Skip to content
NCBNational Capability Benchmark
Navigate with ↑ ↓Enter to openEsc to close

Challenge the benchmark

Choose a score and give the benchmark a specific reason to reconsider it.

The selected score and confidence are read from the current country file when you submit.

Submissions are public and start as awaiting review. A maintainer can add a response and signature after review.

What countries built

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators miss. The source provides the number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 204 of 204 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

4 of 204 deliveries

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Panamasince 2009still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

120 a los 65 social pension

Panama's 120 a los 65 programme paid a non-contributory pension to an average of about 123,000 older people per payment during July 2019–June 2024, with B/.890.835 million programmed over the period and a national beneficiary register used to target eligibility.

123,000 people, average beneficiaries per payment, 2019-07 to 2024-06. 890,834,970 Panamanian balboas, programmed investment in the period, 2019-07 to 2024-06. Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, management report 2019–2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Panama created a tax-funded pension for older people outside formal contributory schemes, then used the Registro Nacional de Beneficiarios and scheduled payments through banks and hard-to-reach-area operations to make eligibility portable across provinces and comarcas.

Preconditions

  • A national identity and beneficiary register that can verify age, residency and pension status
  • A budget commitment that survives changes in the contributory pension system
  • Payment logistics and local access points able to reach people outside the banking network

Where it travelled: Non-contributory pensions travel where formal employment leaves older people uncovered. Panama's case shows that the registry and payment route are as important as the transfer promise, especially in remote and Indigenous territories.

Limits: Beneficiary and budget figures show administrative reach, not adequacy, take-up, payment regularity or reductions in poverty and health insecurity. The average covers several years and the register can miss older people in remote areas; the programme's own report is not a causal evaluation.

Panamasince 2023operating below its peakbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Canal water-and-transit response to the 2023–24 drought

During the extreme 2023–24 drought, the Panama Canal Authority adjusted draft and booking rules to preserve water for the canal and the lakes supplying more than half of Panama's population, reducing daily transits from the normal 36 to 22 in December 2023 while keeping the waterway operating.

22 transits per day, daily transits during the december drought restriction, 2023-12. 36 transits per day, normal daily transit capacity, normal conditions. Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, drought transit advisory, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

The canal authority used hydrological forecasts, vessel booking quotas and draft restrictions to ration a shared water system, protecting drinking-water reserves while preserving a predictable minimum service for maritime customers.

Preconditions

  • Real-time water and traffic data with an authority empowered to change operating rules
  • A single institution able to trade off shipping revenue against urban water security
  • Customers and pilots who can plan around transparent, staged restrictions rather than abrupt closure

Where it travelled: Water-stressed infrastructure needs an operating playbook, not only new capacity. Panama's drought response shows how transparent rationing and forecasts can preserve a service while a longer watershed solution is built.

Limits: The reduction is a documented loss of peak transit capacity during one drought, not evidence that the watershed problem is solved or that every user receives equal service. The canal authority sets the rules and reports the trade-offs; the record does not quantify the effect on households, ecosystems or shipping costs, and later rainfall can restore capacity without removing the underlying vulnerability.

Building

2 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Panamasince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Panama Canal expansion and self-financing operations

After the third set of locks opened in 2016, the Panama Canal Authority handled 9,944 deep-draft transits and 423 million tonnes of cargo in fiscal year 2024, reporting B/.4.986 billion in total revenue despite climate constraints.

9,944 transits, deep-draft vessel transits, FY2024. 423,000,000 tonnes, cargo tonnage through the canal, FY2024. Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, fiscal year 2024 results, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Panama put a strategic infrastructure asset under an autonomous public authority with its own revenue, long-term capital programme and technical workforce, then expanded locks and service rules around the needs of global shipping customers.

Preconditions

  • A legally protected authority able to retain revenue and plan beyond annual budget cycles
  • Stable access to multilateral and bond finance for a megaproject with a long construction period
  • Hydrological, engineering and maritime expertise that can coordinate a global customer base with local water and land constraints

Where it travelled: A self-financing infrastructure authority travels where one asset has national strategic value, but Panama's canal shows the governance bargain: autonomy brings delivery capacity only when public accountability and water constraints remain visible.

Limits: Traffic and revenue show an operating logistics asset, not the expansion's full cost and schedule record, its distributional effects or the counterfactual value of alternative routes. The canal's own results report is not an independent audit of construction performance, and tonnage varies with world trade and vessel mix.

Panamasince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Metro de Panamá network operations

Panama's public metro network, inaugurated in 2014 and expanded with Line 2, transported 118,351,007 passengers in the twelve-month operating period reported in its 2024 institutional memory.

118,351,007 passengers, passengers transported in the reported year, 2023-11 to 2024-10. 321,519 passengers in one day, peak daily passengers on line 1, 2024-04-30. Metro de Panamá, Institutional Memory 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Panama built a dedicated metro company, sequenced lines around the capital's commuting corridors and combined central financing, concession contracts and an operating workforce so a new line could be integrated into a growing network rather than run as a one-off project.

Preconditions

  • A metropolitan transport authority able to reserve corridors and integrate fares and buses
  • Multi-year financing and procurement capacity for civil works, rolling stock and systems
  • An operator and maintenance regime that can turn an opened line into a dependable daily service

Where it travelled: Metro systems travel as network institutions, not just tunnels. Panama's ridership makes the operational layer visible: integration, maintenance and staffing determine whether construction becomes reliable mobility.

Limits: Ridership demonstrates use and operating scale, not whether each line met its original cost or schedule, how much subsidy it requires or whether travel-time gains are shared across the metropolitan area. The operator reports the figures, and a peak day is not a reliability or maintenance measure.