Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Peru's Obras por Impuestos scheme lets private firms finance public projects against future tax liabilities; the finance ministry recorded S/5.504 billion in certificates issued from 2009 through January 2024 and six projects identified as physically and financially complete in 2024.
Peru let companies propose and finance public works and recover the cost through tax certificates, creating a bridge between private capital and local public priorities while the state retained project approval and service ownership.
Preconditions
A tax-credit and certification framework that makes private investment legally recoverable
Public authorities able to identify, appraise and accept projects without turning the scheme into a private wish list
Transparent project registers and technical supervision so a completed work can enter public service
Where else it has been used: Tax-linked infrastructure finance travels to countries with capable revenue authorities and uneven local capital, but Peru's experience shows the need to track the public service and lifecycle cost, not only certificates issued.
Limits: Certificates and completion counts show the scale of a tax-linked financing mechanism, not whether projects were additional, delivered on time, well maintained or distributed fairly. The ministry compiles project information from public systems and companies; the scheme shifts financing and execution roles but does not remove public responsibility for selecting, regulating and operating the asset.
Peru's Educaciรณn Bรกsica Alternativa, the second-chance basic education modality for youths and adults, enrolled 226,500 students in 2016, the highest year of the 2014 to 2023 table, and 190,700 in 2023, according to INEI's Compendio Estadรญstico 2024 citing the Ministry of Education's school census.
The 2003 General Education Law converted Peru's old adult schools into a separate modality of basic education, delivered by public and private CEBA centres with flexible schedules and counted in the national school census. Enrolment peaked in 2016 and has drifted down since.
Preconditions
A school census run by the education ministry that reports enrolment by modality
An existing network of adult and evening schools that could be converted rather than built
A legal definition that lets learners certify primary and secondary completion outside the regular track
Limits: The numbers are in a PDF table (Table 5.6, PDF page 323 of 1,046), published in thousands with one decimal, and INEI republishes the Ministry of Education's census rather than collecting it; the Ministry's own ESCALE portal sits behind a bot-verification wall and could not be read. The peak is only the highest year of the ten-year window the table shows (2014 to 2023), and it was a one-year jump: enrolment was 204,500 in 2014 and 203,900 in 2015, so against 2014 the 2023 count is only about 7 percent lower, and the fall of about 16 percent is measured from that jump. The series reached its low of 188,600 in 2022 and rose slightly in 2023. The modality serves adolescents from 14 as well as adults, so not every learner is an adult, and the table does not split public from private centres. Enrolment is a census-day count, not attendance or completion, and a smaller EBA can partly reflect more young people completing regular schooling. A table footnote says the conversion of former adult education centres into the modality has been under way since 2006, so early years mix old and new structures. The 2003 start is the Ley General de Educaciรณn 28044 that created the modality, which is not stated at the source URL.
Peru's Juntos conditional cash-transfer programme, created in 2005 and placed under MIDIS in 2012, operated in 1,885 districts and benefited 793,623 households by August 2024 through SISFOH-targeted support.
Peru linked regular cash transfers to health and education conditions and used the intergovernmental SISFOH targeting system to identify poor households, giving a national programme a way to reach dispersed communities while retaining a welfare-policy feedback and evaluation function.
Preconditions
A household targeting registry that national and local institutions can maintain and update
Payment rails and local schools and health posts able to verify conditions without making access impossible
A ministry with the budget and monitoring capacity to adjust coverage as poverty and shocks change
Where else it has been used: Conditional transfers travel widely, but Juntos shows the dependency often hidden by the beneficiary number: targeting, local service quality and reliable payment systems decide whether a national register becomes a capability or just a list.
Limits: Household coverage shows administrative reach, not whether transfers arrive on time, improve health or schooling, reduce poverty durably or exclude eligible families. MIDIS reports the programme totals and the targeting system, while causal effects require evaluations rather than beneficiary counts. District presence can also mask uneven access across a mountainous and remote country.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery
From its first dose on 9 February 2021 to the end of 2023, Peru's national COVID-19 vaccination campaign administered 91.3 million doses and completed the primary series for 28.7 million people, 87 per 100 population, with 22.2 million boosted.
The Ministry of Health ran a national campaign through its own clinics plus mass sites and age-tiered scheduling, and tied access to indoor public spaces to a vaccination card from December 2021 to push the late adopters.
Preconditions
Advance purchase contracts and a central cold-chain warehouse (CENARES)
A national immunization register that can count doses by person
Regional health directorates able to staff mass sites and outreach
Where else it has been used: The same campaign model ran across the region; Peru's coverage outpaced most neighbours, but the gap between Lima and the Amazon regions is the part that recurs everywhere.
Limits: WHO publishes what Peru's Ministry of Health reports, so the count is the country's administrative record, not a serosurvey; the CSV is machine-readable and the Peru row carries DATE_UPDATED 2023-12-29. Doses and persons are cumulative and do not show timeliness: vaccination came after Peru had already recorded one of the world's highest COVID-19 death rates, so the campaign evidences recovery capacity, not preparedness that prevented the first waves. Coverage was uneven: the ministry's own 11 December 2021 release, when 70 percent of the target population had two doses, named Madre de Dios, Puno and Ucayali below 50 percent. In January 2023 the ministry reported 1,964,490 doses close to expiry in its central warehouse. Per-100 figures use WHO's population denominator, not the national target population.
Peru's Invierte.pe system tracks public investment across national, regional and local governments; by 25 July 2024 the three levels had executed S/25.939 billion of a S/67.797 billion investment budget, a reported 38.3% advance.
Peru replaced a project-by-project approval model with a multi-year investment cycle that registers, prioritises and follows projects across government levels, giving the finance ministry a common pipeline and a basis for tracking execution rather than seeing only annual spending requests.
Preconditions
A central investment registry and rules that bind national, regional and local project units
Budget and procurement data that can be reconciled to physical project progress
Political and managerial capacity to re-prioritise stalled projects instead of carrying them forward invisibly
Where else it has been used: Multi-year investment-management systems travel as a response to fragmented project pipelines. Peru's case shows their limit: a dashboard and prioritisation rule improve visibility, but delivery still depends on local preparation, procurement and maintenance capacity.
Limits: Budget execution is an administrative flow, not evidence that projects were selected well, completed on schedule, delivered value or reached underserved regions. The daily report aggregates three government levels and counts expenditure against a budget that can change during the year. A planning-and-monitoring system can make bottlenecks visible without guaranteeing that agencies resolve them.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2017operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
A 2023 Contralorรญa control report found the education portfolio of Peru's Reconstrucciรณn con Cambios programme at 36.6% implementation by July 2023 against a 78% milestone expected in the earlier baseline, with the corresponding target date already expired.
Peru created a dedicated reconstruction authority and hired government-to-government technical assistance, then used concurrent audit to expose procurement and schedule risks while projects were still moving. The 36.6% result shows that a new delivery wrapper did not automatically clear local preparation and contracting bottlenecks.
Preconditions
A reconstruction authority with a cross-sector mandate after a major climate disaster
Technical and procurement support that can work across many local implementing agencies
Concurrent oversight with enough access to identify delays early and a management response that can correct them
Where else it has been used: Government-to-government reconstruction models travel as a way to import programme-management capacity, but Peru's audit is the caution: external expertise can improve visibility while unresolved local land, design and procurement constraints still determine the calendar.
Limits: The comparison is for one education portfolio and one control milestone, not the whole reconstruction programme or every project type. The Contralorรญa measures implementation against a management baseline; it does not by itself explain land, procurement or design causes, nor the quality and resilience of completed works. The gap shows a delayed delivery path, not that every intervention failed.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2015dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Peru's Gasoducto Sur Peruano concession, signed in July 2014 for a US$7.328 billion gas pipeline due in commercial operation by March 2019, stood at 37.32% overall progress against 76.49% scheduled in December 2016, according to the energy regulator Osinergmin, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines terminated the concession in January 2017 after the consortium failed to reach financial close.
Peru's energy ministry awarded a single private consortium a design-build-finance-operate concession for a strategic southern gas pipeline, backed by a guaranteed-revenue charge on electricity bills, and then terminated it when the consortium could not close financing; the regulator was left administering the half-built assets.
Preconditions
A concession framework that ties construction milestones to financial close and lets the grantor terminate cleanly
Bidders whose financing does not collapse when a sponsor is caught in a corruption case
A fallback plan, with budget, for custody and re-tendering of stranded assets
Where else it has been used: Large energy concessions with guaranteed revenue travel across Latin America; the GSP case is the cautionary version, where a single sponsor's legal collapse took the financing and the schedule with it.
Limits: Both progress figures are the concessionaire's own report as relayed by the regulator (the table cites 'Fuente: Reporte de Concesionario Gasoducto Sur Peruano SA'); Osinergmin supervised but did not independently measure overall progress. The figure is a weighted composite of permits, engineering, logistics and construction, so 37% overstates what was built: construction and assembly stood at 10.37% against 63.78% planned. The record does not show the final cost to the state, the arbitration outcome, the value of stranded assets, or how far the collapse stemmed from the Odebrecht corruption case and lost bank financing rather than from Peruvian institutions' project management. It is a concession (design, finance, build, operate), so the schedule failure is shared between the grantor and a private consortium. The numbers sit inside PDFs, not a statistical API. Later governments have repeatedly proposed reviving the pipeline under new names; this record concerns the 2014 concession, which ended by decision.
๐ต๐ชPerusince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Petroperรบ's Talara Refinery Modernisation Project, begun with the May 2014 EPC contract, reached full operation in 2023 after Peru's Contralorรญa found its estimated investment had risen from US$1.3 billion to more than US$5 billion by October 2020, about 400%, and a cumulative schedule slippage of more than three years in the project's execution schedule, traced to the auxiliary-units contracting.
Peru legislated a state-owned refiner's modernisation, let the company contract a single EPC builder and then improvise the auxiliary works, and the Contralorรญa's audit traced repeated procurement reversals to a schedule slip of over three years and a several-fold cost rise before the plant reached full operation.
Preconditions
A state enterprise with procurement rules and project-management capacity matched to a multi-billion dollar build
A cost baseline updated before the investment decision, so scope changes are not read as overrun after the fact
An audit office able to review a megaproject while it is still under construction
Where else it has been used: National-oil-company refinery megaprojects (Dos Bocas in Mexico, Abreu e Lima in Brazil) show the same pattern of baseline estimates that bear little relation to final cost; Talara is the Peruvian instance with an audit trail.
Limits: The 400% figure is a conditional statement ('estarรญa significando') attributed to the Comptroller General in a press release, comparing a feasibility-study estimate with an October 2020 cost, not an audited final cost; part of the rise reflects scope changes (Flexicoking, auxiliary units) rather than pure overrun, and the press release does not separate them. The press release's own figures (US$1.3bn to over US$5bn) imply an increase of about 285%, or roughly 3.85 times the estimate, so the stated 400% is the Comptroller's rounding and not the arithmetic; the metric keeps 400 because it is the published figure. The three-year slippage is the audit's figure for the auxiliary-units component over its 2014 to 2018 review window, not a measured end-to-end delay. Petroperรบ is a state-owned company, not a ministry: the record judges the state as project owner, and Petroperรบ's subsequent financial distress and government bailouts are not shown here. 'Operating' rests on a ministry press release declaring 100% operability in September 2023, not on independent utilisation data. The evidence is of a delivery that was completed late and far over cost, not a success.