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NCBNational Capability Benchmark
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Challenge the benchmark

Choose a score and give the benchmark a specific reason to reconsider it.

The selected score and confidence are read from the current country file when you submit.

Submissions are public and start as awaiting review. A maintainer can add a response and signature after review.

What countries built

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators miss. The source provides the number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 204 of 204 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

6 of 204 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Irelandsince 2019still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

National Broadband Plan rural fibre rollout

Ireland's National Broadband Plan combined commercial investment with a state intervention contract for rural areas covering more than 560,000 premises; by October 2024 the government reported over 102,600 premises connected to the National Broadband Ireland network.

102,600 premises (over), state-intervention premises connected, 2024-10. 560,000 premises (over), premises in the state-intervention area, 2020. Government of Ireland, National Broadband Plan benefits and rollout update, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

The state defined a universal-service gap, subsidised a network builder in that gap and left commercially viable areas to private operators. A single contract, a published intervention map and connection points for community facilities let public policy steer private construction without requiring the state to own every fibre asset.

Preconditions

  • A reliable map distinguishing commercial coverage from premises no operator will serve
  • A procurement and subsidy contract with milestones, open access and clawback protections
  • An independent regulator able to monitor build quality, wholesale access and consumer take-up

Where it travelled: The NBP travels as a gap-subsidy model: public money can extend private networks, but the benchmark must separate premises passed, connected and using the service so a rollout headline does not become a coverage claim.

Limits: The connection count is a rollout snapshot, not completion of the national plan or a measure of connection quality, take-up, affordability or economic impact. The state-intervention area is a target geography and the programme's future milestones can move with construction, demand and commercial coverage; premises passed and premises connected are different stages.

Adaptability

4 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Irelandsince 2015still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

MyGovID single sign-on for public services

Ireland built MyGovID as a reusable online identity for welfare, tax, transport, education and childcare services; the 2025 Digital Decade country report records more than 2.7 million verified accounts in December 2024, close to 65% of adults.

2,700,000 accounts (over), verified mygovid accounts, 2024-12. 65 % of adults (close to), verified accounts as share of adults, 2024-12. European Commission, Digital Decade 2025 Ireland country report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Ireland joined identity verification run by the Department of Social Protection to a common sign-on adopted by other departments, so each service could reuse one assurance process rather than issue its own credentials. The account layer makes cross-department integration visible to citizens while leaving service ownership distributed.

Preconditions

  • A national identity-verification process that can be reused by multiple departments
  • A stable personal service number and legal basis for linking benefits and tax services
  • A central product owner with authority to set authentication and accessibility standards

Where it travelled: MyGovID travels as a government-wide identity pattern: a single sign-on only joins services when the back-end data, assurance rules and fallback routes are coordinated as carefully as the login screen.

Limits: Verified accounts are a reach measure, not proof that every service is available or easy to use. The account requires identity-verification steps and a Public Services Card or equivalent route, and the adult-share denominator excludes children and people who remain offline; one account can also be used for many services without showing the quality of those transactions.

Irelandsince 2020delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

National COVID-19 vaccination delivery

Ireland's HSE vaccination programme built a national booking, supply and reporting operation during COVID-19; by 21 July 2021 its dashboard recorded 5,344,686 administered doses, including 2,854,040 first doses.

5,344,686 doses, covid-19 vaccine doses administered, 2021-07-21. 2,854,040 first doses, covid-19 vaccine first doses administered, 2021-07-21. Health Service Executive, COVID-19 vaccination programme dashboard, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Ireland combined HSE clinics, general practitioners, pharmacies, a central registration process and national data reporting under one prioritisation strategy. The shared dashboard let planners see supply and administration together while local providers supplied the last mile.

Preconditions

  • A health service able to allocate scarce doses through a published national priority order
  • Cold-chain logistics and a common reporting system linking hospitals, GPs, pharmacies and clinics
  • Trusted clinical advice that can change eligibility and dosing rules without fragmenting delivery

Where it travelled: The vaccination pattern travels as a federated emergency operation: a central queue and data standard can coordinate many providers, but the last-mile workforce and supply contracts determine whether the plan becomes injections.

Limits: The July 2021 dashboard is an interim administrative snapshot and warns that recorded totals lag some GP vaccinations. Dose counts measure throughput, not equitable access, protection, adverse events or the speed of the programme's later phases; the campaign also depended on global supply and changing clinical guidance.

Irelandsince 2009still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

National Asset Management Agency crisis workout

Ireland created NAMA in response to the property and banking crisis, acquired distressed loans and worked them down through asset sales and development; by the end of 2023 it had generated €47.7 billion in cash and transferred more than €4.25 billion to the Exchequer while preparing an orderly wind-down.

47,700,000,000 euros, cash generated by nama since inception, 2023-12. 4,250,000,000 euros (over), cumulative transfers to the exchequer, 2023-12. National Asset Management Agency, 2023 year-end review, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Ireland isolated distressed property loans in a specialist agency with a statutory mandate, state-backed financing and commercial asset-management skills. Separating workout decisions from the surviving banks created a long time horizon for sales and development while making the agency's cash and wind-down obligations reportable.

Preconditions

  • Legislation that gives a crisis agency clear powers to acquire, restructure and dispose of assets
  • A credible funding and valuation framework that can survive political and market pressure
  • Transparent reporting and a sunset or wind-down plan so an emergency institution does not become permanent

Where it travelled: NAMA travels as a crisis-workout pattern: a temporary balance-sheet institution can create room for recovery, but its public return must be read alongside the losses and guarantees that made the intervention possible.

Limits: Cash generated and Exchequer transfers are financial outputs, not a counterfactual estimate of how the crisis would have unfolded without NAMA. Asset sales depend on market conditions, the agency's mandate was exceptional and temporary, and the figures do not capture distributional effects, losses borne elsewhere in the banking system or the full public cost of the rescue.

Irelandsince 2017still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Met Éireann national weather-warning service

Ireland's national meteorological service uses a standard Yellow–Orange–Red warning system and briefs the National Emergency Coordination Group so government departments and agencies can coordinate ahead of severe weather; warnings are issued up to 48 hours before anticipated conditions.

48 hours (up to), forecast lead time for severe-weather warnings, 2025. 3 levels (Yellow, Orange, Red), warning severity levels, 2025. Met Éireann, Irish Meteorological Service, warning-system guidance, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Met Éireann translates forecast uncertainty into a small, nationally understood set of action levels, then places the forecast inside a whole-of-government coordination forum. That joins technical information to a standing decision process instead of leaving each department to interpret raw weather data independently.

Preconditions

  • A national meteorological service with authority and credibility to issue one public scale
  • A cross-government coordination group that can turn warnings into transport, health and local-response actions
  • Clear thresholds and public guidance that link each colour to a precaution rather than a vague alert

Where it travelled: The warning pattern travels when a forecast scale is paired with a coordination forum: colour labels alone do not create preparedness unless agencies know who convenes, decides and communicates next.

Limits: Lead time and colour levels describe the warning protocol, not forecast accuracy, public comprehension or whether local authorities reduced harm. The system is hazard-specific and weather-dependent, and a warning is only one input into the National Emergency Coordination Group's operational decisions.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Irelandsince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

New Children's Hospital cost escalation

Ireland's New Children's Hospital project saw its approved budget rise from €1.73 billion to €2.24 billion by February 2024 after an independent review recorded €450 million of earlier escalation and weaknesses in set-up, planning, execution and governance.

2,240,000,000 euros, current approved budget for the hospital project and programme, 2024-02. 1,730,000,000 euros, previously approved budget, 2022. Department of Health, Government of Ireland, New Children's Hospital budget approval, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Ireland kept a politically necessary hospital project moving after cost escalation, but the state had to reset the budget and strengthen assurance rather than re-tender. The case makes the value of early challenge visible: once design, contracts and site work are locked, correcting an underestimated scope becomes more expensive than revising the approval.

Preconditions

  • An independent gateway review that tests scope, budget, risk and delivery capability before construction
  • A sponsor with enough clinical and commercial expertise to challenge designers and contractors
  • Change-control rules that expose scope growth and schedule slippage to ministers and the public

Where it travelled: The hospital travels as a megaproject caution: a reset can preserve a needed public asset, but only an early assurance function can prevent a politically protected project from consuming its contingency before the building opens.

Limits: The approved budget includes the main hospital, satellite centres, commissioning, information systems and service integration, so it is not a pure construction-cost comparison. The 2019 review attributes escalation to several interacting factors, and the project was still being delivered when the 2024 budget was approved; the record therefore shows an eroded cost and governance promise, not a completed outcome evaluation.