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NCBNational Capability Benchmark
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What countries built

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators miss. The source provides the number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 204 of 204 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

4 of 204 deliveries

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness.

Boliviasince 2009still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Bono Juana Azurduy maternal and child health transfer

Bolivia's Bono Juana Azurduy opened its 2024 payment round through 47 authorised financial institutions in all 340 municipalities and six Indigenous territories, tying the transfer to prenatal, delivery and early-childhood health checks; the programme reported 1,525,566 pregnant women and 1,783,936 children reached between 2009 and 2023.

340 municipalities, municipalities covered by the 2024 payment round, 2024-01. 47 institutions, authorised financial institutions, 2024-01. Bolivia Ministry of Health and Sports, Bono Juana Azurduy 2024 payment notice, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia linked a modest cash incentive to a sequence of prenatal, delivery and child-health checks, then used a nationwide bank network and mobile intersectoral brigades to move the programme beyond urban clinics and into Indigenous territories.

Preconditions

  • A beneficiary and health-record system able to verify visits without excluding people with incomplete documentation
  • Payment institutions and mobile teams that can reach remote and Indigenous communities
  • Primary-care facilities with enough staff and supplies for the conditions to mean more than a paperwork exercise

Where it travelled: Conditional health transfers travel best when the payment rail and the service network are designed together. Bolivia's case makes the last-mile condition visible: national coverage is a logistics problem as much as a budget line.

Limits: Municipal and financial-channel coverage shows administrative reach, not whether every eligible mother is paid on time, attends the required visits or experiences better maternal and child outcomes. The ministry reports the programme's own totals, while the record does not establish the causal effect of the transfer or the quality of the health facilities where conditions are verified.

Boliviasince 2007still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Renta Dignidad non-contributory old-age pension

Bolivia's Renta Dignidad, created by Law 3791 in 2007 and paid since 2008, reached 1,241,440 beneficiaries in 2024 with Bs5.289 billion disbursed through the national social-security administration.

1,241,440 people, renta dignidad beneficiaries, 2024. 5,289,000,000 Bolivian bolivianos, renta dignidad disbursement, 2024. Gestora Pública de la Seguridad Social de Largo Plazo, Social Security in Bolivia report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia converted a universal old-age entitlement into a predictable non-contributory payment, administered through the long-term social-security system and financed as a standing national obligation rather than a short project.

Preconditions

  • A population register and identity process that can establish age and prevent duplicate payments
  • A fiscal transfer and payment network that reaches older people outside contributory employment
  • Rules that protect payment continuity while the financing base and population structure change

Where it travelled: Social pensions travel where informal work leaves many people outside contributory schemes. Bolivia shows the reach a standing entitlement can create, while leaving the financing and adequacy questions explicit.

Limits: Beneficiary and disbursement totals show the scale of a transfer system, not whether the benefit is adequate, paid reliably in every remote area or sufficient to reduce old-age poverty. The report is an administrative account and does not provide a counterfactual estimate of welfare effects or the programme's fiscal resilience under demographic change.

Building

2 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Boliviasince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Mi Teleférico urban cable-car network

Bolivia's Mi Teleférico network carried 78,715,401 passenger trips in 2024; its management report compared that result with a 97.7 million annual volume required for budget balance, or roughly 80% of the target while the system remained in service.

78,715,401 trips, passenger trips on the mi teleférico network, 2024. 97,700,000 trips, annual passenger volume required for budget balance, 2024 target. Mi Teleférico, 2024 management report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia treated steep urban mobility as a network problem: a state company linked multiple cable-car lines, integrated fares and stations and expanded service incrementally rather than waiting for a single road corridor to solve access across La Paz and El Alto.

Preconditions

  • A public authority able to coordinate land, stations, safety regulation and municipal transport connections
  • Capital financing and specialist operations staff for a high-altitude cable system
  • A fare and subsidy policy that can keep the network usable while it builds ridership and covers maintenance

Where it travelled: Cable transit travels where topography makes roads expensive, but Mi Teleférico makes the operating bargain visible: network scale can be delivered, yet financial break-even still depends on ridership, fares and continuing public support.

Limits: Passenger trips show use of the network, not whether construction stayed on schedule, whether fares cover operating and renewal costs or whether travel time and access improved for low-income residents. The budget-balance target is a management benchmark, not an independent estimate of the system's full social value or lifecycle cost.

Boliviasince 2013operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Industrial lithium carbonate plant below design capacity

Bolivia's state lithium company doubled lithium-carbonate output to 2,064 tonnes in 2024 after its industrial plant began operating, but the Ministry of Economy reported that technical problems with evaporation ponds and the water-treatment plant kept production below the project's projected capacity of 15,000 tonnes a year.

2,064 metric tonnes, lithium carbonate produced, 2024. 15,000 metric tonnes, projected annual plant capacity, 2024. Bolivia Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, Economic Bulletin 2024, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Bolivia pursued a state-led value chain from brine extraction to industrial lithium carbonate, retaining control of the resource and plant while learning that evaporation chemistry, water treatment and process reliability—not only mine ownership—set the usable production ceiling.

Preconditions

  • Long-horizon public finance and technical institutions able to carry a complex chemical process from pilot to industrial scale
  • Reliable water, evaporation and quality-control systems in a fragile salt-flat environment
  • Independent engineering feedback and contracting discipline strong enough to surface underperformance before capacity claims harden into policy

Where it travelled: Resource-processing projects travel poorly when geological ownership is mistaken for industrial capability. Bolivia's shortfall is useful benchmark evidence because it separates strategic ambition from demonstrated, repeatable throughput.

Limits: Output and design capacity establish a large production gap, but they do not by themselves show the plant's full economics, product quality, environmental effects, downstream contracts or whether the technical bottlenecks were later resolved. The ministry's bulletin is an official macroeconomic account, not an independent engineering or audit report.