Each record describes something a country built that the indicators miss. The source provides the number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 204 of 204 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Peru's Obras por Impuestos scheme lets private firms finance public projects against future tax liabilities; the finance ministry recorded S/5.504 billion in certificates issued from 2009 through January 2024 and six projects identified as physically and financially complete in 2024.
Peru let companies propose and finance public works and recover the cost through tax certificates, creating a bridge between private capital and local public priorities while the state retained project approval and service ownership.
Preconditions
A tax-credit and certification framework that makes private investment legally recoverable
Public authorities able to identify, appraise and accept projects without turning the scheme into a private wish list
Transparent project registers and technical supervision so a completed work can enter public service
Where it travelled: Tax-linked infrastructure finance travels to countries with capable revenue authorities and uneven local capital, but Peru's experience shows the need to track the public service and lifecycle cost, not only certificates issued.
Limits: Certificates and completion counts show the scale of a tax-linked financing mechanism, not whether projects were additional, delivered on time, well maintained or distributed fairly. The ministry compiles project information from public systems and companies; the scheme shifts financing and execution roles but does not remove public responsibility for selecting, regulating and operating the asset.
Peru's Juntos conditional cash-transfer programme, created in 2005 and placed under MIDIS in 2012, operated in 1,885 districts and benefited 793,623 households by August 2024 through SISFOH-targeted support.
Peru linked regular cash transfers to health and education conditions and used the intergovernmental SISFOH targeting system to identify poor households, giving a national programme a way to reach dispersed communities while retaining a welfare-policy feedback and evaluation function.
Preconditions
A household targeting registry that national and local institutions can maintain and update
Payment rails and local schools and health posts able to verify conditions without making access impossible
A ministry with the budget and monitoring capacity to adjust coverage as poverty and shocks change
Where it travelled: Conditional transfers travel widely, but Juntos shows the dependency often hidden by the beneficiary number: targeting, local service quality and reliable payment systems decide whether a national register becomes a capability or just a list.
Limits: Household coverage shows administrative reach, not whether transfers arrive on time, improve health or schooling, reduce poverty durably or exclude eligible families. MIDIS reports the programme totals and the targeting system, while causal effects require evaluations rather than beneficiary counts. District presence can also mask uneven access across a mountainous and remote country.
Peru's Invierte.pe system tracks public investment across national, regional and local governments; by 25 July 2024 the three levels had executed S/25.939 billion of a S/67.797 billion investment budget, a reported 38.3% advance.
Peru replaced a project-by-project approval model with a multi-year investment cycle that registers, prioritises and follows projects across government levels, giving the finance ministry a common pipeline and a basis for tracking execution rather than seeing only annual spending requests.
Preconditions
A central investment registry and rules that bind national, regional and local project units
Budget and procurement data that can be reconciled to physical project progress
Political and managerial capacity to re-prioritise stalled projects instead of carrying them forward invisibly
Where it travelled: Multi-year investment-management systems travel as a response to fragmented project pipelines. Peru's case shows their limit: a dashboard and prioritisation rule improve visibility, but delivery still depends on local preparation, procurement and maintenance capacity.
Limits: Budget execution is an administrative flow, not evidence that projects were selected well, completed on schedule, delivered value or reached underserved regions. The daily report aggregates three government levels and counts expenditure against a budget that can change during the year. A planning-and-monitoring system can make bottlenecks visible without guaranteeing that agencies resolve them.
🇵🇪Perusince 2017operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
A 2023 Contraloría control report found the education portfolio of Peru's Reconstrucción con Cambios programme at 36.6% implementation by July 2023 against a 78% milestone expected in the earlier baseline, with the corresponding target date already expired.
Peru created a dedicated reconstruction authority and hired government-to-government technical assistance, then used concurrent audit to expose procurement and schedule risks while projects were still moving. The 36.6% result shows that a new delivery wrapper did not automatically clear local preparation and contracting bottlenecks.
Preconditions
A reconstruction authority with a cross-sector mandate after a major climate disaster
Technical and procurement support that can work across many local implementing agencies
Concurrent oversight with enough access to identify delays early and a management response that can correct them
Where it travelled: Government-to-government reconstruction models travel as a way to import programme-management capacity, but Peru's audit is the caution: external expertise can improve visibility while unresolved local land, design and procurement constraints still determine the calendar.
Limits: The comparison is for one education portfolio and one control milestone, not the whole reconstruction programme or every project type. The Contraloría measures implementation against a management baseline; it does not by itself explain land, procurement or design causes, nor the quality and resilience of completed works. The gap shows a delayed delivery path, not that every intervention failed.