Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism8 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Boliviasince 2021still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Interoperable QR immediate payments, built by the banks and the Banco Central de Bolivia

Bolivia's banks first offered QR payments under their own SIMPLE standard, and the Banco Central de Bolivia then made QR transfers interoperable across banks, cooperatives, housing lenders and development finance institutions with a universal standard compatible with the banks' codes, mandatory electronic channels and free transfers; immediate QR payments rose from 6 million operations in 2021 to 892 million in 2025, 86 percent of electronic fund transfer orders that year.

892 million operations, immediate payments by qr code processed in the year, 2025. 357,747 million bolivianos, nominal, value of immediate payments by qr code in the year, 2025. Banco Central de Bolivia, Informe de Vigilancia del Sistema de Pagos 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The banking system launched its own QR standard, and the Banco Central de Bolivia then built a universal QR standard compatible with it into its settlement module, required every financial institution to offer electronic channels and free transfers, and settled QR payments through its module and the private clearing houses, so each institution's app could pay any account in the system.

Preconditions

Prior interconnection of more than 90 percent of financial institutions for electronic transfers, which the BCB had already mandated
A central bank with regulatory power over every deposit-taking institution, including cooperatives and development lenders
Mobile banking apps already offered by most institutions, so the QR standard only had to be added

Where else it has been used: The same move as Thailand's PromptPay and Malaysia's DuitNow, made by a central bank in a lower-income, cash-heavy economy and accelerated by a currency shortage rather than by a planned cash-reduction policy.

Limits: Both numbers are data labels on Gráfico 17 of a 72-page PDF (PDF page 35, printed page 29), with the 86 percent share on Gráfico 18 on the next page; there is no machine-readable series. The central bank is the regulator, the standard-setter and the reporter, so this is the system's owner grading its own system. The collaboration mixes a private standard with a public mandate: the banking system built SIMPLE, the BCB built a compatible universal standard and imposed interoperability and free transfers, and private institutions and the clearing houses ACCL and UNILINK carried it out. The 2025 jump coincided with Bolivia's dollar shortage, fuel queues and rising inflation, which push people off cash; the value series is in nominal bolivianos and overstates real growth in a year of high inflation. A payment count does not show inclusion: the report gives no figure for first-time account holders. The series counts every immediate QR payment processed through the clearing houses and the BCB's settlement module, not only codes generated under QR BCB Bolivia: the banks' own SIMPLE QR standard came first, the BCB's 2021 vigilance report describes the BCB's compatible QR standard in its settlement module as due in the last quarter of 2022, and the BCB's QR page (https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=pagos_qr_bcb_bolivia) calls QR BCB 'un solo estándar universal compatible con todos los QR implementados por el sistema financiero'. The 2021 figure therefore predates the BCB standard, and the start year is the first year of the series, not the launch of either standard.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Boliviasince 2006delivered and closedbears on Adult learning participation

Yo, sí puedo national literacy campaign and post-literacy programme

Bolivia's Ministry of Education reports that its national literacy programmes, run as 'Yo, sí puedo' from 2006 to 2008 and continued as a post-literacy programme from 2009, taught more than one million people over 15 to read and write between 2006 and 2017, 74% of them women.

1,000,000 people, people made literate by the national literacy and post-literacy programmes (more than), 2006-2017. Bolivia Ministry of Education, Vice-Ministry of Alternative and Special Education, Dirección General de Post-alfabetización, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia's Ministry of Education ran a time-bound national literacy campaign with a standardised audiovisual method and local volunteer facilitators in community centres, then converted its graduates into the enrolment base of a standing post-literacy directorate.

Preconditions

A census-based count of illiterate adults to set targets and find learners
A ready-made, low-skill teaching method that volunteers could deliver without trained teachers
Political priority sustained across the campaign years and a ministry unit to inherit the graduates

Where else it has been used: The same Cuban 'Yo, sí puedo' method was used in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador before and alongside Bolivia, with national literacy declarations in each that independent surveys later qualified.

Limits: The ministry that ran the programmes reports its own cumulative total, as a rounded 'more than one million', with no annual series and no independent verification; the same page gives a second, malformed figure ('1.oo1,372') for 2006 to 2008 alone, which, if accurate, leaves almost no growth in the cumulative total after 2008, so the two figures are either loosely rounded or show the post-literacy phase adding few new literates, and the page is dated 11 May 2016 while citing 2017 data, so it was edited after publication. A count of people made literate over twelve years is not the construct's share of adults in education or training in the last 12 months, and basic literacy is the narrowest form of adult learning; nothing here shows retention of literacy, completion of post-literacy, or participation by adults who were already literate. The page's illiteracy rate of 2.5% in 2017 is not used as a metric: it is not sourced to INE on the page, and higher government-cited rates for 2023 and 2024 appear in state press, so the rate series is contested. The 'Yo, sí puedo' method and early delivery relied on Cuban and Venezuelan support, which a reviewer may weigh against test three, though the programme was mandated and run by Bolivia's ministry.

Adaptability

3 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Boliviasince 2009still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Bono Juana Azurduy maternal and child health transfer

Bolivia's Bono Juana Azurduy opened its 2024 payment round through 47 authorised financial institutions in all 340 municipalities and six Indigenous territories, tying the transfer to prenatal, delivery and early-childhood health checks; the programme reported 1,525,566 pregnant women and 1,783,936 children reached between 2009 and 2023.

340 municipalities, municipalities covered by the 2024 payment round, 2024-01. 47 institutions, authorised financial institutions, 2024-01. Bolivia Ministry of Health and Sports, Bono Juana Azurduy 2024 payment notice, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia linked a modest cash incentive to a sequence of prenatal, delivery and child-health checks, then used a nationwide bank network and mobile intersectoral brigades to move the programme beyond urban clinics and into Indigenous territories.

Preconditions

A beneficiary and health-record system able to verify visits without excluding people with incomplete documentation
Payment institutions and mobile teams that can reach remote and Indigenous communities
Primary-care facilities with enough staff and supplies for the conditions to mean more than a paperwork exercise

Where else it has been used: Conditional health transfers travel best when the payment rail and the service network are designed together. Bolivia's case makes the last-mile condition visible: national coverage is a logistics problem as much as a budget line.

Limits: Municipal and financial-channel coverage shows administrative reach, not whether every eligible mother is paid on time, attends the required visits or experiences better maternal and child outcomes. The ministry reports the programme's own totals, while the record does not establish the causal effect of the transfer or the quality of the health facilities where conditions are verified.

Boliviasince 2007still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Renta Dignidad non-contributory old-age pension

Bolivia's Renta Dignidad, created by Law 3791 in 2007 and paid since 2008, reached 1,241,440 beneficiaries in 2024 with Bs5.289 billion disbursed through the national social-security administration.

1,241,440 people, renta dignidad beneficiaries, 2024. 5,289,000,000 Bolivian bolivianos, renta dignidad disbursement, 2024. Gestora Pública de la Seguridad Social de Largo Plazo, Social Security in Bolivia report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia converted a universal old-age entitlement into a predictable non-contributory payment, administered through the long-term social-security system and financed as a standing national obligation rather than a short project.

Preconditions

A population register and identity process that can establish age and prevent duplicate payments
A fiscal transfer and payment network that reaches older people outside contributory employment
Rules that protect payment continuity while the financing base and population structure change

Where else it has been used: Social pensions travel where informal work leaves many people outside contributory schemes. Bolivia shows the reach a standing entitlement can create, while leaving the financing and adequacy questions explicit.

Limits: Beneficiary and disbursement totals show the scale of a transfer system, not whether the benefit is adequate, paid reliably in every remote area or sufficient to reduce old-age poverty. The report is an administrative account and does not provide a counterfactual estimate of welfare effects or the programme's fiscal resilience under demographic change.

Boliviasince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

COVID-19 vaccination campaign

Bolivia's health authorities reported to WHO that 7,505,389 people, 64 per 100 population, had received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose by 29 December 2023, from a first dose given on 30 January 2021, with 6,307,628 (54 per 100) completing the primary series.

7,505,389 people, people vaccinated with at least one covid-19 vaccine dose, 2023-12-29. 54 per 100 population, people who completed the primary series (last dose), 2023-12-29. World Health Organization, COVID-19 dashboard vaccination data (vaccination-data.csv), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia's health ministry ran a national COVID-19 campaign through its routine immunisation network and mass vaccination points, and reached a majority of the population with a first dose within three years.

Preconditions

A routine immunisation programme with a cold chain reaching rural municipalities
A supply of doses large enough for a national campaign, however obtained
Registers good enough to count who received a second dose

Where else it has been used: Cuba (cub-covid-vaccination) reached far higher completion on domestic vaccines and Venezuela (ven-covid-vaccination) a similar partial reach; the Bolivian case sits between them, with a smaller gap between first dose and completion than Venezuela's.

Limits: The figures are Bolivia's own reports to WHO (DATA_SOURCE 'REPORTING'), with no independent coverage survey behind them. Nearly half the population never completed the primary series (54 per 100), first-dose reach was 64 per 100, and boosters reached 2,521,192 people, 22 per 100, so the record shows a partial delivery, well below the near-universal reach of the strongest campaigns; it is filed because the campaign did reach a majority nationally, on the same terms as ven-covid-vaccination (50 per 100 completed). The VACCINES_USED field is empty, so the record cannot show which products were used or where the doses came from, and evidences distribution only. The per-100 rates divide by WHO's population estimate. Vaccination is a response to one shock, not proof of general preparedness, and the file was last updated in December 2023. The source is a CSV with no prose; the numbers are read from one row. The WHO dashboard address covid19.who.int/who-data/vaccination-data.csv now returns an HTML page, so the cited URL is the blob the dashboard serves, the same one ven-covid-vaccination cites.

Building

3 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Boliviasince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Mi Teleférico urban cable-car network

Bolivia's Mi Teleférico network carried 78,715,401 passenger trips in 2024; its management report compared that result with a 97.7 million annual volume required for budget balance, or roughly 80% of the target while the system remained in service.

78,715,401 trips, passenger trips on the mi teleférico network, 2024. 97,700,000 trips, annual passenger volume required for budget balance, 2024 target. Mi Teleférico, 2024 management report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia treated steep urban mobility as a network problem: a state company linked multiple cable-car lines, integrated fares and stations and expanded service incrementally rather than waiting for a single road corridor to solve access across La Paz and El Alto.

Preconditions

A public authority able to coordinate land, stations, safety regulation and municipal transport connections
Capital financing and specialist operations staff for a high-altitude cable system
A fare and subsidy policy that can keep the network usable while it builds ridership and covers maintenance

Where else it has been used: Cable transit travels where topography makes roads expensive, but Mi Teleférico makes the operating bargain visible: network scale can be delivered, yet financial break-even still depends on ridership, fares and continuing public support.

Limits: Passenger trips show use of the network, not whether construction stayed on schedule, whether fares cover operating and renewal costs or whether travel time and access improved for low-income residents. The budget-balance target is a management benchmark, not an independent estimate of the system's full social value or lifecycle cost.

Boliviasince 2013operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Industrial lithium carbonate plant below design capacity

Bolivia's state lithium company doubled lithium-carbonate output to 2,064 tonnes in 2024 after its industrial plant began operating, but the Ministry of Economy reported that technical problems with evaporation ponds and the water-treatment plant kept production below the project's projected capacity of 15,000 tonnes a year.

2,064 metric tonnes, lithium carbonate produced, 2024. 15,000 metric tonnes, projected annual plant capacity, 2024. Bolivia Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, Economic Bulletin 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia pursued a state-led value chain from brine extraction to industrial lithium carbonate, retaining control of the resource and plant while learning that evaporation chemistry, water treatment and process reliability—not only mine ownership—set the usable production ceiling.

Preconditions

Long-horizon public finance and technical institutions able to carry a complex chemical process from pilot to industrial scale
Reliable water, evaporation and quality-control systems in a fragile salt-flat environment
Independent engineering feedback and contracting discipline strong enough to surface underperformance before capacity claims harden into policy

Where else it has been used: Resource-processing projects travel poorly when geological ownership is mistaken for industrial capability. Bolivia's shortfall is useful benchmark evidence because it separates strategic ambition from demonstrated, repeatable throughput.

Limits: Output and design capacity establish a large production gap, but they do not by themselves show the plant's full economics, product quality, environmental effects, downstream contracts or whether the technical bottlenecks were later resolved. The ministry's bulletin is an official macroeconomic account, not an independent engineering or audit report.

Boliviasince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

El Mutún steel complex, inaugurated in 2025 and found never to have operated

Bolivia's Empresa Siderúrgica del Mutún, whose turnkey contract with Sinosteel was awarded in 2016 and whose complex the President inaugurated in February 2025, reported in its 2026 initial accountability review that the project stood at 92% physical progress against 100% accumulated financial execution, that its own supervision found the complex had never entered operation, and that it had served notice of intent to terminate the contract in January 2026.

92 %, physical progress of the mutún steel project, 2026 (initial accountability review). 100 %, accumulated financial execution of the eximbank and treasury financed contract, 2026 (initial accountability review). Empresa Siderúrgica del Mutún (state steel company), Rendición Pública de Cuentas Inicial 2026, published by Bolivia's Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia's Ministry of Mining had its state steel company sign a single turnkey design-build-operate contract with a Chinese state contractor, financed 85% by a China Eximbank credit, and accepted provisional and final receptions of each plant before the complex had run as a whole; the next administration's site supervision rejected those receptions.

Preconditions

A tied export credit that pays out against contractor milestones rather than against verified operation
A state owner company with thin in-house engineering supervision relative to the contractor
A political calendar that rewarded an inauguration date over a commissioning test

Where else it has been used: The lithium carbonate plant (bol-lithium-plant) shows the same state-led industrialisation model delivering a plant that runs well below design capacity.

Limits: The source is a slide presentation, not an audit: the figures are read off slides whose PDF text extracts garbled, and a reviewer will need to open slide 11 to check them. The review was written by the company's management under the government that took office in late 2025, which has an interest in blaming the previous administration and the contractor; Sinosteel answered the termination notice on 11 February 2026 and the dispute is unresolved, and the external audit and Contraloría opinion the review schedules had not been published at retrieval. The 100% financial execution covers the EXIMBANK and Treasury tranche only; an additional FINPRO credit stood at 55.79%. No official baseline schedule was opened, so the record carries no percentage schedule overrun, and the 2020 suspension under the interim government is part of the delay. The contract amendment from USD 422.6 million to USD 443.98 million on slide 13 is legible only as chart labels and is not used as the metric. The status 'eroded' records the withdrawal of a completion the state had declared in 2025, not the loss of an operating peak, because the plant never produced at scale; a reviewer may prefer to read it as a failed delivery.