the complex had never entered operation, and that it had served notice of intent to terminate the contract in January 2026.
Bolivia's Ministry of Mining had its state steel company sign a single turnkey design-build-operate contract with a Chinese state contractor, financed 85% by a China Eximbank credit, and accepted provisional and final receptions of each plant before the complex had run as a whole; the next administration's site supervision rejected those receptions.
Preconditions
A tied export credit that pays out against contractor milestones rather than against verified operation
A state owner company with thin in-house engineering supervision relative to the contractor
A political calendar that rewarded an inauguration date over a commissioning test
Where else it has been used: The lithium carbonate plant (bol-lithium-plant) shows the same state-led industrialisation model delivering a plant that runs well below design capacity.
Limits: The source is a slide presentation, not an audit: the figures are read off slides whose PDF text extracts garbled, and a reviewer will need to open slide 11 to check them. The review was written by the company's management under the government that took office in late 2025, which has an interest in blaming the previous administration and the contractor; Sinosteel answered the termination notice on 11 February 2026 and the dispute is unresolved, and the external audit and Contralorรญa opinion the review schedules had not been published at retrieval. The 100% financial execution covers the EXIMBANK and Treasury tranche only; an additional FINPRO credit stood at 55.79%. No official baseline schedule was opened, so the record carries no percentage schedule overrun, and the 2020 suspension under the interim government is part of the delay. The contract amendment from USD 422.6 million to USD 443.98 million on slide 13 is legible only as chart labels and is not used as the metric. The status 'eroded' records the withdrawal of a completion the state had declared in 2025, not the loss of an operating peak, because the plant never produced at scale; a reviewer may prefer to read it as a failed delivery.
๐ป๐ณVietnamsince 2024still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Vietnam built the 519-kilometre Quang Trach to Pho Noi 500kV circuit-3 transmission line across nine provinces after construction began on 18 January 2024, and the Government reported it in operation on 29 August 2024 'after six months of construction', meeting the Prime Minister's deadline of completion before September, at an investment of over VND22.3 trillion.
Vietnam's Prime Minister made the line a dated national priority with his own progress reviews, Vietnam Electricity's transmission corporation split it into four component projects built in parallel, and the nine provinces on the route were held responsible for site clearance at the same time as construction.
Preconditions
A state-owned grid company able to mobilise contractors and equipment across four sections at once
Provincial governments that answer to the centre and can clear land on a central deadline
An acute supply crisis, the 2023 northern power cuts, that justified bypassing normal sequencing
Limits: The duration is the Government's own framing: 18 January to 27 to 29 August 2024 is over seven months of construction, not six, and design, investment approval and land clearance before January are not counted. The deadline it met was set during construction by the Prime Minister, so 'on schedule' measures against a political target, not an original baseline, and no approved budget was published to compare with the outturn: the Government's own articles give the investment as VND22 trillion on 14 August and over VND22.3 trillion on 29 August. A single line built under emergency priority after the 2023 northern power shortages shows what the state can do when it concentrates resources; it does not show routine project performance. Construction quality, safety, compensation paid to displaced households and the line's actual utilisation are not in the source, and the outlet is the Government's news portal, not an audit.
๐ช๐จEcuadorsince 2009still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Ecuador contracted the 1,500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair plant in October 2009 for USD 1,979.7 million with a 60-month term ending 5 October 2014; the plant entered commercial operation in November 2016, and a National Assembly oversight report found it had cost USD 2,712.5 million by August 2021, about 37 percent above the contract price, excluding a USD 599 million transmission line.
Ecuador's government declared the plant a national priority, signed a turnkey EPC contract with Sinohydro financed by China Eximbank, and let the contractor set implementation costs, which delivered a 1,500 MW plant two years late and well above the contract price.
Preconditions
Bilateral resource-backed finance that made a large single project fundable quickly
A political decision to size the plant at 1,500 MW before definitive engineering studies existed
Weak owner-side engineering and supervision capacity relative to an open EPC contract
Where else it has been used: The turnkey, lender-tied model was repeated across Ecuador's other emblematic hydro plants and in other Chinese-financed projects in the region; the Coca Codo record is the case most cited when that model's owner-side risks are discussed.
Limits: The 37 percent overrun and the roughly 25-month delay are our arithmetic on two figures in the report, not a figure the report states; the report itself compares against the USD 987 million planning estimate, which would make the overrun far larger, so the baseline choice matters. The source is a parliamentary oversight committee report produced in a politically adversarial investigation, written partly as narrative with annexes, inside a 346-page PDF; it is not an audited cost statement, and the 'USD 2.712.490.418,04 millones' wording mixes units. The report also documents thousands of cracks in the turbine distributors, regressive erosion of the Coca river threatening the intake, and net output of 37,927 GWh from April 2016 to May 2022 against about 62,934 GWh expected, so the plant operates well below design; none of that is in the cost metric. The construction contract was signed before financing was firm and outside the public procurement law. Started is the contract signature year, not the start of physical works.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 2020delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Paraguay's Ministry of Public Works began building the Hรฉroes del Chaco cable-stayed bridge, the first road link from Asunciรณn to the Chaco, in 2020 on an estimated 36-month schedule; at the end of 2023 it reported 90% physical progress against 100% planned, and the bridge was inaugurated on 3 March 2024 and recorded as concluded with provisional acceptance in the 2024 balance.
MOPC tendered the bridge through national public tender MOPC No 156/2019, awarded it to Consorcio Union, financed it from the general budget, and tracked planned against physical progress each year in its public balance.
Preconditions
A ministry able to finance a multi-year river crossing without a multilateral lender's supervision
Domestic contractors with enough balance sheet and imported expertise to take on a cable-stayed span
An annual public reporting format that records planned against actual progress, so slippage is visible before inauguration
Where else it has been used: The transferable part is the plain planned-versus-actual table in the annual balance, which lets a reader see both the early lead and the late slip.
Limits: All figures are the ministry's own reports; no audit-office or independent value-for-money review was opened. The schedule figure is a progress-against-plan percentage in a year-end table, which says the works were behind their own plan at end-2023 but not by how many months; the official sources opened give the construction start only as a year, so a month-precise overrun cannot be computed (a 2020 start plus 36 months gives completion within 2023, against an inauguration on 3 March 2024, i.e. at least two months late, and the 2021 balance showed the works ahead of plan, 43.25% against 32.30%). No total contract cost, original award value or cost overrun appears in the balances opened: the 2024 table carries only that year's spending (G. 98,099,704,513). Press reports describing the bridge as delayed and more expensive were leads only and are not the source.
๐ฉ๐ชGermanysince 2022still operatingbears on Large project delivery
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine the federal government chartered floating storage and regasification units, commissioned the first at Wilhelmshaven in December 2022, and by February 2023 expected to spend about 10 billion euros renting and running five units, against 2.94 billion euros of federal funding made available for four in May 2022.
The economy ministry chartered ready-built floating terminals through the utilities RWE and Uniper instead of building onshore plants, and Parliament passed an acceleration act letting authorities skip environmental assessment and relax procurement for these projects.
Preconditions
A global charter market with floating regasification ships available at short notice
A shock severe enough for Parliament to suspend permitting and procurement rules
A federal budget able to commit billions before the full cost was known
Where else it has been used: Finland, Italy and the Netherlands also chartered floating units in 2022. The German case is the one cited for permitting speed, and also for the overcapacity and cost debate that followed.
Limits: The two cost figures are not like for like and must not be read as an overrun percentage: the May 2022 figure was funding made available for four units, the February 2023 figure is an expected spend for five units over charter terms the government puts at five to 15 years, and the government says a large part will flow back through landing fees. The charter contracts are classified (VS-Vertraulich), so no outside reader can check either number. The schedule claim, decision in late February 2022 to commissioning in December 2022, is computed from two documents rather than published as one figure, and it covers only the first unit; the sources verified here give no commissioning dates for the others, and plans for Stade and a second Wilhelmshaven unit were only targets for end 2023. Part of the speed was bought by suspending process: the government's answer confirms that under the LNG Acceleration Act no environmental impact assessment was carried out at Wilhelmshaven or Brunsbรผttel. Nothing here shows how fully the terminals have been used, which is the main criticism of the build-out.
๐ฆ๐ทArgentinasince 1981still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Argentina's state nuclear operator connected Atucha II to the grid in June 2014, almost 33 years after construction began in July 1981, and began commercial operation in May 2016, after a build halted in 1994 and restarted in 2006.
The state nuclear company NA-SA and the atomic energy commission CNEA restarted a German-designed reactor abandoned mid-build, under a 2006 national reactivation plan, and finished it with Argentine engineering after the original vendor's nuclear business had left the field.
Preconditions
A standing nuclear institution (CNEA) that kept engineers and know-how through the suspension
State finance able to fund a restart once the fiscal crisis passed
A design close enough to Atucha I that domestic teams could complete and license it
Where else it has been used: Restarting a long-suspended nuclear build has rarely worked elsewhere; Brazil's Angra 3 is the comparable case and remains unfinished, which is why Atucha II is cited as proof of completion rather than of efficient delivery.
Limits: The 32.9 years is computed from two month-precision dates in an IAEA table, and the national regulator dates the start to 1982, so the figure could be a year shorter. No cost figure was found at an official source, so the record carries schedule only, and the indicator asks for cost too. Most of the delay is a 12-year suspension (1994 to 2006) caused by fiscal crisis and policy, not slow building, so the number mixes a stopped project with a slow one. The IAEA data are reported to the IAEA by the national authorities. The plant's energy availability factor of about 53 percent over 2015 to 2025 shows that completion did not bring reliable output, and the record should not be read as a success story beyond the fact of delivery.
๐ต๐ฑPolandsince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Poland's Maritime Office in Gdynia signed the first construction contract for the Vistula Spit waterway on 4 October 2019 and opened the canal on 17 September 2022. The Supreme Audit Office found that by April 2023 the programme's value had risen 125 percent, from PLN 880 million to over PLN 1,984 million, and that its completion deadline had slipped two years to the end of 2024.
The Council of Ministers established a multi-year programme and the Maritime Office in Gdynia contracted and built it. The minister responsible raised the budget twice and extended the deadline without telling the cabinet that the project no longer passed its own cost-benefit test. A strategic objective, sea access that bypassed Russian-controlled waters, overrode the economic appraisal.
Preconditions
A strategic or security rationale strong enough to survive a failed cost-benefit test
A multi-year programme instrument whose budget the responsible minister can revise
An audit office with the mandate to publish findings after the fact and to notify suspected crime and breaches of public finance discipline
Where else it has been used: The pattern of a politically fixed opening date and a budget revised to fit is common to prestige infrastructure. What sets this case apart is NIK's documentation that the threshold breach was known before the first contract was signed.
Limits: This is a delivery with a large documented overrun, and it should be read as evidence of poor cost and schedule performance, not as a success. The 125 percent is NIK's figure for the programme budget as revised up to April 2023. Against the further revision to PLN 2,127.5 million in May 2023 the overrun is about 142 percent, a figure computed here and not published by NIK. Final outturn cost after 2024 was not checked. NIK found that the cost-benefit threshold was crossed at a 20 percent cost increase, and that the minister knew of a more than 100 percent rise before the first contract was signed. The project is therefore uneconomic on the state's own appraisal, and NIK said it was considering notifications of suspected crime and of breaches of public finance discipline. Only the canal and lock are open. NIK states that the sea-going vessels the programme was designed for cannot call at Elblฤ g until port works there are finished, so the canal's stated purpose was not delivered on the date the first metric describes. The ministry's count of more than 1,770 vessels in the first year is mostly small craft and is not used. The programme was set up by a Council of Ministers resolution of 24 May 2016. 'Started' uses the first construction contract in 2019, and a reviewer could set it at 2016.
๐ฎ๐ฑIsraelsince 2000still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Israel Railways began electrifying the national network in 2000 and opened the electric express line to Jerusalem in September 2018, but by May 2020 only about 64 of 480 planned route kilometres were electrified, and the forecast completion date had moved from 2019, set in 2013, to the end of 2025, on an estimated cost of ILS 12.1 billion.
A state-owned rail company ran a network-wide electrification programme alongside a new flagship line and opened the line first, diverting cars from other lines to do it. Completion dates were reset repeatedly while the State Comptroller ran follow-up audits.
Preconditions
One state company carrying planning, procurement and operations, so a slip in one stream delays all of them
Repeated external audit that publishes the forecast dates, which is what makes the slippage visible
An operator willing to open a line before it had its own rolling stock, by diverting cars from other lines
Limits: This is a delivery still in progress, not a finished one. At the audit date it had reached 13.3 percent of the planned route, and no official source that opened on the retrieval date gave a later figure, so whether the 2025 date held is not shown. The audit gives an estimated cost (ILS 12.1 billion) but no original budget, so the cost overrun cannot be computed from this source; the schedule slip from 2019 to 2025 is the only performance figure. The completion dates are Israel Railways' own forecasts, which the Comptroller reports. The audit also found that the Jerusalem line opened without its own rolling stock and ran with passengers in test mode for about a year, cancelling 2.6 percent of trips against 0.5 percent on other lines. A hostile reviewer would say the record shows a slipping project, not a delivered one.
๐จ๐ฆCanadasince 2015delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Infrastructure Canada delivered the Samuel De Champlain Bridge corridor in Montreal as a public-private partnership signed in 2015, opening the bridge in July 2019 against a contractual in-service date of December 1, 2018, at a total project cost the department reports as C$4.2 billion, after a C$235 million settlement in 2018 that paid for delay-recovery measures and oversized-part transport issues.
Infrastructure Canada replaced a failing federal bridge through a design-build-finance-operate-maintain contract with liquidated damages for late opening, then bought back schedule with a negotiated settlement when transport restrictions and disputes threatened the date.
Preconditions
A federal asset owner with an urgent safety case (the old bridge at the end of its safe life) that justified a fixed in-service date.
A mature domestic P3 market and an owner's engineer able to price and monitor a 30-year contract.
Budget room to pay a nine-figure settlement rather than litigate through the delay.
Limits: No published figure states the outturn against the baseline, so overrun has to be pieced together by the reader. The value-for-money report gives a 2015 total of C$4.239 billion and a contractual in-service date of December 1, 2018; the department's own story page gives a rounded C$4.2 billion total and a July 2019 opening; the 2018 settlement adds C$235 million and moved the delivery date to December 21, 2018, which was itself missed. The C$4.2 billion therefore cannot include the settlement and appears to restate the original envelope, so the true outturn is at least about 5.5% above it (a computed figure, not published) and the bridge opened about seven months after the contract date. Costs also bundle a 30-year operation and maintenance period and financing, so the number is not a construction cost. All figures are the department's own; the Auditor General's 2018 doubts about the schedule are reported only in the press here. The canada.ca news release refused a scripted curl request and was read through a browser-like fetch. This is one megaproject, not a national portfolio.
๐ฏ๐ตJapansince 2012delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Japan's Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency built the 125 km Kanazawa to Tsuruga extension of the Hokuriku Shinkansen from 2012; its authorised cost rose from 1.1858 trillion yen in 2017 to 1.6779 trillion yen after a second increase of 265.8 billion yen in March 2021, completion slipped one year to the end of fiscal 2023, and the line opened on 16 March 2024.
16,779 100 million yen (oku-yen), authorised project cost after the march 2021 revision, 2021-03. 2,658 100 million yen (oku-yen), cost increase approved in the march 2021 revision, 2021-03. Board of Audit of Japan, fiscal 2020 audit report, chapter 4 item 11, retrieved 2026-10-01.
The move, and what it needed
The transport ministry authorised a state construction agency to build the line on a politically accelerated deadline; when the agency disclosed a second overrun late, the ministry set up an external verification committee, downgraded the agency's performance rating and issued a statutory improvement order, and the Board of Audit examined the causes in its annual report.
Preconditions
A specialised state construction agency with decades of high-speed rail experience
Independent audit and ministerial evaluation that can publish an overrun against a named project
Funding arrangements (lease fees, existing-line sale proceeds, local contributions) able to absorb an increase without stopping the works
Where else it has been used: Japan's verification committee and audit report resemble the UK's National Audit Office reviews of HS2; the difference is that the Japanese line opened within one year of its revised date while HS2 was cut back.
Limits: This is a delivery with a large overrun, filed because the construct asks for cost and schedule performance, not as a success. The overrun against the 2017 authorised cost is about 41 percent (1.6779 against 1.1858 trillion yen), a figure computed here, not published; against the 2012 plan it cannot be computed from this source. The final outturn cost after the March 2021 revision is not in the audit report, and the opening date comes from the delivery agency's own page. The one-year slip is measured against a deadline that the government had itself pulled three years forward in 2015, so part of the 'delay' is a political acceleration that did not hold. Some of the increase reflects new seismic standards and a consumption-tax rise, which an auditor might count as scope or price change rather than poor management; the audit office and the ministry's own verification committee nonetheless found weak reporting from site to headquarters and inadequate ministry oversight, and the ministry issued a formal business-improvement order. One project is not a national track record.
๐ธ๐ชSwedensince 1999still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Sweden built the Botniabanan railway between Nyland on the ร ngermanรคlven and Umeรฅ through the state and municipally owned company Botniabanan AB, starting construction in 1999 and opening it in August 2010, four years after the original 2006 schedule, at a final cost of almost SEK 16 billion in 2010 prices, which the national audit office calculated as 73 percent above the original estimate.
Parliament chose to build the line through a dedicated company, Botniabanan AB, owned by the state and the municipalities along the route and loan-financed so it could build quickly, while Banverket kept the physical planning; the state then rents the line back from the company.
Preconditions
Regional and municipal co-owners willing to share financing and risk
A planning and environmental permitting process that can be forecast, which is where the schedule broke
An early estimate that covered the connecting lines the project needed to work, which the audit found was missing
Limits: The 73 percent is Riksrevisionen's own recalculation in constant 2010 prices; the government's communication in the same document gives SEK 15 billion in current prices, about 3 billion more than at the 1997 decision, so the size of the overrun depends on the price basis chosen. The 140 percent counts follow-on investments on ร dalsbanan and other connecting lines that the audit office judged necessary, a boundary Trafikverket disputed. The four-year delay is computed from two sentences, not published as a figure, and much of it came from environmental permitting under the 1999 Environmental Code rather than construction. The start year rests on a 1999/2000 parliamentary motion saying construction had just begun, because the audit itself dates only the 1997 decision. One railway line is a single project, so this is not a portfolio-level overrun rate, and the audit predates a decade of operation, so whether ridership and freight benefits arrived is not shown.
The Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd began building High Speed Two in 2020. The government cancelled everything beyond Birmingham in 2023. By May 2026 the London to Birmingham railway alone was estimated at ยฃ87.7 billion to ยฃ102.7 billion, more than double the 2020 Phase 1 estimate, with services from Old Oak Common expected between 2036 and 2039 against a 2012 plan to complete the full network by 2033.
100 % overrun (more than, excluding inflation), cost increase over the 2020 phase 1 estimate, low end of the may 2026 range, 2026-05. 2033 year, year dft expected the full london, manchester and leeds network to be complete at the 2012 approval, 2012. National Audit Office (UK), High Speed Two reset, HC 52, Session 2026-27, 29 June 2026, retrieved 2026-10-01.
The move, and what it needed
The Department for Transport approved a national high-speed line, set up an arm's-length company to build it, and committed to construction contracts in 2020 before designs and costs were stable. It then responded to the cost growth by cutting the northern phases instead of the scope of Phase 1.
Preconditions
A sponsoring department able to commit tens of billions over decades without a firm cost baseline
Construction contracts let before a reliable total cost estimate existed, which HS2 Ltd began renegotiating in 2025 to better incentivise cost-effective delivery
Repeated political resets in 2020, 2023 and 2025 that changed scope faster than the client organisation could re-estimate
Where else it has been used: The NAO's 2026 report records the government's 2025 changes to how it manages mega-projects and a separate Euston delivery company set up in April 2026, both framed as lessons from HS2.
Limits: No HS2 train has run. This is a record of a build in progress, not a delivered railway, and the erosion is to planned scope: the Manchester and Leeds legs were cancelled before they were built, so nothing in service was lost. The May 2026 estimate is in a mixed price base and the NAO says it carries a high level of uncertainty until a baseline is set in spring 2027. The over 100% figure compares a London to Birmingham estimate with the 2020 Phase 1 estimate, which excluded inflation and was itself a rebaseline after the 2019 Oakervee review, so the overrun against the 2012 approval is larger and is not stated as one number by the NAO. The 2033 completion year is for a network that no longer exists, so it is a schedule reference, not a like-for-like comparison. Both figures are read from PDFs, with text-extraction spacing artefacts cleaned in the quotes. Spend to March 2026 was ยฃ46.8 billion in nominal prices, including the cancelled Phase 2.
The Department for Transport and Transport for London built Crossrail through Crossrail Ltd from 2009. The NAO put its forecast cost at 28% above the 2010 budget of ยฃ14.8 billion and its opening at up to three and a half years past the original December 2018 date. The central section opened in 2022 and carried 257.4 million journeys between April 2025 and March 2026.
The Department for Transport and Transport for London set up a dedicated delivery company, Crossrail Ltd, with private delivery partners, and when it missed its 2018 opening they replaced its leadership, added ยฃ825 million and more, and handed the finished asset to Transport for London to operate.
Preconditions
Joint sponsorship by a national department and a city transport authority with its own revenue base
Dedicated local funding streams, including a business rate supplement, alongside central grant
An operator ready to take over and run the line once commissioned
Limits: The 28% is the NAO's May 2021 forecast, made before the line opened; this record has not verified the final outturn cost from an audit source, and the NAO itself notes that later funding packages kept moving. The schedule figure is also a 2021 forecast of 'at least 3 years' late; the opening in 2022 is confirmed only by the regulator's statement that the central section opened that year. The cost is nominal, so part of the 28% is inflation over a decade. Crossrail is a London line co-sponsored and part funded by Transport for London and the Greater London Authority, including a business rate supplement, so it is not purely a national delivery, and its success in carrying passengers says nothing about the governance failures the NAO documented in 2018 to 2019. The journey count is a regulator's estimate from ticketing data.
๐ฎ๐ณIndiasince 2008still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Indian Railways, through the Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation, built two freight-only corridors approved by Cabinet in 2008 at โน28,181 crore and reassessed in 2015 at โน81,459 crore, and by March 2025 had commissioned 2,741 of their 2,843 route kilometres.
The Ministry of Railways created a dedicated special-purpose company in 2006 to build freight-only lines alongside the trunk network, financed largely by World Bank and JICA loans, and kept building through large cost revisions until almost the whole length was commissioned.
Preconditions
A state railway able to set up and capitalise a separate construction company
Multilateral and bilateral lenders willing to finance most of the cost on long tenors
State governments acquiring land along long linear routes, which the CAG found was a main source of delay
Limits: The 189% is computed here from two CAG figures; the CAG does not publish it as a percentage. The two estimates are not like for like: the scope changed between them, route lengths were revised upward, the Sonnagar to Dankuni section was added in 2008 and is not part of the corridors now reported as 2,843 km, and both figures are nominal across seven years. The 2015 figure is itself old, and no later audited completion cost is used here. The CAG found avoidable price escalation of โน2,233.81 crore from delays, contract awards 13 to 25 months late, and a target of March 2017 for the first Eastern section, so the schedule slipped by years, but the report states no single schedule overrun figure. The commissioning figure is a ministry press release, self-reported and unaudited. The PIB page refused an automated fetch tool (HTTP 403) but opened with a standard browser user agent.
๐ฒ๐ฝMexicosince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Pemex built the Olmeca refinery at Dos Bocas, authorized in December 2018 and fully operational from February 2025, under an authorized budget of US$15,963.0 million, 79 percent above the US$8,918.5 million Class IV estimate stated when its board authorized the FEL II phase in July 2020.
The federal government chose a greenfield refinery as a political flagship and had Pemex deliver it through a dedicated subsidiary, PTI Infraestructura de Desarrollo, funded through equity contributions from Pemex Industrial Transformation (2020 to 2023). The board re-authorized the scope and budget mid-construction in August 2022.
Preconditions
A state oil company able to absorb repeated capital contributions outside the normal investment appraisal
Political commitment strong enough to keep funding through cost rebaselining
A site and licensor package secured before front-end engineering was complete
Limits: Pemex is the state oil company reporting on its own project. The filing is made under US securities law and carries legal liability, but it is not an audit, and Mexico's audit office (ASF) is not reachable from outside Mexico to check against. The publisher is a state enterprise, not a ministry or statistics office, so a strict reading of the publisher rule could exclude it. The 79 percent overrun is our computation from two figures that do not measure the same thing. The Class IV estimate excludes external works, escalation, contingency and administrative costs and carries a stated range of +30 to -25 percent, while the later budget includes VAT. A share of the gap is therefore a change of definition and not an overrun. The government's original public figure, around US$8 billion, appears only in press reports and is not used here. The schedule is shown only by the issuer's own changing expectations. The FY2025 filing (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000932782/000093278226000006/ck0000932782-20251231.htm) says the refinery "has been fully operational since February 2025". No filing states an original completion date to measure the slip against. Full operation is a claim about start-up, not about utilisation or margins, which the FY2025 filing excludes from its refining margin series.
๐ฆ๐บAustraliasince 2018operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
The Australian Government began building Inland Rail, a Melbourne to Brisbane freight railway, in 2018 through the Australian Rail Track Corporation, which passed delivery to its subsidiary Inland Rail Pty Ltd in May 2024; a verification report delivered to the infrastructure department in November 2025 reported the company's estimate at completion of A$45.6 billion (P90, Target scenario, estimate current as of December 2024) with completions finalised in May 2036, and the 2026-27 Budget then consolidated the project at Parkes and returned $4.4 billion in equity.
The Commonwealth committed to a 1,700 km freight line through a government-owned track company and started construction before the route ends, approvals and designs were settled; when successive reviews put the cost far above the budget, it moved delivery into a dedicated subsidiary, commissioned independent cost assurance and then cut the line back to the sections already under way.
Preconditions
A government-owned rail company able to take Commonwealth equity and build without a separate procurement for each section
Construction started on sections whose environmental approvals and designs were immature
A budget process willing to recognise a reversal and return equity rather than keep funding the full scope
Where else it has been used: The pattern matches gbr-hs2 in this corpus: a national line cut back to its first sections after its cost estimate tripled, with the corridor preserved for later.
Limits: Both numbers are forecasts, not outturn: they are Inland Rail Pty Ltd's own December 2024 estimate as reviewed by a consultancy (ACIL Allen) for the department, and the report itself says IRPL's core assumptions have not been met and the cost is likely to increase with further delay. The faster Stretch scenario is A$44.7 billion with completions by June 2035. Both figures are in Table 1.1 on PDF page 12; the 2018 start and the 2015 business case are on page 8. The truncation is not in this report: it comes from Budget Paper No. 2, 2026-27 (https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2026-27.pdf, PDF page 139, printed page 124), which says the government will 'consolidate the Inland Rail project at Parkes and preserve the remaining rail corridor and intermodal sites for future investment, with $4.4 billion in equity to be returned to the Budget'. The 2015 business case cost and the estimates in the 2023 Schott review are published on infrastructure.gov.au, which did not answer from the machine used for this record, so no original baseline is given here and the overrun against it is not stated. The erosion is to planned scope: Beveridge to Parkes is still being built and nothing in service was lost, and no section of the full line has opened to double-stacked through traffic.
๐ซ๐ฎFinlandsince 2009delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
The Finnish state, with the City of Vantaa paying part of the cost, began building the Kehรคrata (Ring Rail Line) through Helsinki Airport in Vantaa in 2009; construction costs came in above estimate, a glycol leak found at the airport took a year to resolve and reset the schedule, passenger service began on 1 July 2015, and the construction cost finally came to 770 million euros.
The state rail administration and the City of Vantaa cofunded an airport loop tied to new housing zoned along the line; when the cost forecast rose before construction, the ministry renegotiated the cost split and kept the start date, then absorbed a further overrun from ground contamination at the airport.
Preconditions
A municipality willing to share capital cost in exchange for land-use value along the line
A state budget able to absorb an overrun on a single project without stopping it
Airport ground conditions that were not fully surveyed before tunnelling
Limits: The 770 million euro figure is stated by the delivery agency in an anniversary news article ('Hankkeen rakennuskustannukset olivat lopulta 770 miljoonaa euroa'), not taken from an audited final account, and the page flags itself as an old article. The page says only that costs were higher than estimated; the size of the overrun comes from a different source: the Ministry of Transport and Communications release of 10 March 2008 (https://lvm.fi/-/keharadan-kustannukset-ylittyvat-770641) put the forecast at 590 million euros, 75 million more than the estimate before it, so the final cost is about 30 percent above the 2008 forecast and about 50 percent above the earlier one. Those percentages are computed here, and neither source states the price basis, so part of the gap is inflation over 2008 to 2015. The originally planned opening date is not on either page, so the schedule slip is given only as the one year the agency attributes to the glycol problem. The state and the City of Vantaa shared the cost (73 and 27 percent under the original agreement, per the 2008 release). The same article says population growth along the line has been slower than forecast, especially in Kivistรถ, and that not all of the line's targets had been met by 2020. One line is not a national delivery record.
๐ฌ๐นGuatemalasince 1977delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Guatemala's state electricity institute INDE built the 300 MW Chixoy hydroelectric project under contracts signed in 1977 and 1978; after the power-tunnel lining collapsed in late 1983 it entered commercial operation in November 1985, 41 months later than originally planned, at a final cost of US$823.1 million excluding finance charges against an appraisal estimate of US$372.7 million, an increase of 120 percent.
The state utility chose a single-stage scheme with a 26 km power tunnel through poorly understood geology, contracted the works on winning bids before the seismic redesign that followed the 1976 earthquake was settled, and financed the doubling of cost with supplementary loans and local funds.
Preconditions
A state utility with a monopoly on generation and access to multilateral loans
Cost estimates built from bid prices with contingencies sized for ordinary geology
Lenders willing to add supplementary financing rather than stop a half-built dam
Limits: The final cost is INDE's own figure as reported in the World Bank's completion report, which says INDE's data 'reflect shortcomings' and could not reconcile cost increases with physical quantities (para. 4.26, PDF page 32). Both costs and the 120 percent increase are in the table under para. 4.04 (PDF page 25), in para. 4.24 (PDF pages 31 to 32) and in Table 3 (PDF page 71); the 41-month delay against the original plan is in para. 4.04 (PDF page 24) and the summary's 'about 3.5 years' on PDF page 8; para. 3.18 (PDF page 19) records that the bids implied commercial operation by October 1981 while the appraisal team judged it unlikely before June 1982; the November 1985 start of operation is in para. 2.08 (PDF page 13). The text is OCR of a scanned 1991 document. The appraisal estimate is dated to the March 1977 appraisal; its exact price basis is not stated, and price increases account for US$141.1 million of the overrun by INDE's breakdown. The power tunnel's lining remained structurally unreliable after repair, so 'concluded' means built and operating, not sound. The project was co-financed by the World Bank, the IDB and others, though INDE owned and built it. The PCR records that the resettlement programme was judged flawed in conception; the 1980 to 1982 killings of Rรญo Negro residents displaced by the reservoir, documented elsewhere, are outside what this cost figure measures and are the larger failure of this project. This is a 1977 to 1985 build and says little about Guatemala's delivery capacity now.
๐ณ๐ฌNigeriasince 2018operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Works awarded the rehabilitation of the Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano dual carriageway to Julius Berger on 20 December 2017 at an initial N155.7 billion with a 36-month completion period; after repeated variations and augmentations, the Federal Executive Council cut the contract sum under Section I from N797.3 billion to N740.8 billion on 23 September 2024, and the ministry issued a 14-day termination notice on 4 November 2024 after the contractor rejected the reviewed sum and stopped work.
The federal government let one large contract for a 375 km corridor, paid for it through repeated variations and augmentations, and when a new minister demanded a lower fixed price the contractor refused and the ministry terminated, split the work among other contractors and took direct control.
Preconditions
Award and variation approvals routed through the Federal Executive Council rather than a fixed-price baseline
A naira devaluation and inflation shock that made earlier contract sums unenforceable
Political will to terminate a dominant contractor on a flagship route
Limits: The source is the ministry's own statement in a dispute with the contractor, so it carries the government's side. Figures are nominal naira across years of high inflation and a large devaluation, so most of the roughly fivefold growth may be price change rather than poor delivery; the ministry also re-scoped Section I to concrete pavement and gave 38 km of it to Dangote, so the 2024 sum buys a different road from the 2017 one. The termination release frames the N797.3 billion review as concerning 'Section I' while the N155.7 billion award covered all three sections; a ministry release of 7 October 2024 (https://www.fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/3233) describes the same N740 billion as the total contract sum within Julius Berger's scope, with N391 billion already paid, so the two sums may or may not cover identical scope. What ended is the 2017 contract, not the road: Sections II and III were partly completed and handed over before 2023, and a ministry update dated 9 September 2026 (https://www.fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/3425, also shown as a banner on the source page) says the government took over the project, finished 118 km of lot 1, has lot 2 over 60 percent complete and schedules completion for December 2026. Earlier ministry pages (https://fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/2352) give a 36-month completion period from 21 May 2018, so the road is at least five years late; a 2018 ministry release (https://fmw.gov.ng/index.php/read/1299) states the award sum as N155.47 billion, slightly different from the N155.75 billion here. No audit or Bureau of Public Procurement document was opened.
๐ต๐ฐPakistansince 2008operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
WAPDA's subsidiary NJHPC's 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum project, under construction from January 2008 and substantially completed in 2018, had cost Rs 423,446 million by June 2023 against Rs 84,502 million in the 2002 revised PC-I, nine years late; it peaked at 4,940.67 GWh in 2020 and was forced into complete shutdown by a head race tunnel failure on 2 April 2024 (the auditor counts 1,797.704 million units lost in FY2023-24), after an earlier tail race tunnel collapse in July 2022.
WAPDA started tunnelling in difficult Himalayan geology before design issues were settled, and the planning ministry re-approved the cost four times rather than stopping or re-scoping the project, so the bill rose with each revision and the tunnels later failed where weak rock had been flagged.
Preconditions
A state utility able to borrow and add a consumer surcharge to keep financing a project as costs rose
A project appraisal system that approves revised PC-Is after the fact instead of gating on final design
A strategic water-rights deadline with India that pushed construction to start before geology and design were resolved
Limits: This is a delivery that ran backwards twice: badly over cost and schedule while it was being built, then lost its output after it was finished. The overrun is measured against the 2002 revision, which is the auditor's choice of baseline; against the 1989 original (Rs 15,012 million) it would be far larger, and against the 2018 fourth revision (Rs 506,808 million) the project came in under. Part of the rupee overrun is exchange-rate depreciation and interest during construction, which a cost-performance reading should not charge entirely to delivery. The plant never reached its design output of 5,150 GWh even at its 2020 peak, partly because India's upstream Kishanganga project and a higher environmental flow reduced water, which management cites and the auditor rejects. The overrun percentage (about 400 percent) is our computation from two published figures, and the Rs 338,944 million is the auditor's own subtraction. The 2024 shutdown is documented in a second AGP report; the expected restart date circulating in the press is not from this source and is not claimed here. Management disputes several findings and never convened the Departmental Accounts Committee, so the report records the auditor's view without a settled reply.
๐ต๐ฐPakistansince 2012delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
WAPDA built a 1,410 MW powerhouse on Tarbela Dam's fourth tunnel, effective April 2012 and commissioned in 2018; the World Bank recorded it as completed on time and below its estimated cost, with a capital cost expected at US$749 million.
WAPDA added generating capacity to an existing dam's spare tunnel under World Bank procurement and supervision, so the geological and resettlement risks that sink greenfield hydropower were mostly absent.
Preconditions
An existing large dam with an unused tunnel and an operator that had run it for decades
Concessional finance with lender-imposed procurement, supervision and an independent panel of experts
A power deficit large enough that the plant was dispatched at once
Where else it has been used: Pakistan and the World Bank repeated the model at the same dam with the fifth extension (T5HP).
Limits: The lender is grading its own project: 'on time and in less than estimated cost' is the World Bank's sentence in a restructuring paper, not an audit, and the paper gives no baseline figure, so the size of the saving cannot be checked from this source. The cost is an expectation in 2019, before every work was closed; the intakes for tunnels 3 and 4 were still being finished, and the loan closing date moved from 2018 to 2024 because the same project was extended to build T5HP. That fifth extension, financed under the same project number, is rated Moderately Satisfactory in the 2023 ISR and was due for completion in 2025; T4's record is not the record of the whole project. The World Bank financed about 90 percent of the civil and electro-mechanical works, so the case shows WAPDA delivering under a lender's procurement and supervision regime, which is a precondition rather than proof of domestic capability. Building a powerhouse on an existing dam and tunnel is much less risky than a greenfield dam, which is part of why it came in on budget.
๐ฎ๐นItalysince 2003still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Works on MOSE, Italy's system of 78 mobile gates at Venice's three lagoon inlets, began in 2003. All the gates were first raised on 10 July 2020, and 6,689.07 million euros had been appropriated by mid-2022 with the works about 95 percent complete and still unfinished past their planned 2021 completion.
The state handed design and construction of the lagoon barrier to a single concessionaire consortium under a special law for Venice, and when delays and judicial proceedings stalled it, it appointed extraordinary commissioners to finish and operate the gates provisionally.
Preconditions
A special legal regime and dedicated national funding for Venice dating from the 1980s
A single-concessionaire model that concentrated design, construction and control in one body
A visible, recurring flood threat that kept funding flowing through repeated delays
Limits: This is a delivery record with a bad cost and schedule history, not a success story: the barrier works, but late and expensive. The source gives total appropriations, not a baseline estimate, so a percentage overrun cannot be computed from it; the Court's report names a 'progressive increase in costs' without a starting figure here, and the original estimate quoted in the press is not used. Appropriated funds are not spending, and the total includes related works (Piano Europa, decarbonisation, San Marco basilica defences). The 95 percent completion figure is from June 2022 and the 2021 completion date had already passed; the record does not say when, or whether, the works were finished after that. The Court lists well-known judicial proceedings, a progressive increase in costs, technical difficulties, environmental questions and Covid-19 among the complexities of the build. The Court reports the gates have repeatedly protected the city, but the source gives no count of closures, so the record does not claim one.
๐ง๐ฉBangladeshsince 2009delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Bangladesh's Bridge Authority completed the 6.15 km Padma road-rail bridge with government funds. It opened to traffic on 26 June 2022 at a reported actual cost of Tk 30,770 crore, six and a half years after the 31 December 2015 completion date in the 2010 Asian Development Bank appraisal, which had costed the project at $2,915 million.
After its external co-financing package changed, the government kept the Bridge Authority as executing agency and paid for the bridge from its own budget. The Authority revised the project document as costs rose and opened the road deck in 2022, with rail running on the lower deck since.
Preconditions
A fiscal position able to absorb a multi-billion-dollar project without concessional lenders
A specialised bridge authority with a design and supervision record from the earlier Jamuna Bridge
Political commitment strong enough to carry repeated cost and schedule revisions
Where else it has been used: Self-financing a flagship after donors withdraw is rare. Where it has been tried, the usual result is the one here: the asset was delivered, and its cost and schedule were judged against shifting baselines.
Limits: Neither source publishes an overrun percentage. Converting the ADB appraisal at the RRP's own rate of Tk 70.11 per dollar gives about Tk 20,440 crore, so the actual cost is about 51 percent higher. That figure is our computation, and it mixes a 2010 dollar estimate with a taka outturn after more than a decade of taka depreciation and inflation, so much of the gap is currency and price level, not overrun. The ADB estimate includes $99 million of financing charges and appraised a co-financed project. The bridge was built with government funds, as the Bridge Authority page states, after that financing structure changed, so the two figures do not describe the same contract package. Against the government's own revised estimates on the same page, the outturn is about 5 percent below the Tk 32,306 crore figure and about 2 percent above the Tk 30,193 crore figure, which is why the cost record depends on which baseline is chosen. The Bridge Authority page is itself inconsistent: it lists two different estimates under the third revised project document. The schedule slip is clearer: an appraised completion of December 2015 against road opening in June 2022 and project closure in June 2024. The started year is the project start the Bridge Authority states, before main construction contracts were let.
๐ฒ๐ฆMoroccosince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Morocco's solar agency MASEN had the Noor-Ouarzazate I, II and III concentrated solar plants (510 MW) built, grid-connected and fully operational by October 2018, at a completed capital cost of US$1,962 million, about 7 percent below the appraisal estimate of US$2,093 million. Noor II and III then generated an average of 739 GWh a year in 2019 to 2023, against the 1,144 GWh expected at appraisal.
MASEN, the state agency set up for the Moroccan Solar Plan, tendered the plants to private developers under power purchase agreements and sat between them and the national utility ONEE. A World Bank-financed cost mitigation mechanism covered the gap between the solar tariff and what the utility paid.
Preconditions
Concessional finance pooled from the World Bank, KfW, AfDB, EIB, the EU and AFD, coordinated by one national agency
A state buyer willing to absorb a tariff above the cost of grid power for the life of the contracts
A site with high direct irradiation where the state delivered land, access, water and grid evacuation before the developers arrived
Where else it has been used: Morocco tried the same structure at Noor-Midelt. Construction had not started by June 2024, and Noor-Midelt II was redesigned as photovoltaic plus battery storage, because PV and battery costs fell while CSP costs did not.
Limits: The lender graded its own project here. The World Bank financed it, and the report rates the outcome 'Moderately Unsatisfactory', with efficacy and efficiency both 'Modest'. The cost figure is the Bank's economic-analysis number for the Ouarzazate plants. A footnote says it nets a 14 percent saving at Noor I against an overrun at Noor III. On schedule the report gives no figure, only that Noor II and III were built 'with a delay of just a few months'. Cost was on budget, but output was not. Generation ran about 35 percent below the appraisal expectation. Noor II missed its peak-hour share, at 32 percent against a 41 percent target. The Noor III tower plant had two prolonged outages caused by cracks in its molten salt tank: September 2021 to December 2022, and April 2024 to at least October 2024, when the report says it was still offline. The second phase financed under the same operation, Noor-Midelt, had not started construction by the June 2024 closing date. The project therefore delivered 510 MW against a 1,310 MW target. The economic rate of return was negative without carbon benefits. Generation-mix forecasts did not materialise either: coal's share rose to almost 70 percent by 2020. The capital came largely from concessional international lenders, with about US$4.1 billion disbursed from all financiers. A copy of this design would need that finance. All figures are read from a 40-page PDF.
๐บ๐ฟUzbekistansince 2013delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Uzbekistan's government and its state railway UTY began building the 124 km Pap-Angren line with a 19 km tunnel in mid-2013 and finished the works within nine months of the World Bank loan's 2015 effectiveness, with the main infrastructure costing US$1,475.68 million against an estimate of US$1,438.75 million, about 2.6 percent over, and benefits flowing about 18 months earlier than appraisal assumed.
The Cabinet of Ministers decreed the line and put it on a fast track, with the state railway UTY building the track with its own crews and equipment while design proceeded, and a Chinese contractor driving the tunnel in parallel.
Preconditions
A state railway that had already built 640 km of new line with its own workforce
Central authority able to order design and construction to run at once, and to compel the railway to share data
Concessional tunnel financing from China Exim Bank
Limits: The overrun of 2.6 percent is our computation from two figures in the ICR's cost table. The baseline is weak: construction ran simultaneously with detailed design and cost estimation, and by the Bank's appraisal in late 2014 the works were already very advanced, so the estimate was set when much of the cost was known, which flatters the overrun. The ICR gives no planned and actual completion dates for the line itself, only that works finished within nine months of loan effectiveness and benefits began about 18 months early. The 19 km tunnel was built by China Rail and Tunnel Company with China Exim Bank financing, so not all of the delivery was Uzbek institutional capacity, though the rail line was built by UTY's own workforce. The World Bank's own components went badly: the signaling contract was cancelled for misprocurement, US$72.87 million of the loan was cancelled, resettlement compliance was downgraded to moderately unsatisfactory, and UTY declined a second user survey. Passenger demand came in lower than projected. The source is the World Bank evaluating a project it part-financed (about 12 percent of cost), read from a PDF.
Between October 2008 and June 2020 the Ministry of Infrastructure's Cellule Infrastructure reopened 2,752 of a targeted 2,762 km of high-priority earth roads across five provinces and maintained 3,335 km, finishing 3.6 percent over the financing-agreement total and 28 months behind the combined original schedule.
The Ministry of Infrastructure's project unit (Cellule Infrastructure) bought the cheapest passable standard, spot-improved earth roads, through output-based contracts and the Office des Routes, so that mileage, not finish quality, set the pace and kept civil works inside budget.
Preconditions
Concessional donor finance covering most of the cost and a donor willing to extend the closing date four times
A road maintenance fund created in 2009 to keep reopened sections passable
Enough security on the selected corridors for contractors to work
Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed, and the PDF has to be read (table 3 and paragraph 50, pages 19-20). IDA carried 61.6 percent of the money and DFID, through World Bank-administered trust funds, 24.2 percent; the government's own Road Maintenance Fund put in 14.2 percent, so the delivery is Congolese institutions spending donor money under Bank supervision. The 3.6 percent total overrun is measured against financing agreements that were enlarged twice, so it does not compare with the 2008 appraisal cost (US$123 million for 1,800 km); the road works came in 22.6 percent under budget while institution building ran 1,656 percent and the environmental and social programme 235 percent over. The 28-month delay includes a 12-month suspension of disbursements in 2017-18 for non-compliance with environmental and social obligations, including gender-based violence, after an Inspection Panel investigation. The roads are low-standard reopened earth roads, about one fifth of the 15,800 km priority network; the ICR says ten kilometres are unaccounted for, rates M&E quality Modest, and says road-sector management and the maintenance fund's allocation remain opaque. Nothing in the report shows whether the roads stayed open after June 2020.
๐บ๐ฌUgandasince 2013delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Uganda began building the 600 MW Karuma hydropower station in August 2013 against a 60-month plan. By the end of June 2023 the Auditor General reported it 54 months late at 99.9 percent physical progress, and UEGCL records commercial operation from 12 June 2024.
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and UEGCL let the dam as a single turnkey EPC contract to a foreign state contractor, financed mostly by an export-credit loan. That handed design and construction to the contractor, and land, resettlement and transmission stayed with Ugandan agencies, where much of the delay arose.
Preconditions
An export-credit lender willing to finance most of the cost against a sovereign guarantee
A state land acquisition and resettlement process able to keep pace with an EPC contractor, which it did not
Transmission lines built in step to evacuate the power
Limits: The record carries schedule performance only. No official baseline-against-outturn cost figure was found: UEGCL's page states a project cost of US$1.398 billion with no original budget beside it, so cost overrun is unknown. The Auditor General names USD 30 million of interest claims on delayed payments, which is one cost of the delay and not the overrun. The 54-month figure is measured at June 2023, when the plant was not yet in commercial operation. Commercial operation on 12 June 2024 implies a total overrun near 66 months, more than double the plan, but that figure is our computation from two sources. The 60-month plan is the Auditor General's statement of the plan, and the contract itself was not checked. The same report finds that the community development projects promised with the dam were largely unfunded (UGX 3 billion of 38.3 billion received) and that resettlement lagged, so the delivery is incomplete beyond the powerhouse. The record says nothing about how the plant has performed since commissioning.
๐น๐ฟTanzaniasince 2018delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
TANESCO contracted the 2,115 MW Julius Nyerere hydropower dam on the Rufiji in December 2018 for TZS 6.56 trillion over 42 months to June 2022. The contractor completed it on 31 March 2025, and claims settled in the contractor's favour raised the cost to TZS 7.44 trillion.
The government had TANESCO let the whole dam as one EPC contract to an Egyptian joint venture and financed it from the domestic budget rather than concessional loans. That kept the project moving and kept it in national hands, but left contract management and the transmission build with TANESCO, where the audited losses arose.
Preconditions
A treasury able to fund a multi-trillion-shilling project from domestic revenue over several budget years
A utility with the contract-management capacity to enforce delay damages and resist claims, which the Auditor General found lacking
Transmission lines built in step with generation
Limits: The sources are Swahili PDFs. The quotes are from extracted text with spacing artifacts removed, and the English in the claim is our translation. Neither overrun is published as a percentage. The cost overrun of about 13.4 percent (6.56 to 7.44 trillion) and the schedule overrun of about 33.5 months against a 42-month plan (roughly 80 percent) are our computations from the Auditor General's dates and figures. The cost figure counts only the USD 400 million of claims the dispute board awarded. Price adjustment, financing costs, transmission, resettlement and supervision are not shown, so the true overrun is likely larger. The Auditor General adds that the contractor was granted two ex-gratia extensions to 14 January 2024, that TZS 327.03 billion of liquidated damages had not been deducted by November 2025, and that the contractor was released from TZS 262.34 billion of community projects. At completion, three of nine turbines had not been tested because the reservoir was too low, and the full-capacity test was not done on time because TANESCO lacked transmission capacity. Completion of the civil contract therefore does not mean the plant delivers 2,115 MW. The record says nothing about the dam's environmental cost in the Selous (Nyerere) protected area.
๐ท๐ดRomaniasince 2009still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Romania's national road administration has built the 582 km A1 motorway in sections, and construction of the sections the auditors timed began in 2009, and in November 2025 the European Court of Auditors found its latest cost estimate 11 percent below the original estimate in real terms, while one EU co-funded section had run 79 months, or 263 percent of its planned time, late.
Romania's national road company split a 582 km corridor into many small procurement lots and financed most of them with EU cohesion and connecting-Europe funds, which kept unit prices visible and auditable but multiplied permits and interfaces.
Preconditions
EU co-financing with audit and use-it-or-lose-it deadlines that discipline cost reporting
A national road agency able to tender and supervise dozens of separate lots
A permitting regime that, here, required a building permit every 7 km and slowed delivery
Limits: The cost figure is the auditors' aggregate of many sections planned and priced in different years, reindexed to 2019 values from an original estimate whose own date the auditors do not give, and it excludes the Bucharest-Pitesti section; the 2020 report warned that the unfinished Pitesti-Sibiu and Deva-Lugoj stretches left the figures subject to significant change. A real-terms fall can come from cheaper design, deferred scope or optimistic pricing of unbuilt sections, and the report does not say which. The auditors did not compute a schedule delay for the A1 as a whole because its timeline varies by section, and the 2020 report took 2030 as the original opening date only because the TEN-T regulation sets it, so the motorway's schedule performance cannot be read from the cost row. The 2026 update was a desk review of figures supplied by the Commission, national authorities and project promoters, with no site visits. The 79 months is one EU co-funded action, not the whole road, and it compares the Lugoj-Deva lots 2-4 action's planned end of May 2016 with an end date of December 2022 that was still a forecast in 2020. The 2020 report also found โฌ3.7 million of EU co-funding wasted, a finished Lugoj-Deva stretch left unused and 800 metres of built motorway demolished, and one building permit needed for every 7 km.
๐ฐ๐ฟKazakhstansince 2009delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads upgraded 1,281 km of the Western Europe-Western China corridor and connecting roads under a US$2.5 billion programme between 2009 and 2024, for an actual cost of US$2,468.6 million against US$2,500 million appraised, but over 15 years against a planned four and a half.
Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads borrowed from the World Bank to rebuild its stretch of the Western Europe-Western China corridor to dual carriageway, procured it in large international civil works packages, and used the savings from low bids to extend the scope across three oblasts.
Preconditions
Sovereign borrowing capacity backed by oil revenue
A road agency able to run international competitive bidding under lender rules
A corridor with transit demand that neighbours and lenders also wanted built
Limits: The cost line looks on budget only because the scope was moved to fit the money: bid prices came in low and the tenge depreciated, and the savings bought 219 km of extra road, so the total says nothing about cost per km against plan. The schedule figure is the honest one, and it is poor: the closing date was extended four times, the first three to absorb added scope and the last for COVID-19 and the termination of several civil works contracts, and a 42 km Otar-Uzynagash section was still unfinished at closing after two contractors were terminated for non-performance. The source is the lender's own completion report; the World Bank financed 85 percent of the cost, so this is a borrowed-money build supervised by the lender, though executed and repaid by Kazakhstan. Traffic came in about a third below forecast. It is one corridor programme, not a portfolio, so it cannot stand for Kazakhstan's average project performance.
๐น๐ณTunisiasince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Tunisia's transport ministry and the Societe du RFR built the first two lines of the Tunis rapid rail network, about 18 km plus 28 trains, financed from December 2010; the EIB's approximate total cost for the same scheme rose from EUR 550 million at the 2009 appraisal to EUR 653 million at the 2017 appraisal, Line E opened in March 2023 and Line D on 25 January 2025, against a 2015 project study that scheduled construction of the Line E viaduct for 2014 to 2017.
The Ministry of Transport created a dedicated project company, the Societe du RFR, assembled a 40 percent state and 60 percent multi-donor financing package, and built the first two lines through civil works contracts while SNCFT took the operating role; when the Bardo municipality stopped the works, the company went to the administrative court and the cabinet chose a design variant in December 2023.
Preconditions
Concessional lenders (EIB, AFD, KfW, EU) willing to stay in for more than a decade and to suspend and restart disbursement rather than exit
A rail right of way partly owned by SNCFT, so most of the route did not need fresh land
An administrative court able to overrule a municipality that blocked works on a national project
Where else it has been used: The same multi-lender package financed Line A in 2013 and is meant to carry the remaining lines of the planned 85 km network; the Tunis case is usually retold as a delay story, and the part that drops out is that the lines did open.
Limits: The cost figures are the EIB's approximate appraisal totals, not an audited out-turn: the 18.7 percent rise from 550 to 653 million EUR is our computation across two appraisals whose scope wording differs slightly (the 2017 sheet names a maintenance facility and 28 trains, the 2010 sheet only rolling stock), and in January 2025 the French Treasury still quoted a total of 550 million EUR including rolling stock, so the publishers do not agree on the out-turn. The cost is in euros and says nothing about dinar costs after the currency's depreciation. The record has no official original line-opening date: the only official schedule is a 2015 impact study placing the Line E viaduct's construction in 2014 to 2017, so the roughly six-year slip to the March 2023 Line E opening is a comparison of one structure's plan against the line's opening, not a published overrun. The EIB suspended disbursements in 2016 over construction companies' failures to implement safeguards (ESDS 18 July 2017), and works at Bardo were halted by the municipality until an administrative court annulled the stop on 29 December 2023 (EIB register 236943929), so part of the delay is litigation rather than delivery. About 60 percent of financing came from foreign lenders and French and Korean firms supplied engineering and trains. This is a city network, not a national programme, and it records poor delivery rather than good: it is evidence of the construct's weak end.
๐ฑ๐ฐSri Lankasince 2003delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Sri Lanka's Road Development Authority built the country's first access-controlled expressway, about 126 km from Kottawa to Godagama. Sections I to III opened on 26 November 2011 and section IV on 15 March 2014. The project took 13 years against a planned six. Its total cost rose from US$295.9 million at the 1999 appraisal to US$906.5 million at completion in 2014, partly because it was widened from two to four lanes.
The Road Development Authority ran one project management unit for an expressway financed in sections by ADB, JICA, the Nordic Development Fund and later China Exim. When prices rose and the design changed, it went back to the lenders for a supplementary loan instead of cutting the scope.
Preconditions
Several concessional lenders willing to finance one corridor in parallel and to top up after a cost overrun
Land acquisition and resettlement capacity, whose absence caused most of the early delay
A design finalized before contract award, which this project lacked and which ADB names as its main lesson
Where else it has been used: The same Road Development Authority model was reused for the Colombo-Katunayake Expressway (2013), the Outer Circular Highway and the Southern Expressway extension to Hambantota (2020), mostly with Chinese loans instead of multilateral ones.
Limits: The cost growth is not a like-for-like overrun. In 2008 the scope was widened from a two-lane road to four lanes, and against the 2008 re-appraisal of $757.7 million the overrun is about 20 percent, not about 206 percent. Both ratios are our computation from the report's figures. The cost table is sourced to the borrower's own completion report (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011), and ADB, as lender, judges a project it financed. The PCR's cost-by-financier table puts China Exim at $159.48 million within the $906.47 million total, so the section it financed is included. The schedule figure (13 years against six) runs from the 1999 approval and includes four years of design and land acquisition before construction.
๐ณ๐ตNepalsince 2001operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Nepal's government built the Melamchi River diversion tunnel and headworks to pipe an additional 170 million litres a day into the Kathmandu Valley, closing the project in June 2021, more than 14 years after its original March 2007 closing date; the 2021 flood then damaged the headworks, and water has since been diverted for about eight months a year.
The Ministry of Physical Planning and Works and later the Ministry of Water Supply, with ADB as lead financier, tied a trans-basin water diversion to a reform of Kathmandu's water utility in a single loan. The infrastructure was delivered and the institutional reforms largely were not.
Preconditions
Concessional finance from several lenders willing to stay through repeated contractor failure and the exit of three co-financiers
An executing agency able to cancel and re-tender a failed tunnel contract in mountainous, flood-prone terrain
A utility (KUKL) whose tariff and water-levy reforms the project assumed but could not compel
Where else it has been used: ADB's own lesson is that bundling a major physical build with a governance overhaul in one operation was over-ambitious; the remaining reforms were moved into separate pipeline programmes.
Limits: The 14 years is the gap between two loan closing dates, which is a lender's administrative milestone, not a measured completion date for the tunnel; the source gives no physical completion schedule against a baseline. The cost figure is not usable as an overrun: appraisal was $464 million and completion $345.3 million, but the 2008 scope change and the exit of the World Bank, NORAD and Sida mean the two totals price different projects, and ADB says separately that a 2014 additional loan covered tunnel cost overruns without stating the overrun in percent. The erosion is stated in words and one current number: the source publishes no figure for the year-round flow before the 2021 flood, so the secondMetric holds the post-flood level, not a measured peak. The flood is an exogenous shock, though ADB attributes the vulnerability to design that did not fit the terrain. The validation rests on the project completion report written by the lender and the executing agency, and ADB was itself a party to the project's design. The delay mixes national causes (slow decisions, leadership turnover, poor contractor management) with contractor failure, the cancelled and re-bid contracts of nonperforming contractors.
๐ฟ๐ผZimbabwesince 2020still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Zimbabwe's government, funding the works from the budget, set out in its 2021 Budget to finish upgrading the roughly 580 km Harare-Beitbridge highway by 2022; it had opened 355 km to traffic by October 2022, and in July 2025 the Finance Ministry still reported 88 km outstanding, more than two and a half years past the 2022 target.
The Ministry of Transport split the corridor into sections and paid local contractors from the national budget, opening the road section by section as money arrived.
Preconditions
Budget space for a large capital programme during high inflation and currency redenomination
Domestic contractors able to build trunk-road sections to regional standards
A political commitment to a flagship corridor strong enough to survive successive missed targets
Limits: This is a schedule record with no cost figure: the ministry publishes allocations in a currency that was redenominated twice in the period (ZWL to ZiG) and gives no baseline budget for the whole road, so no cost overrun can be computed. The schedule slip of more than two and a half years (end of 2022 to July 2025) is our arithmetic from targets and progress the same ministry wrote in successive budget documents. It is not an audited figure, and the ministry itself kept moving the target (2022, then 2023, then 2025). The documents give the road's length as 560 km in 2020 and 580 km from 2022 onward without explaining the change. Kilometres 'opened to traffic' are self-reported and say nothing about pavement quality. The start year is that of the earliest official progress note, July 2020. Delivery used several local contractors under a national emergency programme, so this is evidence about a fiscally funded, multi-contractor build, not a single tender.
๐ฟ๐ฒZambiasince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Zambia's government contracted Shandong Dejian Group for a fixed-price US$200 million national programme of solar powered milling plants, financed in 2016 and due 24 months after the March 2016 deposit. The Auditor General found it still incomplete at 31 March 2022, 38 months after the scheduled completion date, and found 555 of the completed plants non-functional at audit in January 2024.
The Ministry of Finance borrowed from China Development Bank to buy a turnkey national programme of off-grid milling plants from one Chinese contractor, and appointed the Zambia Co-operative Federation to run them through local co-operatives. No public body was funded to maintain the equipment, so delivery slipped for years and a third of the completed plants stopped working.
Preconditions
A maintenance and spare-parts budget for battery-based equipment spread across rural districts
An implementing agent with the technical staff to accept, commission and service the plants
Contract management able to enforce the fixed-price completion clause against the supplier
Limits: The Auditor General never publishes the peak number of working plants. The secondMetric is the contracted count, not the peak installed or working count. The 555 non-functional plants are counted among the 1,553 milling plants, about 36 percent; that share is our inference. The audit inspected selected sites, so the 555 figure may rest partly on progress reports rather than visits to every plant. The report is internally inconsistent: the loan paragraph describes 1,000 plants for US$200 million, while the finding counts 1,583 contracted units. It also dates the deposit (March 2016) before the China Development Bank loan (July 2016). The section gives no final cost and no completion date, so neither a cost overrun nor a final schedule overrun can be computed. 38 months is the delay at 31 March 2022 against the revised January 2019 date; against the original 6 March 2018 date it is about 49 months. The plants are distributed small units rather than a single structure, which makes the record a weaker fit for major public infrastructure. The Zambia Co-operative Federation, the implementing agent, is a federation and not a ministry. The audit also found K15.5 million in lease fees that were never paid into the Treasury. Nothing here shows how many households used the mills, or whether the non-functional plants were later repaired.
๐ฒ๐ฑMalisince 2014delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Mali's water assets company SOMAPEP-SA built the reservoirs, transmission mains and 1,016 km of distribution networks that brought water services to 803,000 people in Bamako and six other towns, alongside the Kabala treatment plant that came into service in June 2019. Of the US$130 million approved, US$119.6 million was spent, and the project closed in December 2022 against an original closing date of December 2018.
Mali's government split urban water into an asset-holding company (SOMAPEP-SA) that builds and a utility (SOMAGEP-SA) that operates, under a regulator (CREE). SOMAPEP-SA then used an IDA credit to build the transmission and distribution side of an eleven-donor Kabala programme, while other donors financed the treatment plant.
Preconditions
A standing asset company and utility able to procure and supervise works through two coups and a pandemic
Donor co-financing coordinated through one programme, so the plant and the networks were built in step
Tariffs set high enough to keep the system running, which Mali did not do
Limits: The source is the World Bank's self-evaluation of its own credit. Spending US$119.6 million of an approved US$130 million is not a cost underrun against a fixed scope. The approved amount grew from US$80 million to US$130 million in 2016, when six towns were added. The report says savings were used to raise targets, and it publishes no unit cost or contract-level overrun. The four-year schedule slip, from a December 2018 to a December 2022 closing, is our reading of the key dates. Three of those years were added with the 2016 scope expansion and one year in 2021 for COVID-19 and the disbursement suspensions that followed the 2020 and 2021 coups, so most of the slip was planned. Targets outside Bamako were not met because distribution networks were finished late. The Kabala treatment plant itself was financed by AFD, the EU and the EIB, and its cost and schedule are not in this record. The project was designed to make the urban water sector financially sustainable, and that objective failed: tariffs were frozen for eight years, and the indicator was removed in 2021. The project was IDA-financed throughout. The national contribution was implementation by SOMAPEP-SA and SOMAGEP-SA, not money.
๐ง๐ซBurkina Fasosince 2001delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Between 2001 and 2007, ONEA, Burkina Faso's national water utility, delivered the Ziga project through a dedicated project unit. The project built the Ziga earth dam and its transmission main to Ouagadougou, plus 56,000 subsidised connections and 400 standpipes. Eleven external financiers and the government paid US$269.37 million, 131 percent of the US$205.88 million estimated at appraisal, and the project closed on its original date of 31 December 2007.
The government gave ONEA a mandate by decree in 1996 to set up a dedicated Ziga project unit. That unit ran one investment programme for eleven external financiers and the government, with joint annual supervision meetings, while the government adjusted tariffs and paid its own water bills so the utility stayed solvent.
Preconditions
A national utility already financially sound enough to borrow and to recover costs through tariffs
Donor coordination under one project unit and one supervision committee rather than parallel projects
Political backing for tariff adjustments and for the state paying its own utility bills
Where else it has been used: The ONEA model, a public utility under a performance contract with its own project units, became a West African reference case for urban water reform. Later Burkina Faso programmes extended it to sanitation and secondary towns.
Limits: The 31 percent overrun is in US dollars, and much of it is exchange rate. The ICR's own note puts the dollar at 640 CFA francs at appraisal and 506 at closing. Converted at those two rates, the appraisal total of about CFAF 132 to 134 billion and the actual total of about CFAF 136 billion are within a few percent of each other. Spending happened between the two dates, so neither conversion is exact, and the ICR prints both 640 and 650 for the appraisal rate. The real cost overrun in local currency is therefore unknown and probably small, and the dollar figure overstates it. The schedule figure only covers the 2001 to 2007 financing window. The project was conceived in the early 1990s and launched in 1994, so on-time closing says nothing about the decade of preparation before it. The ICR is the World Bank grading an operation it financed and supervised, and it relies on the borrower's reporting. The people-served figure is an estimate the ICR computes at 10 people per connection and 120 per standpipe, not a count. Donors provided almost all of the money, and the borrower's share was about US$8.8 million, so the record shows execution by ONEA, not national financing. The data are from 2007 and say nothing about Burkina Faso's delivery of large projects since then.
๐ง๐ฎBurundisince 2020delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
The Government of Burundi, through REGIDESO and a World Bank project unit, built the 49.5 MW Jiji (32.5 MW) and Mulembwe (17 MW) run-of-river plants with their transmission lines and substations. The project was approved in 2014 at US$270.3 million with an original closing date of December 2019. Construction began only in February 2020, after the 2015 political crisis. The World Bank put the estimated cost at US$319.1 million in November 2024. Jiji was inaugurated in June 2025 and Mulembwe in June 2026.
Burundi bundled two run-of-river plants, transmission and utility reform into one donor-pooled project under a World Bank-supervised implementation unit. It held the scheme together through a political crisis and two additional financings until both plants were commissioned.
Preconditions
Concessional co-financiers willing to top up a stalled grant rather than cancel it
An owner's engineer and contractors able to work in a fragile state with fuel and foreign-exchange shortages
A utility (REGIDESO) able to absorb and operate new generation capacity
Limits: The cost figure is the World Bank's estimate in November 2024, before either plant was commissioned. At that date it reported a financing gap of US$41.7 million still to close. The 18 percent is the Bank's own ratio in its cost table, set against the 2014 appraisal. It excludes a further estimated US$19 million lost to currency depreciation on the 2014 pledges. The schedule slip is not published as a figure. The original closing date of 31 December 2019 against inauguration in June 2025 (Jiji) and June 2026 (Mulembwe) is our reading of a 6.5-year slip. Much of it comes from the 2015 to 2020 political crisis, which delayed hiring the owner's engineer to 2017 and the contractor's mobilisation to 2020, so it is not purely an execution failure. The project was financed and supervised by IDA, the EU, the EIB and the AfDB. Delivery was shared, and the Bank reports weak contract management in the project unit. Completion rests on press releases: the Presidency's June 2025 release for Jiji, and the EIB's June 2026 release for Mulembwe. Neither release shows that the plants deliver the planned 235 GWh a year.
๐ฒ๐ฌMadagascarsince 2004delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Madagascar's road authority and transport agencies delivered road, port, airport and Northern Railway works under the Transport Infrastructure Investment Project from 2004, cutting travel time on the RN44 from 24 to 6 hours, with the closing date extended four years from 30 June 2008 to 30 June 2012 and IDA-financed costs of US$169.39 million against US$150.00 million at appraisal plus US$15.60 million of additional financing added in 2007.
Madagascar's road authority and port and rail agencies ran a multi-modal investment programme on a lender credit, re-scoping it repeatedly as priorities and the political situation changed, and finished four years late.
Preconditions
A road authority and transport agencies able to procure civil works
Lender flexibility to restructure and add financing
Political continuity through implementation, which Madagascar did not have
Limits: The costs are in Annex 1 of the World Bank's own completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory. They are IDA disbursements only (the borrower's own contribution is shown as US$1.11 million against 17.42 appraised), and the 112.9 percent of appraisal is almost entirely the US$15.60 million additional financing of 2007 for the Northern Railway component, which was not in the appraisal; against the revised estimate including that financing, the outturn is 102.3 percent, so the record shows no meaningful cost overrun and should not be read as one. Port and airport components spent a fraction of their estimates and the RN5a upgrade was dropped at the January 2006 restructuring, so scope shrank in some places while it grew in others. The RN44 travel-time result is the report's own indicator comment. The closing date moved through five restructurings, and the 2009 political crisis froze disbursements during implementation. The project is a portfolio of works, not one build, so no single project's baseline and outturn are shown. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.
๐ฒ๐ผMalawisince 2012still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Malawi's electricity utility ESCOM completed and energised all 10 substations and seven of nine planned distribution lines under the Energy Sector Support Project approved in 2011, closing on 15 October 2018 against an original closing date of 30 October 2016, having disbursed US$72.1 million of US$84.7 million.
Malawi's state utility reinforced the grid in its load centres with a package of substations and lines on concessional credit, and finished the works itself after its supervising consultant ran out of budget.
Preconditions
A utility with in-house engineers able to finish works without a consultant
Concessional finance with room to extend closing dates
Demand growth that kept the works a priority
Limits: The World Bank's completion report, which rated the outcome Satisfactory, is the source; the substation and line counts are in paras. 103 and around 583 of the text file and the dates and amounts in the data sheet. The report gives no appraisal cost per work package, so cost performance cannot be read beyond the undisbursed balance, which reflects delay and cancellation rather than savings. The two-year extension followed procurement delays the report attributes to the political situation and inexperience with Bank procedures, and the implementation consultant stopped work in December 2017 when its budget ran out, leaving ESCOM to finish alone. At US$85 million this is a modest programme of grid reinforcement, not a single major build, so it is weak evidence on major project delivery. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.
๐ง๐ผBotswanasince 2009still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Botswana Power Corporation built the 600 MW Morupule B coal power station under an EPC contract appraised in 2009, taking the plant over with known defects on 4 May 2014 against a target of 31 December 2013, after which it ran at a capacity factor of 52 percent from April 2015 to January 2016 against the 80 percent projected at appraisal.
The state utility bought a large coal plant on a turnkey contract from a lowest-cost bidder, accepted it with a punch list of defects to meet a power shortfall, and then imported power and ran diesel units while the defects were chased.
Preconditions
Owner's engineering capacity to verify design and construction quality under an EPC contract
Contract terms that let the owner refuse takeover of a defective plant
A grid with enough backup supply to wait for a plant to be fixed
Limits: The World Bank's completion report rated outcome, Bank and borrower performance all Unsatisfactory. The 52 percent is the measured gross capacity factor for the whole plant in Table 2 for April 2015 to January 2016 (54 percent for April 2014 to March 2015); Table 1 gives about 38 percent from grid connection to March 2014, and paras. 91 and 96 describe availability 'hovering around 50 percent'. On cost the project did not overrun: the power-station, transmission and water component came to US$1,188.6 million against an appraisal estimate of US$1,539.6 million (Annex 1), so the failure is in schedule and performance, not budget. The report attributes the defects mainly to the Chinese EPC contractor's design and construction quality, with some operation and maintenance issues, and records three site fatalities; the plant was financed largely by an ICBC loan with a World Bank guarantee. The report does not cover the plant after 2016, so whether it later reached its design output is not shown. 'Operating' is used because the plant generates; the record documents a delivery that never reached its design performance rather than one that eroded from a peak.
๐ฑ๐ธLesothosince 2011still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Lesotho's Metolong Authority built the Metolong Dam and raw water pump station near Maseru, starting impoundment on 15 February 2014 against a contract date of 31 October 2012 and delivering 93 megalitres a day on 8 October 2014 against a contract date of 1 July 2013, with every component of the programme overrunning its cost.
Lesotho created a dedicated authority to deliver a dam, treatment works and bulk pipelines for the lowlands with many co-financiers, and delivered water about 15 months behind contract after price escalation and procurement delays.
Preconditions
A ring-fenced delivery authority for one programme
Several co-financiers able to cover cost gaps
Experience from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to draw on
Limits: The contract and revised dates are in Table 9.1 (Annex 9, page 53 of 59) of the World Bank's completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory; both delays in months (15.2 and 15.5) are computed here from the dates in that table. The report states that all components overran their cost, attributing it partly to construction-price inflation from South Africa's 2010 World Cup works (para. 72), but gives no programme-wide baseline and outturn cost, and the World Bank financed only part of a programme co-financed by the Kuwait Fund, Arab and other lenders, the EIB and the government. The project closing date was extended three times for a cumulative 42 months, to 31 December 2018. Impoundment coincided with the 2015 to 2016 drought. Plain-text file of a PDF.
๐ฒ๐บMauritiussince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Mauritius's Ministry of Public Infrastructure upgraded the 12.1 km B6 Belle Rive to Quartier Militaire road under the World Bank Infrastructure Project approved in 2009, at a cost of US$33.88 million against an appraisal estimate of US$21.60 million, 157 percent of the estimate.
The infrastructure ministry procured a rural road upgrade on an estimate that was never checked against designs, then added scope under local pressure, and paid half as much again as appraised.
Preconditions
Detailed engineering designs before the cost estimate is fixed
A scope-change control that resists late stakeholder additions
A lender willing to reallocate funds from cancelled technical assistance
Limits: The costs are in Annex 1 of the World Bank's own completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory and the borrower Moderately Unsatisfactory. Para. 41 explains most of the increase as poor checking of the estimate at appraisal and added scope requested by stakeholders (junctions, a bridge, village works), with further increases from weather and flooding, and gives slightly different totals (about US$32 million, then about US$35 million for the contract), so the 157 percent is the annex figure and the narrative does not match it exactly. A 12 km road is a small project for the construct, chosen because it is the one Mauritian build with an official baseline and outturn found; Mauritius's larger Metro Express light rail was not assessed. The project closed on its original date, 31 December 2014. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.
๐ธ๐ฉSudansince 1973delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Sudan's government and the Rahad Corporation (RAHCO) built the Rahad irrigation scheme, 300,000 feddans east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile, with a main pumping station, a siphon under the Dinder River and a barrage on the Rahad River, under credits approved in March 1973; the physical works were completed in December 1982 against a planned June 1978, at a final cost of US$395.6 million against an appraisal estimate of US$125.0 million.
The government let a large pump irrigation scheme go to tender before detailed design was finished, then refinanced a doubling of cost through a second round of Arab and IDA credits and absorbed the remainder in the national budget.
Preconditions
Appraisal based on a feasibility study rather than detailed design
Several co-financiers willing to raise commitments mid-project
A construction market where contractors had better-paying bids elsewhere in the region
Limits: The report is the World Bank auditing a project it financed alongside the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund, the Saudi Fund and others, so the delivery was Sudanese but the money and the judgement were largely external. Much of the threefold overrun came before construction: the project was reappraised in 1975 at US$320.7 million, 156 percent above 1973, because detailed designs had not been done at appraisal and the 1973 oil shock drove inflation, so only a 23 percent overrun is measured against a design-based estimate. The final cost is itself an estimate: the report says local costs such as administration and settlement are approximate and that better information had been requested. Figures are nominal dollars at the exchange rates of the time. The schedule comparison uses the dates for completing physical components in the report's data table (June 1978 appraised, December 1982 actual); the text says the project finished more than four years late. The scheme did develop the full planned area, and the auditors re-estimated its economic return at 20 percent against 14 percent at appraisal, so a cost overrun did not mean a failed asset. The text file is an OCR of a 1984 typescript and some table cells are garbled.
๐ฌ๐ญGhanasince 2007delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Ghana's Department of Urban Roads, joined in 2012 by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, set out in 2007 to build Sub-Saharan Africa's first bus rapid transit corridor in Accra for an estimated US$46 million of infrastructure, but after a design review raised that estimate to US$100.7 million and counterpart funds did not arrive, the BRT was dropped in the 2014 restructuring without its 9.1 km of dedicated lanes being built, and the project closed in December 2015, 35.5 months after its original December 2012 closing date.
Two government agencies split responsibility for the roads and the buses of a first-of-its-kind BRT, tendered it before the design was complete, and when bids came in at double the estimate and the treasury could not pay its share, cut the corridor and spent the remaining credit on cheaper bus lanes elsewhere.
Preconditions
A new transit mode with no domestic design or operating precedent
An appraisal without an up-to-date land use plan or transport master plan for the city
Counterpart funding that depended on the annual budget rather than a ring-fenced allocation
Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed with AFD and GEF money, and it rates the outcome Unsatisfactory, so it judges the Bank's design as well as Ghana's delivery: the report says the BRT design was not fully developed at appraisal and that bid documents were prepared during implementation. The US$100.7 million is a revised estimate, not money spent, because the BRT was cancelled before Lots 2 and 3 were contracted; what was built under Lot 1 (the Odaw Bridge expansion and a railway flyover) cost US$14.7 million against US$9.2 million estimated, a 60 percent overrun. The 35.5 months is computed from the original and actual closing dates in the report's key dates table (31 December 2012 and 15 December 2015); the text gives the extensions as 29.5 months for two of them. The remaining funds went to quality bus services on two other corridors, which were not operating at closure. What happened to bus services in Accra after 2015 is not covered here.
Cรดte d'Ivoire's Ministry of Public Works built the 70 km Yabayo-Gagnoa road and rebuilt the bridge over the N'Zi River under the Fourth Highway Project (Credit 406-IVC, approved June 1973), completing it in September 1978 against a planned June 1976, at a cost of US$24.7 million against an appraisal estimate of US$12.3 million, an overrun of 101 percent.
The public works ministry split a new road into separate contracts for earthworks, paving and aggregate, gave the first to an inexperienced state enterprise, and the later contracts stalled waiting for it, doubling cost and tripling the construction time.
Preconditions
A government push to upgrade main roads to high standards in the 1970s boom
State-owned construction enterprises given work without proven capacity
A lender that accepted the borrower's contract split against internal warnings
Limits: This is a modest project by today's standards: a 70 km road and one bridge, US$24.7 million in 1970s dollars, of which the IDA credit was US$7.5 million and the rest the government's, so it is a mid-sized public works delivery rather than a national megaproject; no larger Ivorian project with a published baseline and outturn was found. The source is the World Bank auditing its own lending. The audit attributes the overrun to the road construction and the 27-month delay mainly to the decision, accepted by the Bank, to split the works by function: a government-owned enterprise lacking managers and trained operators did the earthworks late, holding up the French-Ivorian joint venture that was to lay the base and surface. The schedule figures come from the audit's basic data sheet (June 1976 planned, September 1978 actual, a 175 percent time overrun); the text gives completion as 27 months after the project completion date. Despite the overrun, the auditors re-estimated the economic return at 24 percent against 14 percent at appraisal. The text is an OCR of a 1981 typescript.
๐ฌ๐ณGuineasince 1989delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Guinea's Ministry of Transport and Public Works paved the Dubreka-Kolaboui (196.5 km) and Mamou-Kankan (401 km) national roads under the Fourth Highway Project, approved in June 1988, at a latest estimated cost of US$207 million against an appraisal estimate of US$200 million, with the IDA credit closing on 31 December 1996, three years late, and the last 94 km of Mamou-Kankan still under construction in 1997.
The public works ministry packaged two long trunk-road upgrades with spot repairs and labour-based maintenance into one programme, and paid for it by assembling seven donors in parallel, each financing particular sections.
Preconditions
Donors willing to finance road sections in parallel under one sector programme
A ministry able to procure and supervise several international civil works contracts at once
Counterpart funds for local costs, which here arrived at less than half the planned level
Limits: The report is the World Bank's own completion report on a credit it made, and the IDA credit was only US$55 million of the US$207 million: parallel finance of US$143 million came from the AfDB, the French CFD, USAID, Japan's OECF, BADEA and the European Community, so the cost figure covers a multi-donor programme run through the ministry. The cost is a 'latest estimate', not an audited outturn, and the 3.5 percent overrun is small partly because the scope changed: about 500 km of cement-stabilised base and asphalt concrete on 310 km were added, so the money bought a higher standard than appraised. The three-year delay is on the credit's closing date, not on road completion dates; the report says the last 94 km of Mamou-Kankan, financed by the EC, was to be finished by the end of 1999. The government paid about US$8 million of its planned US$19.2 million contribution. The report blames delays on a slow restructuring of the ministry, poor technical studies, cumbersome procurement and late payments to contractors.
The Republic of the Congo's transport agency ATC rebuilt an 88 km section of the Brazzaville to Pointe-Noire railway through the Mayombe range, with 19 bridges, three tunnels including one of 4.6 km and 17 million m3 of earthworks, completing it in mid-1985 against an expected end of 1979 at a cost of US$399 million against an estimate of US$149 million, an overrun of 168 percent.
The state transport agency, running the railway at the same time, managed a mountain realignment with tunnels on engineering that underestimated the ground, and when bids came in high and the works slipped, ten lenders refinanced the doubling of cost rather than stop.
Preconditions
A single national rail corridor whose collapse was feared, which made stopping politically impossible
Lenders willing to add supplementary credits to a half-built line
Traffic forecasts tied to timber and manganese exports that did not materialise
Limits: The audit is the World Bank's evaluators on a project the Bank appraised and part financed: the realignment had ten financiers, including France, the European Community and the Bank's US$38 million loan and US$30 million supplementary credit, so the money was largely external and the audit judges the Bank's appraisal as much as ATC's execution; it says the Bank accepted detailed engineering based on inadequate soil, topographic and geological study and allowed physical contingencies of only 10 percent for earthworks and 15 percent for tunnels. Figures are nominal dollars over a decade of high inflation, so part of the overrun is price escalation. The 168 percent and five and a half year delay (a 157 percent time overrun) are the audit's own computations. Traffic, expected to double, stayed flat, and the audit puts the economic return at zero or negative and calls the project unsustainable, so the record is a delivery that was finished but did not pay off. The text is an OCR of a 1990 typescript and some words are garbled.
๐ฌ๐ฒGambiasince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The Gambia's Ministry of Transport, Works and Infrastructure contracted the US$35.7 million (D1.8 billion) Banjul roads, drainage and sewage rehabilitation in May 2019 without tender, for completion by November 2021; by August 2021 12,953 m of the 15,216 m of roads, 85 percent, were built and 63 percent of the contract price paid, the pumping and lifting stations were outstanding, and the completion date had been extended to November 2022.
The works ministry accepted a contractor's unsolicited offer to pre-finance the reconstruction of the capital's roads and drains, signed a single-source design-and-build contract, then switched to paying it from the budget in interim instalments ahead of the hardest components.
Preconditions
A procurement authority that can be bypassed by single sourcing for a presidential priority
A contractor willing to start work before a signed contract
Budget room to pay interim certificates once the pre-financing was dropped
Limits: The audit is a compliance management letter, not a completion audit: it stops at 31 August 2021, three months before the original deadline, so it shows progress and a one-year extension of the deadline to November 2022, not an outturn. Whether the project was finished, at what final cost and on what date is not shown here, and the status 'operating' rests only on the audit's finding that most roads were built and in use. The 85 percent is of a road length that an addendum had raised from 14,614 m to 15,216 m, and the audit does not report a cost increase from that addendum. The figures are in a 24-page PDF (site verification on page 23). The audit's main findings are about process, not schedule: the contract was single sourced and gazetted only in February 2021, works began on 18 March 2019 before the contract was signed on 11 May 2019, no performance security was provided, withholding tax was not deducted, and 63 percent had been paid while critical components worth US$2.47 million, 6.9 percent of the sum, were outstanding. A contractor-initiated, pre-financed offer is how the project began, so the institutional delivery is partly the contractor's proposal.
Guinea-Bissau's port authority (JAPG) rehabilitated the old commercial wharf of Bissau Port, built river ports and ferry ramps and, with a new deepwater wharf financed in parallel by four Arab funds, completed the IDA-financed Bissau Port Project on 30 June 1990 against a planned 31 December 1987, at a final cost of US$20.0 million against an appraisal estimate of US$17.36 million.
The government split its port programme into an IDA part and an Arab-funded new berth awarded to the same contractor, so when the Arab funds suspended payments over the country's arrears the contractor slowed work on both, and IDA supervision kept the project going to completion.
Preconditions
A port authority set up as a separate agency able to borrow and contract
Several lenders financing separate parts through one contractor
A government able to keep current on earlier loans, which here it was not
Limits: The report is the World Bank on its own credit, and it notes that the government sent no comments for Part II, the borrower's review, despite repeated requests; consultants acting for the borrower prepared a final report the PCR drew on, so the borrower's own view is largely missing. The cost figures cover only the IDA-financed part (wharf repair, river ports, technical assistance and supervision of the new berth); the new deepwater wharf itself was financed separately by the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Fund, BADEA and the OPEC Fund, and its cost and schedule are not reported here, though the report blames repeated suspensions of Arab Fund disbursements, triggered by the government's late repayment of earlier loans, for most of the delay. The 14.9 percent overrun is in dollars; the report says the credit, made in SDRs, covered the work without an overrun, and scope grew with four extra ferry ramps, container storage and more technical assistance. The project is small in absolute terms, about US$20 million, but Bissau is the country's main port and the report credits the project with a modern deepwater facility where only a badly damaged wharf had existed. The text is an OCR of a 1991 typescript.
๐ธ๐ฎSloveniasince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Slovenia's state-owned power holding HSE and its subsidiary TEล raised the estimated cost of the 600 MW ล oลกtanj unit 6 from 1,302,747 thousand euros in the August 2011 investment programme, the ceiling written into the 2012 law guaranteeing its 440 million euro EIB loan, to 1,428,457 thousand euros in the February 2014 programme, breaching the condition on which the state guarantee was given, according to the Court of Audit.
A state-owned utility group committed to a single large lignite unit, financed it with a state-guaranteed EIB loan conditioned on a cost ceiling, and then revised the investment programme upward several times while construction ran, leaving the state as guarantor to accept the breach.
Preconditions
A state holding with a captive coal mine and a political mandate to keep the lignite region working
A state guarantee law that set a cost ceiling but no mechanism to stop the project when it was crossed
Shareholder oversight bodies that did not ask for cash-flow reports until after the overrun
Limits: Both figures are in a PDF, on PDF page 9 of the post-audit report, which restates finding 2.1.2 of the main audit report of 19 August 2015 (no. 321-1/2014/49). The main report itself is published with the investment values redacted as business secrets (marked (P)) in its OCR copy, so the post-audit report is the readable source. The comparison is between two revisions of the investment programme, not between the first approved estimate and the final outturn: the record does not show the earlier, much lower estimates of the original 2006 to 2008 investment documents, which this protocol did not read at an official source, and so understates the full growth. NIP 6 is an estimate made while the unit was being built, not a final account. The court's main finding concerns HSE's management of the group's cash flows, and it also found the assumed coal cost (2.25 euros per GJ) and electricity prices unachievable, so the unit's financial case failed on more than construction cost. The unit was built under contract by an Alstom consortium; the delivering institutions are the state-owned HSE and TEล , and the state as guarantor and owner (through AUKN, SOD and SDH), whose oversight the court also faulted. The started year is the main construction contract with Alstom, as commonly reported; it was not read at the cited source. Status is concluded because the unit was built and operates; the record says nothing about its economics after 2016 or Slovenia's coal exit plans.
๐ฑ๐ปLatviasince 2016still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The Latvian State Audit Office found in June 2024 that the estimated construction cost of Rail Baltica's main line in Latvia had risen sevenfold since 2017 to about 8.7 billion euros, that design work due by the end of 2021 was only 54 percent complete and now planned to finish by the end of 2027, and that the Riga Central Station works contracted in 2019 at 430 million euros had risen to 565 million euros.
The transport ministry approved scope changes and cost increases for stations, the Riga node and the main line itself, often without bringing a full cost picture to the Cabinet, while design guidelines kept changing and EU co-financing deadlines kept slipping.
Preconditions
A first cost estimate made before any design guidelines existed
A ministry able to approve scope changes without a single Cabinet-level change process
Financing that depends on successive EU funding calls rather than a committed national budget
Where else it has been used: The joint Baltic review found the same pattern in Estonia and Lithuania, so the overrun is a property of the joint project's governance as well as of Latvian administration.
Limits: The source is a situation review (situฤcijas izpฤte), which the audit office itself describes as a short compilation of facts with no conclusions or recommendations, not a full audit. The 8.7 billion is stated as 'aptuveni' (about) and as a sevenfold rise since 2017, so the 2017 baseline (roughly 1.2 billion) is implied, not printed; it is not used as a metric here. Much of the rise is scope and specification change (the design guidelines were revised more than 100 times after 2018, and the station node went from two tracks to four), so the multiple measures how far the 2017 estimate was from a buildable project as much as delivery performance. The project is not finished: the release says only 4.5 percent of the needed main line financing was available, and the joint Baltic review it summarises puts the whole three-country project at 23.8 billion euros in 2023 against 5.8 billion in 2017, with the first phase now due in 2030. Rail Baltica is a joint Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian project funded about 85 percent by the EU; this record covers only the Latvian section and the Latvian ministry's management. Status is operating because the project is under construction; a decision to phase or cut the Latvian scope after June 2024 was not checked at an official source. The started year is the 2016 Cabinet approval of the project scope named in the release. The 565 million euro station figure is computed here: the release says the 2019 contract cost of 430 million euros rose by a further 135 million in 2024, and does not print 565.
๐ฆ๐นAustriasince 1998delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Austria's federal rail infrastructure company รBB-Infrastruktur AG forecast the Koralmbahn's total cost at 6.139 billion euros at the end of 2023, 282.4 million euros or 5 percent above the 2012 baseline, but missed both the 2018 completion date in the 2004 Koralmbahn contract and the 2023 opening date in the 2012 to 2017 framework plan, according to the Court of Audit, and the line entered passenger service on 14 December 2025.
The federal government funded a new high-speed line through the federal rail framework plan and its state-owned infrastructure company managed the build, holding total cost close to the 2012 estimate while a hard-rock tunnel lot overran in cost and time and pushed the opening back twice.
Preconditions
A rolling multi-year federal rail framework plan that funds the project year by year
A state infrastructure company with project controlling strong enough to absorb a lot overrun inside the total
A supreme audit institution that audits individual construction lots, not only totals
Limits: The cost figure is รBB-Infrastruktur's own forecast, which the court reports; it is a forecast at the end of 2023, not a final account, and the 5 percent increase is measured from 2012, when the project was already well advanced, so it says nothing about growth from the first estimates of the 1990s and 2000s, which the release does not give. The court's audit covered 2012 to 2023. The release says the tunnel lot KAT 2 alone rose 297.75 million euros and took about 31 months longer, with contractor claims above a third of the original contract sum, and that the company paid tunnel stoppages contrary to the contract. The opening date of 14 December 2025 is taken from รBB's own project page (https://www.unsereoebb.at/de/suedstrecke, 'Am 14. Dezember 2025 geht die Koralmbahn in den Fahrgastbetrieb'), not from the court. The full report PDF (https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home/2025_14_Koralmbahn.pdf) was not opened; the figures come from the release. The started year is approximate and was not read at either source: preparatory works on the line began in the late 1990s and the Koralm tunnel drives later. รBB-Infrastruktur is a state-owned company, so the delivery is institutional, but the record reports cost and time only, not ridership.
๐ฉ๐ฐDenmarksince 2020still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The European Court of Auditors found in 2020 that the Fehmarn Belt fixed link, the 18 km rail and road tunnel that Denmark finances, designs and builds through its state company Femern A/S, had an initial cost estimate of 4.4 billion euros at 2008 prices (5.0 billion at 2019 values) against a latest estimate of 7.7 billion, a 54 percent increase, and that construction planned to start in 2012 for opening in 2018 had started in 2020 with opening expected in 2028.
Denmark took on the whole financing and construction risk of a cross-border tunnel through a state-owned company repaid from future tolls, under a state treaty that limits the neighbouring country to its own access lines.
Preconditions
A state company model already used for the Great Belt and รresund links, financed by state-guaranteed loans repaid from tolls
A bilateral treaty dividing responsibilities, which also left the timetable exposed to the other country's planning law
EU co-financing under the trans-European transport network
Where else it has been used: The same state-guaranteed company model built the Great Belt and รresund fixed links, so this is the third use of the Danish model; the delay this time came from the planning process on the other side of the border.
Limits: The figures are in a PDF: the timeline table is Annex II (PDF page 66) and the cost table Annex III (PDF page 67), with the 5,016 to 7,711 million euro comparison and 54 percent in the table on PDF page 36. The ECA compares the latest estimate with the first political estimate on purpose, so part of the increase reflects scope settled after 2008, and the re-indexation uses the GDP deflator, not construction prices. The ECA's 'transport flagship infrastructure' includes the Danish and German rail access lines, and Germany finances and builds its own access lines, so the 7.7 billion is not a purely Danish cost; the report states that the tunnel itself is financed, designed and built by Denmark (paragraph 23, PDF page 21) and that the fixed link is therefore a Danish project. The figures are from 2019 and 2020; the tunnel is still under construction, and later Danish estimates and the current opening date were not checked at a Danish source, so the 2028 opening is the ECA's estimate at the time. The ECA reports that the construction start slipped largely because of the German planning approval process and litigation, which is outside Danish institutions' control. The EU co-finances the project, and the ECA audits EU spending, not Femern A/S's management.
๐จ๐ฟCzechiasince 2020still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The Czech Supreme Audit Office reported in June 2026 that 41 motorway sections totalling more than 300 km were opened to traffic between 2020 and 2024, after years with almost none (no kilometre in 2014, four in 2018), but that the average cost the state paid per kilometre of motorway opened rose from nearly CZK 275 million in 2020 to CZK 505 million in 2024, an increase of nearly 84 percent.
The transport ministry and its Road and Motorway Directorate prepare motorway sections through long zoning and permitting processes and then build many of them in a short window financed by the State Fund for Transport Infrastructure and EU funds, paying whatever the market price is when the sections finally reach construction.
Preconditions
A state road directorate with a pipeline of permitted sections ready to tender
A transport fund able to raise annual spending sharply
Permitting reform that releases sections held up for years, which is also what bunches them into a high-price period
Limits: The source is the audit office's English press release; the comprehensive report it summarises, based on 13 audits completed from 2020 to 2025, was not opened. Cost per kilometre opened is an average over whatever sections happened to open in each year, so it mixes simple and complex sections (tunnels, bridges, terrain) and nominal prices across a period of high construction inflation; the office says the rise 'cannot be attributed solely' to inflation or complexity, which is a judgement, not a decomposition, and no baseline against outturn is given for any single section. The 2020 figure is stated as 'nearly' 275 million. The same release gives project-level findings that support the schedule side: preparation of the D4 section took the Ministry of Transport and the Road and Motorway Directorate 21 years and was delivered as a PPP whose payments run to 2049, and the directorate had not completed the modernisation of 20 sections of the D1 for CZK 28 billion after 10 years. The record shows delivery volume rising and unit cost rising together; it does not show whether the 2020 to 2024 output was on its planned schedule. The started year is the first year of the audit office's comparison, not the start of the motorway programme.
๐ญ๐ทCroatiasince 2018delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Croatia's road authority awarded the 2,440-metre Peljeลกac Bridge to China Road and Bridge Corporation in 2018 for HRK 2.081 billion excluding VAT with a 36-month completion deadline, works started on 31 July 2018, the last steel segment was installed by 28 July 2021, and the government expected the bridge and access roads to open in June 2022, in a project whose eligible costs of 420 million euros were 85 percent financed by an EU grant of 357 million euros.
The government revived a cancelled bridge as an EU cohesion-funded major project, tendered it on price with a fixed deadline, and let it to the lowest bidder, a Chinese state contractor, while EU money covered 85 percent of eligible costs.
Preconditions
An EU cohesion allocation large enough to cover most of a single national megaproject
A feasibility study commissioned by the European Commission that settled the choice of route
A road authority able to run an open international tender and enforce a fixed deadline
Limits: The source is a government news item written by the national news agency Hina at the moment the span was closed, so it carries the government's framing and gives a contract price and a deadline, not a final cost: no final account or audit of the bridge's outturn cost was read. The page puts the total project value at 'โฌ526 billion', an evident typing error for 526 million, and the EU grant figure appears as 'โฌ357' without a unit; the record uses the 420 million euro eligible cost and 357 million euro grant stated elsewhere on the same page, and the European Commission's release of 7 June 2017 (read through the Internet Archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20190715235249/https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2017/06/06-07-2017-commission-approves-eu-financing-of-the-peljesac-bridge-in-croatia) confirms 357 million euros and 85 percent. The 36-month deadline from 31 July 2018 fell at the end of July 2021, when the span was joined; the expected June 2022 opening was a forecast on the page, and the actual opening date (reported as 26 July 2022) was not read at an official source, so the record can say only that the structure was joined on its contract deadline and opened about a year later with its access roads. The project had an earlier history the page omits: a first construction contract from 2007 was cancelled by a later government, according to press reports not used as a source. The bridge was built by a Chinese state-owned contractor, so the delivery attributable to Croatia is the procurement, financing and project management.
๐ธ๐ฐSlovakiasince 2015still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Slovakia's state decommissioning company JAVYS, which the European Court of Auditors reported in 2016 as holding the Bohunice V1 decommissioning end date at 2025 with a cost estimate of 1,239 million euros, reported in its 2025 annual report that the final decontamination and demolition contract signed on 18 December 2024 runs 60 months, putting the end of decommissioning at the end of 2029, at a total estimated cost of 1,220 million euros, with 66 decommissioning projects completed by 31 December 2025.
A state company created to decommission shut-down reactors runs dozens of EU-funded projects under a detailed decommissioning plan monitored by the European Commission and the EBRD, and reschedules the end date when the final demolition contract is procured.
Preconditions
A dedicated state decommissioning company with its own nuclear licences
EU accession commitments that fund most of the cost through a ring-fenced programme
A regulator able to license each decommissioning stage separately
Where else it has been used: Lithuania's Ignalina decommissioning, funded under the same EU arrangement, slipped much further (ltu-ignalina-decommissioning).
Limits: JAVYS reports on its own programme; the figures are in a PDF, the 2029 end date and the 60-month contract of 18 December 2024 on PDF page 17, the 1,220 million euro estimate and the 735 million EU share on PDF page 19, and the 66 completed projects on PDF page 20. The baseline comes from a different publisher: the European Court of Auditors' Special Report 22/2016 (https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_22/SR_NUCLEAR_DECOMMISSIONING_EN.pdf) says the Slovak end date 'has remained at 2025' (paragraph 64, PDF page 40) and gives estimated costs of 1,146 million euros in 2011 and 1,239 million in 2015 (Table 8, PDF page 46). The two cost figures are not on the same basis, so the record does not claim the cost fell; it claims cost was held roughly flat while completion slipped about four years. Decommissioning is a stretch for 'major public infrastructure projects': it is a large state engineering programme that builds waste facilities and demolishes a plant rather than a new asset, and it is mostly paid for by the EU (735 million euros of the 1,220 million, through the EBRD-managed BIDSF fund and the Slovak Innovation and Energy Agency). The started year is 2015, the start of the second decommissioning stage under the nuclear regulator's licence of 23 December 2014; the first stage began earlier. Whether the 2029 date holds is not known.
๐ฑ๐นLithuaniasince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The European Court of Auditors found in 2016 that Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant decommissioning had pushed its end date back by a further nine years since 2011 to 2038, that the interim spent fuel storage facility was ten years behind the 2005 decommissioning plan, and that the estimated decommissioning cost had risen 15 percent from 2,930 million euros in 2011 to 3,376 million in 2015, and 67 percent since the 2010 estimate.
A state enterprise decommissions a large Soviet-designed plant under EU accession commitments, building fuel and waste storage through international contracts paid by an EU fund, and its end date moves each time a key facility is delayed.
Preconditions
EU accession-linked funding that covers most of the cost
Reliable design records of the plant being dismantled, which were missing here
Contract management capacity strong enough to resolve disputes with foreign suppliers quickly
Where else it has been used: Slovakia's Bohunice V1, funded under the same arrangement, held its end date until 2025 and then slipped to 2029 (svk-bohunice-v1).
Limits: The figures are in a PDF: the 2038 end date and the nine-year postponement in paragraph 60 (PDF page 38), the ten-year delay of the interim spent fuel storage facility in Table 6, the 67 percent rise in paragraph 73 (PDF page 44) and the 2011 and 2015 estimates in Table 8 (PDF page 46). The report is ten years old and the current end date and cost estimate were not checked at a Lithuanian source; the Lithuanian audit office's site (valstybeskontrole.lt) returned a Cloudflare challenge. The ECA audits EU spending, and the EU funds most of the programme, so the figures describe a jointly financed delivery carried out by the state enterprise Ignalina NPP. Decommissioning is a stretch for 'major public infrastructure projects': it builds waste and fuel storage facilities and dismantles a plant, and the report says delays came partly from contractual disputes with a foreign contractor and from poor information on how the Soviet-built plant was constructed. The started year is approximate: 2010 is the base year of the ECA's cost comparison, and the report does not give a start date for decommissioning itself.
๐ท๐ธSerbiasince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Serbia's state road company Koridori Srbije built 45.5 km of Corridor X motorway on the E-75 towards North Macedonia and the E-80 Dimitrovgrad bypass towards Bulgaria under a loan approved in July 2009, finishing at a total project cost of EUR316.2 million against an appraisal estimate of EUR318.2 million, but taking about 10 years from approval to full completion against a planned 6.5, with the loan closing in September 2019 instead of December 2015.
A dedicated state motorway company procured large lots under development bank rules, held the cost line by re-bidding failed contracts and drawing an additional loan, and accepted years of delay rather than scope cuts.
Preconditions
A single implementing company for the corridor with procurement and supervision staff
Contingencies in the appraisal estimate large enough to absorb variation orders
Government budget for expropriation, whose absence caused the early delays
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, in a completion report on a project it financed and rated, written with data from the implementing agency. The two costs are in para. 11 and Table 2 (printed page 8) and para. 54 (page 19); the 10 years against 6.5 and the closing dates are in para. 32 (page 13) and the datasheet (page 2). Staying on budget was helped by a 2016 additional loan of EUR35 million that covered overruns (datasheet and para. 58), and the construction cost alone rose 21 percent over the initial contract prices, so 'on budget' means within an appraisal estimate that carried contingencies, not within contract prices. The Dimitrovgrad bypass contractors were terminated twice and its works finished in November 2019 against an April 2012 contract date (Table 6). The record covers only the World Bank financed sections of a longer corridor co-financed by EIB, EBRD and others, whose cost and schedule are not reported here. Traffic in 2018 was 46 percent of the appraisal forecast on the E-80. The start year is the first works contract (April 2010, Table 6).
๐บ๐ฆUkrainesince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Ukraine's road agency Ukravtodor rehabilitated or upgraded 156.3 km of the M-03 Kyiv to Kharkiv and M-12 corridors under a US$560 million loan approved in November 2015, after slow progress led the government in 2017 to cancel US$222.2 million of the loan, dropping three M-03 bypasses and two long-term maintenance contracts, so the loan closed at US$337.8 million in September 2022, nine months after its original date.
The national road agency delivered the widening of a corridor it had already been rebuilding with the same lender, and when bypasses stalled on land acquisition the government cancelled them rather than extend the loan.
Preconditions
An experienced implementation unit from earlier corridor loans
Land acquisition and resettlement procedures that can be completed before works are tendered
A lender willing to cancel and reallocate rather than hold undisbursed funds
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, in a completion report on its own loan, and the loan amount is not the full cost of the works; no figure for the cost of the delivered roads against an appraisal estimate per km was used. The cancellation and its reasons (land acquisition not started at Poltava, community objections at Kopyly, a realignment at Chutove) are in paras. 23 and 26 to 27 (printed pages 10 to 12); the 156.3 km is in para. 41 (page 16); amounts and dates are on the datasheet (page 2). In 2019 disbursement was about 11 percent with over 60 percent of the period elapsed, and some lots were moved in from a parallel World Bank road project, so the delivered kilometres mix two programmes. Russia's invasion in February 2022 stopped the civil works under force majeure seven months before closing, so the final delay is not all the agency's. The record shows a scope cut, not a cost overrun, and says nothing about the separate Great Construction programme.
๐ง๐พBelarussince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Belarus's Ministry of Transport and Communications widened 154 km of the M6 Minsk to Grodno highway to dual carriageway under a loan approved in December 2014, against 86 km planned, after civil works for the planned sections were awarded for less than half the estimate; the corridor component cost US$242.15 million against US$259.28 million at entry, and the loan closed in June 2022 against an original June 2020.
The transport ministry tendered the corridor in lots to joint ventures of local state-owned contractors, and when bids came in far below estimate it used the savings to add 67 km of the same corridor without new financing.
Preconditions
Complete designs before effectiveness, so works could start as soon as procurement closed
A domestic road construction industry with capacity and equipment
A cost estimate high enough that competitive bids produced savings rather than claims
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan, with costs reported by the borrower. The component costs are in Table 2 (printed page 9), the 154 against 86 km in para. 32 (page 14), the savings in para. 52 (page 21) and the dates on the datasheet (page 2). The low cost was helped by a government decision to exempt the works from VAT, so part of the saving is a transfer within the state, not efficiency. The actual cost excludes design, supervision and land acquisition, which the government paid separately. Works were not contracted until July 2016, more than a year after effectiveness, because of a dispute over whether state-owned Belarusian contractors were eligible, and the road safety centre was incomplete at closing. The report was written in 2022, after which World Bank engagement with Belarus stopped, so later maintenance of the road is unknown.
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's public road company PC Roads FBH delivered 76.9 km of road works, including a 35 km upgrade of the Neum to Stolac road, under a project approved in August 2016, but rehabilitated only 41.75 km of main roads against an appraisal target of 178 km, which was cut to 42.23 km in 2021, and the closing date moved from December 2021 to September 2023.
The entity road company took a multilateral loan for a list of sections whose designs did not yet exist, then cut the list to what designs, land and budget allowed and concentrated on one strategic coastal link.
Preconditions
Detailed designs and land acquisition finished before the results framework is fixed
An entity-level road agency able to borrow with state guarantee
Co-financing that can be raised when costs move
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on a project it co-financed with the EIB. The 178 and 42.23 km targets are in para. 55 (printed page 19), and the 41.75 km achieved against the revised 42.23 km target is in the outcome table (Table 4, page 13), the 76.9 km and the Neum to Stolac upgrade in paras. 30 to 31 (page 11), the cost per km in para. 45 (page 17) and the dates on the datasheet (page 2). The Bank attributes the cut to designs that were only 1.0 km complete at entry, so the 178 km target may have been an error of preparation rather than a delivery that shrank; the report says rehabilitation cost per km came out more than five times the plan for the same reason. Total project cost rose from US$101.3 million to about US$105.5 million, mostly as an EIB increase. Land acquisition and COVID-19 delayed the Crnaja tunnel and led to sections being cancelled. The project covers one of the country's two entities, not Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.
๐ฒ๐ฉMoldovasince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Moldova's State Roads Administration upgraded 149.3 km of unpaved local roads to paved standard under a project approved in October 2015, after unit costs doubled from US$230,000 to about US$415,000 per km and contracts on 42.3 km were terminated, so a 2019 restructuring cut the target from 300 km to 150 km and the project closed in July 2023 instead of March 2021.
The road administration designed for a low-cost paving technique, failed to attract bidders able to build it, then redesigned for asphalt at twice the unit cost and halved the length.
Preconditions
A contractor market able to bid on the chosen technique
Bid and performance security terms small firms can meet
Maintenance budgets matched to the pavement type chosen
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own credit, which rated it. The 300 to 150 km cut and the unit cost doubling are in para. 54 (printed page 26), the terminated contracts on 42.3 km in para. 39 (page 21), the 149.3 km in the results table (page 16) and the dates on the datasheet. The doubling followed a switch from a cheap surface treatment that local contractors could not build to conventional asphalt, so part of the cost rise bought a more durable road. These are local roads, a programme of many small contracts rather than one major build, and the US$102.5 million project is small against Moldova's national road spending.
๐ฆ๐ฑAlbaniasince 2018delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Albania's Albanian Development Fund rehabilitated about 70 km of regional and local roads under a US$50 million loan approved in April 2018, against 55 km planned, after civil works were awarded at up to 48 percent below estimate, with the closing date extended by 18 months to June 2024.
A development fund that has implemented donor-financed roads since 1993 ran competitive bids among local firms, and used the savings to extend the list of roads.
Preconditions
An implementing agency with long donor procurement experience
Enough local contractors to make bidding competitive
A lender willing to let savings extend scope
Limits: This is a small programme of regional road contracts, not a major national build, and it is filed because no official cost or schedule outturn for a larger Albanian project (the Arbri road concession, the Durres to Kukes motorway) was found; it is weak evidence for the construct. The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan. The 55 and 70 km are in para. 12 and para. 58 (printed page 16); the report attributes the savings partly to the Albanian Development Fund's own cost estimation method, which it says overestimated costs, so 'under budget' partly measures a padded estimate. The 18-month extension is on the datasheet and in para. 21; the report cites COVID-19, the 2019 earthquake and land acquisition at Pogradec. 'About 70 km' is approximate in the source, and the source is inconsistent: the summary results table reports 62 km rehabilitated against the 55 km target, while the annex results table and the text give 70 km as of October 2024. The start year is the approval and signing year (2018); the first works date is not stated on the pages read.
North Macedonia's Public Enterprise for State Roads contracted Sinohydro in November 2013 to build the 56.7 km Kicevo to Ohrid section of motorway A2 for EUR411 million by January 2018; by December 2021 five annexes had moved completion to December 2023 and raised the contract value by EUR187 million (45 percent) to EUR598 million, and the State Audit Office found works 72 percent complete by value in August 2023.
The government named a Chinese contractor by statute under a bilateral loan agreement and started construction on an old design, then absorbed the redesign of tunnels, cuttings and landslide sections through successive annexes that raised the price and moved the deadline.
Preconditions
A loan-tied contractor selection that skips competitive tendering
A basic design old enough to be out of step with ground conditions
Parliamentary approval of annexes rather than a fixed-price baseline
Limits: The figures are in a PDF in Macedonian, in the key audit matter section 5.1 (printed pages 25 to 27); the 45 percent increase is also stated in the summary (printed page 4). The road was still under construction when the audit was written, so the record shows an overrun in progress, not an outturn; later annexes and deadlines reported in the press (a further increase and a 2027 deadline) were not checked against an official document. The EUR598 million is the contract value; the audit puts total investment, including expropriation, interest and exchange differences, at about EUR575 million spent by November 2023, and financing at US$685 million in two Chinese loans. The audit attributes the overrun to a basic design drawn up between 2002 and 2010 that did not match the terrain, giving 42 variations, which is the auditor's reading. The contractor was named by a 2013 law rather than chosen by open tender, so the record also reflects a procurement choice. 'Operating' means the build is still running, not that the road is open.
๐ญ๐บHungarysince 2006delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Hungary's State Audit Office reported in September 2010 that the first section of Budapest metro line 4, approved by the capital in September 2004 at a cost of HUF236.5 billion with a deadline of end 2009, was forecast to cost HUF370 billion, 56.4 percent more, and to open in the second half of 2013.
The capital set a deadline in its 2004 permit before permits and land were secured, signed works contracts in 2006 with penalty deadlines it then had to relax, and redesigned stations after an architectural competition while construction was under way.
Preconditions
A financing agreement between city and state that fixed the budget before design was complete
A permit deadline set without reference to the state of technical preparation
Contracts whose penalty dates were linked, so one slip moved all of them
Limits: The figures are in a PDF in Hungarian (summary findings, printed pages 12 to 13, with a chart of planned dates and costs); they are a mid-construction forecast, not the final outturn, and the line's opening in March 2014 and its final cost are not in this source. The auditor attributes part of the increase to scope added after the permit: EU-supported municipal works around stations (HUF39.5 billion), a single-vault station redesign (HUF44.8 billion) and reserves of about 14 percent, so not all of the 56.4 percent is overrun on the same scope. The report's chart puts the opening date in the 1996 feasibility study at 2005, so the delay looks larger against that baseline. The investor was the City of Budapest through its project directorate, with central government paying a large share under a 2004 agreement, so the delivery is a joint municipal and national one. Later OLAF findings on irregularities were not used.
๐ง๐ฌBulgariasince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Bulgaria's Road Infrastructure Agency rehabilitated national roads under a EUR144 million project approved in June 2007, but after budget cuts in 2010 cancelled three lots on about 87 km where works had not started, reducing the length from 450 km to 307 km, and closed in June 2013, two years late, at EUR97.1 million, 67 percent of the appraisal estimate.
The road agency contracted nine regional rehabilitation lots on a loan, then, when the national budget could not cover its co-financing and payments, cancelled the lots not yet started and stretched the rest over two more years.
Preconditions
Co-financing from a national budget exposed to a fiscal shock
Contracts signed before the budget for their full duration was secured
A lender willing to restructure and extend rather than close
Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan, which reproduces the agency's own implementation report as an annex. The 450 to 307 km reduction and the cancelled lots are in section 1.6 (printed page 4); the costs in Annex 1 (page 19); the original and revised closing dates on the datasheet. Spending fell because scope was cut, not because works came in cheap, so the 67 percent is a measure of a shrunken programme, not of savings. The cause the report names is the government's fiscal restraint after the 2008 to 2009 crisis, with 2010 budget funds spent on 2009 obligations, and only 8 to 9 percent of the loan disbursed by mid-2009. These are rehabilitation lots on existing class I to III roads, not a new motorway, and the record says nothing about the EU-funded motorways built in the same years.
๐ช๐ฌEgyptsince 2009still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The Egyptian Electricity Holding Company built the 1,300 MW Ain Sokhna supercritical thermal power plant, with its first unit entering commercial operation on 3 March 2015 and the second on 4 June 2015, at a final cost of US$1,159.4 million against a base cost of US$2,139.6 million estimated at appraisal in 2009.
The state power holding company procured a large thermal plant in a few big packages co-financed by four lenders, priced the appraisal estimate conservatively, and redeployed the savings into grid works.
Preconditions
A state utility with an engineering department experienced in large thermal plants
Co-financing from several development lenders committed before bidding
A market for supercritical boilers and turbines competitive enough to bid below estimate
Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$600 million of the cost, wrote the report. The costs are in Table 1 and para. 23 (ICR pages 8 to 9), the commercial operation dates in para. 20 of the annex on design and implementation; the report says construction was 'initially delayed' but finished 'about when expected' and gives no original target date for commercial operation, so schedule performance rests on that judgement and on the 2015 dates. The ICR does not explain why the plant cost 46 percent less than estimated; a 2013 restructuring had already cut the estimate to US$1,655.3 million, which suggests the 2009 estimate was high rather than that delivery was unusually efficient, and the savings went into a transmission component. That transmission component ran late: it was not finished at the extended loan closing of 31 December 2018 (original closing 31 December 2015), and its final cost was not known. The plant was designed to burn heavy fuel oil as well as gas, which the report says raised its cost and lowered its efficiency against a combined-cycle plant. The status rests on the report's account of operation in 2015 to 2018, not on a current source.
๐ฎ๐ถIraqsince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Iraq's Ministry of Electricity set out in 2007 to restore 400 MW at Hartha power station units 2 and 3 by December 2010 under the Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project, but when the project closed on 30 June 2015 no capacity had been restored, the works were about 70 percent complete, the cost estimate had risen from US$150 million to US$187.62 million with a US$98.97 million financing gap, and the contractor withdrew from the site.
The ministry tried to finish a rehabilitation begun under sanctions by contracting one turnkey supplier to install equipment bought a decade earlier, and when disputes and budget shortfalls stalled the works, it could neither fund a variation nor terminate.
Preconditions
Legacy equipment that tied the contract to bidders familiar with its design
A government budget able to fund variations and security costs, which was missing after the 2014 oil price fall
A contract with clear termination and dispute rules, which the report says were lacking
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated both itself and the borrower unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory, and it says blame for the delays was shared between the ministry and the contractor (para. 53, PDF page 29). The 0 MW and 70 percent figures are in the results table (PDF page 7); the cost table and the US$98.97 million gap are in Annex 1 (PDF page 43); the halt is para. 46 (PDF page 25: 'works have practically stopped'). The cost estimate excludes about US$19 million the government paid for contractor security and an unsettled price adjustment. Much of the failure came from the design: the project had to reuse equipment bought in 1999 under the Oil for Food Programme, which narrowed bidding and bred disputes, and the security situation from 2014 raised costs. The status is 'concluded' because the financed project closed and its result, no capacity restored, stands; it is a delivery failure, not a reversal, since nothing delivered was later lost and the report does not say the rehabilitation was terminated. Whether the ministry later completed the units with its own money was not read at any Iraqi source. The units are part of one station, a modest project by value; the record evidences delivery failure on a rehabilitation, not on a new build.
๐ฑ๐งLebanonsince 2012operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction and the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment built most of a system to bring 250,000 cubic metres a day from the Awali to 1.2 million people in Greater Beirut, but when the World Bank loan closed on 30 April 2025, 106 months after the original June 2016 closing date, no additional water had been delivered, the 24/7 supply reached in a 20,000-customer pilot zone in 2018 had not been maintained, and component costs had risen from US$370 million at approval to US$561.7 million.
The reconstruction council and the regional water utility split a gravity conveyance, treatment and distribution system between them, financed the start with a World Bank loan, and depended on utility surpluses and a second loan for the rest; when the utility's revenue and the state's finances collapsed, the scheme stopped short of delivering water.
Preconditions
A utility with cash surpluses able to co-finance distribution, which disappeared with the 2019 crisis
Parliamentary ratification of loans in time, which failed for the 2018 additional financing
Contract terms that allocate contractor insolvency risk, which the report says were missing
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Highly Unsatisfactory and its own performance Moderately Unsatisfactory. The 106 months are in para. 17; the zero water delivered, the 75, 84 and 89 percent completion of tunnels, pipelines and treatment plant and the 20,000-customer pilot are in Table 2 and paras. 29 to 31 (ICR pages 8 to 9). The US$561.7 million is the project budget at closing printed in Table 3 of the report against US$370 million at appraisal, and matches the sum of the three components in Annex 3 (US$434.0, 112.7 and 15.0 million; page 31) against 294.0, 61.0 and 15.0 at approval. Lebanon's 2019 financial collapse, COVID-19, the 2020 port explosion and a contractor's insolvency all fall inside the delay, so it is not a clean measure of institutional capacity in normal times, and a US$90 million additional financing approved in 2018 lapsed because Lebanon did not make it effective. The erosion is the pilot zone's 24/7 supply, reached in 2018 and lost; that is a small part of the project, and the main failure is non-completion, not loss. A follow-on Second Greater Beirut Water Supply Project was approved on 14 January 2025 to finish the works, so the delivery may still complete. The related Bisri dam, financed under a separate project, was partly cancelled before construction (footnote in para. 8) and is not counted here.
๐ฏ๐ดJordansince 2004delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Jordan's Ministry of Public Works and Housing built the 40 km first phase of the Amman Ring Road under the Amman Development Corridor Project, whose estimated total cost rose from US$160.6 million at appraisal in 2004 to US$455.97 million in March 2013, with the road works alone rising from US$106.92 million to US$279.87 million, while the loan closing date moved from June 2009 to December 2012 and one of three sections was 65 percent complete at closing.
The public works ministry split a 40 km expressway around Amman into three sections financed by three lenders, acquired land late and at rising prices, and absorbed design changes during construction with additional financing rather than rescoping.
Preconditions
A land acquisition budget fixed before prices rose along an announced alignment
Three lenders with separate procurement and supervision rules on one road
A ministry able to fund overruns from the budget, which ran short in the final section
Limits: The World Bank, which financed one of three road sections (with the Arab Fund and the EIB financing the others), wrote the report and rated the outcome, its own performance and the borrower's Moderately Unsatisfactory. The costs are in Annex 1 (printed page 18): land acquisition rose from US$40.9 million to US$158.43 million and is a large part of the overrun, and the latest estimate includes US$42 million of payments due after closing to finish Section 1 and settle bills. Against the 2008 additional-financing estimate of US$343.18 million the overrun is 32 percent, so much of the growth was already recognised mid-project. The 65 percent figure for Section 1 is in the results table; the report says in para. 48 that the road remained uncertain of reaching operation 'when nearly twice the expected construction time has passed', and that the inland port and customs depot were 'gradually dropped'. The text is a scanned 2013 report with OCR errors in the data sheet. When the whole road opened was not read at an official source; 'concluded' means the financed project closed with the road mostly built.
๐ฌ๐ชGeorgiasince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Georgia's Roads Department completed most civil works on the Zemo Osiauri to Chumateleti and Chumateleti to Khevi sections of the East-West Highway across the Rikoti Pass by the project's closing on 30 June 2025, four and a half years after the original loan closing date of 31 December 2020, and the government's own financing rose to US$91.03 million against US$44 million planned for the enlarged project (US$24 million at approval plus US$20 million under the 2017 additional financing).
The Roads Department carried the national east-west highway over its hardest mountain pass in contracts financed by the World Bank and the EIB, and when contracts failed or were re-tendered the government covered the gap from its own budget instead of cutting scope.
Preconditions
A sequence of earlier highway projects that built the Roads Department's contract management
Lenders willing to co-finance tunnels and bridges in seismic mountain terrain
Budget room to nearly quadruple counterpart funding
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory and efficiency Modest. The financing figures are in the data sheet and Table 2 (ICR page 4); the closing-date changes in the restructuring table (paras. 10 to 11) and para. 23. Much of the extra time and government money followed a 2017 decision to add the 11.6 km Chumateleti to Khevi link, co-financed by an EIB loan of EUR 67.47 million, so the plan the outturn is set against grew mid-project; Table 2's component 1 estimates (parent plus additional financing, US$273.48 million including EIB) against actuals (US$359.72 million) give a 32 percent overrun by my own sum, which the report does not state. The report attributes the 18-month extension of 2023 to re-tendering, COVID-19 and mountain construction, and the parallel Fourth East-West Highway project's ICR (2020) records that a Zemo Osiauri to Chumateleti lot was terminated in December 2018 and re-bid under this project. Most civil works were complete at closing, with residual works finished afterwards on government money; the date of full opening was not read at an official source.
๐ฆ๐ฒArmeniasince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Armenia's Ministry of Transport, Communication and Information Technologies reconstructed about 30 km of the M1 Yerevan to Ashtarak and M2 Yerevan to Artashat roads under the first tranche of the ADB-financed North-South Road Corridor programme for an implementation cost of US$68.70 million against US$68.0 million at appraisal, but completed the project on 16 June 2016 against a planned 31 December 2013, after one round of bids was rejected and the M1 section was cut from 18.4 km to about 10 km.
The transport ministry used a multitranche ADB facility to rebuild the national north-south corridor section by section, adjusting each tranche's scope to land acquisition and fiscal limits instead of extending its budget.
Preconditions
A multitranche facility that lets scope move between tranches
A project management unit that also prepares designs and tenders for later tranches
Government readiness to finance gaps when bids come in above estimate
Limits: ADB, the lender, wrote the report. The completion dates and costs are in the basic data table at the front of the PDF (pages 2 to 4); the scope changes are paras. 8 to 16. The 30-month slip from December 2013 to June 2016 is my subtraction from the two dates; the loan closed on 23 February 2018 against 30 June 2014 in the loan agreement. Cost held near appraisal only because the scope moved: the M1 section was cut to about 10 km because of land acquisition, 2 km was transferred to tranche 2 when Armenia hit fiscal limits, and 19.6 km of the M2 was added, so the outturn buys different roads; the combined tranche 1 and 2 works contract was US$10 million above the engineer's estimate and the government undertook to fund overruns (para. 14 and footnote 13). This is the first and smallest tranche of a programme to rebuild a 550 km corridor; later tranches, including the Talin to Gyumri works, were not read, and the programme's overall delivery is not evidenced here.
๐ฆ๐ฟAzerbaijansince 2009delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Azerbaijan's water agencies built water supply and sanitation systems in eight regional (rayon) centres under the Second National Water Supply and Sanitation Project, after a 2012 restructuring cut the scope from 21 rayons to 8 because of cost increases, while the total project cost rose from US$560 million to US$641.8 million and the loan closed on 30 June 2019 instead of 28 February 2013.
The government launched a national programme to rebuild water systems in all regional centres on rough cost estimates, financed slices of it with World Bank loans, and when real costs emerged, cut the number of towns and stretched the timetable instead of finding the money.
Preconditions
Feasibility studies before approval, which were missing here
An implementing utility not already running a dozen donor projects at once
A lender willing to refuse additional financing and force a downsizing
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory. The financing and dates are in the data sheet (ICR pages 1 to 2); the cut from 21 to 8 rayons, the reasons and the closing extensions are in Box 1 (page 8), and footnote 7 attributes the reduction to cost increases and unanticipated investments. The approval cost and the final cost cover different scopes: the original estimates for 43 rayons across both national projects were 'not supported by thorough technical studies', so the 2008 figure was not a real baseline, and a US$150 million additional financing in 2014 paid for design changes required by new government policy (legalised dwellings, EU standards), not only for overruns. Implementation moved from AzerSu to the irrigation agency SAWMA in 2009 and then to its successor company after mis-procurement in Nakhchivan, so 'the country's institutions' here are several, and the record does not separate their performance. People served and service quality are in the report but are not the subject of this record.
๐ฐ๐ฌKyrgyzstansince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
The Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications rehabilitated 50 km of the Osh-Batken-Isfana road corridor, against about 30 km planned at approval in 2009, for a total project cost of US$52.46 million against US$30.72 million estimated, over four years and ten months instead of three, closing on 31 December 2014 instead of 30 June 2013.
The transport ministry's implementation group rehabilitated a corridor section on a World Bank credit and, delivering on budget, was given two additional financings to extend the works along the same road.
Preconditions
An implementation unit with a track record on other donors' road projects
A lender that rewards delivery with additional financing on the same corridor
A corridor whose remaining sections were already designed
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36), the 30 km plan in para. 1.5.2, the 50 km outturn in para. 3.2.2, and the schedule in para. 1.7.2. Most of the cost rise followed added scope: two additional financings added road length and the repair of about 350 km of Osh urban roads, both paid from the road component (US$27.29 million estimated, US$50.27 million actual), so no cost per kilometre of the corridor can be computed from the report and the record cannot separate overrun from added scope. The 18-month extension also followed the added scope. This is a 50 km rehabilitation, small against the country's network, and it says nothing about larger state-financed builds; no Kyrgyz audit was read.
๐ฎ๐ทIransince 2000delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
The Tehran Sewerage Company built interceptors, trunk mains, tunnels and a wastewater treatment plant under the first phase of the Tehran Sewerage Project at a latest estimated cost of US$359.22 million against US$341.45 million at appraisal in 2000, with the treatment works costing 189 percent of their estimate and the loan closing on 30 June 2008, two years late, before the plant and the eastern trunk main were finished.
The capital's sewerage company built the network in parallel with a design-build-operate contract for the treatment plant, letting the network race ahead on cheap domestic pipe while the plant ran late and over budget under inflation and a foreign-currency contract.
Preconditions
A domestic pipe industry able to supply at falling prices
Counterpart funds indexed for inflation, which were short here
A foreign-currency contract hedged against a weakening rial, which it was not
Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$145 million, wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The component costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36); the US$28.7 million funding shortfall, high inflation (12 to 24 percent a year) and a euro-denominated plant contract as the cause of the two-year extension are in para. 50 (PDF page 20). The total stayed near the estimate only because interceptors and laterals came in at 61 percent of estimate while the trunk main (178 percent) and treatment works (189 percent) overran, so the aggregate hides the overrun on the hardest parts. The plant and the eastern trunk main were unfinished at closing, and the report says only that the company had resources to finish them; completion was not read at a current source. The figures are 2000 to 2008 and say little about Iranian delivery under sanctions since.
๐ท๐บRussiasince 2014delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Russia's Accounts Chamber found in June 2020 that the state company Avtodor's Central Ring Road project, whose first stage was originally to be built in 2014 to 2018 and was now scheduled for 2014 to 2021, had risen in cost by 2.6 billion roubles in 2019 to 315.9 billion roubles, and that launch complexes 1 and 5 were only 49 and 61 percent complete on 1 January 2020.
The federal road company procured a ring road around Moscow as long-term investment concessions, financed by the National Wealth Fund, budget subsidies and investors, and as works lagged the government extended deadlines and the Accounts Chamber audited the project year by year.
Preconditions
A sovereign wealth fund able to buy the state road company's bonds
Concession contracts with enforceable milestones, which the audits found weakly policed
An audit office that publishes a check of the same project each year
Limits: The live ach.gov.ru did not answer a script today, so the cited copy is the Internet Archive's of 15 September 2020. The page is the audit office's summary of its check, not the full report, and it does not state the original cost, so the record shows cost growth in one year, not the full cost overrun against an approved baseline; the schedule baseline is in the page's footnote, which gives the construction period of the first stage as 2014 to 2021, originally 2014 to 2018; the Chamber's 5 August 2015 release on the same project (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20210717054203/https://ach.gov.ru/news/sredstva-fonda-nacionalnogo-blagosostoyaniya-napravlennye-na-stroitelstvo-ckad-ne-ispolzuyutsya-v-po-22619) says construction of complexes 1 and 5 had not started a year after their agreements were signed and that National Wealth Fund money sat unused in a bank. The road is a concession-based project of a state company with private investors (33.8 billion roubles of 186.5 billion invested by end 2019), so delivery is partly private. The 2014 start is the year of the first concession agreements cited by the 2015 release. Status 'concluded' assumes the ring opened in the years after the audit; no official source for the final opening date or final cost was read, which is the record's main weakness.
Papua New Guinea's Department of Works restored or maintained 600 km of national roads against a 640 km target under the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, closing in June 2012 five and a half years after the original December 2006 closing date, with national road works under the original loan costing US$35.62 million, 158 percent of their US$22.52 million appraisal estimate.
The works department ran a lender-financed maintenance and restoration programme on national and provincial roads, absorbed a cost surge on roads by cutting bridges, and extended the programme twice.
Preconditions
Local contractors able to bid for maintenance packages
Provincial governments with budgets to co-fund their share
A lender willing to restructure scope inside a fixed envelope
Limits: The component costs are in Annex 1 (project cost by component, original loan) and the dates and road lengths on the datasheet (sections B and F), read from the plain-text version. The appraisal figure excludes VAT and the actual includes it, so part of the 158 percent is a tax difference the table itself flags. Total project cost was on budget (US$58.21 million against US$58.78 million) because bridge components were cut, so the overrun on roads was paid for by building fewer bridges: provincial bridges spent 11 percent of their estimate. The ICR attributes the road cost rise to the construction boom from the PNG LNG project and to sealing more gravel roads than planned. The World Bank rated the outcome Satisfactory, and the programme is maintenance and rehabilitation rather than one new structure. The cost comparison covers the original IBRD loan only; a 2007 IDA additional financing scaled the programme to two more provinces and extended it, and its national road works also overran, at US$40.86 million against US$28.72 million (142 percent, Annex 1 table b), so the June 2012 closing reflects added scope as well as delay. The government paid US$2.28 million of the US$25.07 million counterpart planned at appraisal, with provinces and other donors covering part of the gap.
๐ฑ๐ฆLaossince 1997delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Laos's Ministry of Communication, Transport, Post and Construction upgraded about 200 km of Road No. 13 between Banlak 35 and Pakse to a bituminous standard, completed in March 2002, at US$157,785 per km against an appraisal estimate of US$209,670 per km, and the project closed on its original June 2003 date at US$63.78 million against US$68.92 million appraised.
The transport ministry upgraded a 200 km trunk road under two international contracts and ran a multi-year routine and periodic maintenance programme alongside it.
Preconditions
International competitive bidding that attracted capable contractors
A maintenance fund to protect the upgraded road
Grant finance from a second donor for bridges
Limits: The unit costs are in section 4.3 of the ICR and the totals in Annex 2 (printed page 30), read from the plain-text version; the record states the two published unit costs and does not compute a percentage. The saving is on unit cost, not on the road works line: Annex 2 shows Roads No. 13 and A-1 at US$34.58 million against US$33.45 million appraised even though the A-1 bypass was removed and financed under another project, and the project total came in under appraisal only because physical and price contingencies of US$9.96 million were not needed (actual US$63.78 million against a US$58.96 million baseline before contingencies). The Annex 3 table labels both unit costs 'Calendar 2002 US$ per km' and puts the contract cost at US$153,785, so the actual came in at 103 percent of contract; the 25 percent saving is against the appraisal estimate, which was set before the 1997 Asian crisis and may have been pessimistic. Actual construction took 45 months against 42 contracted, 7 percent longer. Annex 2 prints 88 percent beside the road works line although its own figures give 103 percent, so the table is not internally consistent. JICA separately financed 44 bridges on the road, about six of whose approaches still showed unacceptable settlement. The World Bank wrote and rated the report, and it describes a delivery finished more than 20 years ago.
๐ฒ๐ณMongoliasince 2017delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Mongolia's Ministry of Energy and its distribution companies rehabilitated the Baganuur and Erdenet-Bulgan distribution networks and built a 10 MWp solar plant in the Western Energy System under the Second Energy Sector Project, spending US$53.35 million against a US$55.40 million appraisal estimate but closing in August 2024, 25 months after the original September 2022 closing date.
The energy ministry split a lender-financed programme into distribution upgrades run by regional companies and one turnkey solar plant, kept costs inside the envelope and took two extensions to finish.
Preconditions
Regional distribution companies able to act as implementing units
Grant co-finance for the renewable component
A lender willing to extend rather than cancel
Limits: The cost and date figures are in section 2e of the IEG review (pages 2 to 3), read from the plain-text version; the full ICR was not opened. IEG attributes 18 of the 25 months to subprojects added in the western system at the 2022 restructuring and seven months to inefficiencies, with COVID-19 equipment delays, government changes after elections and procurement problems named as causes, so roughly seven months is slippage on the original scope. The planned US$1.0 million borrower contribution was cancelled, so the project was wholly grant financed. The project is mid-sized, about US$55 million, so it shows delivery on a modest programme rather than on Mongolia's flagship builds such as the new Ulaanbaatar airport, for which no completion figures were found. The solar plant was reported operational in 2022, ahead of the formal closing, so the schedule figure mostly concerns the distribution works. IEG rated the outcome Satisfactory.
๐ณ๐ฟNew Zealandsince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
City Rail Link Limited, owned by the Crown and Auckland Council, achieved practical completion of Auckland's 3.45 km underground City Rail Link on 30 June 2026 against a target delivery cost of NZ$5,493 million, up from a NZ$3.4 billion estimate made in 2014, and the line opened to the public on 13 September 2026, after its company had planned completion for late 2024.
The Crown and Auckland Council set up a jointly owned delivery company, let the main stations and tunnels to an alliance, and re-baselined the budget twice as costs rose rather than cutting scope.
Preconditions
A sponsor agreement splitting cost 50:50 between national and local government
An alliance contract that shares cost risk with the builders
Political tolerance for re-baselining a flagship project
Limits: The NZ$5,493 million and the 30 June 2026 practical completion are in the 2025/26 annual report, a Word document; the 13 September 2026 opening is on the company's home page (https://www.cityraillink.co.nz/). The NZ$3.4 billion 2014 estimate and the 'late 2024' completion plan come from the company's cost page as archived on 26 January 2023 (https://web.archive.org/web/20230126164501/https://www.cityraillink.co.nz/city-rail-link-cost-timeline), which also gives the April 2019 revision to NZ$4.419 billion; the live page no longer carries them. The 62 percent increase over the 2014 estimate is our calculation and mixes price bases: the company attributes the 2019 rise to construction inflation, a larger contingency and a scope change for nine-car trains. Total spend to 30 June 2026 was NZ$5,283 million against approved funding of NZ$5,644 million, and the company reports itself within budget, which is true only against the 2019 and later baselines. The company is reporting on itself; no Auditor-General review of the outturn was opened. 'Started' is the year main works began, which the cited report does not state.
๐น๐ฏTajikistansince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery
The Government of Tajikistan resumed construction of the Soviet-era Rogun hydropower plant in 2007 from the state budget, signed the main dam contract in 2016 and commissioned two temporary units (400 MW) in 2018 and 2019. It invested about US$3.3 billion in 2007 to 2022, and in November 2024 the World Bank put the cost to complete the plant at US$6.29 billion, with construction completion moved to 2033 and full reservoir impoundment not before 2039, 63 years after construction first began in 1976.
The Tajik government restarted a stalled Soviet megaproject from its own budget and a Eurobond, brought two temporary turbines online early to earn revenue during construction, then used World Bank-backed safety and environmental studies to draw in a donor financing package for the rest.
Preconditions
A site with Soviet-era works, surveys and tunnels already in place
A state willing to divert a large share of GDP to one project for over a decade
Riparian water agreements and an independent dam-safety review credible enough for international lenders
Limits: No cost overrun can be computed: the appraisal document gives no original budget or baseline completion date to set the US$6.29 billion against, so the gap's unit (percent overrun) is not met. The US$6.29 billion is a forward estimate of remaining cost with contingencies, not an outturn, and adding it to the US$3.3 billion already spent is our arithmetic, not the Bank's. The schedule slip is our reading of milestone dates: construction began in 1976, the Soviet works stopped in 1992, and completion is now 2033 with impoundment in 2039. The Bank itself expects 'some further delays' to the March 2024 milestones. It attributes slow progress to financing shortfalls. The source is the lender's appraisal for its own grant, written to justify financing. The project is now financed by ten development partners, so delivery after 2024 is shared rather than purely Tajik. Spending close to 39 percent of GDP and a US$500 million Eurobond left the country at high risk of debt distress. 'Operating' means two temporary units run, not that the 3,780 MW plant is built.
๐ฉ๐ฐDenmarksince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Denmark set up Kvalitetsfonden in 2007 to fund a new hospital structure. Through it the regions are building or rebuilding 16 hospitals with a combined investment frame of about DKK 57 billion (2023 prices). Rigsrevisionen reported in November 2023 that the programme's largest overrun, Nyt Hospital Nordsjรฆlland, had its budget raised by DKK 2.3 billion, or 44 percent, and was expected six years later than planned.
Parliament created a state fund that gave each region a fixed, inflation-indexed grant frame per hospital and made the regions carry any overrun. The health ministry supervised changes against the grant conditions, and Rigsrevisionen audited the projects repeatedly while they were being built.
Preconditions
A 2007 structural reform that created five regions large enough to act as client for a multi-billion-krone building
A national decision to concentrate acute care in fewer, larger hospitals, which fixed the scope in advance
An audit office and a parliamentary audit committee that report on projects while they are still under construction
Where else it has been used: Norway's hospital trusts and the Netherlands' hospital rebuild programmes used fixed regional frames in a similar way. In the Danish case the largest single-site projects still ran over.
Limits: The headline 44 percent belongs to one project, the worst in the programme, so it is not the programme's cost performance. The report gives no programme-wide overrun in its text. Figure 2 of the same report lists original and latest budgets in 2009 prices for 15 of the 16 projects, leaving out Nyt Hospital Bispebjerg, whose budget had not been published. Summed by hand, the 15 come to about DKK 43.9 billion against frames of DKK 39.2 billion, roughly 12 percent over. That is our calculation from chart labels, not a published figure. Several projects held their frame partly by cutting scope through savings catalogues, which Rigsrevisionen criticised in Beretning 11/2019 and its follow-ups. A frame that holds after cuts is not a delivery on time and on specification. 2007 is the year the fund was set up. Grants were confirmed project by project afterwards (2013 for Nordsjรฆlland), so construction started years after 2007. The programme is unfinished: Rigsrevisionen's January 2025 follow-up still counted seven projects under construction, six of them under heightened ministry supervision, so final outturns are not known. The figure is a budget forecast in 2023 prices and is reported as a region's estimate, not an audited final account.
๐จ๐ฟCzechiasince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Czechia's Road and Motorway Directorate (ลSD) rebuilt 160.8 km of the D1 motorway between Miroลกovice and Kรฝvalka in 20 sections from April 2013, reopening the last sections in October 2021, three years later than the 2012 schedule, with costs projected at CZK 29.844 billion including the ล mejkalka bridge against CZK 28.208 billion planned.
The Road and Motorway Directorate rebuilt the country's main Prague to Brno motorway section by section with traffic still running. The Ministry of Transport approved 20 separate section projects instead of one programme budget, and EU cohesion funds paid CZK 14.0 billion of the cost.
Preconditions
EU Operational Programme Transport co-financing for two budget periods, which paid half the cost
A road agency able to tender and supervise many concurrent section contracts, and a ministry that never set a binding overall schedule or budget
A permit appeal process that averaged 444 days per contested section, which set the pace more than construction did
Limits: The cost figure looks good only because of the baseline it is compared with. The 2012 plan of CZK 28.208 billion was never approved: the audit office says the Ministry of Transport rejected the summary investment plan and approved 20 separate section projects, with no binding overall budget or schedule. The roughly 6 percent overrun is our computation from two published totals, in nominal crowns, with no inflation adjustment. The final cost is unknown. The audit office says the figure is not final, several sections had not been financially settled, and the ล mejkalka bridge cost is a forecast for work planned from 2022 to 2026. Against an earlier baseline the project looks worse. The audit office's 2017 release (audit 16/06) gave the expected total as CZK 20.5 billion and found unit costs up 73 percent, from CZK 74 to 128 million per km, between the 2013 sections and those begun in 2015 and 2016. The three-year slip is measured to the August 2021 schedule, which ลSD revised 73 times. In November 2022 eight sections still lacked final approval, and nine bridges and three overpasses were in poor or very poor condition. The audit says the modernisation is not complete, so a later finish date would lengthen the slip. This is a rebuild of an existing motorway kept open to traffic, not a new build. The audit looked closely at only five sections, worth CZK 6.792 billion, and a cyber attack on ลSD's systems limited what auditors could see. The figures are ลSD's own, reviewed by the auditor, not independently measured.
Papua New Guinea's Independent Public Business Corporation, using ADB and OPEC Fund loans, built the first phase of the Lae tidal basin, a new berth and container terminal at the port of Lae, between April 2012 and December 2014. It was about four years later than planned and cost $310.4 million, against a $154 million project at the 2007 approval.
The government had its state enterprise holding company, IPBC, borrow concessionally from ADB and the OPEC Fund. IPBC procured a single design-and-build contract for reclamation, berth and terminal, and the Morobe Provincial Administration ran the livelihood programme for displaced settlers and the Labu community.
Preconditions
Multilateral lenders willing to add $89 million of financing in 2011 when geotechnical findings broke the original design
A resettlement plan acceptable to settler households on government land and to the Labu villages
A state port company with tariff revenue to service the debt, which the validation doubted
Limits: The headline 7 percent overrun is against a 2011 revised estimate that had already absorbed $137.4 million of design changes found by later geotechnical work. Against the $154 million package approved in 2007 the increase is about 100 percent. That is our computation and is not like for like, because the scope grew. The validation reports civil works costs up 116 percent and involuntary resettlement costs up 3,590 percent against appraisal. Figures are nominal US dollars. The evaluator is the lender's own evaluation department, validating a completion report the lender wrote. It rated the project less than successful overall, less than effective, less than efficient and less than likely sustainable. The validation attributes the four-year delay to the combination of post-approval design changes and resettlement: 482 settler households on government marshland and a landing site used by three Labu villages, for which a supplementary resettlement plan acceptable to the affected communities had to be prepared. The contractors were foreign: a Korean design-build consultant and China Harbour Engineering. The national institutions' role was procurement, finance and resettlement. A post-completion audit found siltation back to 11 m below chart datum, from the dredged 14 m, at the basin's western entrance. The source says it appeared to have stabilised and does not report lost berth capacity. We have not treated it as an eroded delivery, but a reviewer could. The validation finds handling capacity of 2.0 million revenue tons a year, above the 1.4 million target, so the cost and delay bought a working asset. One project says nothing about PNG's record on other major works.
๐ฌ๐ทGreecesince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Greece procured 744 km of motorway as three PPP concessions that commenced in 2008; after works were suspended in 2011 and the contracts were renegotiated in 2013 and 2015, the European Court of Auditors found the three projects delayed by four years on average, their combined cost per km up 36 percent, from 9.1 to 12.4 million euro, and the planned road length cut to 486 km.
The Greek state bundled several hundred kilometres of motorway into three design-build-finance-operate concessions, transferred traffic risk to the concessionaires, and paid toll-backed private finance plus EU co-financing; when traffic collapsed the state renegotiated, deferred sections and paid about 1.2 billion euro more rather than stop the works.
Preconditions
Access to EU cohesion co-financing large enough to fill a renegotiated financing gap
A parliament willing to ratify concession contracts in the absence of a general concession law
Contracts signed before archaeology, permits and land expropriation were settled, which is what turned the crisis into public liability
Where else it has been used: Spain's A-1 and C-25 concessions, audited in the same report, were renegotiated soon after signature at a public cost of about 300 million euro, a smaller version of the same pattern.
Limits: This is a record of poor cost and schedule performance, not of good delivery, and it is filed because the gap asks for exactly that figure. The 36 percent is a cost per km, and it mixes two movements: the absolute cost of the Central motorway fell (2,375 to 1,594 million euro) while its length was cut by 55 percent, and Olympia's length was cut by 45 percent, so per-km cost rises partly because fixed and financial costs were spread over fewer kilometres. It is not a like-for-like overrun on a fixed scope. Table 3 of the report shows the combined total project cost of the three concessions falling from 6,743 million euro (2,375 + 2,825 + 1,543) to 6,004 million euro (1,594 + 2,619 + 1,791) as length fell from 744 to 486 km, so the 36 percent per-km increase coincides with an absolute cost about 11 percent lower on a 35 percent smaller scope. The ECA computed the figures from information provided by the Greek authorities and audited only three of the five second-wave concessions (Aegean and Nea Odos are not covered). The completion dates in Table 2 are labelled estimated/actual as of the audit, so the four-year average includes forecasts for the Central and Olympia sections due in August 2017. The ECA attributes much of the cost to the 2009 financial crisis, under which traffic fell around 50 percent below the lenders' worst case, and to the public partner's poor preparation (archaeology, environmental permits, expropriation): the record cannot separate those causes. The deferred northern and southern sections of E-65 and the deferred Olympia stretches were taken out of these contracts; whatever was built later under other contracts is not in this number. The report is from 2018. The ECA also records that Greece's PPP route procured 744 km in three tenders where the earlier 82 km of Olympia took up to 20 years and 31 procurements, which is the strongest point in the programme's favour.
๐ฆ๐ฟAzerbaijansince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Azerbaijan's road administration upgraded 94 km of the M4 Baku-Shamakhi highway to a four-lane road and built 48 km of new M3 motorway under the World Bank-financed Third Highway Project, at US$2.47 million per km against US$2.96 million estimated at appraisal, with the loan closing in March 2021 instead of March 2015.
The road administration borrowed from the World Bank for a defined corridor, accepted the lender's procurement and engineering review, held to the original alignment instead of the ministry's costlier viaduct proposal, and reused savings by adding a motorway section through restructuring.
Preconditions
Access to multilateral lending with appraisal estimates that create a published baseline
A road agency able to procure and supervise several works contracts at once
Works contracts in local currency, which turned a devaluation into a dollar saving
Limits: The completion report is the lender's own evaluation of its loan, drafted with the borrower's data. The cost saving is not mainly efficiency: the report says the lower dollar outcome is mainly attributable to the manat losing more than half its value in 2015 to 2017 while works contracts were priced in local currency, so in local terms the project may have overrun. The 72-month slip is computed here from the two closing dates; the scope also changed twice (the M3 section added, part of the M4 dropped in a landslide zone), and the report concedes the final extension may have been avoidable, so not all of it is construction delay. The efficiency rating is only Modest. It is one corridor of 142 km, with a lender supervising procurement, so it is weak evidence about Azerbaijan's road programme outside donor projects.
๐ง๐ฌBulgariasince 2008dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Bulgaria's state utility NEK ordered long-lead reactor equipment for the Belene nuclear plant from Atomstroyexport in 2008. The project was cancelled before any unit was completed, and on 6 December 2016 the Ministry of Energy transferred 601,617,133 euros to NEK so it could pay the damages awarded against it in ICC arbitration case 18086/GZ/MHM.
601,617,133 EUR, state financial assistance transferred to nek to pay the belene arbitration award to atomstroyexport, 2016-12-06. 1,400,000,000 BGN, costs incurred on the belene construction to date, as stated by the minister of energy, 2016. Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Bulgaria, press release of 6 December 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.
The move, and what it needed
NEK, the state utility, ordered long-lead reactor equipment from a single foreign vendor in 2008 before financing or a final contract price was settled. The government cancelled the project in 2012, the Ministry of Energy advanced NEK repayable assistance in 2016 to pay the vendor's arbitration claim, and the project was revived in 2018.
Preconditions
A state utility allowed to commit to equipment orders before the project's financing was closed
Political control of the decision that changed with each government
A single-vendor contract enforceable in international arbitration
Limits: Belene never produced electricity, so this record documents a delivery that failed before it operated, not a capability that eroded. The headline number is a termination cost, the arbitration damages for equipment ordered in 2008, and not a cost overrun against a budget: the record carries no official baseline budget or schedule for the 2008 phase. The 1.4 billion leva of costs incurred comes from a minister speaking in a television interview. The ministry republished the transcript without a printed date; the 2016 year is inferred from the special assistance law the interview discusses. It is not an audited figure. The project was decided in April 2005, cancelled in March 2012, and revived by a National Assembly decision of 7 June 2018 and a Council of Ministers decision of 29 June 2018. Later decisions on the site and the equipment are not covered by these sources. The 601.6 million euros was advanced to NEK as repayable assistance, not a grant, so the final fiscal loss is not shown here. The later disposal or reuse of the equipment the payment bought is not covered.
๐ง๐พBelarussince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Belarus started building its first nuclear power plant at Ostrovets in November 2013, a two-unit WWER-1200 plant totalling 2,400 MW. Its regulator's 2019 report scheduled unit 1 for 2019 and unit 2 for 2020. Unit 1 was commissioned in 2021 and unit 2 in October 2023, three years after the 2019 schedule.
The Belarusian state chose a single foreign state vendor to build a reference design turnkey, and built up a domestic regulator and operator in parallel under a sequence of IAEA review missions, accepting slippage on the vendor's schedule.
Preconditions
A strategic partner state willing to supply design, construction and credit together
A centralised state able to hold a decade-long build through political and diplomatic opposition
A reference plant of the same design already being built abroad (Leningrad NPP-2)
Limits: This is a schedule figure only. The record carries no official budget or final cost for the plant, so cost performance is unknown. The slip is measured against a schedule that the 2019 report itself calls 'updated'. This record uses the 2019 schedule because it is the one stated in an official source. The schedule is given in years, not months, so the three-year slip for unit 2 is approximate. The 2019 schedule speaks of commissioning while the 2023 figure is the start of commercial operation, so the two milestones may not be identical. Both figures come from the Belarusian regulator reporting on its own country's flagship project. The plant was built turnkey on a Russian design, financed from the republican budget and a Russian state export credit, as the 2019 national report states. The delivery is therefore only partly attributable to Belarusian institutions: they decided, licensed, supervised, financed and now operate it. The source does not show capacity factors or outages after commissioning.
๐ฐ๐ฌKyrgyzstansince 2002delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
The Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications completed the third and final phase of the Bishkek-Osh road rehabilitation in July 2007, bringing the rehabilitated length of the only internal surface connection between Bishkek and Osh to 463 km, with a 31.7 percent cost overrun on base cost items and civil works finished 33 months after the October 2004 appraisal schedule.
The Kyrgyz government, through the Ministry of Transport and Communications and a project implementation unit staffed by local consultants experienced on the earlier phases, rehabilitated its only north-south trunk road in phases over a decade, financing each phase with an ADB concessional loan and a counterpart share.
Preconditions
A concessional lender willing to finance the same corridor three times in succession
An implementation unit staffed by local consultants experienced on the earlier phases
Counterpart and maintenance funding from a small budget, which arrived late and only after the works ended
Limits: The record covers phase three only: 120 km of the Bishkek-Osh road and 125 km of secondary roads, not the two earlier phases. The 31.7 percent is on base cost items and is driven by the secondary roads and an added bridge ($7.6 million of the $13.6 million); main-road civil works ran 11.6 percent over per km, and total project cost rose from $50.0 million to $57.1 million, about 14 percent, because contingencies and currency gains absorbed part of the overrun. The 33 months is computed from two dates in the text, and 22 of the delay months came before construction, in loan effectiveness and bidding against a 7-month plan; one civil works contract was terminated and the supervision consultant was sanctioned. The road was 80 percent financed by an ADB concessional loan, and the validation is ADB's evaluation office reviewing ADB's own completion report; it rated the project 'less effective' pending a later performance evaluation that this record does not carry. Traffic grew about 4 percent a year against a forecast of 6 to 7, accidents rose in number and severity after the works, and the road maintenance funding covenants were not met until 2007, so nothing here shows the condition of the road today.