Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Paraguay's public-works balance records the Ruta PY02 duplication and expansion as a 149.5-kilometre public-private partnership, awarded under the 2013 APP law with a USD 507 million construction contract and a concession running to 2046.
Paraguay used an APP concession to bundle design, financing, construction, maintenance and operation of a national corridor, moving some delivery and lifecycle obligations to a private special-purpose company while the ministry retained contract oversight.
Preconditions
A procurement and contract-management authority able to specify service levels over a multi-decade concession
Traffic, toll and payment data strong enough to allocate demand and revenue risk transparently
Public capability to monitor construction quality, renegotiate only under clear rules and enforce maintenance after opening
Where else it has been used: Public-private partnerships travel only when the state can remain a demanding contract manager. Ruta PY02 is useful evidence of scale and institutional ambition, but its long concession also makes monitoring and renegotiation part of the capability being tested.
Limits: Contract length and value show the scale and financing model, not whether the road met its promised schedule, lifecycle cost, safety standard or service-level payments. A government project balance can confirm the contract and progress but is not an independent value-for-money review, and construction and operation continue over the concession term.
Paraguay's Ministry of Education and Sciences enrolled 94,436 young people and adults in its four formal and non-formal Educaciรณn Permanente programmes in 2025, as reported in the Ministry of Economy and Finance's budget evaluation for that year.
The education ministry runs basic, secondary and vocational second-chance programmes for over-age learners through a national network of centres, many hosted in ordinary schools in the evening, and reports enrolment through the budget-by-results system.
Preconditions
Schools that can host evening classes for adults
A ministry directorate dedicated to youth and adult education
A budget reporting system that asks for physical results, not only spending
Limits: The number sits in one sentence on printed page 34 (PDF page 35) of a budget evaluation, sourced in its footnote to the education ministry's own reporting (SIME Nยฐ 5.130/2026); the ministry is reporting on itself through the finance ministry. The programmes serve people aged 15 and over, so part of the count is youth rather than adults, and enrolment is not completion. 94,436 is about 2 percent of Paraguay's adult population, so this evidences a standing national second-chance system, not broad adult participation. The four programmes are not broken out, and no earlier year is given on this page, so no trend can be read; the education ministry's open-data portal, which carries the enrolment series, did not respond from here. The started year is the 1998 General Education Law that set out permanent education for young people and adults; it is not stated in the source.
Paraguay's Tekoporรฃ Mbarete social-protection programme protected more than 175,000 families nationwide in 2024, paid monthly after a 2023 redesign and reported 95% bankarisation plus georeferencing of 11,316 participating homes.
Paraguay combined a recurring transfer with family guides, monthly payment and a georeferenced beneficiary register, then pushed bank access into a programme that had previously paid less frequently and reached families unevenly.
Preconditions
A social registry and field network able to identify, revisit and update vulnerable households
Payment rails that can reach rural and Indigenous families without making bank access a new exclusion test
Health, education and social-work services capable of turning a transfer into sustained household support
Where else it has been used: Social-protection systems travel when the registry and payment rail travel with the benefit. Paraguay's redesign shows how frequency, field accompaniment and financial inclusion can be treated as one delivery problem.
Limits: Family coverage and payment-channel penetration show administrative reach, not whether transfers arrive on time, meet household needs or improve health, schooling and income. The report is the government's own account and does not provide a counterfactual impact estimate; georeferencing also cannot by itself reveal who remains excluded from the registry.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 2021still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness
Paraguay's tax administration approved 651,894,711 electronic tax documents during 2024 and reported 6,659 electronic billers using the SIFEN system, combining mandatory onboarding for larger firms with the free e-Kuatia'i route for small taxpayers.
Paraguay made the tax document a machine-readable event: SIFEN set a national standard, validated documents centrally and combined a mandatory calendar for larger taxpayers with a free tool and electronic signature path for smaller ones.
Preconditions
A tax authority with legal power to set the document standard and phase in compliance
Reliable identity, signature and validation services that firms can integrate at low cost
A support and exception process for small businesses with limited connectivity or software capacity
Where else it has been used: Electronic invoicing travels as a state-business coordination project, not merely an IT purchase. Paraguay's combination of a central validation rail and a free small-firm route is the part worth comparing.
Limits: Document and taxpayer counts show system throughput and adoption, not the revenue effect, compliance cost, uptime or whether informal firms can participate without disproportionate burden. The tax authority reports the implementation totals, and the staged mandate means the 2024 base was not yet a census of all taxpayers.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 2019delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery
By 29 May 2019, Paraguay's Secretarรญa de Emergencia Nacional had assisted 62,521 of the 65,000 families affected by the flash floods of March to May 2019 across 14 departments, delivering 1.5 million kg of food, 150,000 roofing sheets and 110,000 plywood boards.
The national emergency secretariat, holding its own emergency fund, procured food and building materials centrally and distributed them department by department against a household count, with shelters in Asunciรณn run alongside civil-society groups.
Preconditions
A national emergency fund that can be drawn without a new appropriation
Stockpiles or framework contracts for food and roofing material
Municipal and departmental lists of affected households
Where else it has been used: Relief-in-kind against a household count is the common Latin American model; it closes the response gap but leaves recovery and exposure to other agencies.
Limits: Both the numerator and the 65,000 denominator are the government's own counts, published by the agency that did the work, and nobody independent checked them; the text is read on ReliefWeb's republication because sen.gov.py did not answer a scripted request today. Assistance is relief in kind (food, props, sheets and boards for self-repair), not reconstruction, resettlement or risk reduction, and the release gives no timing, so it cannot show how fast families were reached. Some assistance in the Chaco was delivered with the First Lady's office. Repeated flooding of the same Asunciรณn riverside settlements shows the relief cycle does not reduce exposure.
Itaipรบ supplied Paraguay's grid with 20,383 GWh in 2024, 4.5% more than in 2023, while the binational plant generated 67,089 GWh in total and continued operating after four decades of service.
Paraguay sustained a technically complex binational asset through a permanent operating institution, shared dispatch and long-horizon maintenance rather than treating the dam as finished when construction ended; the national grid could then convert a cross-border project into domestic energy security.
Preconditions
A durable treaty and governance structure able to resolve operating and revenue disputes across two states
Engineering, maintenance and safety institutions that preserve performance over decades
Transmission and utility capacity able to absorb a large, hydrology-dependent supply stream
Where else it has been used: Large infrastructure lasts when the operating institution is designed as carefully as the concrete. Itaipรบ is a useful benchmark case because its delivery story is four decades of binational maintenance, not only its original construction.
Limits: Annual generation and supply show output from an operating asset, not the original cost and schedule, transmission reliability, environmental effects or the distributional consequences of the binational tariff and power-allocation rules. Hydrology strongly affects the yearly number, and the plant's own report is not an independent project audit.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 2015dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Paraguay's planned Asunciรณn Metrobรบs corridor ended with an incomplete and unviable works package: in April 2024 the Public Prosecutor's Office said the state had paid certificates for works that did not meet the programme's purpose and alleged a G.180.03 billion patrimonial loss.
Paraguay attempted a multi-municipality bus rapid transit corridor through a public works contract, but weak design integration, contract management and escalation left paid works disconnected from a functioning service and triggered an ex-post prosecution rather than an operating system.
Preconditions
A corridor design agreed with the municipalities, operators and affected communities before civil works are certified
Contract-management capability able to test whether each payment creates a usable part of the service
A credible stop-and-correct process that can surface an unviable design before sunk infrastructure and litigation dominate the response
Where else it has been used: Failed transport projects are useful capability evidence when the failure is written as a delivery problem rather than a scandal alone. Metrobรบs shows why integration, certification and the ability to stop matter as much as the initial capital commitment.
Limits: The loss figure is an allegation in an ongoing criminal case, not a final judicial finding or a complete cost-benefit account. The notice establishes that the works were incomplete and did not serve the stated programme, but it does not measure the corridor's intended passenger benefits, the full financing cost or the later value of infrastructure retained by the state.
๐ต๐พParaguaysince 2020delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Paraguay's Ministry of Public Works began building the Hรฉroes del Chaco cable-stayed bridge, the first road link from Asunciรณn to the Chaco, in 2020 on an estimated 36-month schedule; at the end of 2023 it reported 90% physical progress against 100% planned, and the bridge was inaugurated on 3 March 2024 and recorded as concluded with provisional acceptance in the 2024 balance.
MOPC tendered the bridge through national public tender MOPC No 156/2019, awarded it to Consorcio Union, financed it from the general budget, and tracked planned against physical progress each year in its public balance.
Preconditions
A ministry able to finance a multi-year river crossing without a multilateral lender's supervision
Domestic contractors with enough balance sheet and imported expertise to take on a cable-stayed span
An annual public reporting format that records planned against actual progress, so slippage is visible before inauguration
Where else it has been used: The transferable part is the plain planned-versus-actual table in the annual balance, which lets a reader see both the early lead and the late slip.
Limits: All figures are the ministry's own reports; no audit-office or independent value-for-money review was opened. The schedule figure is a progress-against-plan percentage in a year-end table, which says the works were behind their own plan at end-2023 but not by how many months; the official sources opened give the construction start only as a year, so a month-precise overrun cannot be computed (a 2020 start plus 36 months gives completion within 2023, against an inauguration on 3 March 2024, i.e. at least two months late, and the 2021 balance showed the works ahead of plan, 43.25% against 32.30%). No total contract cost, original award value or cost overrun appears in the balances opened: the 2024 table carries only that year's spending (G. 98,099,704,513). Press reports describing the bridge as delayed and more expensive were leads only and are not the source.