Each record describes something a country built that the indicators miss. The source provides the number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 204 of 204 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Chile runs Mercado Público as a shared e-procurement platform; in 2024 it transacted US$17.643 billion through 2,031,670 purchase orders involving 110,255 participating suppliers.
ChileCompra set common tender rules, a digital marketplace and open transaction records so public agencies could buy from a broad supplier base through one visible channel rather than each agency maintaining a separate procurement system.
Preconditions
A central procurement authority with the mandate to standardise rules across agencies
An online market, supplier registry and transaction data that can be audited by buyers, firms and civil society
Enough public purchasing volume and digital capability for suppliers to justify participating in a shared platform
Where it travelled: National e-procurement portals are widely copied. The Chilean case shows that a large transaction count is only a platform capability: integrity, SME access and value for money still need separate outcome measures and active oversight.
Limits: The report's totals describe purchase-order commitments rather than payments, and they are operator-reported. They show the reach of a common market, not whether procurement is cheaper, more competitive, more innovative or less corrupt, nor whether small suppliers receive an equitable share. The supplier classification is based on administrative data and does not establish the quality or delivery of the contracts awarded.
🇨🇱Chilesince 2010still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration
Since 2010, Start-Up Chile has supported more than 2,500 startups from Chile and abroad through an equity-free public accelerator that connects founders with investors, mentors and corporates.
CORFO supplied equity-free early funding, a landing platform and a founder network while private investors, mentors and corporates supplied market knowledge, follow-on capital and commercial links. The state used a public accelerator to widen the pipeline rather than trying to pick every winning company itself.
Preconditions
A capable public agency able to run competitive selection and portfolio support
A startup pipeline, visa or landing arrangements and enough market access to attract international founders
Private investors, mentors and corporates willing to provide complements after public entry support
Where it travelled: Public accelerators can travel to places trying to build an innovation ecosystem, but the model needs a credible pipeline and follow-on private capital. A large alumni count without local links or survival evidence can become a branding programme rather than durable capability.
Limits: The programme's portfolio count is self-reported and records support, not startup survival, additionality or the share of value retained in Chile. It does not show whether public funding displaced private investment, whether benefits reached domestic firms or how outcomes compare with other accelerators. The equity-free model and network describe an intervention, not proof of a causal economic return.
After the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, Chile's reconstruction programme repaired or replaced more than 223,000 homes across seven regions; MINVU reported 99.93% progress by February 2020 and changed protocols, seismic standards and risk-mitigation requirements.
223,000 homes repaired or replaced, homes repaired or replaced in 27f reconstruction, 2020. 99.93 % of reconstruction programme, reported progress of 27f reconstruction programme, 2020. Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU), 27F reconstruction report, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
Chile coordinated a multi-region housing and urban recovery programme through national standards, subsidies and local delivery, then used the reconstruction experience to revise emergency protocols, seismic requirements and mitigation practice.
Preconditions
A national housing ministry with the budget and authority to coordinate across regions and municipalities
Construction and engineering standards suited to earthquake and tsunami risk
A damage register, delivery pipeline and feedback from the recovery effort that can be converted into changed rules
Where it travelled: Post-disaster reconstruction programmes often travel as templates, but the Chilean lesson is the feedback loop: speed and volume matter, while durable preparedness depends on turning delivery failures and field experience into enforceable standards before the next shock.
Limits: The housing and progress figures are government-reported and do not independently verify build quality, equitable access, long-term habitability or whether risk was reduced for every community. A programme marked 99.93% complete is not evidence that every livelihood, public facility or ecosystem recovered, and the final homes were still in execution at the time of the 2020 report.
Chile launched the integrated Transantiago bus–metro system in 2007; an independent 2016–19 evaluation found the state subsidy per passenger fare rose from CLP 640 per CLP 1,000 paid in 2016 to CLP 790 in 2019 even as passenger production rose 7%.
790 CLP subsidy per CLP 1,000 passenger fare, state subsidy per clp 1,000 passenger fare, 2019. 640 CLP subsidy per CLP 1,000 passenger fare, state subsidy per clp 1,000 passenger fare, 2016. DIPRES, independent evaluation of the National Public Transport Subsidy, retrieved 2026-08-31.
The move, and what it needed
The state integrated bus routes and metro under concessions and used subsidies to stabilise fares, but the evaluation exposed weak outcome baselines and growing fiscal dependence. The case shows why a complex service reform needs a measurable fallback plan as well as a unified operating design.
Preconditions
A unified transport authority able to coordinate routes, metro, fares and concession contracts
Reliable passenger, coverage, cost and service-quality baselines before the reform begins
Contract and contingency mechanisms that can be revised when demand, operations or fiscal exposure diverge from plan
Where it travelled: Integrated transport reforms are common worldwide. Transantiago travels as a caution that coordination and physical integration do not substitute for outcome measurement, realistic demand assumptions and contracts that preserve room to correct course.
Limits: The subsidy ratio is not the system's total cost, a schedule overrun or a direct measure of service quality. The evaluation reported missing coverage baselines and global outcome indicators, and the transport network continued operating under later reforms and branding. Rising subsidy dependence is a warning about delivery and contract design, not proof that one institutional choice caused every passenger or fiscal problem.